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Foreword 
Despair Is No Solution 
John K. Roth 
The genocides of the 20th century have unveiled the true heart of human­
ity. At our center lies an ability to commit evil of an almost unimagined 
degree .... The unthinkable has already happened; the idea of future catas­
trophes is therefore not unthinkable. 
-Michael Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann 
The Coming Age of Scarcity scares me. Perhaps you will feel the same. 
The reasons are not far to find. They are summed up in this foreword's 
epigraph, which comes from the introductory essay that Michael 
Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann, the editors of this volume, have 
provided. 
Showing how scarcity and surplus populations can lead to disas­
ter, The Coming Age of Scarcity is about evil. It documents "ethnic cleans­
ing" and excavates the world's expanding killing fields. Sadly, it 
anticipates mass death and genocide in the twenty-first century even 
while trying to prevent them. 
The writers who have contributed to these pages know evil when 
they see it. They intend that their readers see it, too. They succeed­
so much so that this book does more than scare me. It leaves me 
depressed, almost to the point of despair. 
To understate the case, this book discourages me. Perhaps it will 
do the same for you. How could it not? The world's expanding 
megacities and refugee hordes, as well as pressures for and protests 
ix 
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against immigration, are only the latest signs of an unrelenting global 
population crunch, which increasingly leaves the world with more 
people than any one needs. A world with more people than anyone 
needs is a deadly place. It is a stage set perpetually for mass death and 
genocide. 
Surplus people are only one of the preconditions for mass death 
and genocide. Roger Smith's essay rightly argues that scarcity is an­
other. As this entire book suggests, moreover, the specter of scarcity is 
likely to be even worse in the twenty-first century than it has been in 
the twentieth. That judgment is credible even though the late-1996 
World Food Summit will have taken place in Rome before this book 
·
appears. Sponsored by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
of the United Nations, the summit meeting intends to renew the com­
mitment of world leaders to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and to 
ensure lasting food security for the world's people. 
The word renew bears watching. A similar World Food Conference 
in 1974 had already committed-supposedly-the world community 
to such worthy aims. Two decades later, however, the FAO reports 
that 800 million people in developing countries face chronic malnutri­
tion. Eighty-eight countries, forty-two in sub-Saharan Africa alone, are 
in low-income, food-deficit conditions. Meanwhile, with the figures 
calculated in 1985 U.S. dollars, external aid for such places declined 
from $10 billion in 1982 to $7.2 billion in 1992. The daunting problems 
faced by the 1996 World Food Summit are made even more so by the 
fact that the meeting has no binding effects on any one. Each partici­
pating country remains free to do as much, or as little, as it sees fit. 
Sociologist Gil Elliot rightly identified the twentieth century as the 
most devastating in history as far as human-made deaths are concerned. 
No updating of Elliot's 1972 calculations would do any thing to change 
that judgment. To the contrary, although "Never again!" still resounds 
after Auschwitz, post-Holocaust history has nearly turned that cry into 
an all-too-hollow cliche. The fact is that genocidal killing has taken 
more lives since the Holocaust ended than it did in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The arrival of a new century, moreover, will unlikely 
bring relief. There is every reason to think that the twenty-first century 
will feature even more human-made death than the twentieth. 
At least thus far, attempts to prosecute those who have been ac­
cused of genocidal crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia do 
not inspire confidence that the threat of arrest and punishment will do 
much to deter genocide's fury. Nor can one take heart from the open-
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ing of John Cobb's essay, which observes that projections about the 
future are uncertain because history is always full of surprises. As his 
analysis helps to make depressingly clear, more often than not history's 
surprises are lethal to the point of catastrophe. 
In every contribution to this book, there are plenty of reasons for 
despair. Joseph Tainter shows how competition and expansion-long 
the boosters for "progress"-exacerbate conflict that can turn geno­
cidal. John Gowdy measures the biophysical limits to industrializa­
tion, creating a nasty surprise for those who think that the future will 
be benignly open forever. Ted Trainer sees present society as unsus­
tainable, Virginia Abernethy wonders about the bloody divisiveness 
that accompanies resurgent tribalism, and Chris Lewis analyzes the 
necessary collapse of modern industrial civilization. 
The list could go on and on, but this book's impact drives home 
the point that, in one way or another, we are approaching the end of 
the human world as we have known it. Do not misunderstand: an 
apocalyptic doomsday is not at hand. The world is not going to end 
anytime soon, but the times are changing decisively nonetheless. 
Sometimes the ending of an era is cause for celebration. Ironically, 
in an age of mass death and genocide, such a conclusion would be 
unrealistic. The conditions accounting for our deadly age will die hard. 
Whatever happens, including even the corrective and constructive 
changes that this book's authors recommend, the shifts are likely to be 
wrenching and violent. Things will get worse before they get better­
if they do get better. 
One reason is that for too long too many of us, including even 
people who have the means to buy this book and the time to read it, 
have enjoyed the world that is too much with us. Much as we deplore 
mass death and genocide, we will still find it extremely difficult to bring 
about the global changes that are needed to check it. Even while trying 
to prevent mass death and genocide in the twenty-first century, we may 
also resist the changes that are really needed to eliminate them. 
The many beneficiaries of existing circumstances will not set aside 
their privileges easily any more than the wretched of the earth will 
placidly accept their desperate conditions of scarcity. As the pressures 
mount, and they will, parties on all sides will defend their interests. In 
too many cases, moreover, the defense will be by any means-wrench­
ing and violent-that are perceived as necessary. History may prove 
such judgments wrong, but that outcome would be so surprising that 
only the foolish would bank on it. 
xii Foreword 
This book calls forth dark moods within me. And yet it evokes 
other moods as well. Perhaps it will do the same for you. At least in 
my case, these "and yet" moods are neither removed from nor located 
beyond the darkness with which this book engulfs me. Their move­
ment is a stirring within that darkness, but the movement is not easily 
named. What I feel is not captured by words like hope or conviction, 
and even less do my feelings involve much that a glib word like op­
timism contains. 
The stirring aroused within me by The Coming Age of Scarcity is 
best expressed in the negative. It is reflected in this foreword's title: 
despair is no solution. Those words also come from the introduction that 
Michael Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann have written, which ulti­
mately urges people to work against despair within and despite the 
darkness. 
As I explore these feelings and write the words that they have 
provoked here, I do so as a philosopher and teacher who has spent 
most of a thirty-year academic career studying the damage that the 
Holocaust and other forms of genocide have done. In particular, I 
have written these words right after completing the syllabus for my 
current course on the Holocaust and genocide and just before the 
1996-97 academic year begins. Reflecting on the essays in this book 
while I have been preparing again to teach young college students 
about the subjects it addresses, I have been reminded once more that 
teachers are constantly stalked by despair. How could we not be? 
Most teachers are idealists. However jaded we may become, most 
of us became teachers because we wanted to mend the world. That 
hope, however, encounters discouragement aplenty. History, especially 
genocide's history, provides it. So does teaching, which is a less-than­
reassuring activity when humankind's future is at stake. 
We are all beginners every day. No matter how hard we teachers 
try, indifference persists, prejudice remains, ignorance endures, and no 
place on earth guarantees safety from the destruction that such forces 
can unleash. Education's gains take place against stiff odds; learning 
is not evolutionary progress. Every year, every class, means starting 
over because wisdom does not accumulate. 
Teaching about the Holocaust and genocide makes me more mel­
ancholy than I used to be. It makes me realize how much despair lurks 
around every classroom door. Even more, however, such teaching 
makes me understand that those recognitions are not the conclusion, 
but they must be the stirring amid darkness, the insistence affirms that 
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despair is not the solution. To let despair have its way would be to 
give every genocidal act a victory that it does not deserve and must 
not have. 
Where mass death and genocide are concerned, however, what is 
the solution? Is there such a thing? Perhaps, but if so, what ingredients 
does it contain? Responses to those questions-good and thoughtful 
ones-are found in this book's pages. As they draw to a close, I would 
add only two words of recapitulation: a warning and then a fact. 
The warning: "If we stop remembering," says Holocaust survivor 
Elie Wiesel, "we stop being." The memory and analysis of mass death 
and genocide found in this book warn against despair. The effect of 
that warning can be to sensitize us against indifference, which is 
despair 's best friend and evil's welcome accomplice. 
As for the fact, the essays in this book can sensitize us against 
despair and indifference because history shows that human-made mass 
death and genocide are not inevitable and no events related to them 
ever will be. We know this because human-made mass death and 
genocide emerge from decisions and institutions that depend on ordi­
nary human beings who are responsible for their actions and who 
could act differently and better than they often do. 
If we heed the warning and do not deny the fact-especially in an 
age of scarcity, mass death, and genocide-we will keep working to 
mend the world's broken heart. Despite much of its content, then, this 
book awakens, haunts, and challenges me in ways that I ignore at 
everyone's peril. I trust it will do the same for you. 
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The Coming Age of Scarcity 

I. The Coming Age of Seareity 
An Introduction 
Miehael N. Dobkowski and 
Isidor Wallimann 
The twentieth century can be characterized as the "age of genocide." 
The "progress" of this century has been constant along its journey of 
horrors-from the massacre of the Armenians, to Stalin's planned fam­
ine in the Ukraine, to the Holocaust, to the killing fields of Cambodia, 
to the ethnic massacres in Burundi and Rwanda, to the ethnic cleans­
ing in the former Yugoslavia. 
According to a number of scholars, the violence of past centuries 
pales before the violence and mayhem of the present one. In his pio­
neering work, Twentieth Century Book of the Dead, Scottish sociologist 
Gil Elliot estimated that more than 110 million people were killed by 
their fellow human beings between 1900 and 1972. Such findings led 
him to conclude that manmade death "is the central moral as well as 
material fact of our time" (Elliot 1972, 1-6) . Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, 
tracing quantitative trends in collective violence over the centuries, 
came to a similar conclusion. On the basis of his analysis, Sorokin 
concluded that "the curse or privilege to be the most devastating or 
most bloody war century belongs to the twentieth; in one quarter 
century it imposed upon the population a 'blood tribute' far greater 
than that imposed by any of the whole centuries combined." (Sorokin 
1962, 342) . 
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Although the literature on collective violence focuses predomi­
nantly on genocide and warfare, it is important to recognize that there 
are other forms of governmental mass killing. In several earlier stud­
ies, we attempted to broaden the discussion of genocide by including 
a consideration of structural violence-the violence created by social, 
political, and economic institutions and structures, or by benign ne­
glect or demographic and environmental factors. Structural violence, 
by causing suffering and death as the result of structured social in­
equality, creates conditions conducive to the outbreak of overt vio­
lence, particularly as civil war and ethnic conflict. Once initiated, this 
violence usually exacerbates the socioeconomic conditions by destroy­
ing portions of the economic infrastructure, by overturning the deli­
cate political balance, and by damaging the ecosystem thereby 
aggravating the economic and social conditions that cause structural 
violence. It can easily become a vicious circle of violence. We see that 
being played out in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and in Africa.  
The enormity of the violence of our century is indicated by our 
almost schizophrenic attitude toward it. We move between attitudes 
of despair and numbing on the one hand and denial or avoidance on 
the other. These attitudes are mirror images of each other. They both 
seek to deny reality by avoiding any responsibility for the need to 
understand and confront the phenomenon. Our first obligation, how­
ever, is to face it squarely. 
As we argued ten years ago in Genocide and the Modern Age, if 
scholarly efforts are to contribute to the improvement of the human 
condition by preserving life, in the case of genocide and mass deaths 
we can no longer conceive of them as random and rare historic phe­
nomena. History and contemporary experience just won't allow such 
a conclusion. Instead, we are compelled to look for patterns and cau­
sation that lead to and are associated with these tendencies. We must 
look upon the history and nature of societies giving rise to mass death 
as human-made and thereby influenceable. Any other perspective 
would preclude the human agency necessary to act preventively. Thus, 
we postulate that the social, economic, and historic circumstances 
making mass death possible are largely the creations of human beings, 
are not random and may be associated with social patterns and struc­
tures that can be studied. Scholars have demonstrated that for past 
genocides. We should be able to bring these insight to bear on a con­
sideration of the dangers we face in the future. As we approach the 
end of the millennium and the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
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nothing is clear or certain except that the projection of present direc­
tions in population growth, land resources, energy consumption, and 
per capita consumption cannot be sustained and may lead to even 
greater catastrophe. These challenges are experienced and expressed 
by different social segments in ways that are likely to create fierce 
conflict within place and between place. Within place, producers, the 
state, and local groups are battling over the control of natural re­
sources. Between place, communities and nations battle over who 
should produce and consume, and who should conserve.1 
The problem facing us as we approach the twenty-first century is 
not how to reduce scarcity amid downsizing, but how to resolve the 
resulting conflicts without resorting to genocide either explicitly through 
warfare or implicitly through unequal burden sharing. We maintain, 
with the contributors to this volume, the conviction that the issues we 
face are very serious. However, we also believe that they are susceptible 
to analysis and that the problems are influenceable. We do not subscribe 
to rigid historical determinism-the future can be altered as long as we 
understand the forces that may be propelling it and have the individual 
and collective will to think beyond self-interest and narrow parochial­
ism. We all have a stake in balancing economic and ecological needs, 
short- and long-term demand and individual and community interests, 
both local and global. If we realize that, we have the chance of devising 
strategies capable of allowing for diverse and divisive social segments 
to make peaceful decisions as socioeconomic and ecosystems contract. 
The alternative may be war and genocide. But before purposeful action 
can be taken to prevent potential disasters, we first have to understand 
what is at stake and what the issues are. 
This book addresses one of the most pressing and significant is­
sues that humanity has been confronted with so far. Yet, despite the 
compelling nature of the problem, only few attempts are under way­
little effort is spent-to analyze the dangers we face and to develop 
strategies designed to avert the looming catastrophe. We would like to 
maintain that world industrialization and urbanization and its associ­
ated social system and techniques-such as the universal market sys­
tem or centralized planning bureaucracies-cannot be sustained except 
1. Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski, eds., Genocide and the Modern Age: 
Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987); Michael 
N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wa!limann, Genocide in Our Time: An Annotated Bibliography 
with Analytical Introductions (Ann Arbor, Mich. :  Pierian Press, 1992). 
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for a relatively few privileged people and at the cost of increased mass 
death, which may include genocide. The alternative, namely, to aban­
don the global industrialization project and to begin a move away 
from industrial society as it is known today, equally entails a risk of 
mass death on a tremendous scale. 
It is true that modernization and industrialization have confronted 
us with many great problems before while millions have been forced 
into deprivation, poverty, wars, and premature death. In the course of 
modernization worldwide, however, the world population has never­
theless grown significantly. Therefore, one might be tempted to con­
clude that the social and economic systems that have laid the paths 
and been the engines for industrialization will again respond in time 
to avert the anticipated mass death and increasing spiral of human 
self-destruction on a scale never witnessed so far. However, this would 
indeed be a fateful attitude to assume. 
If this is so, we are as social scientists and humanists well advised 
to speedily reconsider our priorities and to increasingly engage in a 
kind of scientific praxis that is explicitly directed toward the preserva­
tion of life, at home and elsewhere in our global society. Guided by the 
norm and the wish to preserve life, we have to increasingly ask the 
following questions: 
1 .  What knowledge is required? Do we have necessary theoretical 
social science knowledge to guide us through the forthcoming great 
transformation that is to lead us away from today's modernity? 
2. Whom does this knowledge serve? Do we have the type of 
knowledge that will both guide us through this transformation and 
serve humanity in that it is directed toward the preservation of life? 
But what exactly is the problem that confronts us? What are the 
anticipated bottlenecks based upon which one could say that tradi­
tional modernization will come to an end? What are the bottlenecks 
that could lead to mass death? In an attempt to address these ques­
tions, let us first turn to a short discussion of industrialization. 
Industrialization 
It is important to recall that the great transformation from agricul­
tural to modern, urban, and industrial societies has always been fi­
nanced on the back of peasants both in the nineteenth century, in the 
area that is now known as the center, and in the twentieth century, 
in the area now known as the periphery. Whether this transfer of 
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value from the agricultural sector has been achieved with political 
and bureaucratic means or through the indirect and anonymous 
coercion of market systems, the truth remains that the surplus value 
produced in agriculture alone financed industrial production and 
made urban and industrial life sustainable. This is not to deny that 
agriculture simultaneously became more productive owing, in part, 
to the very growth in the urban-based sciences and industrial pro­
duction it had financed. However, much of this "great transforma­
tion" has always been associated with immense hardship on the 
peasantry, be it for the many who remained in rural areas or for 
those who migrated as wage laborers to the growing cities.  Much 
premature death because of poverty, disease, and lack of medical 
attention went hand in hand with drastic improvements in the life 
expectancy, particularly for infants. Thus, the age structure of the 
population was shifted to a median age of twenty, or even below, 
while life expectancy at birth rose to about sixty years . 
The most common techniques to bring about the transformation 
of agricultural society have been the market mechanisms associated 
with capitalism and the socialist central planning approach relying 
primarily on authoritarian bureaucratic methods. These methods can 
again be divided into those that encouraged urban formations (East­
ern Europe) and those that tended to discourage large-scale, rural­
urban migration. Thus, China has tended to promote the selective 
industrialization of rural communities.  Despite these differences, how­
ever, the socialist approaches have one thing in common that clearly 
distinguishes them from the capitalist transformation technique: the 
idea, and the social contract, that modernity and industrial society can 
be attained while guaranteeing-in conjunction with the right and the 
obligation for men and women to work-a sociocultural existence 
minimum to all. Only from about 1 795 to 1834, and only in England 
during the Speenhamland regulations, did the capitalist technique resort 
to a kind of guaranteed minimum-income policy. Even this phase can 
primarily be seen as a strategy to get the transformation going, to 
soften the blows dealt by enclosures, and to encourage enough per­
sons to permanently participate as wage laborers outside agriculture. 
Once the transformation had gained sufficient momentum, the 
Speenhamland regulations were abandoned to make room for the poor 
laws, police and jails, utilitarianism and free markets, Manchester lib­
eralism and social Darwinism, cyclically recurring economic crises, 
class struggle, and revolutionary activity. 
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By the time the modem welfare state was developed, the capitalist 
system had entered the ongoing imperialist phase. Its transformation 
technique had taken a firm grip of ever more distant agricultural popu­
lations whose surplus could be used to both expand the newly created 
industrial society in the center and to introduce large-scale urban life 
and rudimentary industrial production in the periphery. Class struggle 
and other conflicts may have been instrumental in bringing it about, but 
the welfare state, and the almost guaranteed existence minimum that 
we associate with this institution, particularly since World War II, has 
also been financed by the surplus transferred and appropriated from 
the periphery. Meanwhile, however, the half of the world's population 
still subject to transformation under capitalism is far from having an 
existence minimum guaranteed and, if at all, is only beginning to estab­
lish the first and most rudimentary social insurance schemes. Addition­
ally, as the worldwide transformation proceeds, thus providing 
alternatives for industrial producers in the center, the center 's welfare 
state guarantees to existence are also eroding, despite such normative 
documents as the United Nations human rights convention or the Eu­
ropean social charter. Faced with the competing socialist alternative to 
modernization, these documents were once strongly promoted by the 
already transformed and modernized capitalist center. 
Population Growth 
All industrialization has been associated with significant population 
growth. The world's population roughly doubled from 1750 to 1900 
and again from 1900 to 1950. In 1800 it still took far more than a 
hundred years for the world population to double. Today it takes only 
thirty-eight years. Some 1 .7  billion people inhabited this planet in 1900. 
In 1990 it was 5.3 billion and in the year 2025 we shall have 8.5 billion. 
Only about one-fifth of the world's population lives in the fully trans­
formed and industrialized part of the world including Eastern Europe. 
About two-fifths alone live in India and China, giving China a slightly 
larger population than India. Sixty percent of the world's population 
lives in Asia, about 9 percent in Latin America, and about 12 percent 
in Africa.  The reasons for the ever fas�er population growth are well 
known. Although birthrates have tended to decline, they have not 
decreased fast enough to compensate for the gains owing to lower 
infant mortality and the general increase in life expectancy. These gains 
have not been made possible by high-tech medicine, but by relatively 
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simple techniques, such as an improved diet, better control over bac­
terial environments (general hygiene, water supply, food storage, an­
tibiotics), and by vaccinations against various contagious and other 
diseases. The world-wide knowledge of these techniques, the possibil­
ity for their widespread deployment at a low cost, world information 
on social and medical problems, political pressure, the need for social 
control, and human compassion have been major causes for the ever­
accelerating population growth. Presently, it is not expected that AIDS 
or diseases such as cholera or tuberculosis, although growing, will 
significantly alter the rate of population growth in the near future. 
One of the correlates of modernization has been that birthrates 
decrease with increased urbanization and a higher standard of living. 
Experience in the fully transformed industrial countries generally has 
shown that population growth tends to stabilize at a low positive rate 
and that some countries even have slightly negative growth rate. This 
experience leads to the notion that, once the world will be transformed 
into modernity, industrialized, and economically developed, the world 
population too will be stabilized in its growth. Of course, the crucial 
assumption made here is that it is possible to provide the world with 
the standard of living of industrial countries, irrespective of the eco­
nomic systems-particularly capitalism, which chronically tends to­
ward overproduction and crisis-and ecological considerations. 
Experience shows that most campaigns to more swiftly reduce the 
birthrate are successful only in societies with a sufficiently high stan­
dard of living. However, they can also be successful in relatively poor 
societies with a low standard of living if, and only if, social and eco­
nomic justice is simultaneously given a high priority. The more vul­
nerable people become economically, and the more they are threatened 
by modernization and industrialization, the more they are inclined to 
adhere to birthrates that enhance population growth. This pattern is 
often seen as an example of irrational behavior. Allegedly, it prevents 
families from accumulating the human, social, and financial capital 
needed for the family's economic improvement, and it is said to annul 
all productivity gains made on the macro level to improve the stan­
dard of living. However, as is well known among development work­
ers and agricultural specialists, when people must live at the margins 
of existence, they tend to minimize risks and not to maximize profits and 
accumulation. By adhering to higher birthrates, they aim to spread severe 
existential risks to more people, which from their point of view is a 
reasonable thing to do. 
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However, it is also true that women often give birth to more chil­
dren than they desire, and that the children are required for the family's 
survival and successful reproduction. Because this condition is usually 
induced by gender inequality, it follows that birthrates can also be 
reduced in part by strengthening the position of women in society. In 
sum, without sufficient equality on the micro and macro levels, there 
is little hope to reduce the birthrate sufficiently for population growth 
to level off. 
Migration and Employment 
Because the transformation reduces the percentage of the population 
employed in agriculture, and because insufficient alternative employ­
ment is available in rural areas, people have migrated to cities. Pres­
ently, some 45 percent of the world's population lives in urban spaces. 
In fully transformed countries, it is about 70 percent, while it is only 
about 35 percent in those areas still undergoing transformation. Latin 
America is an exception. About 70 percent of its population lives in 
cities. 
Migrants tend to be young and not only male. In some economic 
environments and cultures, women tend to migrate even more often 
than men. Because of the volume of migration and the high fertility 
potential of the migrant population itself, the population grows at a 
much higher rate in urban as compared to rural areas. 
The industrialized center has only about 7 percent of its popula­
tion employed in the agricultural sector. The rest of the world (which 
accounts for about four-fifths of the globe's inhabitants) still employs 
about 60 percent of its population in agriculture. This corresponds to 
the situation in Europe and the United States in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when Europe's industrialization was well under 
way. However, industrialization and urbanization then involved both 
a smaller population and extended over a larger time span than is true 
today. Therefore, new and old urban spaces contain considerably more 
people than nineteenth-century cities, and we have not even begun to 
imagine what it means to bring-besides the ongoing population 
growth-only half of the now remaining agricultural population into 
other forms of usually urban-based economic activities. 
The nineteenth-century transformation of agricultural society chan­
neled migrants into industrial work-to the extent that they found 
employment at all. The tertiary, mostly service, sector was developed 
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later. Today just the opposite is true. The formal economy favors the 
expansion of services. In addition, the huge informal economic activ­
ity belongs itself more to the tertiary than to the secondary sector. This 
pattern seems to confirm the notion that we are far from growing into 
a true world industrial society. Displaced from agricultural occupa­
tions, people end up with few perspectives and no vision that can 
make them feel part of a new era, involving such things as the creation 
of nation states, industrial production, and mobility, which were char­
acteristic of the nineteenth century. To the extent that they are taking 
part in the international division of labor, they mostly do so in depen­
dency and with unequal terms of trade. And even though the stan­
dard of living in developing countries erodes further and poverty 
deepens, the population affected by industrialization and urbaniza­
tion remains politically disenfranchised on an international level, where 
industrialization policies and world economic decisions are being made. 
Energy and Other Resources 
Thus far, all industrialization and urbanization has been associated 
with an increased use of energy, directly and indirectly replacing the 
human and animal energy used in production and distribution, ex­
panding the sphere of unnecessary consumption, and allowing for 
world markets and their corollary, the world division of labor. This 
expansion of world trade and the world division of labor is, of course, 
again a precondition for world industrialization. 
World energy consumption, although increasing, remained rela­
tively low until 1950. From 1950 to 1990, however, the use of energy 
increased sevenfold, far outpacing the population, which approximately 
doubled during the same period. Most of this increase came from the 
use of fossil fuels, of which oil and gas constituted the largest share. 
The contribution of atomic and hydroelectric power to the world's 
energy supply is only about 15 percent. 
As gross national product (GNP) per capita grows, so does the use 
of energy. Therefore, one-fifth of the world's population uses about four­
fifths of the world's energy, most of it as industrial fuels. Traditional 
fuels (wood, peat, dung) supply about 5 percent of the world's energy 
and are almost entirely (85 percent) used in peripheral countries. At the 
present rate of use, it is estimated that the world has oil for another 40 
years, gas for another 60, and coal for another 660 years. Coal supplies 
about a third of today's energy. The future supply of traditional fuels 
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(particularly wood) depends on several factors, such as the need for 
drinking water, the need to reduce carbon dioxide levels, the amount of 
acid rain, and the damage from the destruction of ozone layers. 
It is not possible here to address the future supply of all resources 
such as minerals and water. It is important, however, to mention that 
the arable land available for the production of food and fibers tends 
to shrink. Any expansion will be possible only at the expense of for­
ests or grasslands, jeopardizing other resources, particularly water and 
topsoil. Any increases in the agricultural output would, therefore, have 
to come from different growing techniques, pest controls, irrigation, 
the use of fertilizers, plant breeding, and genetic engineering. During 
the 1980s, the growth in world grain production has decreased and, if 
measured per capita to correct for population growth, world grain 
production has tended to level off. 
Bottlenecks: A Historically Unique Constellation 
Impending bottlenecks, as can be deduced from the discussion so far, 
center in population growth, land resources, energy, and environmental 
constraints. What is most crucial is that we have never found ourselves 
in a situation in which all four factors are so closely linked. Sure, we 
have had a growing population and population pressures before, but 
there has always been more land to be cultivated. Sure, we have had 
large populations to care for before, but more energy-intensive agricul­
tural production and improvements in plant breeding have always been 
possible. Sure, we have had the need for more energy before, but there 
has always been some new oil field just a few feet below the ground. 
Sure, we have had all these pressures before. But have we experienced 
them as impenetrable limits, as absolute deficiencies of land and en­
ergy? Have we experienced them all at the same time and as impen­
etrable limits? Certainly not. Have we ever simultaneously experienced 
such severe land and energy limits and also faced the real danger of an 
ecological collapse? Again, certainly not. 
Today, this planet counts some 5.5 billion people. In 2025, it will 
contain 8.5 billion. Beyond 2025, we do not know how much the popu­
lation will grow. Current opinion tends to assume that, as a result of 
economic development, the birthrate will "automatically" fall to about 
two children per family before 2050, a level now observed for trans­
formed countries. This assumption is very unrealistic, however, since 
about 35 percent of the population under transformation already lives 
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in poverty-although the transformation is far from having been com­
pleted and the number of children per family in industrializing coun­
tries under transformation is still about four. But even if the assumption 
should prove to be correct, the population is expected to reach 9.5 
billion in 2050 and to level off at about 10 billion in 2075. However, by 
2030, we shall also have exhausted the presently known oil reserves or 
about 30 percent of today's energy supply. And by 2050, we shall 
further have exhausted the presently known gas supply or (together 
with oil) about one-half of today's energy supply, although owing to 
population growth, we shall also have reduced the per capita energy 
consumption by about 40 percent. 
The energy crunch is made worse by environmental limits. The 
degree to which we have been using fossil fuels is changing our eco­
system and the human, animal, and plant reproduction and survival 
patterns that have for centuries been built around it. The lives of 
millions are increasingly at risk if sea levels begin to rise and glaciers 
melt. It is estimated that 30 percent of the world's population lives in 
a thirty-mile-wide coastal strip and is concentrated in Asia and Eu­
rope. Millions of people would have to be relocated as environmental 
refugees, their lives would be threatened by floods and tidal waves, 
.in.ore fertile arable land would be lost, and the erosion inland would 
be more severe owing to increased rains. 
As a result, the largest environmental organizations urge a 30 
percent reduction of carbon dioxide levels by 2005, a 50 percent reduc­
tion by 2020, and an 80 percent reduction by 2050. These reductions 
would indeed necessitate a drastic change in our present energy-use 
patterns and amount to a drastic absolute cut in the amount of energy 
used-all this in times of significant population growth. 
Finally, the tremendous food pressures must be reiterated. We can 
cultivate the land more intensively and turn our lawns into vegetable 
gardens, but how many millions more can be fed by such measures? 
We may resort to the oceans for protein, but oceans are already over­
fished. We may turn away from animal protein to feed more people 
with the same amount of grain, but this reserve applies only to the 
transformed world and becomes increasingly insignificant as the Third 
World population grows. We may resort to ocean farming, greenhouse 
and hydroponic production, but can we compensate for the destruc­
tion of agricultural lands because of overuse and overexposure to wind 
and water? Can we compensate for the loss in land because of urban­
ization and the increased demand for housing? Can we compensate 
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for the loss in plant growth and crop yield because of increased ultra­
violet radiation? We do not believe that these challenges will be met 
without bottlenecks that may cost the lives of millions. 
It seems evident now that there will be a temporal conjunction of 
four sizable bottlenecks: population, land, energy, and environmental­
carrying capacity. All of them are so intricately related that they form 
a system complexity whose very balance has never been so delicate 
and yet so important to our survival. Therefore, we must also distin­
guish between bottlenecks that present continuous but stable chal­
lenges and those that represent discontinuous and unstable challenges. 
Population growth, for example, is a challenge with great continuity. 
However, as we approach the question of energy and land, particu­
larly if environmental pressures are included, we can increasingly 
expect challenges characterized by discontinuity. Even though energy 
resources may not be depleted, the supply of energy could for techno­
logical, political, or economic reasons become highly discontinuous. 
Agricultural land may increasingly go out of commission in a discon­
tinuous way, be it because of events such as droughts, floods, erosion, 
or drastic overuse. As the system reaches an ever-greater complexity, 
and as survival hinges ever more and with small margins on this 
complexity, any jolt to the system is bound to make survival more 
immediately a matter of life and death. 
Furthermore, the jolts emitted by the economic system are also of 
importance, for production factors like population, land, energy, as 
well as many environmental constraints are mediated and coordinated 
by markets. Markets, however, are also known to have a great deal of 
discontinuity owing to the anonymous number of its participants and 
the unforeseeable outcome produced by their myriad market interac­
tions. Thus, the capitalist market, the very technique chosen to manage 
survival, is itself a threat to survival, as is exemplified by speculation, 
recessions, and depressions, booms and busts. Market dynamics them­
selves upset the delicate balance between land, energy, population, 
and the environment, and thereby directly determine survival and 
death rates. 
Additionally, techniques to assure continuity in a world of random 
but significant disturbances may break down. Already insurance com­
panies suspect that a number of recent weather-related events may 
have ceased to be sufficiently random or insignificant or both to be 
insured.  The private market insurance system may soon prove to be 
unable to ensure against certain ecosystem risks. The instability would 
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thereby increase, leaving politics as the last potential guarantor of 
continuity and stability, as is already the case with atomic power plants, 
where no private insurer is willing to cover the entire risk, nor could 
such risk be covered. However, how many big risks, should the event 
and the scarcity associated with them occur, can the political system 
handle before solidarity breaks down, instability increases, conflicts 
grow, and massive death results? 
In times of growth and system expansion, potential conflicts can 
more likely be ignored, for their resolution is relatively easy. Every­
body can come up with Pareto-type conflict resolutions.  The going 
gets much tougher though, and more lives are at stake, when con­
flicts await resolution during system contraction, increased scarcity, 
and shrinking surpluses. First, the number and severity of conflicts 
tend to increase. Second, conflict potentials can no longer be as 
easily ignored, for, should they erupt, the disturbance would only 
augment the scarcity and make any resolution increasingly and un­
necessarily more difficult. Third, resolutions to conflicts are politi­
cally and economically much harder to find in times of general scarcity 
and contraction. 
Presently, our world still relies on expansion and Pareto-type con­
flict resolutions. International exchange and free trade is thus enhanced, 
as is evident by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Further­
more, Eastern Europe, once a highly self-sufficient economic and po­
litical system, is being dismantled and integrated with the world 
division of labor. China, while still self-sufficient, may because of its 
participation in international trade and communication also become 
more unstable and be pressured to further expand market relations. 
While Eastern Europe and China chose to bring about industrializa­
tion by the primacy of political priorities over market priorities and by 
politically distributing scarcity (also in the sphere of consumption), 
Eastern Europe is now joining the rest of the world by introducing 
social and political relations based on the primacy of markets. And 
China may soon follow and experience large-scale migration, increased 
inequality, poverty, higher birthrates, and destabilized population 
growth. 
Capitalism, which is now the world's dominant political and eco­
nomic system, thrives on market expansion. However, how compatible 
is capitalism with the long-term zero or negative growth environment 
of the future? It is incompatible! Not only does capitalism have great 
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difficulty in handling such conditions, economically and politically, but 
it also has, for the same reasons, difficulty in preparing for them. Thus, 
markets, if left to themselves, cannot factor in long-term scarcity. Has 
the price of oil, for example, signaled that oil will soon be very scarce? 
On the contrary, oil markets have, if anything, signaled an ever-growing 
supply of oil. The same could be said for land, lumber, and many other 
natural resources in limited supply. 
The ability of the capitalist market system to guide us through the 
next decades of increasing scarcity and downscaling of industrial pro­
duction is very limited indeed, and if lives are to be preserved, the 
primacy of politics over markets will have to be introduced again, as 
was the case for practically all of human history except its bourgeois 
phase. In this context, it is ironic that, just when political control over 
the economy is especially needed, Eastern Europe is-with huge losses 
in productive capacity and means of production and at tremendous 
social and economic restructuring costs-reintroducing the primacy of 
markets. 
Issues to Be Addressed 
To enter an age of ever-increasing scarcity and downscaling is to enter 
an age of increased conflicts that contain a great potential for mass 
death and even genocide depending on the mechanisms by which 
scarcity is channeled to affect only certain groups and the mechanisms 
by which conflict is resolved, managed, or suppressed. If the analysis 
given here is correct or even plausible, and if the goal is to help hu­
manity survive this tremendous challenge with no or minimal human 
loss, we must increasingly ask questions like the following: 
1 .  Based on our knowledge, where and how can we warn the 
larger public of impending bottlenecks, and thus make the bottlenecks 
a legitimate focus of high priority discussion everywhere? 
2. How does the capitalist system tend to react when it approaches 
a zero or negative growth environment? What are the economic and 
political mechanisms by which scarcity is distributed? What is the 
likelihood for fascism and other authoritarian political systems to arise 
to deal with scarcity while preserving class relations? What might be 
the cost in human lives if the distribution of scarcity were left to markets 
or to authoritarian and fascist politics? 
3.  What could we learn from societies at war or in an environ­
ment of war? How did they experience and deal with scarcity? What 
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forms of solidarity and other coping mechanisms (even under capital­
ism) did they adopt? 
4. What conflict-resolution strategies can be pursued for con­
flicts in which all parties have something to lose? 
5. What can be learned from the behavior of cooperatives and 
other mutual-help type social organizations pertaining to the manage­
ment of scarcity? 
6. To what extent is the broad social control over the means of 
production a prerequisite for increased solidarity and a more equal 
distribution of scarcity (or surplus), particularly since even a relatively 
perfect worldwide distribution of income alone would not come close 
to eliminating world poverty today? 
7. To what extent can the impending bottlenecks be dealt with 
only by reestablishing basic self-sufficiency on a regional basis? 
8. To what extent can basic regional self-sufficiency, if coupled 
with a democratic access to the means of production, inhibit migra­
tion, decrease the birthrate, and reduce the surplus that is transferred 
from the periphery to the center? 
9. What is the necessary kind and level of industrial production, 
and modern cultural and social life that must be retained to effectively 
and efficiently downscale while simultaneously meeting growing bottle­
necks and needs? 
10.  To what extent should social scientists be engaged as cata­
lysts and organizers of movements concerned with social justice and 
the preservation of human life? After all, it is well accepted that 
social scientists are involved in such things as human relations, quality 
of work life, and other "movements" to keep corporate organizations 
alive. Why should social scientists not be equally free and assertive 
in sharing their knowledge with organizations whose aim is to stop 
world industrialization, to downscale industrial society, and to pre­
serve life? 
These are but a few questions that must increasingly be addressed, 
and many of them are broached in this volume. Other important ques­
tions could be added. Moreover, the social science theory repertoire 
must, in anticipation of the issues ahead, also be reevaluated. Many 
classic and modern social science theories have their origin in the late­
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Invariably, these theories are con­
cerned with the dramatic social changes brought about by the opening, 
expansion, and differentiation of social and economic systems, and as 
a consequence, will soon prove to be grossly inadequate. As this analysis 
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suggests, the severe bottlenecks that lie ahead will bring about an 
equally drastic social change owing to scarcity, system closure, and to 
the downscaling in industrial production, world markets, the world 
division of labor, urbanization, and so on. This transformation of so­
ciety will not be just a 180-degree reversal of the ongoing world indus­
trialization, but one of another kind. This all encompassing, fast, and 
drastic social change of the near future will ultimately also generate a 
new brand of "classic" social theory. 
The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century bore two different and 
opposing conceptions of the human being. Hobbes argued that left to 
their own devices, people would descend to the level of the animal, so 
that without the proper ordering of society and civilization, human 
beings would be ruled by the law of the jungle. The contrary position 
is that of Rousseau, who argued that people are inherently good but 
society was the corrupting influence. Modernist faith has largely fol­
lowed Rousseau's position: the self was thought of as ultimately good. 
What was needed was a societal revolution that allowed the natural 
goodness of the individual to emerge and flourish. 
We have come to be highly skeptical of the belief in the inherent 
goodness of the self. Enlightenment, education, culture, and science 
will not necessarily produce individuals who will do what is right. 
The genocides of the twentieth century have unveiled the true heart 
of humanity. At our center lies an ability to commit evil of an almost 
unimagined degree. We have seen the nature of human beings and 
found that the most ordinary among us can transport millions to their 
death, can fill the earth and the sky with the victims of killing fields. 
The theory of the inherent goodness of the human being was daily 
disproved in Nazi Germany and in the other state-sponsored geno­
cides and massacres. 
But if Rousseau's argument was shown to be naive, so has Hobbes's 
been proved wrong, for what made Nazism possible was the use of 
state power for absolute evil ends. The near-total genocide of the Jewish 
people, for example, would not have been possible without, on the one 
hand, the ability to use all aspects of cultural transmission to reduce the 
Jew to nonperson and, on the other, the ability to mobilize the full 
weight of the modern bureaucratic state to carry out mass murder. 
That dual ability is still with us. It would be a tragic error to think 
that what happened in Germany and Europe, for example, was a sin­
gular event that we cannot understand and that cannot be repeated; 
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we can and it already has. Newsweek reported on May 9, 1994: "As 
many as 200,000 people have been murdered, mutilated and dumped 
like garbage in the streets of Kigali, the capital, and in the verdant 
countryside of Rwanda during weeks of savage tribal warfare. Wield­
ing machetes, knives, clubs, and grenades, Hutu government forces 
and paramilitary extremists have hunted down and slaughtered Tutsi 
civilians and sympathizers in . . .  a campaign of 'genocide. '  Refugee 
sites have become deathtraps" (24). 
Even now, in Europe, in Africa, and elsewhere, specialists are se­
lecting, exploiting, and concentrating new victims. Potentially, these 
measures are the precursors of a killing operation. As time passes, the 
destruction of European Jewry and the other genocides of the twenti­
eth century will recede into memory. From this moment on, however, 
fundamental assumptions about human behavior and about civiliza­
tion can no longer stand unchallenged, for though the occurrence is 
past, the phenomenon remains, as well as the causes exacerbated by 
the political, social, and economic bottlenecks outlined above. The 
unthinkable has already happened; the idea of future catastrophes is 
therefore not unthinkable. 
When we look at our young students, we tremble for their future. 
We would like to be able to tell them that despite endless violence and 
disillusionment, one must maintain faith in people and in humankind 
and in our ability to solve problems. Despair is no solution. The solu­
tion lies in analysis, in hard thinking and questioning, and in purpose­
ful and informed action. To that goal this book is dedicated. 
The structure of the book is simple. The first part, including the 
essays by John B. Cobb, Jr. , and Chris Lewis, analyze major forces 
having an impact on the survivability of civilization as we know it 
into the twenty-first century. Both authors outline the challenges we 
face, including overpopulation, pressure upon the land, migration, 
ecological damage, and social instability. They conclude that rates of 
growth in population and in per capita consumption cannot be sus­
tained. They argue, therefore, that we are witnessing the collapse of 
global industrial civilization. The paradox of development is that within 
the tremendous success of modern industrial civilization lies the cause 
of its collapse and ruin. By recognizing that imminent collapse, how­
ever, we may also find a solution to the impending catastrophe. In­
stead of seeing the collapse as a tragedy, both authors see it as an 
opportunity to move away from a global, market-driven economy to 
more local and regional models. 
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In part two, we present more detailed discussion of the problem 
of scarcity and how it relates to conflict. The authors in this section 
powerfully argue that the current level of human activity is unsustain­
able. They demonstrate that population growth in particular affects 
the natural world and can affect the social order and international 
political systems. John Gowdy and Joseph Tainter remind us that there 
are historical dimensions to this problem that we need to be aware of. 
We can learn from past societies that the economy is a subsystem of 
a larger biophysical system and dependent upon it. Past civilizations 
collapsed because their leadership elites ignored this basic fact. There 
is a connection between power, environmental degradation, and social 
collapse. A demographic explosion not only hurts the hundreds of 
millions of people caught in it, but also does great damage to other 
spheres. Human activity, ecological damage, and social and political 
conflict are related, these authors contend. Their consensus, with some 
variation, is that the projected growth in the world's population can­
not be sustained without social and political turmoil. 
The earth is under a twofold attack from human beings-the ex­
cessive demands and wasteful habits of affluent populations of devel­
oped countries and the billions of new mouths to feed in the developing 
world. This leads Gowdy, Trainer, and Abernethy to portray the issues 
as a race against time. The main source of conflict and war is the 
ceaseless quest for greater wealth and power in a world with shrink­
ing resources. Dilworth provides a theory that tries to explain how we 
got into this vicious-circle predicament, but he also believes that there 
can be no solution to the problems outlined above within an economy 
driven by market forces and capital accumulation. If we do nothing to 
stabilize the world's total population, curb the profligate use of energy 
and food, and control damage to the environment, before long we will 
have so overpopulated and ransacked the earth that we will pay a 
heavy price in regional, possibly global, conflict. As Abernethy sug­
gests, even the United States is not insulated from this problem. Mi­
gration strains, illegal immigration, urban collapse, the growth of an 
urban underclass, social disintegration, and rampant crime are all 
related to illegal immigration, which is related to global overpopula­
tion. This problem also has an impact on the developed world, which 
must find solutions; Abernethy suggests some that deal with popula­
tion and immigration control. Finsterbusch proposes solutions that 
increase the ability of governments to macromanage the economy and 
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allow for major value shifts in society away from consumption to 
simplicity and "conspicuous frugality." 
It is clear that ideological rivalries, racial and religious hatreds, 
and historical factors also contribute to conflict. Nevertheless, the so­
cial effects of scarcity seem to form the context within which such 
struggles swiftly intensify. Although, as Tainter and Dilworth point 
out, this was as true in ancient Macedonia or in eighteenth-century 
Europe as it is today, what has changed is the momentum of popula­
tion growth involving hundreds of millions of people, rather than the 
millions in Louis XIV's day. W hat sort of future do we face if social 
turbulence increases at the same pace as the world's population? T hat 
is the subject of the case studies in part three of the book. 
The authors in part three go bey ond the empirical and theoretical 
studies of the first two parts to examine how scarcity has already led 
to mass death and genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti 
and to speculate on the likelihood that scarcities could be a more 
decisive factor in genocide in the future. Roger Smith, David Smith, 
and Waltraud Morales argue effectively that scarcity is not the only 
explanation for global wars, ethnic violence, and civil unrest within 
states or between them. However, the important conditioning and 
motivating factor of scarcity cannot be underestimated and probably 
will be more prevalent in the future given the convergence of resource 
scarcity, environmental depletion, human degradation, and ethno­
political and religious discrimination. Furthermore, as Rappoport ar­
gues, "postmodern" people, unfortunately, will generally be tolerant 
of and perhaps indifferent to genocidal events. All the relevant cul­
tural factors-the language, imagery, and climate of moral ambigu­
ity -suggest that a growing desensitization is at work. To help break 
through this pervasive psy chic numbing and political apathy, Craig 
Rimmerman calls for engaging students in a serious confrontation with 
the implications of doomsday thinking and its critique. We must find 
way s of encouraging students and ourselves to confront serious issues 
and their social implications. Otherwise, we may slide into the frag­
mentation of the postmodern personality that Rappoport believes fa­
cilitates the adoption of desensitizing or defense mechanisms when 
facing impending tragedy. 
Against such seemingly persistent and powerful social, economic, 
demographic, and psy chological forces, what can an individual or a 
polity do to forestall these destructive forces? In the modern world, 
20 Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann 
events move at an outstanding speed, and our consciousness cannot 
keep pace. We remain trapped in the old, familiar modalities of thought 
and politics and economic organization. Yet, we have the ability, if not 
always the will, to change. We are, it seems to us, overdue to start this 
change and transformation. We have no alternative. As Primo Levi 
wrote more than a decade ago about the brave souls who stood up to 
oppression in the Warsaw Ghetto rebellion: "They have demonstrated 
that even when everything is lost, it is granted to man to save, to­
gether with his own dignity, that of future generations."  (Levi 1989, 
170-71) .  We still have that ability, but with every passing year and 
every new global tragedy, it becomes more difficult to grasp. 
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Why should affluent societies in Europe or the Americas care about the 
population explosion in the developing world, ecological disasters in 
the Mediterranean basin, and the spread of mass poverty and disease in 
the far-flung corners of the world? Of what practical concern is it for a 
banker in Tokyo, a businessman in Copenhagen, a farmer in Iowa, or a 
housewife in Alberta-who are busy trying to live their lives-that there 
is famine and civil war in Somalia, floods in Bangladesh, and genocide 
in Rwanda or Bosnia? There always have been enormous gaps between 
the rich and the poor nations. The reason people in the developed world 
should care is that it is absolutely in their self-interest to limit the expo­
nential growth in population and resource depletion. 
The demographic imbalance between rich and poor societies is 
producing a migratory flow from the poor to the rich societies, that is 
challenging the ability of the rich societies to absorb the poor without 
devastating conflict. It is certain that people have always inflicted 
damage upon their environment. Human beings have cut down, 
burned, overgrazed, and polluted their habitats since ancient times. 
But the environmental crisis we now confront is quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from anything we have faced before simply 
because so many people have inflicted so much damage to the world's 
ecosystem during the present century that the system as a whole-not 
simply its parts-may be in danger. We see this happening in world 
population growth, in increasing rates of resource depletion, in eco­
logical damage, and in widening disparities of income and resource 
use between developing and developed nations. All of these tenden­
cies strain the capacities of the world's ecosystem to sustain itself into 
the next century without regional or global disasters. That is the focus 
of the following section. 
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2. The Threat to the Underclass 
John B. Cobb, Jr. 
Projecting the future is very uncertain business. Nothing is more cer­
tain than that there will be surprises. History never moves smoothly 
along expected lines. 
What can be said with some certainty is that projection of present 
directions leads to catastrophe. Current rates of growth in population 
and in per capita consumption cannot be sustained. Great expansion 
of both is still possible in principle, especially assuming increased 
efficiency in the use of resources, continuing technological advances, 
reduced warfare and military expenditures, and major social adjust­
ments. Surprising developments can extend this possibility even fur­
ther than can now be imagined. 
The cost of this continuation of present trends will be enormous. 
Remaining wilderness will disappear, with great reduction of bio­
diversity. Agricultural production will be more and more dependent 
on high-tech methods. Increasing dependence on chemicals and 
bioengineering will have now-unpredictable effects on human health. 
Nuclear energy will be relied on regardless of the dangers involved. 
Higher levels of pollution will have to be tolerated. 
Although this scenario seems more optimistic than its alternative of 
earlier collapse of the system, it is, in some respects, more frightening. 
By postponing adjustments for a long time, indeed, until the surface of 
the earth and human relations have all been adapted to high tech and 
to full global integration, they lead to a situation in which the eventual 
failure of the system will affect everyone catastrophically. Even the 
knowledge of how to survive apart from the expertise of the technocrats 
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will have been lost, and the sources for subsisting from nature will have 
been destroyed. Hence, although now-dominant forces will hold this 
course as long as possible, and most people are likely to support them, 
this may well be the most destructive of the possible scenarios. 
The surprises in store for us may not be of this sort. They may 
instead be crises that strike us much sooner than we expect. Changes 
in weather may appear more abruptly than now anticipated, and they 
may prove more disruptive of agricultural production globally than 
now projected. These changes might lead to mass migrations to places 
where there is food, migrations that will be violently resisted. Bacteria 
and viruses may evolve faster than our devices for protecting our­
selves from them, leading to population reduction through massive 
epidemics. People oppressed by the continual expansion of the present 
system may revolt in much larger numbers than in the past and may 
cause social chaos. The psychological stresses associated with the 
present system may overwhelm it as it continues to assault human 
community and demand the abandonment of all security. Fanatic 
political or religious movements may gain such power as fundamen­
tally to disrupt the economic system. 
I am making no such predictions. Surprises cannot be predicted. 
The likelihood is that what happens will not fit any pattern now 
imaginable to us. Perhaps some surprises will favor the continuation 
of growth and others will lead to major setbacks. The greatest surprise 
would be the emergence of a widespread recognition that the continu­
ing pursuit of growth is a mistake. Such a surprise is not impossible, 
and to that possibility we will return. 
Having acknowledged the likelihood that present trends will not sim­
ply continue into the future, I will nevertheless describe these as they 
now appear in the United States and point out some of the already 
emerging negative features that threaten to become steadily worse. 
These are the dark side of policies and procedures that are now almost 
universally accepted and affirmed. Basically these policies and proce­
dures express the "economism" that is now the dominant spiritual 
force in the world, the belief that the economic sector is the one hope 
of salvation and that it affects this salvation through growth. 1  
1 .  M y  sources, other than general information and the article by Kaplan for which 
data are provided in the text, are not in regularly published documents. For my com­
ments on Cuba I am indebted to a Food First Action Alert, spring 1994, entitled "The 
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Because of the victory of "economism" since World War II, na­
tional governments have relinquished power in favor of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the transnational corporations. It is the deci­
sions of these economic institutions that now determine the fate of the 
planet. Their primary goal is to facilitate the increase of gross world 
product through overcoming all remaining restrictions on the move­
ment of capital and goods across national boundaries .  
Because national boundaries still inhibit the movement of work­
ers, the mobility of capital and goods puts the workers in each country 
into competition with those in others. This competitive situation ex­
erts a downward pressure on wages in affluent countries. It also dis­
courages standards of workplace safety and environmental safeguards, 
and it undercuts the bargaining position of labor unions. Unfortu­
nately, because of the vast number of unemployed and underemployed 
persons in low-wage countries, it does not exert a comparable upward 
pressure on wages, standards, or empowerment of labor in the coun­
tries to which capital moves. 
In sum, the globalization of the market restores the great advan­
tage of capital over labor, which had been eroded during the later 
years of national markets. In those contexts, labor could organize and 
bargain with considerable success. Because corporations were compet­
ing with other corporations that had to make similar concessions to 
labor, their resistance to these concessions was limited. Governments 
were interested in the quality of life of their citizens and hence regu­
lated business in its treatment of workers. The globalization of the 
market ended this relative equity. Labor unions cannot organize effec­
tively across national boundaries, and no global governmental organi­
zations enforce standards on transnational corporations. 
The result is that the gap between those who live from capital and 
those who live from labor is growing steadily wider. Those who live 
from capital are not only the financiers themselves but also those 
dependent on lawyers, managers, technical experts, educators, and 
Greening of Cuba" by Peter Rasset and Shea Cunningham. For my information on 
Kerala T am indebted to an unpublished essay by W. M. Alexander, 30 El Mirador Court, 
San Luis Obispo, Calif. 93401,  entitled "Exceptional Kerala: Efficient and Sustainable 
Human Behavior." The statistics I cite are found on page 17. The data on the GPI are 
in a desktop publication of Redefining Progress, 116 New Montgomery, Room 209, San 
Francisco, Calif. 94105, dated September 1994. It is entitled "The Genuine Progress 
Indicator: Summary of Data and Methodology," and its authors are Clifford Cobb and 
Ted Halstead. The detailed statistics are provided on page 39. 
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specialists of many other kinds who are paid well for their services. In 
affluent nations perhaps 20 percent of the population enjoy the pros­
perity of capital. 
T he remainder of the population is divided between those whose 
labor is needed in the market and those who are not needed. T he 
unneeded group exists because of surplus labor in general or because 
persons in the group lack the qualities or skills required to function 
effectively in the market. In the United States, as farming was dis­
placed by agribusiness and unskilled factory work was sent overseas, 
this unneeded group grew. It has become a full-fledged underclass. 
Such a class has alway s existed, but it has in the past been a minor 
element in society. As long as most people lived on farms, there was 
work for all. Small-scale production could employ persons of a wide 
range of education, skills, and personality ty pes. Industrial society 
also provided innumerable unskilled jobs. 
Now we have a society in which almost all persons are separated 
from all means of production. They have been removed from the land. 
Small-scale local production cannot compete with major industries. 
And major industries have found it more profitable to employ low­
skilled and semiskilled labor in other countries. Because competition 
in the global market requires constant reduction of labor costs, and 
because technology can replace even highly skilled labor, the superflu­
ous group grows, and competition for the remaining attractive oppor­
tunities intensifies. Reduced use of middle management threatens 
members of this class as well. Former members of the classes of skilled 
labor and management are forced to compete for fewer well-pay ing 
jobs. All of this makes an increasing segment of our society superflu­
ous from the point of view of production for the market. 
W hen the governments assumed some responsibility to feed, house, 
and clothe all citizens, programs were instituted to provide a mini­
mum of income for all. As the underclass grows, it claims more from 
the government through these programs. The programs at the same 
time discourage the underclass from taking such unskilled, poorly 
paid positions as are still available. Because welfare pay s as well as 
these jobs, and because these positions no longer lead to better ones, 
dependence on the government becomes the less unattractive choice 
for some. 
T he more enterprising members of the underclass turn to crime. 
T he laws against drugs that are nevertheless in great demand make 
control of their distribution lucrative and the best chance to escape 
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permanent poverty. Competition in the underclass for control of dis­
tribution contributes to the mutual killing that is so widespread. The 
crime within the underclass leads to near war between it and the 
police. At any given time a high percentage of the young males is in 
prison. 
Meanwhile, the declining standard of living and reduced pros­
pects of the working class make its members anxious and angry. 
Their anger is directed not at the wealthy but at the underclass. The 
underclass is depicted as being supported by the taxes of workers 
despite the unwillingness of the underclass to work. Its criminal ac­
tivity is highlighted, and the need to be protected from it is exagger­
ated. Little attention is given to the causes of the growth of this 
unproductive, sometimes violent, and often self-destructive segment 
of society. 
The climate now exists in the United States for withdrawal of 
governmental support of the underclass. The money saved will be 
used to strengthen law enforcement and build more prisons. Mean­
while, the economic system increases the size of the underclass, and 
the withdrawal of public support and concern lead to fewer alterna­
tives to criminal activity and self-destruction. Fewer alternatives in­
tensify the fear and hostility of workers and allow those in power to 
increase the barriers between the underclass and the remainder of 
society. Their self-destruction is now accepted so long as they do not 
disturb the rest of society. 
I am here depicting a rapidly emerging situation. The residual 
compassion for the suffering of the underclass still prevents "the final 
solution."  Those who decrease support for its members are careful in 
their public rhetoric. But the trend in public opinion and public policy 
is to abandon this class to its own devices. And if this leads to its self­
destruction, few mourn! That most of the members of this class are 
black and brown makes it easier for the white majority to ignore their 
suffering and to blame those who suffer for their misery. 
Globally, the population that is superfluous in relation to the needs of 
the market is much larger. It includes a considerable part of Africa, 
Latin America, and south Asia as well as selected populations in the 
Middle East. The Palestinian Arabs constitute an especially clear case. 
The Jews would have preferred that the Palestinians leave as they 
conquered Palestine. They have not resorted to extreme measures to 
eliminate them. They have not practiced genocide. But they have taken 
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most of the best land and, even more important, most of the water 
resources, thus drastically restricting the economic opportunities of 
the Palestinians. They have repressed resistance to these measures and 
generally allowed few political or civil rights. They have spread their 
settlements in such a way as to make a genuine Palestinian state 
unlikely. Although they do make use of some Palestinians as workers, 
they are reducing this dependence. Survival of Palestinians in the land 
left to them in the Gaza Strip, for example, will depend on an inter­
national largess that is very restricted. With few exceptions, Palestin­
ian Arabs are being forced into underclass status. 
This forced underclass status is happening on a much larger scale 
in Africa.  R. D. Kaplan, in a shocking article, "The Coming Anarchy," 
published in the February 1994 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, describes 
the situation in West Africa. In Sierra Leone supplying timber for the 
global market led to deforestation, which in turn has caused erosion 
of much of the agricultural land. Much of the rural population has 
moved to shantytowns around the capital, where the water supply is 
not differentiated from the sewers. Swamps have appeared where 
forests once grew, and these breed malarial mosquitoes. Now most 
persons have a type of malaria that does not respond to standard 
treatment. AIDS is spreading rapidly. Political order has broken down. 
The resources of Sierra Leone are no longer important for the 
global market. With the end of the cold war, strategic considerations 
are no longer relevant. The threat of malaria keeps foreigners out. 
Hence aid depends on charitable concerns, concerns that are not im­
portant in global circles. We may thus consider almost all of the popu­
lation of this country as relegated permanently to the underclass. The 
world will pay little attention as civil war, hunger, and disease take 
their course. 
Kaplan describes the global increase in shantytowns surrounding 
the urban centers of "developing" countries. He notes that they vary 
greatly in their ability to generate livable communities. But the conclu­
sion is that an increasing portion of the vast population that becomes 
superfluous in rural areas because of modernization of agriculture 
cannot be absorbed in the industrializing cities. This underclass con­
stitutes a threat to political stability. We may doubt that governments 
defending themselves against this superfluous population will be 
particularly hesitant to use near-genocidal means. 
Some of the people who are superfluous from the perspective of 
the market cling to their land in rural areas. Peasant resistance to 
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displacement by agribusiness occurs in many places. The major war­
fare that has developed in recent decades is low-intensity conflict by 
armies against peasant resistance. Because the labor of these peasants 
is not needed by the developing economy, and their presence hinders 
modernization, governments are rarely concerned with their political 
and human rights. 
The threat to indigenous peoples is more extreme. In many situ­
ations their livelihood is bound up with the forests that are being 
destroyed in the name of the global market and economic progress. 
Their defense of these forests is often met with violence, and the de­
struction of the forests undercuts their way of life and their means of 
livelihood. The globalization of the market is accompanied by the 
decline of indigenous populations worldwide. They are not only su­
perfluous but positively stand in the way of progress. 
These comments are about the recent past and the present with lim­
ited projections into the future. The market creates an underclass, which 
has occurred nationally in the past as Joseph Tainter and Chris Lewis 
point out in subsequent chapters. As the market becomes more and 
more fully global, this underclass grows rapidly and comes to include 
whole peoples. 
When we hear that a billion people in the world are hungry, we 
are usually told that we should promote economic development 
through the expansion of the global market to produce the food needed. 
We are less often told that it is the economic development and the 
expansion of the global market that has caused most of the hunger. 
Nor are we usually told that the increased agricultural production 
generated by modernization of agriculture does not provide food for 
these people because they have no means to pay for it. In short, we are 
rarely told that the policies supposedly justified by the needs of the 
poor are the policies that have made them poor and that add to their 
numbers year by year. 
Because the policies do not tend to include these people in the 
productive economy but tend to increase the size of the underclass, 
and because members of this class are too poor to constitute a signifi­
cant market for the increasing supply of goods, these people are, in­
deed, superfluous as far as the global economy is concerned. They are 
already suffering a none too benign neglect and sometimes active attack. 
When production can no longer keep up with demand because of 
resource shortages and pollution, we can be sure that it is they who 
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will suffer first and most acutely. We can be sure of this because it is 
already happening and because the policies that lead to these results 
are becoming more fully dominant. 
The one restraint on brutal treatment of the underclass is the moral 
teaching of humanism and of the major religious traditions. This moral 
restraint is losing its hold on the masses of workers, who think they are 
asked to make sacrifices for the sake of the underclass. Should signifi­
cant sacrifices really be asked of them, it is clear that they will refuse. 
In our essays for this book we are asked to consider not only the 
threats to human well-being implicit in present practices as they are 
projected into a future of real scarcity but also how the foreseeable 
suffering may be mitigated. In the sections that follow, I will consider, 
briefly, directions the underclass itself may adopt to reduce threats to 
its survival. I will then consider, at greater length, the possibility that 
the working class may call for changes in basic policies that would 
eventually reincorporate the underclass into the economy. These pos­
sibilities also involve changes that could enable society to adapt to 
growing scarcity in ways that would not be self-destructive. 
The one generalization that can be made about the future of the 
underclass is that it cannot count on help from the dominant society 
as long as present policies are in force. In the inner cities of the 
United States and in the slums surrounding Third World cities, this 
class will be increasingly neglected and contained, even sealed off, 
from the rest of society. West Africa will be ignored. Resistant peas­
ants and indigenous people will be harassed, will have their leaders 
imprisoned or killed, and will be forced off their remaining land. 
Their survival will depend on their own resources under extremely 
adverse circumstances. 
What is astonishing is the extent to which, under such circum­
stances, many do find ways of surviving, which requires that they 
establish solidarity among themselves and self-reliance. Kaplan de­
scribes the great differences in slums in which new communities are 
created and in those where such community is absent. 
In the inner cities of the United States, the most hopeful develop­
ments are those of local self-organization into more self-reliant neigh­
borhoods. When such communities develop, the small sums of money 
that enter them can circulate internally rather than quickly leaving to 
pay for external goods and services. The more goods and services the 
members of such communities can provide for one another, the less 
dependent they are on gaining external money. 
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There are severe limits to the economic independence possible for 
many inner city communities. Nevertheless, far more can be done 
than has generally been realized. Even the quantity of food that can be 
produced locally in urban areas is surprising. Pooling of financial 
resources can lead to support of local, very small-scale entrepreneurs. 
Housing repair and maintenance can often be done by local people. 
Those who have such skills can teach others. When cash is scarce, 
services can be provided within the neighborhood by barter and labor 
exchange. As the community meets more of its members' needs, au­
tomobiles become less important. 
This buildup of the local community contributes to survival not 
only by reducing reliance on unreliable external sources but also by 
improving the self-image of the members. Members of the underclass 
become self-destructive when they internalize the image held of them 
by the larger society. To whatever extent they become self-determining 
they also gain self-respect and respect for one another. Consumption 
of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco declines, while their costs in crime, 
money, and human ability become available for constructive use in the 
neighborhood. 
These comments are vague, but they point in the only direction 
that offers hope. If the wider society involves itself at all, it is to tie the 
inner city more into the larger economy. This procedure does not work 
and will not last. The few who are benefited are likely to leave the 
community. Only if such resources that the larger society is prepared 
to offer are brought under the control of the community will they 
benefit the neighborhood in an inclusive way. And this benefit will 
occur only to the extent that the resources are used to make the com­
munity less dependent on the larger society. 
These comments are also idealistic. The extent to which they can 
be implemented in any neighborhood composed largely of the 
underclass is likely to be limited. To picture any such neighborhood as 
able to survive without strong ties to the outside seems absurd. Nev­
ertheless, in my projections, it is the only hope. As outside support 
and positive involvement declines, drastic changes will occur. Where 
a strong sense of community exists in a neighborhood, these changes 
may be toward greater mutual support even in desperate conditions. 
Where it does not, we must expect mutual destruction by persons who 
are seeking their own survival at the expense of their neighbors. 
The survival of whole nations that are superfluous in the global economy 
depends on similar principles. They will survive to the extent that they 
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become self-sufficient economically. Their long-term survival will also 
depend on their sustainable use of their resources. 
An interesting case study here is Cuba. Cuba never intended to 
become a self-sufficient economy. Its economy was long tied into that 
of the Soviet Union, and in typical market fashion it specialized in 
producing what it could export to Eastern Europe, chiefly sugar. It 
imported oil, fertilizer, insecticides, more than half of its food, and 
industrial equipment and supplies. 
When the Soviet empire broke up, the problems with such "inter­
dependence" became apparent. Because of Cuba's interdependence 
with the Soviet Union, it could not meet its own basic needs without 
this trade. This situation would not have been serious if Cuba had 
been admitted on reasonable terms into the new global trading sys­
tem. But the price of admission was to abandon its socialist experi­
ment and return to the capitalism from which it had freed itself. 
Unwilling to do this, it has been forced to move toward a much more 
self-sufficient economy. Its continued political independence depends 
on its success in making this difficult move. 
The transition is extremely painful. Because Cuba produced less 
than half of its food, and because even that depended on imported 
fertilizers and insecticides, the nation was in very poor condition to go 
it alone. Despite heroic efforts to shift production, food consumption 
per capita may have dropped by 30 percent ! From being a well-fed 
nation, Cuba has dropped to the level of the poorest of Latin Ameri­
can countries. The only difference is that what food there is is distrib­
uted equitably by rationing. 
The question is whether Cuba can learn quickly to produce food 
organically and with human and animal labor. Fortunately, Cuban 
agronomists had done a great deal of research on alternative farming 
methods before the crisis, which has enabled Cuba to make rela­
tively rapid progress .  If Cuba succeeds in making this transition and 
feeding its people organically and sustainably, it will mark a first 
case of successful transition from unsustainable monoculture to sus­
tainable agriculture . 
It is far too early to say whether Cuba will succeed. It is being 
forced to make this transition under enormous hostile pressure from 
the United States, which is doing all it can to make the transition 
difficult and to encourage opposition to the government within Cuba. 
The Cuban people may decide they prefer subservience to the United 
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States to hunger. On the other hand, there is no clear sign that the will 
to political independence has died. What has been learned unequivo­
cally is that such political independence is possible only if there is 
basic economic independence as well. 
Even if Cuba succeeds in feeding itself sustainably, there will be 
many continuing economic problems. Becoming industrially self-sus­
taining may prove even more difficult. Doing so with a sustainable 
use of resources may not be possible. The whole experiment may fail. 
Even if it fails, it will have come close enough to success to suggest 
that under more favorable circumstances and with more time to make 
the transition, many countries could still attain relatively sustainable 
economic self-sufficiency. 
It may be unrealistic to think that any country will voluntarily 
adopt this course. At present most countries have acquiesced in the 
structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund 
designed to move them further away from self-sufficiency and to bind 
them more firmly to the global market. They have done so despite the 
obvious suffering this imposes on their people. Once they have taken 
these steps, extricating themselves from the market becomes more and 
more difficult-as difficult as it is proving for Cuba. Nevertheless, it 
is important to see that political and economic independence may not 
yet be impossible. And as the price of dependence on the global market 
to nations at its periphery becomes ever clearer, some of those that are 
most expendable from the perspective of the global market may fol­
low Cuba's example. 
A qualification is in order here. Cuba has been able to make its 
own decisions only because of the strength of an army that is loyal to 
the government. Invasion by the United States would be too costly in 
' 
American lives to be supported by the American people, and the revo-
lution has been too popular among the people for efforts at subversion 
to succeed. 
These circumstances are unique. The Cuban is the only revolution 
in Latin America that the United States has allowed to continue for 
such a long time. Chile, Granada, Panama, and Nicaragua are more 
typical examples of revolutionary efforts and their destruction. Through 
direct intervention or through subversion, the United States may con­
tinue to prevent other nations from following the Cuban model, even 
if it continues to succeed. Probably this policy will continue for some 
time to be true in Latin America. But in Africa and in parts of Asia, 
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where less is at stake for the United States and the global market, 
countries unimportant to the global market may be allowed in time to 
follow Cuba's examples. 
For the underclass, I have argued, as long as the global market reigns 
supreme, the one hope is disengagement from it. Any neighborhoods 
or countries that have thus disengaged will have not only a better 
chance of surviving while the market reigns but also a better chance 
of surviving its ultimate collapse. Of course, they will not escape the 
global problems of pollution and weather change. And any resources 
they preserve for sustainable use may stir the envy of more prodigal 
neighbors when global shortages are acute. This is not an optimistic 
scenario. 
The long-term hope of the underclass must be that the world's 
workers will awaken to the consequences for them of the global mar­
ket system. This awakening would mean that the anger now directed 
against the underclass would be redirected against the system that 
produces this class and works against their own well-being. If this 
redirection happens widely enough and soon enough, the direction of 
the economy can still be changed-an occurrence that would be a 
surprise. It would be the one truly favorable surprise that I can now 
imagine. 
To consider how such a change could occur requires us to con­
sider how matters now stand. Most workers recognize that massive 
redistribution of existing wealth will not occur. Further, they do not 
want what little wealth they themselves possess to be redistributed to 
the underclass. In any case the communist experiment in redistribu­
tion is viewed as a total failure. Hence, economic solutions must not 
require such redistribution. 
The solution to economic problems must therefore be economic 
growth. Growth enables all to gain at the expense of none. The capi­
talist system best promotes growth. It requires specialization in pro­
duction, the more the better. The amount of specialization possible is 
proportional to the size of the market within which capital and goods 
flow freely. Hence, expanding the market to the entire planet gives 
maximum opportunity for that growth to occur. 
This general picture is so deeply rooted in the common sense of 
modem culture that even the occurrence of massive counterevidence 
does little to raise questions about it. For example, during the past 
twenty years, while economic growth in the United States has contin-
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ued unabated, wages have fallen dramatically. The growth of the 
economy has not benefited workers. 
The standard response is that this is a temporary situation to be 
corrected by further growth and that this further growth requires glo­
balization of the market. This, in turn, requires that U.S. producers 
become more efficient, and that means that they should employ fewer 
workers. Thus the downsizing of U.S. companies that directly reduces 
the number of well-paying jobs available is affirmed as the means of 
benefiting U.S. workers. In support of this argument economists point 
out how many new jobs have been generated in the U.S. economy. 
They rarely point out at the same time that these are less well-paying, 
less secure jobs, with less prospect for advancement. 
This counterfactual defense of globalization as the way of improv­
ing the situation of workers is buttressed by blaming other countries 
for being less open to U.S. goods than the United States is to theirs. 
Japan is the target of this criticism. Certainly, Japan is internally far 
less committed to the free market than is the United States. The Japa­
nese government and financial leaders still strive to order the economy 
to the benefit of the Japanese people as a whole. In this they have been 
remarkably successful. Of course, their economy as a whole benefits 
immensely from the openness of U.S. markets to their goods. But even 
if they surrendered to U.S. pressure and removed all formal restraint 
on imports, the benefits to U.S. workers would be minimal. 
The truth is that the gains made by U.S. labor in a basically na­
tional economy are being rapidly eroded in its globalization. There is 
no reason to suppose that continued globalization will reverse this 
trend. On the contrary, the only hope for improvement in the condi­
tions of labor is the return to a national economy. 
The objection is immediately made that such a return would be 
less productive, meaning that it would reduce the gross national prod­
uct (GNP) or the gross domestic product (GDP), or at least slow their 
increase. Because it is assumed that rapid growth as measured by 
these indices is of near-ultimate importance for the economic well­
being of the nation and its people, this argument is taken as decisive. 
Because of the widespread assumption that growth, measured in 
this way, is desirable, a few efforts have been made to ascertain the 
relation between such growth and the economic well-being of the people. 
All economists agree that the correlation is not perfect. Some things are 
counted in GNP and GDP that do not contribute to economic welfare, 
and some things that do contribute to economic welfare are not counted. 
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An example of the former are expenditures on crime that rise with the 
rate of crime and do not indicate that people are better off. For example, 
household activities, such as cooking, cleaning, and child care, are es­
sential to the economic well-being of the community. However, while 
acknowledging that the GNP and GDP are imperfect indications of 
economic well-being, economists generally continue to use them to 
measure economic progress. Recently they have come to favor the GDP. 
More careful study, however, reveals that the gap between what is 
measured by the GDP and real, sustainable economic well-being is 
sometimes very large. The most thorough study now available is be­
ing conducted by Redefining Progress, a San Francisco organization. 
It has developed what it calls the genuine progress indicator (GPI) . 
According to this indicator, from 1950 to 1992, while the per capita 
GDP more than doubled (from less than $8,000 to more than $16,000), 
per capita GPI declined from nearly $6,000 to just over $4,000, or 
about 25 percent. 
There is no exact measure of economic well-being. But if the best 
available figures indicate that the policies leading to doubling the GDP 
also lead to a massive decline in sustainable economic well-being, 
surely questions should be raised about the wisdom of continuing 
those policies! Because this decline in economic well-being, both cur­
rent and anticipated, corresponds to the experience of most workers, 
it may be possible to persuade them to detach themselves from com­
mitment to this destructive form of growth. 
Not all the factors considered in the genuine progress indicator are of 
interest to all workers. Some of them deal with environmental deterio­
ration. Those concerned for the well-being of the environment and 
with intergenerational equity constitute another group, overlapping 
with labor, who may be persuaded that continuation of current growth­
oriented policies, especially the globalization of the market, is a mis­
take. These policies certainly intensify the assault upon the natural 
world. 
The environmental community currently is more vigorous in ar­
ticulation of its concerns than is labor. Also, although many of its 
members are strong supporters of economic growth and globalization, 
others have already recognized the inherent problem with this direc­
tion. Environmentalists and labor joined forces in criticizing the North 
American Free Trade Agreement and gained some concessions. Hav­
ing done so, some of each group accepted the agreement. Others, 
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especially among the environmentalists, opposed it on more funda­
mental grounds. 
Unfortunately, the tenuous alliance that was then forged was frag­
mented by the outcome. Those who understand that growth and glo­
balization are twin enemies of humanity remain a small element in 
society as a whole. Supporters of the present system are firmly in 
control of both political parties, the media, and the academy. They are 
currently recovering ground lost to environmentalists in the past two 
decades. At least in the United States and in the global power system, 
the sovereignty of the market has never seemed more secure. 
On the other hand, pride might come before a fall . The arrogance 
with which everything is subordinated to a market that serves the rich 
at the expense of all others could elicit a reaction. Workers and envi­
ronmentalists could once more join forces, and they could achieve 
greater persuasiveness among other citizens. I am not predicting this 
scenario; I am simply describing the only hopeful one I can imagine. 
The question is what positive program could be proposed to pre­
pare for the coming scarcities. The answer is that the program would 
have to be worked out by those who recognized its importance. Nev­
ertheless, in this very speculative essay, my speculations about what 
should go into such a program can be included. 
I have already made it clear that the first step would be the rever­
sal of the move to the global economy. This step would be far from 
easy! Nevertheless, for the United States such a move would not entail 
the suffering that is now occurring in Cuba. For the United States to 
feed itself and meet its other basic needs would not be difficult. For it 
to shift massively to organic agriculture without serious disruptions 
would take time, but it is certainly possible. For it to shift toward more 
labor-intensive farming with more use of animals would also take 
time, but there are no fundamental obstacles once a popular decision 
to move in this direction was reached. 
The goal would not be simply for the United States to feed itself 
but for most food for each region to be grown locally. Shortened sup­
ply lines are another part of the move toward reduced use of scarce 
resources and reduced pollution. There would be no need abruptly to 
cut off all imports or to stop trading with other parts of the country, 
but as shortages become more critical, the regions most able to feed 
their residents will be most secure. 
Even this kind of farming is not ultimately sustainable, for it does 
not end the erosion of soils. Further experiments in preserving and 
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regenerating soils are urgent. The most interesting now are those of 
the Land Institute under the leadership of Wes Jackson. The institute 
is developing perennial plants that can be grown in combinations 
analogous to those of the prairie and attain yields comparable to today's 
annual grains. Success in this experiment could revolutionize farming 
and make it truly sustainable. 
We now pay very little for our food, because the costs are passed 
on to society and to the future in other forms. This passing of costs is 
connected with the oil-intensive agriculture that has displaced so many 
farmers. Some of our payments to the unemployed are also part of the 
cost of food. 
A society oriented to minimizing future crises resulting from short­
ages would pay the full cost of producing food sustainably. It would 
accept imperfections in vegetables and fruits. On the other hand, its 
produce would be fresher and more healthful. 
Another change would be a shift from heavy emphasis on meat to 
more fruits, vegetables, and grains. Eating meat is an inefficient way 
to gain the calories and nutrients we need. Our current meat-oriented 
diet is, in any case, less healthful. Much of the increased cost in pro­
ducing fruits, vegetables, and grains with fewer chemical fertilizers 
and insecticides and less oil-run machinery would be canceled by the 
reduced cost of eating grains directly in comparison with meat. 
I have concentrated on food, because when we think of funda­
mental shortages and the risk of massive human suffering resulting 
from them, food comes first. A people who can feed themselves are 
likely to survive. "Food first" is the correct slogan. 
The discussion of food also indicates how the society that can 
survive will involve more of its people in its economy. One major 
cause of the underclass is the displacement of farm labor by fossil 
fuels and the agribusiness these make possible. The development of a 
truly sustainable agriculture will require the reemployment of many 
people. Of course, the move from inner city to countryside will be just 
as difficult as the earlier move from countryside to inner city, but it 
can have a far more positive outcome. As necessary habits and skills 
are developed, society can again find means to help many become 
independent farmers with a secure and crucially important role in 
society. 
Proposing a move in the United States from global dependency to 
national sufficiency as a means of readying itself for global shortages 
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appears to many to be hard-hearted in relation to our trading part­
ners. It is true that it will be highly disruptive, just as the shift from 
national economies to a global one has been disruptive. It is not true 
that in what matters most, it will harm these partners. If they are to 
survive the coming shortages without immense suffering, they, too, 
need to live close to the soil and be able to meet their basic needs. 
Encouraging them to stop producing food for themselves in order to 
export the products of agribusiness to us has not been good for their 
people. To reverse this process will benefit far more people than it will 
harm. 
There is, however, a serious problem with which I have not dealt, 
or needed to deal, in my scenarios for Cuba or the United States. In 
much of the world, population growth has made it impossible to re­
turn to earlier economic patterns. The shift to independent farmers 
would enable many to return to the land, but many others would find 
no place there. And in some countries the agricultural base probably 
cannot support the existing population, much less the larger popula­
tions projected in the next century. 
My judgment is that there is no way of preventing massive suffer­
ing that does not involve curtailment of population growth, some­
times drastic. At present, it is true, overconsumption is a greater 
problem for the planet than overpopulation. The difference is that 
consumption can be greatly curtailed without terrible suffering by 
policies such as I have outlined. But where a population already presses 
the limits of carrying capacity, it simply cannot continue to grow. One 
solution is emigration to other regions that are not so crowded. If 
countries like the United States and Canada agreed to take surplus 
populations, absolute global limits would be postponed-but not much. 
Meanwhile, the price in social and ecological disruption would be 
enormous. I do not believe that easing barriers to emigration from 
overpopulated countries is truly helpful. It is important for people in 
each geographical area to face the finitude of their land and to deter­
mine what they want to do. If birthrates continue high, death rates 
will rise. If they choose that maxim, they must accept the consequences. 
Populations will not reach the projected highs. 
Nevertheless, changing policies in the United States will help even 
in these countries, especially if the policies are followed in other afflu­
ent countries. Many of the resources of impoverished countries are 
now annually transferred to the affluent world. Repayment of debts 
and the policies required to make these payments are a major factor. 
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In a world no longer committed to globalization of the market, these 
debts could and should be promptly forgiven. Poorer countries would 
be left with their own resources to use for themselves. 
Furthermore, the abandonment of the global economic system need 
not mean the end of aid. Ambiguous as aid has been in the past, some 
forms have helped people. Aid in family-planning programs and in 
community development should be greatly increased, while massive 
projects geared to what has been called development in the past should 
end. In any case, people must develop their own solutions. Ones 
imposed from without will not work. 
Kerala provides a hopeful indication of what a less-industrialized 
people can do for itself. Kerala is a state in India with per capita 
income about average for that country. It has operated with demo­
cratic processes and has come through open discussion to the adop­
tion of a number of interesting social policies. Its remarkable success 
can be judged by the following statistics comparing Kerala with India 
in general. 
1. In India 31 percent of women of high school age are in school; 
in Kerala, 93 percent. 
2. In India the number of deaths per thousand live births is 91; in 
Kerala, 16. 
3. In India the average number of children per family is 3 .9; in 
Kerala, 1 .9. 
4. In India the life expectancy of women born today is 59; in Kerala, 
73. 
Again, it is important to understand that these results were not 
achieved by economic growth. In this respect Kerala is not ahead of 
India as a whole. They were achieved by social policies that have 
ensured that the basic needs of all are met and that have targeted the 
improvement of the condition of women as of special importance. 
These policies have not involved compulsion by an authoritarian gov­
ernment but shared decisions. Kerala's success is one of the unforesee­
able surprises that make hope possible. 
3. The Paradox of Global 
Development and the 
Necessary Collapse of Modern 
Industrial Civilization 
Chris D. Lewis 
Collapse is recurrent in human history; it is global in its occurrence; and 
it affects the spectrum of societies from simple foragers to great empires. 
-Joseph Tainter 
The Collapse of Complex Societies 
With the growth and expansion of a European market economy since 
the seventeenth century and the development of a global industrial 
economy in the twentieth century, science has recorded the rapidly 
accelerating human destruction of the earth (Turner et al. 1990) . Since 
the 1950s, with the aid of modern science and technology, the human 
population has doubled, and scientists predict that the enormous trans­
formations of the earth in the past three centuries will be doubled, 
trebled, or more in the centuries to come (Kates, Turner, and Clark 
1990, 14) . If we are to feed the projected 10 to 12 billion people by 
2050, we will need to increase agricultural production three to four 
times and increase energy consumption six to eight times (Kates, Turner, 
and Clark 1990, 14) . Can global, modern industrial civilization sustain 
this rapid rate of growth without destroying itself or really endanger­
ing the well-being of future generations? How can we support grow­
ing populations in the underdeveloped world and increasing affluence 
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in the developed world without destroying the earth and undermin­
ing modern industrial civilization? Tragically, the struggle to feed 
exploding populations and improve living standards throughout the 
world is only accelerating the global destruction of the environment. 
Since its birth in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, the 
modern world, driven by the desire to accumulate wealth and control 
human and natural resources, has waged a brutal war against the 
earth. In Extinction, biologists Paul and Anne Ehrlich (1981, 8) note 
that "never in the 500 million years of terrestrial evolution has this 
mantle we call the biosphere been under such savage attack." In their 
1993 World Scientists' Warning to Humanity, signed by more than 
1,680 scientists worldwide, concerned scientists warned that "human 
activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environ­
ment and on critical resources" (Union of Concerned Scientists 1993, 
3). Tragically, the modern world's relentless struggle to conquer and 
subdue the earth in the name of progress will bring its collapse and 
ruin. Its vain struggle to control and defeat the awesome power of 
nature will, in the end, destroy modern industrial civilization. 
I will argue that we are witnessing the collapse of global industrial 
civilization. Driven by individualism, materialism, and the endless 
pursuit of wealth and power, the modern industrialized world's ef­
forts to modernize and integrate the world politically, economically, 
and culturally since World War II are only accelerating this global 
collapse. In the late-twentieth century, global development leaves 80 
percent of the world's population outside the industrialized nations' 
progress and affluence (Wallimann 1994) . When the modern industri­
alized world collapses, people in the underdeveloped world will con­
tinue their daily struggle for dignity and survival at the margins of a 
moribund global industrial civilization. 
With the collapse of the modern world, smaller, autonomous, local 
and regional civilizations, cultures, and polities will emerge. We can 
reduce the threat of mass death and genocide that will surely accom­
pany this collapse by encouraging the creation and growth of sustain­
able, self-sufficient regional polities. John Cobb has already made a 
case for how this may work in the United States and how it is working 
in Kerala, India. After the collapse of global civilization, modern peoples 
will not have the material resources, biological capital, and energy to 
reestablish global civilization. Forced by economic necessity to be­
come dependent on local resources and ecosystems for their survival, 
peoples throughout the world will work to conserve and restore their 
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environments. For the societies that destroy their local environments 
and economies, as modern people so often do, will themselves face 
collapse and ruin. 
Thus, the rapid expansion of modem industrial civilization since 
the 1600s, which modem peoples understand as progress, is destroy­
ing the earth and threatening the human future (Hauchler and Kennedy 
1994) . Since the birth of the modem world, we have witnessed accel­
erating global population growth, air and water pollution, destruction 
of forests, farmland, and fisheries, depletion of nonrenewable natural 
resources, loss of biodiversity, and increasing poverty and misery 
throughout the nonmodern world (Brown and Kane 1994) . In 
Worldwatch's State of the World 1 995, Hilary French (1995, 171)  con­
cludes: "The relentless pace of global ecological decline shows no signs 
of letting up. Carbon dioxide concentrations are mounting in the at­
mosphere, species loss continues to accelerate, fisheries are collapsing, 
land degradation frustrates efforts to feed hungry people, and the 
earth's forest cover keeps shrinking."  And in his introduction to State 
of the World 1995, Lester Brown (1995) warns that eroding soils, shrink­
ing forests, deteriorating rangelands, expanding deserts, acid rain, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, the buildup of greenhouse gases, air 
pollution, and the loss of biological diversity threatens global food 
production and future economic growth. How could this rapid growth 
in wealth, population, science and technology, and human control over 
the natural world have produced such catastrophic results? 
Progress is proving to be a dangerous delusion, which modem 
peoples continue to support despite the overwhelming evidence that 
it has led to an escalating war against the earth. Ironically, the modem 
world's relentless pursuit of victory in this centuries-old war against 
nature will be the principal cause of its defeat and collapse. In The 
Vanishing White Man, Stan Steiner (1976, 277) argued: The ruins of the 
Roman Empire, and the Mayan and Byzantine and Ottoman and Inca 
and Islamic and Egyptian and Ghanaian and Nigerian and Spanish 
and Aztec and English and Grecian and Persian, and the Mongolian 
civilization of the great Khans are visible for all to see. Is it heresy to 
say that the civilization of the white man of Western Europe, which 
has dominated much of the earth for four hundred years, is about to 
become one more magnificent ruin? Not because it has failed to ac­
complish its goals, but because it has succeeded so well, its time on 
earth may be done. The paradox of development is that the tremen­
dous success of modem industrial civilization will be the cause of its 
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collapse and ruin. To understand this paradox, we need to understand 
how modern economic and political institutions are creating both the 
so-called developed and underdeveloped worlds, which I will refer to 
as the First and Third worlds (Escobar 1995) . 
By creating the specter of vast, untold wealth and freedom in the 
First World and massive, desperate poverty and despair in the Third 
World, global development is creating the contradictions that will 
undermine global industrial civilization. On the one hand, global eco­
nomic integration is creating spectacular wealth and progress for the 
20 percent who live in the developed world, but, on the other hand, 
it is creating massive poverty and social unrest for the 80 percent who 
live in the underdeveloped world (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994) . Be­
tween 1960 and 1995, rather than shrinking, the income gap between 
the rich and the poor grew. In 1960 the richest 20 percent of the world 
earned thirty times as much income as the poorest 20 percent, while 
by 1991 the richest 20 percent was approaching sixty-one times as 
much wealth as the poorest (French 1995, 176). At the United Nations 
World Summit for Social Development in March 1995, James Speth, 
administrator of the United Nations Development Program, noting 
that the income gap between the rich and poor had doubled over the 
past thirty years, said: "This widening gulf breeds despair and insta­
bility. It imperils our world" (Crossette 1995, A6) . 
Despite this growing inequality between the developed and the 
developing worlds, aid to developing nations has been shrinking and 
will continue to do so. Industrial nations and the major international 
lending institutions are asking developing nations to invest more of 
their own money to meet basic needs (Crossette 1995, A6) . But how 
can they afford to do this given the increasing burden of debt servic­
ing? By 1993 the total external debt of developing countries was $1 .7 
trillion (French 1995, 178) .  To pay off that debt, developing countries 
paid $160 billion in debt-service payments in 1992-more than two 
and a half times total official development assistance (French 1995, 
178). Instead of becoming developed, some Third World leaders charged 
that they were becoming even poorer, and even more dependent on 
shrinking foreign aid (Escobar 1995) . 
Most people in the world are living on the margins of develop­
ment. Three-quarters of the world's population lives in the 130 poorer 
countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and most of the popula­
tion do not have either steady jobs or secure income (Barnet and 
Cavanagh 1994, 179) .  In Global Dreams, Richard Barnet and John 
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Cavanagh (1995, 22) argue that there is a growing struggle between 
"the forces of globalization and the territorially based forces of local 
survival seeking to preserve and to redefine community." Barnet and 
Cavanagh (1995, 429) conclude that "local citizens' movements and 
alternative institutions are springing up all over the world to meet 
basic economic needs to preserve local traditions, religious life, cul­
tural life, biological species, and other treasures of the natural world, 
and to struggle for human dignity. " This increasing conflict between 
the demands of global industrial civilization and diverse peoples and 
cultures to protect their way of life and local autonomy is further 
evidence that the modern world is collapsing. 
The integration of the global economy after World War II caused 
the growth of neofeudalism in the Third World, and in parts of the 
First World. Outside the increasingly guarded and walled prosperity 
of the developed world lives an expanding global peasantry, strug­
gling to survive the encroachment of the modern industrial world into 
their lives.  Surrounded by impoverished masses, neofeudal city­
regions are emerging as the new hubs of global economic activity 
(Gardels 1995) . Today there are at least thirty city-regions that domi­
nate international trade and commerce (Petrella 1995, 21) .  The wealthy 
in these city-regions (CR) share more economic and political interests 
in common than they do with the citizens of the nations they are 
located in (Petrella 1995, 21) .  Instead of the G-7 nations controlling the 
global economy, we are witnessing the rise of the CR 30. In an increas­
ingly neofeudal world, these city-regions are islands of affluence, sur­
rounded by a sea of global peasants, whose livelihoods have been 
undermined by global free trade, the mechanization of industry and 
agriculture, environmental degradation, and the growth of sprawling, 
deteriorating megacities in the Third and First Worlds (Petrella 1995). 
This global peasantry faces increasing poverty, misery, and de­
spair. According to the United Nations, "the world's poorest, in fact, 
got poorer in the 1980s and there is a great correlation between mount­
ing instability . . .  widespread unrest, turmoil and violence which is 
now affecting an unprecedented number of countries in the develop­
ing worlds" (Ihonvbere 1992, 8). In 1992 the head of the World Bank, 
Barbar Conable said, "Living standards in Latin America have fallen 
below those of the 1970s. In sub-Saharan Africa, parts of the region 
have suffered a veritable collapse of living standards, institutions, and 
infrastructure" (Ihonvbere 1992, 7) . In its 1990 report, the youth com­
mission warns about the political and economic threats created by 
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"mass poverty, economic dislocation, deindustrialization, declining 
foreign aid, mass net transfer of resources of about $40 billion a year 
from the Third World to the developed world, decaying institutions, 
political tensions and instability and the general inability of poverty­
stricken and debt-ridden countries to provide for the basic needs of 
the majority" (Ihonvbere 1992, 8). With the possible exception of some 
of the newly industrializing countries of east Asia, most of the rest of 
the Third World "is an economic, social, and ecological disaster zone" 
(O'Connor 1994, 171) .  
The increasing poverty and despair of the Third World was exac­
erbated in the 1990s by the First World's effort to rebuild Eastern 
Europe and help the countries of the former Soviet Union. Many Third 
World leaders complained that this diversion of resources and foreign 
aid has increased their suffering and desperate situation (Ihonvbere 
1992, 10) .  In "The Continent That Lost Its Way," Victoria Brittain (1994, 
150) describes Africa as a disintegrating continent: "Across Africa, 
nation-states are disintegrating under the pressures of economic, envi­
ronmental, political, and social stress more acute than at any time 
since the slave trade. Hundreds of thousands of people are on the 
move. "  Amid this societal disintegration, AIDS is wreaking untold 
havoc on the African continent. What has caused the rapid growth of 
what political scientists refer to as failed or collapsed states in Africa? 
Massive population growth, deforestation and soil erosion, air and 
water pollution, destruction of the environment, the growth of export 
agriculture, and mass migration to overpopulated, deteriorating cities 
is straining the ability of African nations to meet the needs of their 
people and increasing the spread of the AIDS virus. Besides the loss 
of vital foreign aid, African countries are facing increased economic 
competition, promoted by the World Bank, from Asia and Latin 
America, which has driven the prices of African exports lower and 
lower (Brittain 1994, 151) .  Faced with declining export earnings, in­
creasing tariff barriers in the industrialized nations, and pressure from 
First World lending institutions to pay its foreign debt, Africa is sink­
ing into poverty, starvation, and despair. 
But this desperate situation faces not only Africa but increasingly 
the entire Third World . While many in the First World experience 
untold wealth and affluence, the Third World continues to sink into 
poverty and misery. According to the United Nations Development 
Program, between 1960 and 1989, the gap between the rich and the 
poor nations doubled (Chomsky 1994, 129). This growing economic 
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inequality is created by the developed nations feeding off the wealth 
of the underdeveloped nations. According to Susan George, resource 
transfers from the Third to the First World amounted to "a much 
understated $418 billion from 1982 to 1990, which is the equivalent in 
today's dollars of some six Marshall Plans for the rich through debt 
service alone" (Chomsky 1994, 130) . During these same years, besides 
the developed world's looting their resources, predatory loans from 
First World banks increased the Third World debt burden by 61 per­
cent, 110 percent for the least-developed countries (Chomsky 1994, 
130) . And, finally, according to the World Bank, tariffs and protection­
ist measures of the industrial countries reduced national income in the 
Third World by about twice the amount of official aid (Chomsky 1994, 
129). Thus, First World development depends on the underdevelop­
ment of the Third World and the growth of neofeudalism. 
In the 1990s increasing violence and societal decay is widespread 
throughout the underdeveloped world. Made superfluous-surplus 
population-by the global economy, young people, especially young 
men, from .Kinshasa to Munich to Los Angeles act out by becoming 
brutal, violent criminals, "striking out blindly in all directions" 
(Enzensberger 1993, 39) . This condition is most evident in the failed or 
collapsed states in Africa. In 1995 most states in Africa have either 
failed or are collapsing (Gruhn 1995). Civil wars and sporadic violence 
in failing states have produced enormous refugee populations through­
out Africa (Gruhn, 1995) . 
Instead of seeing these collapsed states as the result of the failure 
of development, and the increasing economic marginalization of en­
tire populations, the American foreign-policy elite sees these problems 
as the result of "ethnic, nationalist, and separatist conflicts, which they 
refer to as ENS wars" (Schwarz 1995, 58). According to Leslie Gelb, the 
president of the Council on Foreign Relations, these foreign civil wars 
are "the new core problem in post-Cold War politics" (Schwarz 1995, 
67) . Gelb concludes that "the main strategic challenge for the United 
States is to develop plans . . .  to stem civil wars" (Schwarz 1995, 58) . 
But Gelb and First World economic and political leaders fail to recog­
nize the larger cause of these ENS wars, which is the economic, soci­
etal, and environmental ruin caused by development. These states fail 
because their citizens no longer believe they can solve the economic 
and political crises they face. Instead of looking to the state, they look 
to ethnic, religious, tribal, and social groups to end their poverty and 
restore social and .political order. The increasing number of ethnic, 
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nationalist, and separatist conflicts (ENS wars) throughout the world 
further demonstrates that global industrial civilization is collapsing. 
Failed states and chaotic and lawless cities in Africa illustrate the 
growing contradictions confronting the modern world. In Civil Wars, 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1993) examines what he calls "molecular 
civil wars" created by the breakdown of the state. In molecular civil 
wars, which are raging out of control in many parts of Africa, the 
young and the desperate prey on the helpless masses and themselves. 
This violence further undermines the ability of the failed state and 
society to restore economic, political, and social order. Reflecting on 
the vicious, brutal, nihilistic nature of escalating urban violence in 
Savages and Civilization, Jack Weatherford (1994, 282) argues that "civi­
lization has produced a savagery far worse than that which we once 
imputed to primitive tribes . . . .  Civilization created and nourished 
[these urban savages], and the center of the city has become the new 
frontier." This savagery and the violence, disorder, and despair it 
generates is caused by global development and the underdevelop­
ment it creates. 
With the growth of a global industrial economy after World War 
11, First World political and economic elites found that to support 
continued economic growth and affluence of the developed world, 
they had to promote poverty, social disorder, and despair in the Third 
World. The irony, however, is that since the 1970s, these elites have 
been forced to create similar conditions in the First World. The eco­
nomic and social crises created by this poverty, disorder, and despair 
in both the Third and increasingly the First World countries is causing 
the collapse of global industrial civilization. 
In the early 1980s the so-called Third World debt crisis threatened 
to destabilize the global economy. Developing countries found that 
development and the creation of export industries paid for by First 
World loans could not solve the economic and social problems that 
development experts and global elites promised they would. Instead 
of ending poverty and improving the quality of life, development 
seemed to be creating more poverty, and even underdevelopment. 
By the 1980s, because of the deterioration of terms of trade, falling 
commodity prices, tariff barriers, and extraction of economic surplus 
by transnational corporations and by the World Bank and First World 
banks, it was evident to many Third World peoples that their poverty 
and underdevelopment was caused by First World exploitation of their 
wealth, resources, and workers. In the 1980s, large parts of Asia, Af-
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rica, and Latin America saw their worst economic crisis in this century 
(Escobar 1995, 90) . For example, in the 1980s Latin American nations 
paid the First World an average of $30 billion more each year than 
they received in new lending (Escobar 1995, 83) .  In Latin America the 
1980s are known as the lost decade. 
By the 1990s it was all too evident that the First World's prosperity 
was dependent on the continued underdevelopment of the Third World. 
While the 130-plus developing countries of the South (referred to as 
the Group of 77) already account for four-fifths of the world's people 
and one-sixth of its economic output, the industrialized countries 
(known as the G-7 industrial nations), with 26 percent of the popula­
tion, account for 78 percent of world production of goods and ser­
vices, 81 percent of energy consumption, 70 percent of chemical 
fertilizers, and 87 percent of world armaments (Escobar 1995, 212). In 
the 1990s the average per capita income in the developing countries is 
only about 6 percent of that of the developed countries (Speth 1992).  
While the First World celebrated the return of economic prosperity in 
the 1980s, more than fifty developing countries experienced a decline 
in per capita food production (Speth 1992). Moreover, since 1982, the 
food available to poor people in the Third World has fallen by about 
30 percent. It has fallen because of the success of development and the 
growth of export markets. Without the wealth and affluence of the 
First World, Third World peoples found they could not afford to buy 
the food that development helped them produce. As a result, accord­
ing to the United Nations, the number of people in absolute poverty 
is 1 .3 billion (Crossette 1995) . The debt crisis and increasing poverty 
and suffering in the 1980s led many Third World peoples to conclude 
that development, far from being a miracle cure for their growing 
problems, was just another form of neocolonialism. 
By the early 1990s development experts were predicting that within 
the next fifty years, the human population would exceed 9 billion and 
global economic output may quintuple (Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, and 
Rathjens 1993) . If the use of energy increased sevenfold between 1950 
and 1990 to create our present development, what increase in energy 
would it take to develop the entire globe (Wallimann 1994, 47)? In 
addition, we must ask whether the global environment can support 
another sevenfold increase in energy use between 1990 and 2030. Could 
development, even sustainable development, provide the natural re­
sources, ecosystem services, affluence, and freedom to support this 
growth without undermining the ability of the earth to meet the 
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demands of modern industrial civilization? This was the central ques­
tion participants at the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Envi­
ronment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, which pretentious 
organizers called the Earth Summit, were confronted with (Sitarz 1994) . 
But despite the 1992 Earth Summit and international discussions 
about sustainable development by First World political and economic 
elites in the 1980s and 1990s, the relentless pursuit of wealth and 
profits and unsustainable development continues. The great modern 
myth supporting this development is the promise that global eco­
nomic growth will eventually bring to all peoples the wealth and 
abundance enjoyed by a minority in the First World. But this myth is 
increasingly being questioned by the majority in the Third World, who 
have yet to see the cornucopia created by development. 
In fact, First World claims about the emergence of a democratic, 
fully integrated, global industrial economy are clearly specious. De­
spite this so-called globalization, most people are outside the global 
industrial economy (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994) . The transnational 
corporations (TNCs), which are the primary links in this global 
economy, are concentrated in the industrial world and in scattered 
enclaves throughout the underdeveloped world. Thus, globalization 
has created islands of affluence in a vast sea of underdevelopment in 
the Third World (Redclift 1987) .  In this emerging global industrial 
economy, development enables the First World to live off the resources 
and degraded environments of the Third World. 
In Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions, Michael 
Redclift (1987, 112) defines development as "the process through which 
the environment is transformed from a local cultural and ecological 
system . . .  into a functioning element in the international system." Pre­
cisely because of this development, Redclift (1987, 45) concludes, "the 
ecological breakdown, forecast in the 1960s and 1970s, has already oc­
curred in parts of the South." Billions of people in Latin America, Af­
rica, and Asia are discovering that poverty, collapsing social institutions, 
and environmental degradation are the price of development. 
The growth of failed states in sub-Saharan Africa is a measure of 
the true costs of development. Having borrowed billions of dollars to 
pay for this development, much of sub-Saharan Africa is now starving 
while debt interest is being paid (Redclift 1987, 69) .  In "The Coming 
Anarchy," Robert Kaplan (1994, 46) argues that "West Africa is becom­
ing the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental stress, in 
which criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger. Disease, 
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overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee mi­
grations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international bor­
ders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and 
international drug cartels are not the most tellingly demonstrated 
through a West African prism." Connelly and Kennedy (1994, 72) warn 
that West Africa "increasingly looks like strife-torn, plague-ridden 
medieval Europe."  And Kaplan (1994, 58) concludes that in West Af­
rica we are witnessing "the political and strategic impact of surging 
populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water 
depletion, air pollution . . . .  " With its failed states and deteriorating 
environment, sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates the tragic impact of 
development in the Third World. 
The 1992 Earth Summit and the promise of sustainable develop­
ment promoted in Agenda 21, the United Nations' 1992 plan for cre­
ating a global sustainable society, were attempts to resolve the 
increasing doubts Third World peoples and politicians have about the 
promise of development (Chatterjee and Finger 1994) . If Third World 
countries withdraw from the global economy to solve their increasing 
economic and societal problems, First World economic and political 
elites fear that this will deprive them of their source of cheap raw 
materials, export markets, and cheap labor required to maintain their 
profits in an increasingly competitive global economy. In the 1980s 
political and economic elites in the developed countries created the 
ideology of sustainable development in a desperate attempt to con­
vince underdeveloped countries that only further global development 
and economic growth can solve the economic and political crises cre­
ated by development (Chatterjee and Finger 1994).  
But, ironically, just as First World countries compete to achieve 
increasing control over the global economy, they are discovering that 
they have less and less control over their own economies and resources. 
With the growth of a global economy since the 1960s, TNCs are lim­
iting the ability of even the most powerful First World nations such as 
the United States, Germany, and Japan to control their own national 
economies. The only currently functioning global agents are TNCs, 
not First World national governments. TNCs conduct 70 percent of 
international trade and 80 percent of foreign investment (Chatterjee 
and Finger 1994, 112). According to the United Nations, the TNCs 
control 80 percent of cultivated land for export crops worldwide and 
a mere twenty of them control 90 percent of pesticide sales (Chatterjee 
and Finger 1993, 106) . 
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If sustainable development and the further integration of the glo­
bal economy are not the answers to the increasing problems confront­
ing both the First and the Third Worlds, then what is the solution? The 
answer, as John Cobb has already argued, lies in the remarkable abil­
ity of peoples and cultures to adapt to constantly changing local and 
regional environments. Thus, if Third World peoples find that devel­
opment and their dependence on the global economy is creating pov­
erty, suffering, and political turmoil, it would, in fact, be very adaptive 
for them to withdraw from the global economy and refuse to accept 
First World efforts to develop them. This would further undermine 
the myth of development, the myth that human progress can be 
achieved only through modernization. 
Whether we call it civilizing, progress, modernization, develop­
ment, or now sustainable development, modern peoples have imag­
ined that it is the developed world's "manifest destiny" to teach the 
rest of the world that modernity is the only course open to them. But 
this is simply not true. There are just too many diverse cultures, 
religions, and ways of life for modernization and global develop­
ment to finally triumph. By refusing to disappear into history, de­
spite innumerable attempts to civilize and teach them to be modern, 
nonmodern peoples demonstrate the resilience and strength of their 
cultures and societies to survive and adapt in a complex and chaotic 
world. 
The First World's failure to modernize and civilize the world should 
not be seen as a tragedy, but as an opportunity. With the increasing 
recognition of the inability of development to resolve the economic 
and political contradictions it creates, whether you call it sustainable 
or not, peoples and communities will be once again forced to draw on 
their own cultures, histories, religions, and intimate knowledge of their 
local environments to improve their lives and ensure a "reasonable 
life" for their children. For most of history, successfully adapting to 
changing local and regional environments was the fundamental chal­
lenge facing human societies. 
But how will First World political and economic elites react to 
these efforts by Third World peoples and others to withdraw from the 
global economy and to create a society and future not based on mod­
ernization and development? Third World peoples' refusal to pay their 
debts, to sell their resources to the developed world, and their refusal 
to allow the First World and TNCs to dominate their economies, so­
cieties, and politics will not come without global conflict and struggle. 
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There will be neocolonial wars, political and economic subversion, 
widespread suffering and turmoil, and social and political chaos. We 
witnessed some of this during the cold war, when the United States 
and Europe found more often than not that they had to force Third 
World people to accept development and the neocolonialism and tre­
mendous poverty, suffering, and political unrest it created. The Soma­
lis and Balkan nations' ability to use force to prevent continued First 
World domination are models for this future conflict. The process will 
not be easy. It will be like the wars and conflicts that brought the fall 
of the Mayan and Roman empires (Ponting 1991). 
The successful collapse of global industrial civilization is, in part, 
dependent on the 80 percent not fully integrated with the global 
economy breaking free from their ties to modern industrial civiliza­
tion. Faced with growing threats of economic and ecological collapse, 
many underdeveloped nations and regions should declare their inde­
pendence from the global economy, recognizing that this economy is 
the larger cause of their poverty. After breaking free from the First 
World's economic and political hegemony, underdeveloped countries 
can then use their resources and people to feed themselves and im­
prove their quality of life. Of course, we have been witnessing such 
attempts for the past fifty years after World War II as colonial and 
neocolonial struggles for independence. The wars in Vietnam, Cambo­
dia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, So­
malia, and in the nations of the former Soviet Union were all struggles 
to win independence from foreign domination. The cold war was, in 
large part, a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union 
over who would dominate the modern world and the so-called non­
aligned nations of the Third World. With the global instability created 
by the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
decline of American hegemony, underdeveloped countries may find 
that they have the strategic opportunity to demand their indepen­
dence from First World domination. They can refuse to pay their debts, 
withdraw from the global industrial economy, nationalize foreign cor­
porations that are exploiting their wealth, and create local and re­
gional economies to support their own people. But Third World 
independence from the First World-dominated global economy will 
not come without a heavy economic, political, and military price. 
With the withdrawal of underdeveloped countries from the global 
economy within the next thirty to fifty years, the developed countries 
will face continual material, ecological, and energy shortages that will 
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force them to downscale their economies. The First World will, ironi­
cally, be forced to follow the lead of the Third World and create local 
and regional economies that are sustainable and self-sufficient. In many 
instances, nations will break up, forming smaller polities tied together 
by ethnic, religious, or social bonds. If these polities and nations take 
responsibility for helping their peoples survive the hardship and suf­
fering imposed by the devolution of the global industrial civilization 
and economy, they will be better able to reduce the real threat of mass 
death and genocide that will arise from the collapse of modern indus­
trial civilization. 
Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allow­
ing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy 
and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United 
States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to 
force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. 
These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even 
regional nuclear wars. If First World countries choose military con­
frontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, 
then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will 
make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these 
neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic 
and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global 
industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex eco­
nomic and trading networks and squander material, biological, and 
energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its 
ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the 
worst-case scenario for the collapse of global civilization. 
It is also entirely possible that the global economy is already so 
fragile that developed countries cannot afford to engage in these neo­
colonial wars, especially if they do not do it as a global block of de­
veloped nations through the United Nations. The desperate struggle 
among competing modern empires to maintain their resource pipe­
lines into the underdeveloped world will only further undermine glo­
bal civilization. Warring nations' attempts to cripple their enemies by 
denying access to their economies and resources will only hasten the 
collapse of the global economy. 
No matter how it collapses, through economic collapse and the 
development of local and regional economies or through a global 
military struggle by the First World to maintain its access to Third 
World resources, or both modern industrial civilization will collapse 
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because its demands for energy, natural resources, and ecosystem ser­
vices are not sustainable. 
The current collapse of economies and states in Africa, Latin 
America, and the former Soviet Union demonstrate that this global 
collapse is already occurring. The inability of the United States and 
the United Nations in the 1990s to solve the economic and political 
problems that exacerbate conflicts in Africa, Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, and the former Soviet Union demonstrate that the developed 
countries might be under such economic and political stress that they 
cannot afford to use the political or military capital necessary to force 
recalcitrant nations and peoples to remain within the global industrial 
economy. Although many would argue that the massive death and 
suffering caused by these conflicts must be stopped, it could be that 
this death will be less than if the First World intervened and tried to 
force Third World countries to remain within global civilization. At­
tempts to intervene in these growing regional conflicts, on the basis of 
liberal internationalism and global civilization, will backfire and cause 
only more suffering. In fact, these interventions will further accelerate 
the collapse of global civilization. 
The fundamental dilemma facing First World political and eco­
nomic elites is that their efforts to create a global industrial economy 
by further integrating Third World countries into the global trade and 
economic system dangerously stresses the material, biological, and 
energy resources of the earth (Union of Concerned Scientists 1993). 
And this economic integration, based on past economic history, will 
create only more poverty in the underdeveloped world. The only way 
to sustain the standard of living of the 20 percent of the world's popu­
lation in the First World is to continue to drain resources from the 
Third World, which even now supports 80 percent of the world's 
population. 
However, there are those who would challenge my conclusions, 
arguing that Agenda 21 (Sitarz 1994) and United Nations' plans for a 
global sustainable society could resolve the growing economic and 
political contradictions that threaten the future of global industrial 
civilization. Agenda 21 calls for reducing the standard of living of 
developed countries and then raising the standard of living of the 
underdeveloped countries up to that sustainable level. Such a global 
sustainable society, however, is impossible because the earth cannot 
support 6 billion people at or anywhere near a modern, First World 
standard of living (Union of Concerned Scientists 1993). Second, the 
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brutal destruction of global ecosystems, material resources, and en­
ergy stocks in the past four hundred years has so damaged the earth 
that there simply aren't the resources and ecosystem services to sup­
port a sustainable, modern global society. The irony and tragedy is 
that our very efforts to create a global economy based on high stan­
dards of living and progress in the last 400 years has so damaged the 
earth and torn apart the fabric of modern civilization that a global 
sustainable society is no longer possible. The fact is that our efforts to 
sustain an increasing standard of living for the 20 percent of the world's 
people in the developed world has created increasing poverty, despair, 
and political and economic chaos for the 80 percent of the global popu­
lation that lives in the underdeveloped world. 
I am not arguing, however, that human overpopulation and the 
resulting destruction of global resources will be the primary factor 
causing the collapse of global civilization. The global environmental 
crisis is the result of the expansion of modern industrial civilization 
and the development of the First World and the underdevelopment of 
the Third World since the 1600s. In Sustaining the Earth, John Young 
(1990, 107) argues that "people constitute an environmental problem, 
not because of their existence, but because of what they do, and the 
parts of the environment they use up or damage."  The culture of the 
modem world-its individualism, materialism, scientism, and faith in 
progress-and the global expansion of that culture is the central cause 
of the collapse of modern industrial civilization (Ehrenfeld 1978) . And 
surviving polities and nations must keep this firmly in mind if they 
are to avoid future collapses themselves. 
The only alternative we now have is to recognize the very real 
imminent collapse of global industrial civilization. Instead of seeing 
this collapse as a tragedy, and trying to put Humpty Dumpty back 
together again, we must see it as a real opportunity to solve some of 
the basic economic, political, and social problems created and exacer­
bated by the development of modern industrial civilization. Instead of 
insisting on coordinated global actions, we should encourage self­
sufficiency through the creation of local and regional economies and 
trading networks (Norgaard 1994). We must help political and eco­
nomic leaders understand that the more their countries are tied to the 
global economic system, the more risk there is of serious economic 
and political collapse. 
In the case of the collapse of Mayan civilization, the city-states and 
regions in Central America that were not as dependent on the central 
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Mayan civilization, economy, and trade were more likely to survive its 
collapse. The city-states that were heavily dependent on Mayan hege­
mony destroyed themselves by fighting bitter wars with other power­
ful city-states to maintain their declining economic and political 
dominance (Weatherford 1994). Like the collapse of Mayan and Ro­
man civilization, the collapse of global civilization will cause mass 
death and suffering as a result of the turmoil created by economic and 
political collapse. The more dependent nations are on the global 
economy, the more economic, political, and social chaos they will 
experience when it breaks down. 
Once global civilization collapses, humanity will not have the 
material, biological, and energy resources to rebuild it. This must be 
the real lesson that nations and polities learn from this global collapse. 
If they try to rebuild unsustainable regional or even international econo­
mies, it will only cause more suffering and mass death. 
In conclusion, the only solution to the growing political and eco­
nomic chaos caused by the collapse of global industrial civilization is 
to encourage the uncoupling of nations and regions from the global 
economy. Efforts to integrate the underdeveloped countries with this 
global economy through sustainable development programs such as 
Agenda 21 will only further undermine the global economy and in­
dustrial civilization. 
Unfortunately, millions will die in the wars and economic and 
political conflicts created by the accelerating collapse of global civili­
zation. But we can be assured, on the basis of the past history of the 
collapse of regional civilizations such as the Mayan and the Roman 
empires, that, barring global nuclear war, human societies and civili­
zations will continue to exist and develop on a smaller, regional scale. 
Yes, such civilizations will be violent, corrupt, and often cruel, but, in 
the end, less so than our current global industrial civilization, which 
is abusing the entire planet and threatening the mass death and suf­
fering of all its peoples and the living, biological fabric of life on earth. 
The paradox of global economic development is that although it 
creates massive wealth and power for modem elites, it also creates 
massive poverty and suffering for underdeveloped peoples and societ­
ies. The failure of global development to end this suffering and destruc­
tion will bring about its collapse. This collapse will cause millions of 
people to suffer and die throughout the world, but it should, paradoxi­
cally, ensure the survival of future human societies. The collapse of 
global civilization is necessary for the future, long-term survival of human 
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beings. Although this future seems hopeless and heartless, it is not. We 
can learn much from our present global crisis. What we learn will shape 
our future and the future of the complex, interconnected web of life on 
earth. 
P A R T  T W O  
Scarcity and Conftiet 

Introduction 
In the light of the broad global trends discussed in the preceding 
section, we should not be surprised if there is a relationship between 
scarcity and internal and regional conflict. With population pressures 
building up in various parts of the globe, the struggle for resources 
intensifies and with the end of the cold war, we may expect to see old 
ethnic animosities and religious conflicts come to the surface with 
greater intensity, particularly in the poorer parts of the world. We 
have already seen this happening in Central America, Southeast Asia, 
Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, and the rimlands of 
the former Soviet Union. 
The optimists argue that natural resources are not a finite entity 
that is steadily being depleted; they see the creation of new or modi­
fied resources that are the result of human inventions and labor, and 
they believe technology has an infinite capacity for solving the earth's 
problems. They also have abiding faith in the resiliency of the earth 
itself and its human inhabitants. Just as Malthus was wrong in his 
predictions, so are today's doomsayers. If the optimists are correct, the 
world will just be a more prosperous place with more "stuff" distrib­
uted to larger numbers of people. If they are wrong, as the contribu­
tors in this section argue, the human race may be in for more conflict 
and suffering if it does not change its course of the relentless pursuit 
of growth, accumulation, and waste. 
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4. Biophysical Limits to 
Industrialization 
Prospects for the Twenty-first Century 
John M. Gowdy 
Human Beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human 
activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment 
and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put 
at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and 
animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable 
to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are 
urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about. 
-Union of Concerned Scientists 
"Warning to Humanity" 
Among physical scientists, and among biologists and ecologists in par­
ticular, the view is widely held that the current level of human activity 
is unsustainable. Various biophysical indicators suggest that our spe­
cies is pushing the limits of the ability of the planet to support us. 
According to calculations by Vitousek and others (1986), human activ­
ity, directly and indirectly, expropriates about 40 percent of the poten­
tial terrestrial products of photosynthesis. Exhaustive calculations by 
Kraushaar and Ristinen (1993), based on solar energy flow, conversion 
efficiencies, and many other factors, estimate that the planet has enough 
arable land to support a population of 10 billion. The human popula­
tion is now approaching 6 billion and still growing rapidly. Economic 
activity, particularly burning fossil fuels and the destruction of forests, 
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has pushed atmospheric C02 to the highest levels since a period of 
global warming some 125,000 years ago. Atmospheric C02 is expected 
to increase from its preindustrial level of 270 ppm to 600 ppm by the 
middle of the twenty-first century raising global temperatures by 3.5° 
to 7°C and raising sea levels by 1 to 2 meters by thermal expansion 
alone (Manabe and Stouffer 1993) . Even if there are no surprises, such 
as a sudden climate flip from one steady sate to another, the rise in 
temperature caused by higher atmospheric C02 levels will have seri­
ous consequences for the ability of the human population to feed it­
self. In the view of many biologists, the most serious environmental 
problem is biodiversity loss. According to E. 0. Wilson (1992) the 
current catastrophic loss of biodiversity represents the sixth major 
extinction of life on earth that has occurred during the 570-million­
year history of complex life on the planet. He estimates that by the 
middle of the next century more than 20 percent of existing species 
will disappear. 
Each of the above calculations and observations may be disputed. 
The likelihood, however, that they are all fundamentally wrong is 
virtually zero. From many different perspectives it is clear that we are 
pushing the limits of the ability of the biophysical world to support 
the continued expansion of the use of natural resources and of the 
assimilative capacity of the environment. Evidence from many sources 
leads us to the conclusion that industrial production will be drastically 
reduced because of constraints on energy and resource use arising 
from supply constraints and environmental limits. It is increasingly 
likely that sometime in the next century the "industrialization project" 
(Wallimann 1994) will come to a halt with unforeseen but probably 
negative consequences for our species. What are the prospects for 
getting off the industrial growth path before social disintegration and 
mass death is inevitable? 
We who are alive today are in a unique position in human history. 
Not only do we exist at a critical instant in the biophysical history of 
the planet but we also have an unprecedented understanding of the 
details of this history. We are beginning to understand how the bio­
physical boundary conditions for human activity are irreversibly chang­
ing and to understand the human role in that process. Scientific 
advances in the past two decades have been truly astounding. Models 
designed to predict the consequences of climate change are being 
continually refined and are becoming more and more accurate. Eco­
logical research showing the value of biodiversity to ecosystem stabil-
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ity is also being developed and refined. Even more important, per­
haps, we are beginning to understand the connections between social 
phenomena, such as class differentiation and the generation of eco­
nomic surplus, and environmental degradation. 
Most of the global changes in the earth's support systems have 
occurred since World War IL The primary cause is the tremendous in­
crease in world economic output, particularly in the northern countries. 
Economic indicators have shown vigorous growth while most biophysi­
cal indicators show an alarming decline. Understanding the conflict 
between economic and biophysical systems is essential to understand­
ing our present predicament and in finding a way out of it. 
The Importance of Economic Growth 
Within the World Soeiopolitieal System 
It is becoming increasingly obvious that the promise of utopia through 
the creation of an ever-more-abundant array of material possessions is 
a hollow one. Not only is continued economic growth impossible in a 
finite world, opinion surveys indicate that, despite rapid economic 
growth in the past, people are becoming less, not more, satisfied with 
the quality of their lives (Schor 1991) .  Even the relatively small minor­
ity of the world's population who have reaped the benefits of an in­
creasing material abundance are increasingly unhappy, less secure, 
and have less leisure time to enjoy their lives. Furthermore, the prom­
ise of extending northern prosperity to "developing" southern coun­
tries is a fading dream. An increasing number of countries are being 
added to the list of what are cynically termed "failed nations."  
I f  i t  i s  physically impossible for economic growth to  continue for 
much longer, and if this growth is evidently making its beneficiaries 
less happy, why then is the goal of economic growth accepted without 
question by every existing government? Two basic reasons are (1)  
economic growth does benefit the tiny minority who make the basic 
decisions about resource use and the distribution of economic sur­
pluses and (2) economic growth is an essential feature of a self­
organizing system whose existence depends on continual expansion. 
From the international to the local level, the proponents of eco­
nomic growth are those who directly benefit from it. These are the 
people most willing to sacrifice environmental quality and social secu­
rity and stability for economic expansion. The people making invest­
ment decisions that will degrade the environment and the quality of 
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life are those who can best insulate themselves from the adverse con­
sequences of those decisions. World leaders of all stripes must be as­
sured that "development" can continue before environmental issues 
are even discussed. Any interference with national sovereignty on 
ecological grounds is met with a self-righteous declaration of the "right 
to develop" (Sachs 1995) .  Who makes the decisions to develop and 
who reaps the benefits? Decisions to destroy collective goods, such as 
rain forests or climate stability, are made by a handful of people in the 
boardrooms of Tokyo, New York, or Zurich. These decisions are fre­
quently subsidized by the institutions of international capital, such as 
the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. At the local level, 
economic growth at all costs is promoted by the most conservative 
growth-oriented segments of the economy as represented by local 
chambers of commerce. The side effects of economic growth at the 
local level, including increased congestion and higher taxes to pay for 
new services demanded, are borne by others. The blind march toward 
the increasing "rationalization" of economic activity and increasing 
privatization of markets is eliminating the last vestiges of social con­
trol over investment and resource-use decisions. 
Economic growth seems to be indispensable to the world economy 
as it currently functions. Economic growth makes it possible to reap 
the benefits of technological advance by ensuring a more rapid turn­
over of capital stock, by alleviating the need to deal with questions of 
unequal income distribution, and by allowing firms to capture in­
creasing productivity from increasing returns to scale (Gowdy 1994) . 
When worker productivity increases, the resulting higher incomes 
generate a need for new products to absorb the increase in demand. 
Expansion due to increased demand enables producers to capture 
economies of scale, resulting in more productivity improvement, higher 
incomes, and so on ad infinitum. Positive feedback mechanisms such 
as these mean that economic growth perpetuates more economic growth 
and that socioeconomic and political features that promote growth are 
continually reinforced. The points of conflict between the prerogatives 
of economic growth and the prerogative of maintaining a planet suit­
able for continued human existence are clear: 
1 .  Population increase is good for the economy because it increases 
the market for goods, but the human population level has reached the 
point where it is environmentally unsupportable. 
2. Increasing per capita consumption is good for the economy but 
requires increasing amounts of resources and generates increasing 
amounts of waste products. 
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3. The expansion of markets is good for the economy but brings 
new parts of the natural world under the peculiar and shortsighted 
logic of market exchange. 
When economic growth slows, income distribution becomes more 
unequal, as it has within the northern countries and between the north 
and the South, since the productivity slowdown that began with the 
energy crises of the 1970s. When economic output declines, as in the 
global and local economic depressions of this century, and today in 
much of the Third World, the result is usually social upheaval and 
mass destruction. Within the present world economic system, eco­
nomic growth is essential to keeping the incomes of the wealthy high 
and keeping the lid on those at the bottom. The problem is that natu­
ral, biophysical laws will, sometime in the next century, halt the ex­
pansion of this human-created system. 
Human Economy as a SeU-Organizing System 
Recent work applying entropy to economic systems has illuminated 
the fact that economic activity is possible only by extracting low en­
tropy from the larger biophysical system. Thermodynamic analysis 
also shows clearly the potential for chaos in far-from-equilibrium self­
organizing systems such as the modern economy. The pioneer of this 
approach to economic theory was Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971), 
who twenty-five years ago published his monumental work, The En­
tropy Law and the Economic Process. Georgescu-Roegen used the en­
tropy metaphor to develop an economic theory based in historical 
time and grounded within biophysical reality. Georgescu-Roegen called 
his theory "bioeconomics." He argued that bound energy and matter, 
low entropy, is not only the taproot of economic value but was also the 
ultimate source of social conflict. Georgescu-Roegen was born in Ro­
mania in 1906 and lived until 1994, giving him a historical and geo­
graphical perspective that fueled his intellectual contributions to 
economics and political economy. 
The idea that the economic process is not a mechanical analogue, but 
an entropic, unidirectional transformation began to turn over in my 
mind long ago, as I witnessed the oil wells of the Ploesti field of both 
World Wars' fame becoming dry one by one and as I grew aware of 
the Romanian peasants' struggle against the deterioration of their 
farming soil by continuous use and by rains as well. However, it was 
the new representation of a process that enabled me to crystallize my 
thoughts in describing for the first time the economic process as the 
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entropic transformation of valuable natural resources (low entropy) 
into valueless waste (high entropy). I may hasten to add . . .  that this 
is only the material side of the process. The true product of the eco­
nomic process is an immaterial flux, the enjoyment of life, whose 
relation with the entropic transformation of matter-energy is still 
wrapped in mystery. (Georgescu-Roegen 1976, xiv) 
Georgescu-Roegen's great contribution was to show, with the en­
tropy metaphor, that the economic process is not a reversible, self­
contained circular flow as described by neoclassic economic theory, 
but is an irreversible system constrained by and dependent upon larger 
ongoing processes taking place in the biophysical universe. This simple 
fact means not only that economic activity is constrained by the larger 
systems but also that by degrading the enveloping biophysical sys­
tem, we limit the future possibilities for human activity. Although 
these observations are self-evident to most natural scientists, they are 
ignored or even hotly contested by most neoclassical economists. 
The application of thermodynamics to social and biological sys­
tems got a boost when Ilya Prigogine won the Nobel Prize for chem­
istry in 1977. He argued that far-from-equilibrium systems can achieve 
a high degree of self-organization by drawing low entropy from an 
adjacent environment (see the discussion in Foster 1995) . The implica­
tions of Prigogine's work are (1)  an economic system cannot exist 
without an open boundary between it and the outside world upon 
which it depends and (2) such a system is inherently unstable because 
the boundary conditions change as low entropy matter and energy 
pass into the system and as high entropy waste passes back across the 
boundary. 
The extension of the work of Georgescu-Roegen and Prigogine 
shows not only the impossibility of continued economic expansion in 
a finite system but also the increasing instability of such a system as 
the limits to expansion are reached. Technological "improvements" 
cannot be relied upon to overcome biophysical limits, because techno­
logical change necessarily affects the boundary conditions between 
the economic system and the rest of the world. Perrings ( 1995) has 
developed a far-from-equilibrium model showing clearly that techno­
logical change is not independent of the economic growth process as 
mainstream economics argues. The law of conservation of mass im­
plies that economic expansion must result in the material transforma­
tion of economic and ecological processes. Given the impossibility of 
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prices to reflect changes in environmental attributes, such changes 
will be unanticipated by markets. Perrings (1995) concludes that "not 
only is the growth oriented economy itself an unstable system, it is 
directly responsible for destabilizing the global system of which it is 
a constituent part ." 
The history of the human species since the widespread adoption 
of agriculture some ten thousand years ago has been one of playing 
out a far-from-equilibrium-producing process of expansion and col­
lapse. Cultures after cultures, in various climates, regions, and epochs, 
have temporarily escaped environmental constraints by tapping scarce 
low entropy only to collapse as the boundary conditions inevitably 
changed and as the biophysical processes upon which they depended 
could no longer support the unsustainable level of economic activity. 
Ghosts from the Recent Past: 
A Business-as-Usual Scenario 
The information and scientific revolution in the past few decades has 
brought a better understanding of past civilizations. Better dating tech­
niques, satellite imagery, and more sophisticated analysis of the cli­
mates and ecosystems supporting past civilizations have led researchers 
to increasingly appreciate the role of environmental degradation in 
social collapse. Human cultures moved to unsustainable technologies 
with the widespread adoption of agriculture some ten thousand years 
ago. The switch from hunting and gathering to agriculture was most 
likely triggered by a sudden climate change, namely, the global warm­
ing that continues today. The widespread ecological disruption trig­
gered by this sudden warming caused a period of coevolutionary 
disequilibrium during which it became increasingly difficult to sup­
port the human population through hunting and gathering. Once 
agriculture and settled communities became established, the increase 
in human population and the formation of hierarchical class-based 
societies locked in the new agricultural way of life. 
The transition to agriculture was the most profound change in 
human history in terms of our relationship to the natural world and 
in our relationships with one another. Rather than living off the day­
to-day flows from nature, the new economic system depended upon 
stocks of natural resources and complex capital goods. Production 
was no longer for immediate use but was geared to creating an eco­
nomic surplus. Not only were these new systems environmentally 
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unsustainable, but production for surplus created a new and evidently 
unprecedented social system based on class division. As Malinowski 
succinctly put it, "Authority is the very essence of social organization" 
(quoted in Woodburn 1982) . With the adoption of economies geared to 
the production of surpluses, and the resulting concentration of power 
in a few hands, the organizers of economic activity and the beneficia­
ries of environmental exploitation were those who could best insulate 
themselves from the negative effects of that exploitation. 
Intensive agriculture was evidently adopted independently in three 
areas of the world about the same time: Mesoamerica, China, and 
southwest Asia. This new economic system quickly led to huge in­
creases in population, highly stratified societies, and large-scale envi­
ronmental disruption. In contrast to the highly stable hunting and 
gathering cultures, which in some cases lasted hundreds of thousands 
of years, the agricultural age has been characterized by rapid expan­
sion and sudden collapse. In central Jordan, by 6000 s.c., less than one 
thousand years after the first adoption of agriculture, villages were 
being abandoned as deforestation led to soil erosion and declining 
crop yields (Ponting 1991, 69) .  The first literate society was that of the 
Sumerians, who kept detailed administrative records about crop yields. 
Analysis of these records show that increasing salinization from 
overirrigation was a problem early on. Wheat and barley were the two 
main crops grown by the Sumerians. Wheat is much more sensitive to 
soil salinity than barley and administrative records show a steady 
decrease in the percentage of wheat grown over the fifteen hundred 
year period beginning about 3500 B.C . .  Written and archaeological 
evidence shows that by 2400 B.c. crop production began to decline 
rapidly. From that time on, there is evidence of a shrinking resource 
base, social unrest, and eventually external conquest by the Akkadian 
empire (Ponting 1991, 70-72) .  The Akkadian empire, in turn, repeated 
the pattern of expansion, environmental degradation, and social dis­
integration (Weiss et al. 1993) . Ponting discusses this pattern for other 
cases, including the Mayan, the Indus Valley, and the Greek and 
Roman empires. Pollen records and other sources show that the present­
day Greek landscape is a result of millennia of overgrazing, defores­
tation, and general land abuse (Runnels 1995) . 
The Mayan civilization, which expanded by an increasingly inten­
sive system of cultivation until it collapsed about six hundred A.D.,  
shows the typical overshoot and collapse. According to Ponting (83), 
by using the natural resources readily available to them, by finding 
ways of exploiting these more fully, and, in some cases, by creating 
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artificial environments, the Maya were able to build a complex society 
capable of great cultural and intellectual achievements, but they ended 
up destroying what they had created. Perhaps the more complex the 
superstructure, the more difficult it was to retain an awareness of the 
connections or to alter course. 
Recent evidence indicates that the Maya leveled their forests to 
make lime stucco used in their monumental architecture. The stucco 
was used on limestone palaces to make a smooth veneer on which to 
create bas-relief scenes of deities and Mayan rulers. According to ar­
chaeologist Richard Hansen, "The object was to display their wealth 
and power and to manipulate the ichnography so as to sustain the 
ruling class" (quoted by Honan 1995, 9). 
One of the most incredible and yet most relevant examples of short­
sighted environmental abuse and social dysfunction is that of Easter 
Island. Easter Island is one of the most isolated human habitations in 
the world lying thousands of kilometers from the nearest inhabited 
islands. It was first settled about A.O. 700 (Bahn and Flenley 1993, 81) 
probably by voyagers from Polynesia. When the first settlers landed, 
the island was forested with palm trees. The soil was rich enough to 
support an agricultural base for a population that peaked at about 
seven thousand. The diet of these settlers included chickens and 
Polynesian rats, which they brought with them, and sweet potatoes. 
Despite the extreme isolation of Easter Island and its small size (it 
is possible to walk around the island in a day), its inhabitants stripped 
the island of almost all trees, overworked the soil, and in general 
created an environmental catastrophe for themselves. By the time 
Europeans arrived in 1722, the population was reduced to a few hun­
dred impoverished residents living in squalor in caves. Apparently, 
the island was controlled by religious cults based on the construction 
and worship of the huge stone figures for which the island is famous. 
In a frequently recurring pattern, as the resource base of the island 
became more and more precarious, religious fanaticism intensified until 
even the most modest efforts at self-preservation were ignored. The 
huge statues were transported using trees as skids, which required 
tremendous amounts of timber as competition to erect statues increased 
among the island's clans. The resulting environmental devastation is 
described by Ponting (1991, 5). 
From [the year] 1500 the shortage of trees was forcing many people to 
abandon building houses from timber and live in caves, and when the 
wood eventually ran out altogether about a century later everyone had 
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to use the only materials left. They resorted to stone shelters dug into 
the hillsides or flimsy reed huts made from the vegetation that grew 
around the edges of the crater lakes. Canoes could no longer be built 
and only reed boats incapable of long voyages could be made. Fishing 
was also more difficult because nets had previously been made from 
the mulberry tree (which could also be made into cloth) and that was 
no longer available. Removal of the tree cover also badly affected the 
soil of the island, which would have already suffered from a lack of 
suitable animal manure to replace nutrients taken up by the crops. 
One lesson to be learned from the history of past civilizations is 
that political pressure from elites bent on preserving their power at all 
cost will inevitably result in perpetuating unsustainable systems until 
it is too late, that is, until environmental degradation leads to social 
disintegration. Easter Island society collapsed even though there were 
no outside forces such as military threats, colonization, or social dis­
ruption through trade. The society used only local natural resources 
whose limits should have been obvious, although the evidence indi­
cates that they acted as if they were oblivious to the impending re­
source exhaustion. Large stone heads were started in quarries but were 
left unfinished because there were no trees left to move them. If such 
obvious self-inflicted environmental collapse could happen in isolated 
island societies where environmental damage is immediate and obvi­
ous, this is certainly an indication that there are no "natural" mecha­
nisms present in post-hunter-gatherer societies to ensure even short-run 
ecological sustainability. There is evidently no negative feedback mecha­
nism in complex societies that limits environmental destruction even 
when that destruction threatens social stability. 
In these past examples (except that of Easter Island), when a par­
ticular society disintegrated, the survivors could migrate to other areas 
and repeat the rapid expansion and collapse. Today the same thing is 
happening on a global scale and there will be no place to go when the 
current system repeats this well-established pattern. A comprehensive 
study led by Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, and Rathjens (1993, 38) involving 
a team of thirty researchers concluded that "scarcities of renewable 
resources are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of 
the developing world."  The results of this study confirm the theoretical 
(thermodynamic) analysis discussed above, and show that the recurring 
pattern of expansion, resource exhaustion, and collapse of human soci­
eties during the past millennia is now repeating itself on a global scale. 
Homer-Dixon and others (1993, 38) conclude that (1) increasing resource 
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scarcity can strengthen the hand of the social elite and exacerbate an 
unequal distribution of resources, (2) the parameters of the resource 
base, such as the depth of upland soil in the tropics, are a physical 
given, not a product of human institutions, and (3) environmental degra­
dation may have passed, in much of the developing world, a threshold 
of irreversibility. Dasgupta (1995), drawing on empirical studies from a 
number of disciplines, comes to a similar conclusion. There are self­
reinforcing links between population, poverty, and the degradation of 
local environments. Dasgupta also points out that power is shared 
unequally among classes and gender and those who make decisions 
about resource use and income distribution ty pically do not pay the 
environmental and social costs of their decisions. For example, in the 
decision to have more children, men in developing countries have more 
power, yet it is the women who bear the costs. Dasgupta (1995) found 
an unmistakable relationship between poverty, female illiteracy, and 
population growth. Data on the status of women from seventy-nine so­
called Third World countries display an unmistakable pattern: high 
fertility, high rates of illiteracy, low share of paid employment, and a 
high percentage working at home for no pay-they all hang together. 
Timothy Weiskel sees common patterns in the collapse of past 
civilizations and today 's environmental and social crises. He argues 
that the history of past civilizations shows a common pattern of 
"gradual emergence, brief flowering, and rapid collapse of civiliza­
tion, often taking the form in the final stages of devastating military 
struggles for the control of arable land or essential resources" (Weiskel 
1989, 104) . The most pronounced ecological and social breakdown is 
occurring in Africa where two-thirds of the countries are affected by 
famine to some degree (Goldsmith 1985). Kaplan (1994) argues what 
is happening in West Africa is a portent of things to come worldwide: 
West Africa is becoming the sy mbol of worldwide demographic, en­
vironmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as 
the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, 
scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of 
nation-states, and international borders, and the empowerment of 
private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now 
most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. West Af­
rica provides an appropriate introduction to the issues, often extremely 
unpleasant to discuss, that will soon confront our civilization. 
T he pattern of burgeoning city populations, environmental degra­
dation, and social unrest is not confined to the African continent. Even 
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countries considered success stories, such as China, are facing the same 
problems. The Chinese economic miracle, according to Homer-Dixon, 
is an illusion. China's recent 14 percent economic growth rate indi­
cates only that the cities of coastal China are joining the Pacific rim. 
China is still experiencing tremendous population growth and incred­
ible environmental degradation (Smil 1993) . A large-scale population 
movement from the rural areas to the cities is now under way, with 
the usual accompaniment of crime and growing income disparities. 
Homer-Dixon expects that China will fragment like West Africa .  
Mayumi (1993) also sees a disturbing pattern in the collapse of  past 
civilizations and what is happening in the Third World. In the collapse 
of past civilizations, disintegration started first on the peripheries of 
power, then closed in on the center. 
A look at past civilizations such as Easter Island shows that their 
institutions could not deal with the problem of long-run ecological 
sustainability. Faced with increasing environmental constraints, just 
before their final collapse, these societies intensified the very behavior 
that took them to the brink of collapse in the first place. Likewise, the 
usual solution suggested today for the problems caused by economic 
growth is yet more growth. For example, the Brundtland report on 
sustainable development began with a clarion call to protect the envi­
ronment from further degradation. The proposed solution, however, 
was more economic growth to pay for environmental cleanup. A de­
tailed analysis of the recommendations of the Brundtland report by 
Duchin and Lange (1994) concluded that even if all of its recommen­
dations were implemented, the world economy would not achieve 
sustainability. 
Ghosts from the Distant Past: 
Is There Any Hope? 
Our species, Homo sapiens, is the last remaining member of a genus 
that first appeared some 3.5 million years ago. For almost all the time 
human beings have lived on earth, our economic and social institu­
tions were based on a hunting and gathering life-style. This is the 
most successful way of life yet devised by human beings in social 
equality and ecological sustainability. An examination of the charac­
teristics of hunter-gatherers can illuminate the connection between 
social equality and environmental integrity and give us some insights 
as to how we might change our existing institutions and get on the 
path toward a just and ecologically sustainable society. 
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James Woodburn (1982), based on field studies of the Hadza, a 
hunter-gatherer culture of Tanzania, describes some of the character­
istics of hunter-gatherer societies that promote social equality: 
1 .  Social groups are flexible and fluid. 
2. Individuals are completely free to choose whom they associate 
with, reside with, and trade and exchange with. 
3. Individuals are not dependent on specific others for access to 
basic requirements. 
4. All relationships stress sharing and mutuality without requir­
ing long-term binding commitments. 
In these types of societies individuals have no real authority over 
one another. Furthermore, all of these characteristics are consciously 
protected as part of what Woodburn calls an "aggressively egalitar­
ian" social strategy. He writes: 
In these societies equalities of power, equalities of wealth and equali­
ties of prestige or rank are not merely sought but are, with certain 
limited exceptions, genuinely realized. But, the evidence suggests, 
they are never unchallenged. People are well aware of the possibility 
that individuals or groups within their own egalitarian societies may 
try to acquire wealth, to assert more power or to claim more status 
than other people, and are vigilant in seeking to prevent or limit this. 
(Woodburn 1982, 432) 
Woodburn distinguishes between "immediate return" cultures, in 
which people obtain an immediate and direct return from their labor. 
Food is eaten soon after it is gathered or hunted, and technology is 
very simple. In "delayed return" systems, people hold some property 
rights over some assets. These assets include "capital" used in produc­
tion, such as nets or boats, processed or stored food, and rights asso­
ciated with wild products that have been improved by human effort, 
such as selectively culled wild herbs or wild plants that have been 
cared for. Although both types are much more egalitarian than 
agricultural- or industrial-based societies, the immediate return sys­
tems are the most egalitarian in wealth, status, and power. Inequalities 
of wealth are not tolerated and women have far more independence 
than in delayed return systems (Woodburn 1978). 
The basic reason is that in immediate return systems, access to the 
means for making a living is free and open to all. Material technology 
is limited. The basic requirement to get along in these societies is the 
extensive knowledge about the specific ecosystems of which each 
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society is a part. This knowledge is freely available and is given to all 
members of the group. With delayed return societies, although they 
are also very egalitarian, we see the beginnings of class differences 
based on access to technology and the resulting control of an eco­
nomic surplus. With permanent surpluses, almost always associated 
with agriculture, came social divisions and the control of production 
and distribution by elites. To the Western way of thinking, the most 
remarkable thing about the distribution of the economic output among 
hunter-gatherers is that it is independent of who produces it. In so­
cieties like the Hadza and !Kung, most of the meat is provided by a 
few hunters. Woodburn notes that among the Hadza there are healthy, 
adult men who have scarcely killed an animal in their entire lives, 
yet are provided for just like everyone else and suffer no ostracism. 
The !Kung have elaborate formal rules disassociating the hunter from 
his kill (Woodburn 1982, 440) . After the kill, the meat is shared among 
the members of the band according to strict rules that break the link 
between production and consumption. Woodburn writes of the 
Hadza: 
Among the Hadza the best portions (which differ depending on which 
species has been killed) belong to the initiated men and may not 
under any circumstances be eaten by the hunter on his own. For the 
Hadza this would be a particularly heinous offence which would be 
likely to result in violence toward the hunter; it would also, Hadza 
believe, cause him to become seriously ill and perhaps even die. 
(1982, 441 ) 
Neoclassical economists would argue that such sharing among 
non-Western societies is merely an insurance policy for future lack of 
success in hunting. A hunter may give up some of his rights over a kill 
to receive a reciprocal exchange later. The evidence suggests that this 
interpretation is totally wrong. According to Woodburn (1982, 441) :  
"Donors often remain on balance donors and may not receive any­
thing like an equivalent return. Entitlement does not depend in any 
way on donation. Some men who are regular recipients never them­
selves contribute."  
That there is  no connection between production and distribution, 
nothing like a "marginal productivity theory of distribution," shows 
the fiction of the notion of "economic man." There is nothing inher­
ently selfish and greedy about our species. Judging from historical 
Limits to Industrialization 79 
hunting and gathering societies, the "natural" state of humankind may 
be much closer to Marx's "primitive communism" than to contempo­
rary capitalism. 
Another feature of hunter-gatherers is that there are frequently 
sanctions on accumulation of personal possessions. The lack of posses­
sions is not merely due to the nomadic nature of hunter-gatherer life. 
There are sanctions that apply even to the lightest objects, such as 
bread or arrowheads. Woodburn (1982, 445) sees one central feature of 
the social organization of those societies that insures egalitarianism. 
People are disengaged from property and thus from the potential for 
property rights to create dependency. This idea could not be more 
subversive to the standard economic way of thinking, which equates 
"freedom" with an ever-greater expansion of "property rights. "  
Maintaining Options for the 
Twenty-first Century 
What can we learn from past societies? Can we use the concepts and 
scientific evidence discussed above to prevent a repeat of history and 
the collapse of our civilization? Two simple facts follow from the above 
discussion: 
1. The economy is a subsystem of a larger biophysical system and 
dependent upon it. Past civilizations collapsed because their institu­
tions ignored this basic fact. 
2. There is a connection between power, environmental degrada­
tion, and social collapse. Decisions about resource use are made by 
those whose power and prestige depends upon continued exploitation. 
In environmental preservation what should we do? The recom­
mendations of most natural scientists concerned about the environ­
ment are basically the same. Chief among the physical requirements of 
sustainability are these: (1)  stop burning fossil fuels; (2) reduce the 
human population to a manageable level; and (3) protect biodiversity 
by protecting large wild areas from market exploitation. Only by quickly 
taking these steps can we prevent mass death and eventual social 
collapse and ensure that our species has a future when our economic 
and social systems change to a new, and unpredictable, form. 
How can we achieve these goals? Gurr (1985) argues that both 
environmentalists and technological optimists have been naive in 
their assessments of the ability of human societies to adapt to change. 
Technological utopians fail to recognize the environmental limits that 
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constrain human technology, and environmentalists fail to appreci­
ate the policy constraints imposed by political realities. Growth pro­
ponents are guilty of technological optimism, and environmentalists 
are guilty of political optimism. 
Gurr (1985, 53) writes: "[J]ust as there are ultimate ecological con­
straints on economic growth, political constraints weigh heavily on 
what might be achieved collectively in the face of serious scarcity." 
Gurr suggests that when relative scarcity increases, and the more rap­
idly it proceeds, the greater the negative political consequences. The 
main negative consequence is a move toward greater disparities in 
income distribution as those in power try to maintain their income 
growth when faced with increasing resource constraints. Thus scarcity 
induced economic decline is likely to result in redistribution from the 
bottom and middle to the top income groups. Such a widening of 
income differences has happened in almost every country since the 
energy crises of the 1970s. The United States now ranks first in income 
inequality among industrialized nations with the wealthiest 1 percent 
owning 40 percent of the nation's wealth (Bradsher 1995) . The increas­
ing concentration of economic and thus political power in the hands 
of a few makes environmentally destructive resource-use decisions 
more likely even if opposed by the majority. In a democracy the in­
creased wealth at the top will be translated into growing political 
power for the most reactionary forces. 
Is there any reason to hope that this process can be reversed? 
Gurr ( 1985, 68) suggests that future environmental crises will be large 
enough and come rapidly enough to convince people of the need for 
comprehensive solutions. The question is will these solutions take 
the form of policies to promote further growth at all costs (by at­
tempting to increase the supplies of economic goods), or will policies 
recognize environmental limits (by decreasing the demand for eco­
nomic goods)? 
In Western democracies, particularly in the United States, we are 
seeing a desperate push by the most conservative forces to increase 
the income of the wealthy at the expense of other income groups and 
the environment. What potential is there for collective action against 
this retrenchment? First of all, the connection between reactionary social 
policies and environmental scarcity must be understood and articu­
lated. As Breyman (1993) notes, knowledge truly is power. Time and 
a growing body of scientific information is on our side. Solutions 
emphasizing shared responsibility and a recognition of limits must be 
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advanced in the political arena. The following groups are likely allies 
in a movement emphasizing frugality, redistribution, and shared 
responsibility: 
1 .  social activists, the poor and lower-middle classes, who are 
feeling the brunt of elitist polices of redistribution, 
2. environmentalists, an increasingly powerful lobby in the United 
States and Western Europe, 
3. the young, who are most concerned with medium and long­
term environmental crises and with social decay, and 
4. segments of the business community that will be most adversely 
affected by scarcity. 
Again, the connection must be carefully and explicitly made be­
tween reactionary social policies and increasing scarcity. 
Paradoxically, it seems that the only hope of preventing a repeat 
of the overshoot and collapse pattern of the past is a sudden, severe, 
and unmistakable environmental shock. If the greenhouse researchers 
are correct, and they have been correct so far, we could see such a 
shock in the next decade or two. The predicted consequences of global 
warming, sea level rise, increasing severity of storms, and an increas­
ing frequency of droughts and crop failure are already happening. The 
ranks of environmental organizations will swell as events such as global 
warming begin to hit with increasing force. Young people who may 
expect to live another fifty to sixty years will be most alarmed by the 
prospects of impending environmental degradation from global warm­
ing and biodiversity loss. Powerful economic interests will also be 
adversely affected by global warming. The insurance industry, for 
example, is already expressing concern about environmental issues, 
and certainly the real estate and tourism industries will be affected by 
sea level rise and severe weather. 
A common theme in much of the new literature about environ­
mental degradation and social conflict is that the nation-state as we 
know it will be of less importance in the future (Gurr 1985, Homer­
Dixon 1991, Kaplan 1994) . Kaplan argues that the central government 
as a unifying force is already being replaced in many regions of the 
world by religious and ethnic organizations. It may be that the best 
hope for preventing social breakdown in the next century is to de­
velop collective institutions based on the middle ground between 
private individualism and national governments. Much of biodiversity 
preservation is being done by organizations such as the Nature Con­
servancy and by local land trusts. As inadequate as these current efforts 
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are, they offer a blueprint for reasserting collective decision making 
regarding resource use. 
Calls for a steady-state economy (Daly 1977) have done much to 
educate and mobilize those concerned about the environmental and 
social decay caused by economic growth. But we must now move 
beyond this simple idea. First of all, it is clear that human activity is 
well beyond an ecologically supportable level. We need to have a 
declining state before we reach sustainability. Second, a steady state 
means no growth, a condition incompatible with industrial capitalism 
and maybe incompatible with surplus-generating economies in gen­
eral. The idea that we can substitute "nonmaterial" economic growth 
for resource-intensive growth does little to free us from the old growth­
as-progress paradigm. We need to go beyond "limits to growth" and 
find "alternatives to growth." The difficulty of this task should not be 
underestimated, but we need to start developing comprehensive alter­
natives now to be ready with workable alternatives when most are 
ready to consider them. 
5. Our Unsustainable Soeiety 
Basic Causes, Interconnections, and Solutions 
Ted Trainer 
The first purpose of this chapter is to summarize the reasons for see­
ing the quest for economic growth and affluent life-styles as the fun­
damental cause of the rapidly deteriorating global predicament. (For 
detailed argument see Trainer 1985, 1989, and 1995a and the Cobb, 
Lewis, and Gowdy chapters in this book.) This obsession largely ex­
plains many apparently unrelated problems, most notably the envi­
ronment, resource scarcity, Third World deprivation, conflict between 
nations, and social breakdown. 
Mineral Resources 
Except for a very few items, to extract minerals from crustal rock, as 
distinct from ore deposits, would require prohibitive quantities of 
energy, for example, ten to a thousand times that required for the 
poorest ores. Estimates of the quantity of minerals that have been 
formed into ore deposits within the top 4.6-kilometer depth of the 
earth's continental crust have been derived by Skinner (1987). It would 
be optimistic to assume that 10 percent of these ore deposits can be 
retrieved (ignoring ore grades and energy costs) (Trainer 1995d) . If we 
also assume that mineral consumption will increase from now until 
2060 when it will have reached the level required to provide 11 billion 
with present rich-world per capita amounts, by 2060 43 percent of the 
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thirty-six most commonly used mineral items would be exhausted. In 
other words, unless the resource estimates are grossly mistaken, it will 
be impossible for all people to rise to the per capita levels of mineral­
resource consumption rich countries have now. 
Food 
It takes about 2 hectares (about 5 acres) to provide the diet for one 
person in a rich country (Rees 1992, 125) .  To provide such a diet for 
the 11 billion people likely to live on earth in 2060 would therefore 
require 22 billion hectares. However, there are only 13 billion hectares 
on the planet, and all available cropland in use is not likely to exceed 
1 .5 billion hectares. Obviously, it would not be possible for all the 
present world population of 5.5 billion to have rich world diets, let 
alone all the people soon likely to live on earth. 
Biological Resources 
The annual American per capita consumption of wood requires 1 .3 
hectares of forest (Pimentel et al. 1994, 369, 371) .  For 11 billion people, 
14.3 billion hectares of forest would be required, which is 3.5 times 
total world forested land area. 
Biological resources are more scarce than minerals or energy. The 
rich-world per capita consumption of most resources is fifteen to twenty 
times that averaged by the poorest half of the world's people. If all 
people expected late next century were to use timber, water, and other 
biologic resources at the rate people in rich countries do today, world 
annual production of these resources would be about ten times what 
it is today. Most biological resources would be exhausted in a few 
decades at most. 
The Net Biological Productivity of the Planet 
About 40 percent of all the biological production of the planet's land 
mass, that is, 40 percent of all plant and animal growth, is ultimately 
harvested by humans (Daly and Cobb 1989, 143) . This figure in­
cludes the timber we take, the fields our animals graze, all crop and 
orchard lands, and so on. Yet, world population is likely to double. 
One species out of the possibly 30 million on the planet will not 
likely be able to gear 80 percent of the planet's land biological pro-
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ductivity to its purposes. Remember that if by 2060 all Third World 
people were to become as affluent as people in rich countries are 
now, annual demand on resources would be ten times what it is now, 
hence limits to growth. Theorists agree with Korten's general conclu­
sion that "sustained economic growth is not possible because human 
economic activity already fills the available ecological space" (Korten 
1990, 97) .  
The Environment 
The way of life taken for granted in rich countries has damaging impact 
on the environment. Large quantities of resources are taken from the 
environment and dumped back into it as waste. The average Ameri­
can consumes twenty tons of new materials every year (U.S. Bureau 
of Mines 1985) . The limits-to-growth position is that the environmen­
tal problem will not be solved until we move to ways of life that 
enable us to greatly reduce such figures. Those ways must involve far 
less production and consumption than we average now. 
This point is clearly made with respect to the greenhouse prob­
lem. The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (1990) con­
cluded that to prevent the carbon content of the atmosphere from 
increasing any further, fossil fuel use must be reduced by 60 to 80 per­
cent. (Brown 1991 p. 24) .  If it were cut by 60 percent and shared equally 
among 11 billion people, each person in a rich country would receive 
only one-eighteenth of the amount each uses now. In other words, enor­
mous reductions in resource use and environmental impact must be 
confronted, and the basic implication of the limits-to-growth argu­
ment is that these reductions will not be achieved without radical 
change in life-styles and systems. 
Possibly the most disturbing element in the limits-to-growth case 
is that several indexes of global agricultural and biological productiv­
ity that have grown rapidly in recent decades have tapered to plateau 
or declined in the 1980s. This is true for world meat production, irri­
gated land area, fertilizer use, fish production, grain land, and grain 
production. Grain production rose at about 3 percent per annum be­
tween 1950 and 1980, but in the 1980s averaged only 1 percent per 
annum growth. The total area of land for agriculture is not likely to 
increase. As new (and more costly) land is being brought into use, 
much the same area of productive land is lost through erosion and 
other forces. World fish catch has fallen below the level of the early 
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1980s. It appears, therefore, that after hundreds of years of constantly 
increasing production, we are in a decade when many crucial biologi­
cal limits are being reached. The World Watch Institute concludes, 
"The earth's biological productivity is shrinking" (Brown 1990, 7) . 
The present levels of global output and consumption are inflicting 
unsustainable damage on the planet and they appear to be approach­
ing limits; yet, high living standards are being provided for only 1 
billion people and eleven times as many will probably have to be 
provided for soon. Similarly, if 3 percent per annum growth in world 
economic output is averaged until 2060, world output would be eight 
times present levels and would double every twenty-three years after 
that. Such multiples would not be achievable if we were already ap­
proaching limits for agricultural production. 
Energy 
If the most common estimates of potentially recoverable resources of 
oil, gas, coal, shale oil, and uranium are taken, and it is assumed that 
11 billion people were to use energy at the per capita rate of people in 
the rich countries today, all these energy resources would be exhausted 
in about forty years (Trainer 1985, chapter 4; Trainer 1995a, chapter 8). 
This projection ignores the greenhouse problem, which implies that 
most of the remaining quantities of all of these sources except ura­
nium should not be used. 
It is very unlikely that present levels of world energy consump­
tion can be maintained with nuclear or renewable energy sources. A 
world in which 11 billion people have present rich-world energy use 
per capita would require about 250,000 giant reactors-about a thou­
sand times present capacity. Nuclear fusion is at best many decades 
away, and owing to the scarcity of lithium, the most likely process has 
potential similarly limited to that of fossil fuels. Therefore, for perhaps 
a century the reactors would have to be mostly "breeders," meaning 
about 1 million metric tons of plutonium constantly in use or being 
moved from reactors to reprocessing plants, and one worn-out reactor 
buried every hour, to say nothing of waste or accident problems (Trainer 
1985, chapter 5; Trainer 1995a, chapter 8). 
Solar, wind, and other renewable energy sources must eventually 
be the forms on which we entirely rely, but it is not plausible that they 
could sustain the present liquid fuel or electricity demand of the rich 
countries. (The reasons are detailed in Trainer 1995a, chapter 8; 1995c. )  
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The impressive figures now being published for solar and wind 
energy costs come from the world's few best sites of experimental 
projects. They do not take into account the huge losses that would be 
involved in the storage and transport of electrical energy from sunny 
regions to high latitudes where most rich-world people live. If photo­
voltaic cells producing hydrogen are used to do this, about 96 percent 
of the energy harvested is lost by the time electricity is delivered, 
because of the inefficiencies of conversion, storage, and transport. Plant 
construction and fuel costs for a plant to deliver a thousand mega­
watts would be near $65 billion (assuming $500 per meter total in­
stalled system cost, and 20 percent efficient cells) .  This is some 
thirty-three times the cost for a coal-fired plant, even ignoring all the 
other costs, such as for operation and maintenance, company profits, 
insurance, and the interest payments on borrowed capital. Interest 
costs would probably double or treble the construction cost. The best 
choice might be thermochemical, or hot rock, energy storage and trans­
mission by long-distance high voltage lines. This choice might cut the 
construction cost to $26 billion, but formidable problems would have 
to be solved, such as how to store vast quantities of gas or heat. An 
industrialized society could not survive the at least twentyfold mul­
tiple of present electricity costs that would seem to be involved. 
Wind energy will also contribute to a sustainable world economy, 
but is not likely to support present electric demand. Only 0.6 percent 
of the United States is suitable for efficient wind generation of electric­
ity, although this area might produce electricity equal to 20 percent of 
present demand, ignoring the storage problem (Elliott, Wendel, and 
Gower 1991) .  Europe (except for the United Kingdom) has poorer 
wind resources than the United States. Even in the United Kingdom, 
wind might at best meet less than 10 percent of electric demand (De­
partment of Trade and Industry [U.K] 1993, 2). The main problem 
with wind energy is that even in a good region, there is a good prob­
ability that all mills will be idle at the same time. This probability is 
generally taken to limit the contribution of wind to a system to 5 to 20 
percent of demand. 
There is too little land to fuel present world road transport by 
biomass, let alone a fleet ten times as large, which is what we would 
need if 11 billion people had as much transport per person as we in 
rich countries have now. 
These have been some of the main reasons for not accepting the 
common assumption that affluent industrial societies can be sustained 
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simply by switching from fossil fuels to renewables. (Again, for de­
tailed argument see Trainer 1995c.) 
In view of these considerations regarding crucial mineral, biologi­
cal, and energy resources, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
it will be impossible for all people to rise to the life-styles people in rich 
countries have today. These life-styles exist essentially because the rich 
countries are consuming 75 to 80 percent of world-resource output. 
The main implication has been appropriately summarized by the state­
ment that "the rich must live more simply so that the poor may sim­
ply live. "  In other words, if the limits-to-growth argument is basically 
valid, rich countries should face up to major reduction in their average 
per capita use of resources. 
Limitless Growth Is the Supreme Goal 
The limits-to-growth argument is that present levels of production, 
consumption, and resource use in rich countries are unsustainable. 
Yet, the fundamental and unquestioned goal of almost all economists, 
politicians, journalists, and ordinary people is to increase "material 
living standards," -per capita consumption and the GNP-as much 
as possible and without limit. 
Growth advocates are unconcerned about the multiples of present 
output that their commitment will soon lead to. If output grows at 3 
percent per annum, then in seventy years the economy will be produc­
ing eight times as much every year. For a 5 percent growth rate, the 
multiple is thirty-two. In the 1980s Australia averaged 3.2 percent per 
annum economic growth. This average was clearly insufficient for 
economic health, because virtually all economic problems became more 
serious. Let us then assume that 4 percent growth would be sufficient 
to make our economy healthy. (Prime Minister Keating has said at 
least 4 percent growth is required to start bringing unemployment 
down.) If there is 4 percent per annum growth in an economy, in 
seventy years it will be producing sixteen times as much each year as 
it does now. If we assume that by 2060 all the world's people will have 
risen to the living standards we in rich countries would have by then, 
total world economic output would be 220 times what it is today. 
Even if we assume that the rich countries will have 3 percent per 
annum growth to 2060 while the Third World rises to the present rich­
world living standard, total world economic output would be twenty 
times as great as it is now. 
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These multiples are absurdly impossible. Yet, this is the path cur­
rent social and economic policies commit us to. There are strong 
grounds for concluding that present levels of resource use and environ­
mental impact are totally unsustainable, yet we have an economic 
system that will seek to multiply them many times in coming decades. 
It is difficult to understand the mental processes that enable all main­
stream economists and politicians to proceed as if there were no need 
whatsoever even to consider possible limits to growth. 
The Third World 
The foregoing argument has been about the limits that exist to growth. 
We must also face up to the claim that pursuing growth is causing the 
major global problems facing us. This claim is most evident when 
Third World "development" is analyzed (Trainer 1989, 1995a) . 
Development has been conceived of primarily in doing what will 
stimulate the maximum increase in GNP, that is, stimulating as much 
business activity, sales, exports, investment, and so on, as possible. 
This "growth and trickle down" approach has failed to solve the prob­
lems of most Third World people. The real living conditions of the 
poorest one-third of the world's people have deteriorated over the 
past decade. Possibly a billion people have an insufficient diet. Hun­
dreds of millions are constantly hungry. Perhaps 2 billion do not have 
safe drinking water. Third World debt has risen to impossible levels. 
More than thirty-five thousand infants die every day from avoidable 
causes. 
The basic reason for the failure of conventional development theory 
and practice is the unequal distributions of wealth and resources that 
inevitably result when market forces and growth are the guiding prin­
ciples. If increasing sales and business turnover is one's development 
goal, one will facilitate the flow of resources to those who can pay 
most for them and into those investments likely to generate most sales 
and income. The result will be that the relatively rich take most of the 
scarce oil and other resources for sale while poorer people must do 
without them. Hence, rich-world people average seventeen times the 
energy consumption averaged by the poorest half of the world's people, 
and one-third of all world grain production is fed to animals in rich 
countries (World Bank 1990, Trainer 1989). 
Why do these appallingly unjust distributions occur? The answer 
is simple. The rich countries take most of the world's resource output 
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simply by bidding more for it in the global marketplace. They also 
take many of the things produced by Third World land, labor, and 
capital (including the coffee, tea, and cocoa produce on 16 million hect­
ares of Third World land). Many plantation and mine workers are hun­
gry, while we enjoy the luxuries they produce. The appalling distribution 
and deprivation are therefore direct consequences of the way the global 
market economy functions. A market will always enable the relatively 
rich to take what they want and thus deprive those in most need. 
The development that takes place will also be inappropriate to the 
needs of most people, because returns on investment are not maxi­
mized by investing in the production of cheap goods for poor people. 
More important, the resources the poor once had will be drawn into 
producing items for export. Possibly the worst illustrations of this are 
the millions of hectares of the best Third World land now growing 
crops to export to the rich countries while some of the world's most 
impoverished people work in those plantations. 
There is therefore a contradiction between developing things that 
are most urgently needed and developing what will most maximize 
returns to investors and add most to the GNP. The most appropriate 
development strategies would reduce the GNP, for example, by taking 
land out of export cropping and enabling people to plant it with 
Permaculture "edible landscapes," a system of agriculture emphasiz­
ing the use of renewable resources, to supply themselves with food 
and materials outside the cash economy. 
Living standards in rich countries could not be anywhere near as 
high as they are if the global economy were more just; it delivers most 
of the world's wealth to us while it ignores the poor. What would your 
coffee cost if those producing it were paid decent wages? The rich 
countries often support brutal dictatorships willing to keep their econo­
mies to the policies that benefit the rich countries. When any move has 
been made by poor people in the Western sphere of influence to an 
approach to development that would primarily benefit the poor, we 
have branded it as communist subversion and sent military aid to 
stamp it out. 
Above all, the limits-to-growth analysis makes clear that the con­
ventional conception of development is totally mistaken about goals. 
It is not possible for all Third World people to rise to the living stan­
dards of the rich countries. Yet, that goal is still taken for granted in 
almost all official development theory and practice. 
Peace and Conftiet 
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Some of the most disturbing implications of the limits-to-growth analy­
sis of the global situation arise regarding the problems of peace and 
conflict. The foregoing argument has been that only a few can have 
the life-styles that we in rich countries have, and we can have them 
only for a historically short period, because there are not enough re­
sources for all to rise to anything like the living standards we take for 
granted. But we who have per capita incomes averaging sixty times 
those of the poorest half of the world's people are obsessed with get­
ting richer as fast as possible and without end. Now, if we and all 
others continue to pursue that goal, as population doubles, and re­
sources become scarcer, there can be no other conceivable outcome 
than increasing levels of conflict in the world. 
Much of the foregoing argument has been that we have an empire, 
a sphere of influence, without which our living standards could not be 
as high as they are. We have to be extensively involved in military 
activity to secure our lines of supply from the empire. We could not 
be sure of getting all that oil from the Middle East if we did not have 
aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, rapid deployment forces spe­
cially trained and ready to fly into trouble spots, minesweepers able 
to clear vital shipping lanes, the military presence that stands as a 
warning to others that they had better not interfere with "our" oil 
fields, and the contingency plans for dealing with any rebel tribesmen 
or any sectional uprising that might cut the pipelines. We must be able 
to protect our allies, interests, trading arrangements, and clients. 
United States Army Gen. M. D. Taylor said that "U.S. military 
priorities must be shifted . . .  towards insuring a steady flow of re­
sources from the Third World."  He referred to "a fierce competition 
among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought 
by the United States" and "growing hostility displayed by have-not 
nations towards their affluent counterparts" (Cypher 1981) .  Speaking 
to American soldiers at Camp Stanly, Korea, President Johnson said, 
"Don't forget, there are two hundred million of us in a world of three 
billion. They want what we've got-and we're not going to give it to 
them!"  Ashley says that "expansion is a prime source of conflict. War 
is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce 
and unevenly distributed resources" (1980, 3, 126) . Nettleship makes 
the same point: "War is an inevitable result of the struggle between 
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economies for expansion" (1975, 497) . Chase-Dunn says that "warfare 
appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capi­
talist world economy . . . .  World wars regularly occur during a period 
of economic expansion" (1989, 108, 163). 
In other words, the main source of conflict and war in the world is 
the ceaseless quest for greater wealth and power. We have no chance of 
achieving a peaceful world until nations stop being greedy and work 
out how to live without constantly striving to grow richer. Yet, the 
supreme commitment in our economy is to rapid and ceaseless growth! 
The Basie Problem: The Economy 
There can be no solution to the problems outlined above within an 
economy driven by the profit motive, market forces, capital accumu­
lation, and economic growth (Trainer 1995b). The problems are being 
generated by these factors, most obviously by the obsession with con­
stantly increasing production and consumption in a world with finite 
and scarce resources. (Nevertheless, a satisfactory economy could have 
an important place for market forces and free enterprise; see below.) 
If the limits-to-growth analyses are at all valid, it is clear that not only 
must we eventually arrive at a zero-growth or steady-state economy 
but also we in rich countries must first undergo a long period of 
negative growth in which per capita production and consumption 
measured in cash must be drastically reduced. 
The second major fault built into the foundations of this economy 
is the very mechanism its advocates are most proud of: the market. 
As has been explained, the more freedom that is given individuals to 
maximize their profits in a market, the more effectively will resources 
flow to those who are richest, and the more surely will there be 
development of the industries that produce for the rich. More impor­
tantly, the more scope that is given the market to determine what is 
done, the less influence will be exercised by considerations of moral­
ity, social benefit, or ecological sustainability. A glance at the Third 
World problem or the situation in rich-world urban ghettos or the 
ecological problem shows that all too often the right policies require 
action contrary to market forces. It requires action that free enterprise 
will not take because it would not maximize profits and it would 
either require increased government expenditure and therefore taxa­
tion, or the return of control to local people so that they could col­
lectively develop solutions to their problems largely outside the cash 
economy. 
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It is difficult to understand why faith in growth and the freedom 
of enterprise remains almost unchallenged despite its extraordinarily 
bad record of achievement. Consider the fact that although Australia's 
GDP per capita in real terms has more than doubled since 1950, and 
increased by one-third in the 1980s, in the 1980s various indexes show 
that inequality increased 25 percent, poverty increased 70 percent, the 
unemployment rate almost doubled, the rural debt multiplied by nine, 
and the foreign debt multiplied by ten (Trainer 1995b, chapter 4) ! The 
picture would be worse if we could add numerical indexes for envi­
ronmental quality and the quality of life . For instance, the Australian 
rate of youth suicide has doubled in a generation and problems of 
stress anxiety and depression are reported to be ten times as prevalent 
as they were a generation ago. Extensive evidence indicates that as 
GNP per person has more than doubled in rich countries in recent 
decades, measures of the quality of life have not increased or have 
fallen. Easterlin came to this conclusion after reviewing more than 
thirty studies (1976) . Daly and Cobb's detailed Measure of Sustainable 
Economic Welfare in the United States declined for two decades de­
spite continued economic growth (Daly and Cobb 1 989, 420 ) .  
Douthwaite's The Growth Illusion (1992) deals a t  length with evidence 
and argument supporting his claim that growth has not been accom­
panied by improvement in the experienced quality of life. 
It requires little sociological insight to understand how the obses­
sion with narrow economic goals has contributed to social breakdown. 
To facilitate the maximum rate of increase in economic activity, re­
sources have been predominantly allocated, not to helping the most 
disadvantaged and needy, nor to developing the facilities most likely 
to build cohesive and supportive communities, but to enabling more 
goods and services to be marketed profitably. All impediments to this 
end, set by social structures, customs, or traditions, must be removed. 
Hence, the accelerated atrophy of community and the elimination of 
the informal and noneconomic factors that once supported people, 
plunging everyone further into an individualistic competitive struggle 
in an economy that will not provide for all. It is no surprise therefore 
that the social wreckage of homelessness, suicide, and violence rises 
higher and higher. These are direct consequences of making growth 
the supreme goal, and of refusing to challenge the trickle-down myth 
claiming that growth, the profit motive, and the freedom of enterprise 
are the best principles for enriching all in the long run. 
Possibly most disturbing are the effects of the economy on bond­
ing, mutual concern, civility, social responsibility, and citizenship. A 
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satisfactory society is not possible unless its members have a good 
degree of concern for the welfare of others and of the society as a 
whole. Yet, our economy is founded on the principle that the best 
outcomes for all will follow if all individuals seek to maximize their 
individual advantage and wealth. 
Economic theory is largely responsible for the predicament we are 
in (Trainer 1995b, chapter 11) .  It pretends to be the theory of econom­
ics in general, but it is only the theory of capitalist economics; that is, 
it is only about the form and functioning of the production, distribu­
tion, and exchange mechanisms evident within an economy where the 
overriding goal is to maximize production for sale and freedom of 
enterprise. This theory can say nothing whatsoever about the perhaps 
half of the real economy, which does not involve cash: the household 
sector. Many other realms of value are crucial for production and 
distribution decisions that have little or nothing to do with cash value, 
such as morality, justice, quality of life, work experience, personal 
growth, culture and tradition, community, and, above all, ecological 
values. Yet, in the past twenty years we have entered an era in which 
all considerations other than the maximization of cash benefits are 
being deliberately and energetically swept aside. Public assets are being 
sold off, protection is being eliminated, the last remote areas of the 
Third World are being drawn into the market system, all barriers to 
"trade" (that is, impediments to the access of transnational corpora­
tions to new resources and markets and profitable business opportu­
nities) are being removed-all in a desperate effort to "get the economy 
going again." The conventional economist knows no other solution to 
problems of recession and unemployment than to facilitate more busi­
ness turnover, regardless of how great the volume of unnecessary and 
wasteful production might already be. 
Since the 1970s the global economy has entered a period of se­
rious crisis that is essentially due to the inability to sell all that can 
be produced. This crisis has generated a frantic effort to find profit­
able investment outlets for all the capital that is constantly accumu­
lating (in the United States the amount available for investment per 
capita is estimated to double each twenty years [U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
1985, 6] .  This effort explains the "casino capitalism" evident in specu­
lation on commodities, takeovers, stock markets, and foreign exchange 
dealings, where more than 90 percent of the deals are gambles on 
changes in exchange rates. It also explains the radical global restruc­
turing that is going on, especially the privatization and elimination 
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of arrangements that once protected people, regions, industries, and 
nations from the ravages of market forces. Hence, the new orthodoxy 
enforced by supranational agencies such as the World Bank through 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and now the World Trade 
Organization, which prevent governments from taking action against 
patently unjust, environmentally destructive, or socially damaging 
practices, on the grounds that there must be no interference with the 
freedom of trade. Why do governments go along with these policies, 
which literally entail the destruction of their societies and the further 
impoverishment of their poorest people? Because they have learned 
their orthodox economics well; they know that the supreme goal and 
the only conceivable solution to our problems is to generate more 
business turnover, more production for sale, more growth. 
It should be obvious that even if there were no limits-to-growth 
problems, this economic system cannot solve the problems it now 
generates at an accelerating rate. It provides well for perhaps only 10 
percent of the world's people, that is, the richest half of those who live 
in the rich countries . It is dumping more and more of the people in 
those countries into poverty and a poor quality of life. And it has been 
rapidly burning up its resource and ecological capital; from here on, 
those bills will start flooding in. The recent emergence of much critical 
literature and many alternative economics organizations, such as the 
New Economics Foundation and the Human Economy Network, tes­
tify to the increasing recognition that a radically different economic 
system is required. 
The Form a Sustainable Society Must Take 
If the limits-to-growth analysis of our global predicament is valid, 
there are four crucial and inescapable implications for the nature of a 
sustainable society: (1) it must have materially simple life-styles; 
(2) there must be a very high level of local economic self-sufficiency; 
most of the things people need must be produced by local labor, land, 
expertise, and capital; (3) there must be much more cooperation and 
much less competition than there is in present society; and (4) above 
all, there must be no economic growth; it must be a steady-state 
economy. These principles mean fundamental change in life-styles, in 
the geography of settlements (that is, we must mostly build villages), 
and in the economy. Some elaboration on these key themes follows. 
(For a detailed account see Trainer 1995a.) 
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Simple Life-styles 
Living simply does not mean being deprived of anything that matters . 
It means being content with what is sufficient-for example, sufficient 
for comfort and hygiene. Often the difference between a sufficient and 
a normal standard in consumer society is great. For example, normal 
housing typically costs ten to twenty times as much as perfectly ad­
equate and aesthetically pleasing housing built from mud brick (Trainer 
1995a, chapter 4) . 
Self-Suffieieney 
Most crucial for the development of sustainable settlements is the need 
for small-scale local economies that are highly self-sufficient. First, 
households could produce much more for themselves than they do at 
present, through home gardening, knitting, bottling and preserving, 
sewing, construction, and homemade entertainment. Second, there must 
be far less transport and trade. 
However, it is the town, suburban, and neighborhood levels that 
are most important here. These must become thriving local economies, 
producing many of the things people need for a high quality of life 
from resources that exist locally. This means much decentralization, 
with many small places of employment, enabling most people to get 
to work on foot or by bicycle. Some of these enterprises could be the 
usual types, such as bakeries, but many could function as part-time 
hobby production. It would make sense to retain some big mass pro­
duction factories, but many of the things we need could come from 
small local craft production, thus minimizing factory work. 
Many market gardens could be located throughout suburbs within 
cities, for example, on derelict factory sites and beside railway lines. 
This would reduce the cost of food by 70 percent, especially by cutting 
its transport costs. More important, having food produced close to where 
people live would enable nutrients to be recycled back to the soil through 
garbage-gas units. Two of the most unsustainable aspects of our present 
agriculture are its heavy dependence on energy inputs and the fact that 
it extracts nutrients from the soil and does not return them. 
Houses on each block could become a neighborhood workshop, 
recycling store, meeting place, barter exchange, and library. We could 
dig up many roads, thereby increasing urban land area by one-third 
or more, because there will be far less need for them when we reduce 
production and decentralize. When we have dug up those roads, we 
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will have much communal property, so we can plant community or­
chards and forests and put in community ponds for ducks and fish. 
Most of the neighborhood could become a Permaculture jungle, an 
"edible landscape" crammed with long-lived, largely self-maintaining 
productive plants, such as nut trees. 
There would also be many varieties of animals living in our sub­
urbs, including an entire fishing industry based on tanks and ponds. 
Many materials can also be freely available from communal woodlots, 
fruit trees, bamboo clumps, ponds, and meadows. Many areas could 
easily supply themselves with the clay to produce all the crockery 
needed. Similarly, just about all the cabinetmaking wood needed could 
come from those forests, by means of one small saw bench in what 
was a garage. 
There is much scope for deriving materials from plants that could 
be grown in our suburbs, such as bark for tanning. Dyes from plants, 
tar and resins from distilled flue gases, wool, wax, leather, feathers, 
paint from oil seeds like sunflowers, and many medicines are all pos­
sible. Small local businesses and hobbyists could make use of such 
locally produced materials. 
Most all neighborhoods have all the capital they need to develop 
the things that would most enrich them, yet this never happens when 
savings are put in conventional banks. The solution is to form small 
town banks in which the savings of local people will be lent only to 
firms and projects that will improve the local region. Many neighbor­
hoods and towns are now starting their own banks and moneyless 
trading systems (such as LETS) . 
More Cooperation, Less Competition 
The third necessary characteristic of the alternative neighborhood is 
that it must provide a much more communal way of life. We must 
share more things. We could have one stepladder, one electric drill, 
and so on in the neighborhood workshop rather than one in every 
backyard. We would be on various voluntary rosters and committees 
and on working bees to carry out most of the child minding, nursing, 
basic educating, and care of aged and handicapped people, as well as 
perform most of the functions that councils now carry out for us, such 
as maintaining our parks and streets. We would therefore need far fewer 
bureaucrats and professionals and we would need to earn less money 
to pay the taxes now needed to support them. Each of us might 
contribute half a day a week to community work projects, such 
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as maintaining the orchards and woodlots that provide our "free" 
goods. 
If we lived more simply, eliminated much unnecessary produc­
tion, and shifted much of the necessary production to backyards, local 
small businesses, cooperatives, and the noncash sector of the economy, 
we might need to work in an office or a mass production factory only 
one or two days a week. We could spend the other five or six working 
and playing in the neighborhood doing many varied, interesting, and 
useful things. 
We would live in leisure-rich environments. Suburbs at present are 
leisure deserts. The alternative neighborhood would be full of interest­
ing things to do, familiar people, common projects, animals, gardens, 
forests, and landscaping. People would be less inclined to go away on 
weekends and holidays, greatly reducing national energy consumption. 
Most important of all, there would be far more community than 
there is now. People would know one another and interact on local 
projects. One could certainly predict a huge decrease in social prob­
lems. It would be a much healthier and happier place to live, espe­
cially for older people. 
There would be genuine participatory democracy. Most of our 
local policies and programs could be worked out by elected nonpaid 
committees, and we could all vote on the important matters concern­
ing our small area. The kibbutz settlements in Israel are good ex­
amples of this kind of self-government. There would still be important 
functions of state and national governments, but relatively few. 
No Economic Growth 
There would be no chance of making these changes while we retained 
the present economic system. Market forces and the profit motive might 
have a place in an acceptable alternative economy, but they cannot be 
allowed to continue as major determinants of economic affairs. The 
basic economic priorities must be planned according to what is socially 
desirable (democratically planned, mostly at the local level, not dictated 
by huge and distant bureaucracies) .  However, much of the economy 
could remain as a (carefully monitored) free enterprise carried on by 
small firms, households, and cooperatives, using local markets, so long 
as their goals were not profit maximization and growth. 
The new economy would have a number of overlapping sectors. 
One would still use cash. In another, market forces would be allowed 
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to operate. One sector would be fully planned. Another would be run 
by cooperatives. Another would involve barter and gifts (that is, just 
giving away surpluses) . In one sector there would be totally free goods 
(for example, from the roadside fruit and nut trees) . 
Most of us would live well without much need for cash incomes, 
because we would not need to buy very much. Consequently, we 
might work only one day a week for money and spend the rest of the 
week working and playing in our neighborhoods in a wide variety of 
activities .  Production would be greatly reduced, as would the GNP. 
There would be no unemployment and no poverty (there are none in 
Israel's kibbutzim). We would have neighborhood work-coordination 
committees, who would make sure that all who wanted work had a 
share of the work that needed doing. 
The alternative economy is being thought of as a "third way" -
quite different from free enterprise and big-state socialism but com­
bining some aspects of both within a context of decentralization and 
small scale, with no concern to increase production and consumption 
over time; indeed, the supreme goal for decades would be to reduce 
production and consumption throughout. 
This vision does not imply any reduction in research or sophisti­
cated technology. We could still have all the high-tech and modem 
ways that made sense, for example, in medicine, windmill design, 
public transport, and household appliances. We could have far more 
resources for science and research, and for education and the arts, 
because we would have liberated all the resources presently being 
wasted in the production of unnecessary items, including arms. 
The past two decades have seen the emergence of much literature 
and many groups working on the general limits-to-growth analysis of 
the global crisis summarized above. More recently there has been the 
beginning of practical ventures aimed at building alternative settle­
ments outlined. There is now a global ecovillage movement, which 
includes hundreds of long-established rural intentional communities 
and more being planned and built in the hope of becoming influential 
examples of sustainable settlement (in Context Inst. 1995a, chapter 17) .  
Many would regard the account of  the required alternative society 
given here as naively utopian and impossible to attain. The point of 
this chapter has been to make clear that this is the general form a society 
must take if it is to be sustainable, whether we like it or not, and whether 
or not we think it is achievable. We will either make it to a society 
characterized by simple life-styles, cooperative arrangements, and zero 
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economic growth and local economic self-sufficiency-or we will not 
achieve a sustainable society. There are persuasive reasons for con­
cluding that we will not have the collective sense to take this path, 
given the gross irrationality, indifference, and irresponsibility now 
characteristic of affluent-consumer society. 
The most important research tasks now have to do with working 
out how best to assist country towns and city suburbs to grasp the need 
for transition and to begin working on their salvation. Many country 
towns are dying, many people are suffering the boredom of unemploy­
ment in cities. The problem is how to develop the procedures by which 
the vast but idle personal, material, and financial resources can be ap­
plied to building new social and economic systems that will enable 
these people to provide one another with most of the things they need. 
The Rocky Mountains Institute's Urban Renewal Program is an 
example of the pioneering action we urgently need on a large scale. A 
team goes into a town to work with local people on questions such as: 
Are residents paying money that could be reduced, for example, by 
insulating houses to cut fuel bills? What things are being imported 
that the town could set up small firms to produce? What resources, 
such as idle land, buildings, retired people, and sources of capital, 
does the town have that could be applied to development that would 
enrich people's lives? Can there be a market and festival day each 
month? Can we put some of our savings in a fund to facilitate the 
start-up of much-needed little firms that would give incomes to more 
of our people? Can we plant fast-growing woodlots to save money on 
heating fuel? Can we start a cooperative poultry, rabbit, and fish group 
to give us good fresh and cheap meat? What town developments might 
be carried out by weekly voluntary working bees? What leisure, enter­
tainment, and cultural activities could we organize? 
Despite the alarming magnitude of global problems and the virtu­
ally complete failure of governments, bureaucracies, mainstream econo­
mists, and journalists to attend to the limits-to-growth analysis or the 
radical-conserver alternative, there are now grounds for optimism. 
There is much literature agreeing on the form that a sustainable soci­
ety must take, and for two decades small groups have been pioneering 
the experimental development of ecovillages. The outcome is any­
thing but certain and immense dangers loom on all sides, but at least 
the general path to sustainability is now clearly evident. 
6. Defining the New Allleriean 
Collllllttnity 
A Slide to Tribalism ? 
Virginia Abernethy 
Doubters that rapid population growth drives poverty, inequality, re­
source overconsumption, and polluting emissions that overwhelm 
nature's restorative capacity do, of course, exist. Denial lives. The blithe 
ones, unaware and unafraid, enjoy the free-fall from the penthouse 
roof-until everything changes. 
All may indeed (seems likely to) change. But if a soft landing 
remains possible, clear sight and a long view of population pressure 
on resources should pay off. Former Secretary of State Warren Chris­
topher addressed the fundamentals at a December 1994 State Depart­
ment conference on population and development. "When population 
grows too quickly," he said, "it strains resources, it stunts economic 
growth, it generates disease, it spawns huge refugee flows, and ulti­
mately it threatens [U.S.] stability" (Dickinson 1995, 1) .  The process 
that threatens is insidious: drizzles and drops. Crises may be stag­
gered and localized; oases may remain. 
Constructive strategies are within reach, but first one must recog­
nize elements that darken the horizon. Namely, the rapid increase in 
the population and labor force and the associated depletion of re­
sources are propelling the United States toward shrinking shares per 
capita and toward widening inequality between rich and poor. The 
economic effects of population growth are adding to fiscal imbalances, 
101 
102 Virginia Abernethy 
which already have burdened the American people with $5 trillion of 
federal debt. The feedback loops that link population growth to the 
nation's carrying capacity and the economy are accelerating a down­
ward spiral. 
Recognition of limits is neither new nor unique. Great Britain's 
1949 Report of the Royal Commission on Population stated, "We have 
no hesitation in recommending . . .  a replacement size of family . . .  in 
Great Britain at the present time" (cited in Willey 1994, 3). Similarly, 
the 1972 report of the Presidential Commission on Population Growth 
and the American Future concluded that no national interest is served 
by continuing population growth. Addressing common economic and 
quality-of-life values, commission members said that ordinary Ameri­
cans would be better off if population growth stopped immediately; 
conversely, almost every social, economic, and environmental problem ·would 
be made worse by continuing growth (President's Commission 1972). 
Disillusionment with the American dream and fragmentation along 
ethnic or religious lines could precipitate a breakdown in civil society. 
Crime, riots, and incipient vigilantism today may escalate to worse 
riots, kangaroo courts, scapegoating, and separatism tomorrow. If such 
conditions were to occur, a government seeking to keep control might 
be expected to resort to unpleasantness, in violation of civil rights. 
Here we examine the relationship between (1) scarcity, diversity, and 
conflict, (2) population growth and carrying capacity, and (3) popula­
tion growth and disquiet in America. 
Scarcity, Diversity, and Conflict 
The underlying issue in much domestic and international conflict is 
the incapacity of natural systems to support the resident population. 
Nevertheless, violent upheavals are often reported as class, ethnic, 
and religious conflicts because regions and societies fracture along 
these fault lines. Reports of political and social stresses and associated 
individual pathology (for example, Kleinman 1995) often inappropri­
ately omit mention of the causal role of rapid population growth (Bou­
vier 1995). 
Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, and Rathjens (1993) explicitly reject at­
tempts to gloss over population/resource imbalances in the genesis of 
conflict. Their analysis of civil and international wars on several con­
tinents shows how resource scarcity makes direct contributions to 
conflict and feeds back into political and social alignments in ways 
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that exaggerate unequal distribution of wealth. The synergistic effects 
of overpopulation and scarcity occur as impoverishment breeds com­
petition; and competition turns into resource grabs where sociopolitical 
alignments (tribes, gangs, economic cartels, political factions) provide 
both the cover of legitimacy and the sheer power of numbers and 
organization. 
Journalist R. D. Kaplan (1994) also observes that environments col­
lapsed by the "impact of surging populations" are the frequent root 
cause of political chaos. As overtaxed environments fail, Kaplan expects 
to see "re-primitivized man: warrior societies operating at a time of 
unprecedented resource scarcity and planetary crowding . . . .  Crime and 
war become indistinguishable" (73-74) and security of sorts is found 
only in private guards and armies. West Africa may be "the symbol of 
worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which 
criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger" (46). However, 
collapsing or invaded nations on every continent are potentially threat­
ened by sociopolitical disintegration, refugee migrations across interna­
tional borders, ethnic mixing, and loss of a cultural center. 
Milton Esman (1994) focuses on the risks, sources of conflict or 
accommodation, and likely channels of protest that accompany the 
presence of several minorities together or, alternately, a minority resid­
ing alongside a majority group within one territory. Permutations in­
clude whether one minority regards the shared territory as its 
homeland. Noel Malcolm (1995, 66) suggests that "aggressive nation­
alism is typically a syndrome of the dispossessed, of those who feel 
power has been taken from them." Kaplan finds that ethnic diversity 
where wealthier minority populations can be demonized spawns the 
most vicious conflicts. 
Esman's thesis is that the presence of minorities invariably creates 
strain, so the implicit or explicit goal of a vigorous society is the mini­
mization of diversity. He writes, "The classic approach to deplurali­
zation is the encouragement of individual assimilation" (255). Schwarz 
(1995) also argues that accommodation to diversity is a false political 
myth and that until recently, and although more slowly with African­
Americans, diversity in America has been systematically erased through 
assimilation. An example (see Kaplan 1994, 75-76) is Saul Bellow's 
description of his immigrant family in turn-of-the century Chicago: 
"The country took us over. It was a country then, not a collection of 
cultures." An expanding economic pie makes assimilation easier be­
cause competition is muted. 
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Failing assimilation, conflict-management strategies depend on the 
strength of the state that mediates between parties. But, as Kaplan and 
Esman both point out, a state is fatally weakened by environmental 
collapse. The legitimacy of a state is further affected by whether mi­
nority or majority interests are in control. Schwarz (1995) suggests that 
unicultural dominance is a precondition of national stability; that is, 
claims made by diverse elements in a society cannot be resolved by 
"reasonable" divisions of resources and power, because minorities are 
seldom satisfied by distributions that do not entail significant (there­
fore unacceptable) losses to the dominant group. 
Diversity becomes problematic if a nation's institutions allow, even 
encourage, the mobilization of minorities by "ethnic entrepreneurs" 
(Esman 1994, 245) . Illustratively, the judicial construction of "affirma­
tive action" in the United States has created resentment on all sides. 
Affirmative action programs-now widely viewed as a perversion of 
an ostensibly race-neutral civil rights policy-are being rejected in 
proposals and ballot initiatives to affirm the language of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Law, which forbids discrimination on the basis of race, creed, 
or ethnicity. Dismantling affirmative action exacerbates grievances in 
sectors that acquired a sense of entitlement and now stand to lose 
(Roberts and Stratton 1995) . 
Esman warns that diversity is intrinsically antagonistic to democ­
racy, because "where the state loses control of ethnic relations, the 
result is likely to be protracted violence and civil war, as in Bosnia, Sri 
Lanka, and Sudan" (255) . Containing violence among ethnic groups 
tends to entail increasingly authoritarian state measures. An embattled 
state will prefer an unarmed citizenry; but individuals and groups 
rightly fear losing the capability of self-defense, needed if the state 
were (1) unable to keep order or (2) captured by a hostile faction. 
The United States, which sometimes defines itself as a "nation of 
immigrants," at first appears as a contrary example to Esman's prin­
cipal themes. Yet diminished shares and a diversifying national profile 
complicate unity and democracy. Alexis de Toqueville observed that 
the roots of American liberty are planted in the natural wealth of our 
continent: "The chief circumstance which has favored the establish­
ment and maintenance of a democratic system in the United States is 
the nature of the territory that the Americans inhabit. Their ancestors 
gave them a love of equality and freedom; but God Himself gave them 
the means of remaining equal and free by placing them upon a bound­
less continent" (cited in Potter 1954, 92) . 
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Indeed, American history is congruent with the Esman-Kaplan­
Schwarz analysis. Recent multiethnic riots in Los Angeles-where, 
significantly, some businesses escaped being burned out because own­
ers (mostly Korean) engaged in self-defense-involved newly arrived 
immigrant groups who compete with citizens for jobs, housing, and 
education (Miles 1992) . Esman's observation that authoritarianism 
becomes indispensable to control of ethnic relations foreshadows the 
use of police and national guard to quell the Los Angeles disturbances, 
gun control legislation, and questionable, it is claimed, violent activi­
ties against citizens by law enforcement agencies (the FBI and Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms [BATF] ). Law-abiding citizens have 
reason to fear both injury from extremists and loss of constitutionally 
guaranteed liberties as, once empowered, authoritarian institutions 
expand their mission. 
In the slide to social disintegration, states Kaplan, democracy 
becomes "less and less relevant to the larger issue of govemability . . . .  
[I]t is not clear that the United States will survive the next century in 
exactly its present form. Because America is a multiethnic society, the 
nation-state has always been more fragile here than it is in more ho­
mogeneous societies . . . .  " (Kaplan 1994, 75-76). 
Liberty, tolerance, and democracy are fragile. Civil virtues may 
not survive population growth and shrinkage of the ordinary person's 
portion. But unwanted trade-offs between liberty and order can be 
resisted. Much of the population growth results from immigration, a 
de facto population policy that, to many Americans, appears arbitrary 
and unnecessary. 
Population Growth and Carrying Capacity 
Carrying capacity refers to the number of individuals who can be 
supported without degrading the environment, that is, without reduc­
ing the ability of the environment to sustain the population at the 
desired quality of life over the long term. A degraded environment 
produces less.  Exceeding the carrying capacity today reduces 
tomorrow's productivity, so that smaller and smaller numbers can be 
supported without further damage (Arrow et al. 1995) . Population 
growth combined with the high consumption levels to which all 
Americans and immigrants aspire is the ultimate threat to carrying 
capacity-the topsoil, forests, energy, clean air and water, and other 
resources-of our national home. 
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One cannot predict which of several factors will ultimately be­
come limiting, because technological and market adjustments alter 
pressure points in the system. David Pimentel and others (1995) show, 
for example, that topsoil is being eroded fifteen to thirty times faster 
than its natural formation rate and that 3 million acres annually are 
being paved over or made useless for agriculture. No known technol­
ogy creates or substitutes for topsoil, although its loss is temporarily 
masked by petroleum-intensive technology. If present trends continue, 
arable land will shrink from the 1 .8  acres per person now available in 
the United States to only 0.6 acres per person by 2050 (but 1 .2 acres 
per person is needed to provide a diverse diet) . 
Similarly, major aquifers are being depleted 25 percent faster than 
their replenishment rate. Transport of water from ever-more distant 
sources and desalination are energy-intensive and expensive. Compe­
tition between urban and agricultural users of water is intensifying 
and, foreseeably, water-short areas (much of the U.S. West) will cease 
to be agricultural. 
Agriculture accounts for 17 percent of U.S. petrochemical use. 
Domestic oil is expected to be effectively gone in twenty-five years 
(meaning that the energy recovered will be less than the energy used 
to get, refine, and distribute the oil) . Some uses for oil have no substi­
tute (Gever, Kaufmann, Skole, and Vorosmarty 1986) . 
Already 60 percent of oil is imported. Reliance on foreign sources 
could greatly impact food production, domestic food prices, the $40 
billion per year income from agricultural exports, and policy options 
vis-a-vis oil-producing nations, including Russia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, 
Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 
Demography explains America's insatiable thirst for oil and en­
ergy. Nearly all (93 pecent) of a 25 percent increase in energy use 
between 1970 and 1990 was driven by population growth. That is, 
consumption per capita leveled off, but increased efficiency and con­
servation efforts were, and continue to be, overwhelmed by growing 
numbers (Holdren 1990) . 
Population growth is also endangering whole U.S. ecosystems. 
Thirty systems have declined over 98 percent of their natural area, 
imperiling habitat for countless animal and plant species (Stevens 1995) . 
Five hundred species have vanished already as humans encroach on 
habitat (Ling-Ling 1995). The 40 percent loss of Staten Island's original 
species is attributed to population growth. Man and Biosphere (MAB) 
reserves in New Jersey, the outer islands of the Chesapeake Bay, and 
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southern Florida are similarly at risk. The critical shift is from agricul­
tural to more intensive uses of land as population density increases 
(Long 1995) . 
Losses in biodiversity have economic as well as moral and esthetic 
implications. Biodiversity contributes in uncounted ways to produc­
tivity and income, for example, honeybees pollinate billions of dollars 
worth of crops and we have no substitute! Unseen microorganisms 
restore (albeit over decades or even centuries) eroded topsoil; theirs is 
an essential contribution because "about 10% of all the energy [all 
types] used in U.S. agriculture today is spent just to offset the losses 
of nutrients, water, and crop productivity caused by erosion" (Pimentel 
et al. 1995, 1120) . 
Other factors (deforestation, pollutants, infrastructure, traffic con­
gestion) could be chosen to illustrate carrying-capacity limits. Resources 
are being depleted even at the present rate of use; more people de­
mand more resources; in using them, people create more pollution. 
Some systems have no substitute and, once used up or degraded, the 
loss is irretrievable. Other systems are remediable but at a cost, for 
example, $25 billion is the estimated annual cost of implementing the 
Clean Air Act. Such programs compete with other economic and fiscal 
uses for money. 
Population Growth and Disquiet In America 
As a country grows poorer in natural capital, the hardship that citi­
zens endure depends on the population growth rate, the distribution 
of wealth, and economic competitiveness. 
The United States has the fastest population growth rate in the 
industrialized world. At more than 1 . 1  percent per year, the U.S. rate 
approaches that of some Third World countries and puts the popula­
tion on track to double in less than sixty years. Every increase yields 
a less favorable natural resource/per capita ratio than enjoyed today. 
Yet, few alarms have been sounded over the no-end-to-growth-in-sight 
scenario (Stycos 1995). 
Historically, the U.S. Census Bureau's projections have been too 
low. Their series were revised upward in 1989, 1990, and 1992, because 
assumptions about immigrant numbers and subsequent fertility had 
to be raised. A 1995 series escaped upward revision by altering as­
sumptions about departures from the United States each year. More­
over, asylum claimants (those in the United States but not yet processed 
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by the Immigrant and Naturalization Service [INS] ), estimated at 
150,000 per year, are overlooked; this omission resulted in a greater 
than 10 percent underestimate of immigration in the 1995 Report of 
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. 
A population of one-half billion was "the most likely" variant 
projected for the United States in the year 2050 by demographers 
Ahlburg and Vaupel (1990) . Their number might now be raised in 
contemplation of high immigrant fertility, an increased annual flow of 
legal immigrants (to 1 million including refugees and asylees), and the 
conservatively estimated net 300,000 illegal immigrants including the 
many who overstay visas (aircraft passenger manifests show several 
hundred thousand more persons arriving than leaving each year) (Grant 
1992) . 
The distribution of wealth is second in importance for determin­
ing national well-being. How is the manmade and (inherently limited) 
natural wealth divided up? 
The question is fraught with political ideology, but what is desir­
able ought not be confounded with what seems likely. Historical and 
contemporary societies, and principles of market economics, suggest 
that distributional equity is incompatible with shrinking resources per 
capita. Government can alter for a time the identity of "winners," but 
equality of results is probably not-nor ever has been-achievable. As 
an anthropologist, I conclude that every society that experiences popu­
lation growth without commensurate growth in resources arrives at 
an advanced state of social stratification. The late Mayans and Aztecs 
preyed upon their neighbors and developed elaborate class systems of 
nobles, religious functionaries, military leaders, and commoners. The 
Incas had the same, with the probable added features of vassalage and 
slavery. Neolithic peoples in Great Britain evolved from egalitarian to 
stratified social structures as their communities became more densely 
populated. Stratification became prominent in both India (Davis 1951) 
and Algeria (Baer 1964) about the time that these societies became 
more crowded (Abernethy 1979) .  Women became chattel property in 
Europe's overpopulated late Middle Ages. The overpopulated New 
Guinea Enga victimized women, unlike neighbors with a generous 
land-to-people ratio. So it goes through the ancient and modern world. 
The gap between privileged and powerless appears to enlarge as 
overpopulation and poverty become more profound. 
Growth in the labor force is one mechanism by which population 
growth widens the gulf between rich and poor. Labor is a commodity 
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with respect to production. Thus, a large supply of labor relative to 
demand (availability of jobs) drives down the price (wage) that em­
ployers are willing to pay. The larger the supply of labor, the more that 
the compensation for labor falls. 
Ronald Lee documents the inverse relationship between popula­
tion size and wages. Time series for western Europe beginning in A.O. 
1260, show how "a 10 percent increase in population relative to its 
long-run trend . . .  depressed wages by 16 percent" (Lee 1987, 448). 
Individual countries were characterized by 25 percent (Austria), 24 
percent (Germany and Spain), and 22 percent (France) declines in wages 
in response to 10 percent surges in the labor force. The population 
effect on working persons in preindustrial England was equally dra­
matic: " [R]eckoning in terms of agricultural goods, a 10% increase in 
population depressed wages by 22% and lowered labor 's share of 
national income by 14%" (Lee 1980, 547) . Emphasizing that "popula­
tion-induced changes in the preindustrial [English] economy were not 
trivial," Lee adds that "the segment of society dependent primarily on 
wage income was comfortably off at the end of the fifteenth century; 
[but] after a century of population growth their wages had fallen by 
60% and their situation was desperate" (Lee 1980, 519).  
The population effect on wages is predictable regardless of the 
source of growth. Claudia Goldin examines the 1897-1917 period during 
which 17 million Europeans immigrated to the United States. Men's 
clothing and foundries preferentially employed foreign labor, and 
displacement of less-skilled workers of the native-born population 
caused ripple effects so that across industries, states Goldin, "a 1 per­
centage point increase in the fraction of a city's population that was 
foreign born decreased wages by about 1 .5 to 3 percent" (1993, 21-22) . 
Effects were probably more far-reaching than Goldin imagines, 
because the large labor supply stifled internal migration toward new 
industrial jobs. In his well-remembered "Put Down Your Buckets Where 
You Are" speech at the 1895 Atlanta Exposition, Booker T. Washington 
pleaded for an end to immigration because it contributed to continu­
ing underemployment in rural and small-town America .  Indeed, 
African-Americans began to take advantage of industrial job opportu­
nities in the north only after immigration was effectively ended in the 
early 1920s (Morris 1990; Briggs 1992) . 
Current U.S. data again show deterioration in both wages and the 
conditions of work (Bernstein 1994; Mishel and Bernstein 1995) . Real 
wages stagnated for up to 80 percent of the population beginning in 
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the early 1970s, a period coincident with a one-time surge from women 
and the baby-boom generation bursting simultaneously onto the labor 
market. Continuing growth in the supply of workers is driven by 
immigration. About three-quarters of immigrants enter the labor force, 
nearly doubling the annual demand for net new jobs. Underemploy­
ment (the unemployed plus involuntarily part-time workers) rose from 
9.8 percent of the labor force in 1989 to 12.6 percent in 1993 (Morris 
1995), and is an obstacle to the absorption of a probable 10 million 
discouraged workers, the many welfare recipients whose benefits may 
end, and the 900,000 a year more young Americans entering than 
older workers leaving the labor force. 
By 1990 immigrants were 10 percent of the total U.S. labor force 
and a quarter of all workers without a high school diploma. Vernon 
Briggs, Jr. (1990) testified before the Congressional Judiciary Subcom­
mittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law that immi­
gration victimizes the lower end of the U.S. labor pool, including both 
citizens and established, earlier immigrants whose labor force charac­
teristics resemble those of newcomers. Frank Morris (1990), dean of 
graduate studies at Morgan State University (Baltimore), testified in 
the same hearings that "the black community . . .  may find that any 
encouraging assumptions we had about opportunities for young black 
workers and prospective workers have been sidetracked by hasty 
immigration policies . . . .  It is clear that America's black population is 
bearing a disproportionate share of immigrants' competition for jobs, 
housing and social services ."  Richard Estrada, of the Dallas Morning 
News, concurs. "Apologists for massive immigration appear to blame 
the large-scale replacement of black workers by Hispanic immigrants 
in the hotel-cleaning industry of Los Angeles on the blacks them­
selves, instead of acknowledging the obvious explanation that the 
immigrants depressed prevailing wages and systematically squeezed 
thousands of citizens out of the industry" (1991, 25). Earlier immi­
grants also lose, even when an influx is their own ethnic group. Estrada 
(1990) attributes unemployment among established Hispanics to new 
arrivals from Mexico and elsewhere who undercut wages, that is, will 
work for less and with fewer benefits. He adds, 
In sum, the evidence shows that Hispanic-Americans have emerged 
as the greatest victims of U.S. immigration policy since 1965, instead 
of its greatest beneficiaries. The notion that Hispanics in this country 
favor more immigration, while the rest of America favors less, is a 
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false one that has poisoned the debate for too long. This distortion 
must be corrected, especially by those who explicitly claim to repre­
sent Hispanic-Americans. (1991, 28) 
George Borjas and Richard Freeman (1992) attribute the deteriora­
tion in economic position of high school-educated U.S. workers to 
competition from immigrants and net imports of goods manufactured 
by unskilled labor outside of the United States. High school dropouts 
are still more affected: immigration and the trade imbalance together 
raised the 1988 effective labor supply by 28 percent for men and 31 
percent for women, accounting for up to half of a ten-percentage-point 
decline in the wages of unskilled labor between 1970 and the late 
1980s. 
Recent labor market studies show further net negative impacts. 
Estimating that immigration accounts for as much as one-third of the 
1980s relative income decline among lower-paid workers, Borjas (1995) 
sees it costing working Americans more than $133 billion annually in 
job opportunities, depressed wages, and deteriorating conditions of 
work. Symmetrically, immigration puts $140 billion into the pockets of 
employers. The net $7 billion added to the aggregate economy comes 
at the cost of increasing polarization between rich and poor. 
Steve H. Murdock's testimony on March 22, 1995, before the U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform also suggests that immigration 
adds to aggregate income but without corresponding benefit to indi­
vidual American families. By 2050, states Murdock, "average per-house­
hold annual income (in 1990 dollars) would be approximately $600 
lower because of immigration." 
Jobs are systematically downgraded by labor competition so that 
the nostrum, "There are some jobs that Americans won't do," becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Bring in fresh Third World labor and the 
wage, benefit, and safety conditions to which jobs devolve attract 
neither native-born Americans nor established immigrants (Marshall 
1995) . Wages and conditions of work are competed down so that jobs 
in whole industries-construction, meat packing, and hotelery, for 
example-become less attractive. Meat packing, formerly unionized 
and characterized by adequate wages and working conditions, is now 
said to be the most dangerous job in the United States (Browne 1995) . 
Supply and demand operating in the labor market means that "a surge 
in immigration guarantees that the less skilled service-sector jobs re­
main low paid" (Whitmore 1992, lE). 
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In testimony on March 22, 1995, before the U.S. Commission on 
Immigration Reform, a representative of the Arizona restaurant own­
ers association made a telling admission when asked how the industry 
had coped with the temporarily smaller flow of illegal alien labor after 
passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). He 
replied, "We made the jobs more attractive by increasing wages, im­
proving working conditions, and establishing promotion tracks." 
Queried as to how the industry might cope with new legislation that 
restricted immigrant labor, this same spokesman could not think of 
one single way. 
Some newcomers are entrepreneurial (but at no higher rate than 
the native-born) and upgrade communities. Nevertheless, Americans 
may not benefit because immigrants tend to hire others of their own 
ethnic group, and some businesses are not new but only displace 
American-owned operations. In 1960 blacks owned 25 percent of the 
gas stations in Florida's Dade County (encompassing Miami). By 1979 
black ownership had dwindled to 9 percent and Cuban ownership 
accounted for 48 percent of the total (Abernethy 1993) . 
Low-skill black and white Americans flee states that are heavily 
affected by immigration (Frey 1994; 1995), so data from local labor 
markets understate the extent to which Americans are displaced. Re­
jecting early econometric models that purport to show that legal and 
illegal immigration have little, if any, negative effect on U.S. labor, 
Donald Huddle asks if models and field studies that do show "signifi­
cant wage depression and job displacement [are] ignored and 
distorted . . .  treated as taboos, because immigration as a win-win situ­
ation is such a powerful myth?" (1992, 3) . Huddle (1993) estimates 
that more than 2 million Americans unemployed in 1992 were dis­
placed by immigrants, for a public sector cost of $11 .9 billion in social 
safety net programs. 
American skilled labor is also under pressure, particularly in fields 
where fluent English is not required (Coping 1994; Nelson 1994) . The 
national security implications are not trivial (Wiarda and Wiarda 1986). 
Displacement of specialized professionals by immigrants who often 
will work for much lower wages threatens the viability of U.S. engi­
neering schools and science departments. Is it wise for the United 
States to cede preeminence in mathematics, physical sciences, and 
engineering education? 
International competitiveness, meaning the ability to sell goods 
and services abroad, is the final factor affecting the resource/popula­
tion balance. Exports pay for natural resource imports while leaving, 
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ideally, a balance-of-payments surplus. A positive trade balance en­
ables countries to afford imported carrying capacity (Teo 1995) . The 
Netherlands imports carrying capacity. 
Japan, Singapore, and other so-called Asian tigers have increased com­
petitiveness through large gains in labor productivity. Rising produc­
tivity depends, in turn, on investment in technology, equipment, and 
plant (McCracken 1991) .  
The United States, although competitive in many sectors, may be 
overtaken because of its slower productivity gains: 0.8 percent average 
annual increment compared with 2.8 percent in Japan. Neoconservatives 
explain the variation in productivity trends in the effect of capital 
gains tax rates on savings and investment (Rubenstein 1995). But the 
difference between the 28 percent U.S. maximum tax rate and the 20 
percent Japanese rate seems insufficient to fully explain the disparate 
rates of capital investment. 
A likely contributor to the differential is the cheapness of Ameri­
can labor. Continuing rapid growth in the U.S. labor force (against 
almost no growth in Japan) drives down the relative cost of American 
labor and probably encourages reliance on labor in place of invest­
ment in labor-saving technology. Preference for creating new jobs rather 
than investing to raise the productivity of existing workers tends to 
dilute the average amount of capital backing each job .  This is a drag 
on productivity gains and, thus, on international competitiveness in 
the long run. 
Never to be forgotten as one heads down this road is the widen­
ing gulf between rich and poor. In a democracy, the benefit of cheap 
labor to employers may be transient, because it fosters the rhetoric of 
class warfare and demagoguery. The electoral process can result in tax 
and regulatory policies designed to redistribute wealth; but these also 
stifle wealth-creating business activity (for example, Sweden) so the 
"remedy" is self-defeating. Amelioration of conditions by a debt­
ridden government is unrealistic in the long run. No one wins as 
government debt grows and underemployment worsens. 
Lower compensation and heavier taxation both eat at the middle 
class, which is the bulwark of the domestic consumer market, political 
stability, and democracy. Not only dissatisfaction among ordinary 
Americans but also pathological behavior can spread. Despair of ever 
joining (or remaining in) the mainstream fosters crime, riots, vigilan­
tism, intolerance, scapegoating, and other signs of disappointment and 
anger. All erode civil society and generate instability. 
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C:onelusion 
Population growth underlies many of the serious environmental, eco­
nomic, cultural, and political tendencies that threaten to engulf America. 
Many Americans are resentful, having believed for so long that their 
birthright is the opportunity for honest work that will produce a good 
living. 
The people are far ahead of their leaders in trying to stop popu­
lation growth. Native-born Americans limit family size to 1 .8 children. 
(The average national rate of 2 .1  reflects the significantly higher fertil­
ity of the immigrant sector. ) A cross-section of Americans also affirms 
that "controlling immigration [is] a very important goal" [73 percent 
of public versus 28 percent of leaders]; and that "immigrants [are] a 
critical threat" [74 percent of public versus 31 percent of leaders] (Rielly 
1995, 6). Similarly, the 1988-90 Latino National Political Survey­
released by the Ford Foundation in December 1992, two months after 
passage of legislation that raised legal immigration by 40 percent­
suggests that more than 75 percent of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans 
residing in the United States agree or strongly agree that "there are too 
many immigrants" (LNPS 1992). 
The general public is not xenophobic in its rejection of immigra­
tion, but a growing number perceive a link between worsening con­
ditions, population growth, and the large inflow of aliens. Two-thirds 
believe that "the American Dream of equal opportunity, personal 
freedom, and social mobility [have] become harder to achieve in the 
past 10  years" and 74 percent expect that the struggle will intensify 
in the coming decade (Rielly 1995, 8) .  If current trends continue, 
resentment could rise sharply, redefining who is unwanted and what 
is unAmerican. 
Perception of being cheated out of what is commonly seen as an 
American citizen's birthright will enrage many. Democracy and mu­
tual tolerance may not survive the realization that government, the 
media elite, and multinational corporations have governed in their 
own interests, in disregard for the well-being of the average, loyal 
citizen. The less sophisticated will sense mainly their own alienation 
from society and a near-total absence of a stake in its peaceful continu­
ance. Demagogic leaders could mobilize this mass in the usual way­
scapegoating, myths, promises-and the America we honor would 
become history. A descent into genocide as gangs, tribes, and factions 
war over spoils seems farfetched except in the context of history. 
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The further tragedy would be that the sacrifice is based on self­
delusion, a persistent belief that open-arms immigration policies help 
countries from which immigrants come. They do not help. On the 
contrary, holding out the promise of rescue promotes false percep­
tions. Believing that local limits will not apply, foreign governments 
and people conclude that reproductive self-discipline can be disre­
garded. This miscommunication is devastating because societies can­
not, without limiting natural increase, bring population into balance 
with the carrying capacity of their environment (Abernethy 1979, 1993, 
1994a, 1994b).  
Stopping the momentum of population growth in the United States 
is daunting. Albert Bartlett and Edward Lytwak (1995) explain that 
attaining zero population growth immediately means that the total of 
deaths and emigration must equal (or be greater than) the total of 
births and immigration. Given the 1992 estimates for the United States 
of 2.2 million deaths and 0.2 million emigrants per year, the total of 
births and immigration should not exceed 2.4-a problem to say the 
least, because births alone were 4.1 million in 1992! 
The array of zero-population-growth scenarios can be represented 
by the two most diverse possibilities.  One gives the whole allowance 
(2.4 million) to births while placing immigration at zero (42.5 percent 
and 100 percent reductions respectively) . At the other extreme, immi­
gration remains at the estimated 1992 level of 1 .3 million, leaving room 
for just 1 . 1  million births (a 73.2 percent reduction in U.S. fertility). 
The preceding exercise reveals the strength of the force producing 
population growth and the corresponding risks of delay in formulat­
ing and implementing policy. Delay now could contribute to crisis 
later, a high-stakes gamble. Never (one hopes) will individual deci­
sions about childbearing be overruled by government, but China, of 
necessity, provides precedent. 
Immigration numbers, unlike childbearing, are historically and 
appropriately within the public-policy arena. An all-inclusive cap of 
100,000 annually, say, might give continuing priority to America's 
valued role as a refuge of last resort. One-quarter, or 25,000 places, 
could be reserved for refugees. Asylum claimants (who apply for resi­
dent status only after entering the United States) "jump the line," and 
so need not be rewarded with any significant quota. Skilled immi­
grants and citizens' nuclear families (but not collateral relatives) com­
plete the list of those who should be admitted under a reformed 
immigration policy. 
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Americans could be proud of this policy. It is sensitive and re­
strained and, given the population growth to which we are unavoid­
ably already committed, is congruent with "the interests, and limitations 
of our country" (Kennan 1995, 116) .  This policy would produce a 
gradual decline in population size (through attrition) beginning in 
about 2050. It would come none too soon to mitigate the very likely 
social and political sequelae of overpopulation that could be increas­
ingly upon us. 
7. The Vieions Cirele Prineiple 
A Contribution to the Theory of Population 
and Development 
Craig Dilworth 
As humankind moves into the twenty-first century, probably few 
among us believe that it may well be our last. And the response to 
such a suggestion is most often to say that there have been prophets 
of doom in the past, and their prophecies· have not come true. But 
their prophecies, unlike the present warning, have not been based on 
an extrapolation of accepted fact. 
The facts supporting such a bleak view of the future are them­
selves easily accessible to most people, and are already known to many. 
They include a combination of global warming, the thinning of the 
ozone layer, nonrenewable resource depletion, increasing pollution of 
air, soil, and water, decreasing fresh-water stocks, accelerating erosion 
and desertification, drastically decreasing biological diversity, and 
exponential population growth. 
But it is not the intention of this chapter to prophesy, doom or 
otherwise. The intention rather is to provide an understanding of how 
we got into this predicament, and against the background of this 
understanding to offer some suggestions as to how we might best deal 
with the situation. To obtain such an understanding, we must have 
Support for research used in this article was provided by the Swedish Environ­
mental Protection Agency. 
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before us a picture of the whole of the development of humankind, 
and should therefore begin with a consideration of human prehistory. 
Human Development 
According to the archaeological evidence, the life-form that evolved 
into human beings branched off from other life-forms some 6 to 8 
million years ago. Our nearest living relatives are the chimpanzees, 
who are genetically more like us than they are like the gorillas, their 
and our next nearest kin. And we may still be considered a type of 
ape, one going under the name of hominid. 
The first hominids, the Australopithecus (southern ape) appeared 4 
to 5 million years ago, and differed from other apes primarily in their 
upright stance. Their brain size was still relatively small, and their 
similarity to modern humans has not been considered sufficient to 
include them in the genus Homo. 
The first members of the genus Homo appeared some 2.5 million 
years ago; and the earliest named species of the genus, Homo habilis 
(handy human), lived from about 2 to 1 .5 million years ago. The first 
recognizable stone tools were manufactured by Homo habilis, if not by 
a somewhat earlier form of Homo. 
The next major step in human genetic development was the evo­
lution of the larger-brained Homo erectus from Homo habilis, some 1 .8 
million years ago. Homo erectus, who may be considered a true human, 
learned to control (if not create) fire some 1 .5 million years ago, and 
about the same time began producing hand axes, a practice that con­
tinued more than a million years. From their production of hand axes 
of different sizes but the same proportions, it has been suggested that 
Homo erectus may have used language. There is archaeological evi­
dence that this species of humans hunted elephants, horses, rhinocer­
oses, and giant baboons. By 1 million years ago both Australopithecus 
and Homo habilis had become extinct, and Homo erectus were the only 
living hominids. 
The first Homo sapiens (wise humans) evolved from Homo erectus 
about 400,000 years ago. They too used hand axes, but also developed 
the wooden thrusting spear, as well as wooden containers and canoes. 
Although all early human beings were hunters and gatherers, hunting 
rather than scavenging continually became of greater importance over 
the years. Homo sapiens were almost certainly capable of speech some 
300,000 years ago, a skill that may have been acquired in ritual activi-
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ties performed around the fire, and would have been an aid in hunt­
ing big game on a large scale . 
The Human Revolution 
A view over the whole of the development of humankind shows cul­
tural changes to have occurred at an ever-accelerating pace from its 
beginning some 6 million years ago right up to the present. This devel­
opment took a particular spurt some 100,000 years ago, which was 
some 30,000 years after the appearance of the Neanderthals and about 
the same time as the arrival of the Cro-Magnons, or Homo sapiens sapiens­
our own species. After this time human life became increasingly sophis­
ticated, particularly in the case of the new biologic species the 
Cro-Magnons, with the creation of purely aesthetic objects, the use of 
bone for tools, the making of tools with built-in handles, and probably 
the use of skin clothing. These various developments have led many 
authors to speak of a "human revolution" as occurring at this time. 
Both the Neanderthals and the Cro-Magnons had brains at least as 
large as ours. But where the Neanderthals were heavily built, with 
large teeth and a jutting brow, the Cro-Magnons were physiologically 
much like modern humans, though of a more athletic build. Both lived 
during the last glacial period, which stretched from about 115,000 to 
10,000 years ago; and both engaged in big-game hunting on the large 
steppe-tundra areas of that time. About 35,000 years ago the Neander­
thals, some of whose blood we may share, became extinct. 
The average human life expectancy during this period was slightly 
over 30 years for men and slightly under 30 for women (Lenski et.al. 
1995, 109). Despite what we would consider short life spans, however, 
these people suffered relatively little from communicable diseases (Hole 
1992, 373).  
Starting about 40,000 years ago there occurred another spurt in 
human cultural development, as well as an increase in population 
size, within the hunting-and-gathering life-style. This included the 
systematic hunting of selected animals, the development of cave art, 
the widespread use of blade tools, the ability to create fire, and the 
invention of lamps, needles with eyes, spoons, pestles, axes, the spear 
thrower, and, about 12,000 years ago, the first machine: the bow and 
arrow. In comparison with a spear hurled with the aid of a spear 
thrower, an arrow could be shot twice the distance, at more than double 
the speed, and with greater accuracy. 
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Somewhat before 12,000 years ago, but after the arrival of human 
beings, all megafauna in Australia, including the giant kangaroo, be­
came extinct. And shortly after 12,000 years ago, in Eurasia and America, 
such large mammals as the mammoth, the mastodon, the woolly rhi­
noceros, the giant deer, the saber-toothed tiger, the giant wolf, the native 
American horse and the giant ground sloth all became extinct. All in all, 
by 10,000 years ago, more than fifty genera of large mammals had be­
come extinct over a few thousand years, a greater number of extinctions 
than during the preceding 4 million years. 
The Horticultural Revolution 
Human beings could not live on meat alone, and much of their diet 
depended on plants. During the last glacial period the men hunted big 
game; the women gathered edible roots, fruit, and wild cereals. By the 
end of that period, however, not only had much of the big game 
disappeared, but the warming climate meant an increase in the distri­
bution of edible plants, particularly wild cereals . Ten thousand years 
ago the climate was as warm as today, and at that time began what 
may be termed the second great revolution in human development, 
though a purely cultural rather than biological one, the horticultural 
revolution. 
The primary tool that may be associated with the horticultural revo­
lution is the digging stick, or hoe. Rather than forage after sparsely 
distributed roots in the wild, tubers were planted, normally by women, 
in a garden near the place of domicile. This would often take place in 
an area whose vegetation had previously been removed by fire, the 
whole process being known as swidden, or slash-and-bum, cultivation. 
Starting about 10,000 years ago, the horticultural life style became 
human beings' primary means of subsistence, hunting and gathering 
playing a more peripheral role. At that time the earth's human popu­
lation was between 5 and 10 million, after which it began to increase 
markedly. The domestication of crops began in marginal areas in the 
tropics, and among the first were yams, potatoes, taro, and cassava. 
Tree-borne crops, such as bananas, coconuts, olives, and various nuts, 
also began to be cultivated about this time. Along with the domesti­
cation of plants there also occurred a domestication of animals, first in 
western Asia, starting with the dog, some 12,000 years ago or earlier, 
and succeeded by goats and sheep about 9,000 years ago, then cattle, 
pigs, and bees, and then the horse and donkey about 6,000 years ago. 
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Domesticating animals can be seen as going through the stages of 
taming, in which a few young animals are raised, herding, in which 
the animals are essentially wild but are rounded up for slaughter, and 
proper domestication, which requires the feeding of the animals and 
may include, for example, their being milked or sheared. Domesti­
cated animals were probably poorly fed and were almost invariably 
smaller than their wild ancestors. The domestication of animals led for 
the first time in human development to situations of ownership, do­
mesticated animals rather than, say, land, being the first instance of 
somethings being considered the property of a particular person. 
A major impact of the horticultural revolution upon the human 
life-style was that for the first time human societies became sedentary, 
the first human settlements coinciding with the beginning of the hor­
ticultural period. At this time such fortified towns as Jericho, with a 
population of about two thousand, were built. Where hunter-gatherer 
societies on the average consisted of some forty people, horticultural 
societies consisted of some fifteen hundred at the beginning of the era, 
and about five thousand by the end. Horticultural food production 
was able to support about twenty times as many people per unit area 
as hunting and gathering. 
Because human beings no longer needed to move about carrying all 
their possessions with them, many more possessions could be accumu­
lated. Also, such heavy articles as pottery, first produced some 9,000 
years ago, could be put to use. In connection with pottery the second 
machine was invented, the potter 's wheel, about 6,500 years ago. 
The beginning of the horticultural era also coincided with that of 
the Neolithic era, or New Stone Age, which involved the grinding and 
polishing of stone tools. This phase in human development was even­
tually replaced by the use of metals, the first being copper about 7,000 
years ago, and then bronze, in what may be termed the advanced 
horticultural period. Technological innovations during the horticul­
tural period included sickles, cloth, basket making, sailboats, fishnets, 
fishhooks, ice picks, and combs. Throughout the development of the 
horticultural era, there was an increase in the specialization of human 
activities. 
Interaction between different societies also became notable with 
the horticultural revolution. This interaction took the form of com­
merce and warfare, both of which increased with time, as did female 
infanticide. Hunter-gatherers, in conflicts with horticulturalists, were 
invariably outnumbered, and their only defense was to retreat to less 
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desirable areas . The result of conflicts between horticulturalists 
themselves may have largely been determined by the quality of the 
respective parties' weapons, the use of bronze weapons providing a 
distinct advantage. 
The horticultural life-style provided human beings for the first 
time with an economic surplus, and excess food became the first 
medium of exchange. 
The Agricultural Revolution 
Where the horticultural revolution consisted in the transformation to 
the cultivation of small vegetable and fruit gardens by women using the 
digging stick or hoe, the agricultural revolution can be described as the 
transformation to the growing of cereals in large fields by men using 
plows. Both involved cultural rather than biological or genetic changes. 
The agricultural revolution can be considered to have begun with 
the invention of the plow in Mesopotamia or Egypt somewhat before 
5,000 years ago. Compared to the hoe, the plow was more effective in 
killing weeds and, by turning them into the soil, in returning nutrients 
to the soil and keeping them near the surface, where they could be of 
use to crops. Thus, with crop rotation, the same area of land could be 
used for longer periods, and the amount of food produced per unit 
land was greatly increased. Also, where hoeing could be done only by 
human beings, it was soon realized that a plow could be drawn by 
oxen, leading to the cultivation of larger areas and therefore to even 
greater productivity. This productivity was further enhanced by irri­
gation and the use of manure from the oxen to fertilize the fields. 
The first plows were made of wood; later the plowshares on some 
were made of bronze-though this metal was relatively scarce-and 
not before about 2,750 years ago were they generally made of quench­
hardened iron, that is, steel. Since then, steel has remained the pri­
mary material for making tools and weapons used for cutting. The 
plow was not used in sub-Saharan Africa or America until introduced 
there by Europeans. 
The agricultural revolution was contemporaneous with "the dawn 
of civilization" in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The size of the population 
once again began to increase dramatically, particularly in the valleys 
of such large rivers as the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates, leading 
to the appearance of cities with over 100,000 inhabitants and empires 
with their divine hereditary rulers. Although the first irrigation canals 
were constructed some 7,500 years ago (in Mesopotamia), their use 
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became widespread during the agrarian era. Megalithic structures were 
built, the most notable being the Egyptian pyramids, and writing was 
introduced to record economic transactions. 
At first, as in the horticultural era, food products constituted the 
medium of exchange, but the products were more particularly various 
kinds of grain, which could be stored longer than, for example, tubers. 
Nevertheless, owing to the bulkiness and perishability of grains, met­
als such as silver and copper began being used as currency early in the 
agricultural period. Trade, in which metal currency allowed the rise of 
a class of merchants or middlemen, increased throughout the agrarian 
era. 
Technological innovations during this period included, more than 
5,000 years ago, the plow, the wagon wheel, animal harnesses, writing 
and numerical notation, and the calendar. Later inventions include the 
catapult, the crossbow, gunpowder, horseshoes, stirrups, the lathe, the 
screw, the wheelbarrow, the clock, the spinning wheel, printing, water 
mills, and windmills. By the eighteenth century, agrarian societies could 
support cities with as many as 1 million inhabitants. 
Life expectancy during the agrarian period generally varied be­
tween twenty and twenty-five years, longer for men than for women, 
and shorter in cities than in the country. The spread of disease was 
even more of a problem than during the horticultural era, because of 
increased population density and interaction between societies, as well 
as worsening sanitary conditions in cities as they grew larger. Warfare 
was also common throughout this era. 
Art, music, architecture, and learning also developed markedly 
through this period, as is witnessed by, for example, Greek sculpture, 
Gothic cathedrals, and the birth and development of philosophy and 
science. 
The Industrial Revolution 
Just before and at the beginning of the industrial revolution, which 
occurred first in Britain between 1750 and 1850, came a number of 
inventions, including the Neilson hot blast stove, the Newcomen en­
gine, Watt's steam engine, the flying shuttle, the spinning jenny, and 
the water frame. The main inventions at this time were directly or 
indirectly associated with coal, Newcomen's and later Watt's engine 
first being used to pump water out of ever-deepening coal mines. 
With the industrial revolution came a huge increase in economic 
activity, including the building of systems of rails and canals, largely 
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for the transportation of coal, and the use of the new inventions for 
the production of ever-more products . At the same time the popula­
tion of Britain and Wales, for example, increased tremendously, tri­
pling in the 110 years from 1751 to 1861 (Stevenson 1993, 232) . More 
people married, marriages were on the average earlier, and there were 
more illegitimate children. Life expectancy also increased during this 
period, averaging about thirty-two years in the 1670s and almost thirty­
nine in the 1810s (Laqueur 1993, 105). 
Wars have been larger and more destructive since the industrial 
revolution, because of the invention and use of more powerful weap­
ons, the latest on the list being nuclear weapons. There have of course 
been other inventions during this period, some of the best known 
being the telephone, the electric light, the radio and television, the 
automobile and the airplane. The automobile and airplane were de­
pendent on the prior invention of the internal combustion engine. 
Rather than coal as its source of energy, this engine uses oil (gasoline); 
the first oil well was drilled in the United States in 1859. 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, about 1750, the 
population of the world has increased from about 730 million to 5 .7 
billion, an increase of about 780 percent, and has more than doubled 
in the past forty years . This increase has been accompanied by an 
increase in urbanization, some cities now containing as many as 20 
million people, as well as an increase in the problems of resource 
depletion and pollution mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. 
Industrialization has spread to areas supporting about 20 percent of 
the world's population, these people accounting for about 80 percent 
of world resource use. The consequent difference in the standard of 
living between the two groups is huge and constantly growing. 
Economic activity has also been constantly increasing, as has the 
movement of people over large distances, which has been accompa­
nied by an increase in the spread of communicable diseases, such as 
AIDS. Furthermore, at present, about 13 million people die each year 
of malnutrition or starvation. Nevertheless, world life expectancy has 
increased dramatically during the past fifty years, the average now 
being sixty-five years, slightly higher for women than for men Qohnson 
1994, 224, 364). 
The Demographic Transition Model 
The present population of the world is far beyond what is sustainable 
in the long run, and it is still growing at an alarming rate. What has 
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been the driving force behind the increasing size of the human popu­
lation, and what could possibly make it level off or decline in the 
future, with as little suffering as possible? 
The generally accepted and seldom questioned view of popula­
tion growth versus stability has been the "demographic transition" 
model. According to it, populations grow when people believe that 
having many children will benefit them, particularly in old age; to 
stabilize population size, the society must reach a stage where the 
standard of living is sufficiently high to make such a reliance unnec­
essary. Thus, according to this view, the improved medical and sani­
tary conditions and pesticide use that have led to a marked decrease 
in infant mortality in the world, and a consequent lengthening of life 
expectancy, will also lead to a decrease in fertility and an eventual 
leveling off of the world's population. Politically, this view has had 
the effect of supporting continued economic growth as a goal for both 
industrialized and nonindustialized countries, as well as a laissez-faire 
policy in dealing with the problem of overpopulation: increase eco­
nomic growth and the population problem will solve itself. 
What is not being questioned here is the fact that in many societ­
ies, before the implementation of medical and other technologies from 
industrial societies, high infant mortality was at least partly respon­
sible for low population growth. What is being questioned is the 
purported causal link from improved material standard of living to 
decreased fertility. As has been pointed out by Virginia Abernethy, the 
demographic transition model arose in the 1930s, when Third World 
countries had higher fertility rates than industrialized countries 
(Abernethy 1993, 33) . But, as she says, the problem is that this situa­
tion was taken to be evidence of a causal relation,1 a relation that 
moreover did not apply just at that time but generally! Are we ex­
pected to think that the size of the population of Homo sapiens sapiens, 
which has been increasing at an accelerating rate over the past 40,00 
years, should level off when and only when each family unit of the 
species is equipped with a refrigerator, car, and television? 
At this point we might pause, however, to note that, even if the 
demographic transition model were absolutely correct, its being 
1. In this regard the demographic transition model may be seen as yet another 
expression of the positivism that has influenced so much thinking in this century, one 
characteristic of which is to take relations of uniformity to be causal relations. As pointed 
out by Herman Daly (1992, 164), in the present case lower fertility might just as well be 
the cause of higher per capita income, rather than the effect. For a critique of positivistic 
thinking as applied to modern science, see Dilworth 1995. 
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followed politically would by no means solve the problems to which 
global overpopulation is giving rise, namely, resource depletion and 
pollution. Even if the size of the population of the poorer 80 percent 
of the world's inhabitants would become constant when these people 
had attained the standard of living of the wealthier 20 percent, rather 
than having decreased, the rate of resource depletion and pollution in 
the world would have increased tremendously. For this reason alone, 
the aim of stabilizing population through global economic growth is 
untenable. 
But, in any case, Abernethy has succeeded in raising grave doubts 
about the viability of the demographic transition model itself. She 
cites periods in human history where, contrary to the model, either a 
worsening standard of living has gone hand in hand with decreasing 
fertility, or an improved standard of living has gone hand in hand 
with increasing fertility. These examples include the fact that the tran­
sition to lower fertility in Germany and France preceded or was at 
least simultaneous with declining infant mortality and the situation in 
the United States after the Second World War, when massive economic 
growth was coincident with a baby boom. Other examples are the 
fertility declines in China, Costa Rica, and Sri Lanka despite people's 
low incomes and the high fertility rates in Brazil and Mexico despite 
increasing industrialization and per capita economic growth, as well 
as high fertility rates in several Middle Eastern countries despite high 
income levels (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990, 215; Meadows et al. 1992, 29). 
Abernethy's argument, which has the merit of being supported by 
common sense, is that it is just when people expect good times ahead 
that they have more children, not fewer. 
As for high fertility rates in Third World countries, alternative ex­
planations to that of the demographic transition model have been put 
forward by others. There seems to be a consensus that the high popu­
lation growth in the Third World is largely a result of the impact of 
European culture. As argued by Richard G. Wilkinson, "many primitive 
societies, particularly before contact with Europeans disrupted their 
cultural systems, prevented population growth and managed to live in 
equilibrium with their resources without threat of hunger" (Wilkinson 
1973, 6). The growth rate of the poorer 80 percent of the world's popu­
lation is twenty to thirty times higher now than it was before contact of 
these cultures with those of industrialized nations (Lenski et al, 1995, 
380) . As for contributing to the solution of the overpopulation problem, 
economic growth is certainly getting off to a bad start! 
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Even advocates of the demographic transition view would admit 
that decreasing mortality is a result of European intervention, but that 
preindustrial cultures often could keep their population size in check 
is seldom mentioned. One of the ways in which this was effected was 
through infanticide. 
Among the Tapirape Indians of Brazil, couples could raise two 
children of one sex, three in all. Tapirape culture banned parents from 
raising more, because additional mouths would siphon resources 
needed by other families. The Tapirape considered it selfish and im­
moral to try to keep a surplus baby. The death of the infant, who was 
not defined as human, was considered morally necessary for other 
members of the group to survive (Kottak 1994, 250) . 
According to Wilkinson, the issue at stake involves throwing out 
the whole popular idea of primitive societies as societies in a per­
petual state of hardship, scarcely able to scrape up a bare minimum of 
subsistence, with large families, children suffering from malnutrition, 
and a low life expectancy. Insofar as this is the situation in parts of the 
underdeveloped world, it is a comparatively recent phenomenon. 
Contact with Europeans, and with their alien values and practices, has 
led to the abandonment of customs such as abortion and infanticide 
that once helped prevent overpopulation. As early as the third quarter 
of the eighteenth century a missionary in Paraguay claimed that Chris­
tianity had led to the abolition of abortion and infanticide among the 
Abipones. Ironically, the same missionary also remarked on how plen­
tiful food had been, as if the fact was unrelated to the existence of 
these practices (Wilkinson 1973, 32-33) . 
Such arguments add to the reasons for strongly questioning the 
political goal of economic growth as a route to population stability. In 
the following, we shall attempt to give views such as those of Abernethy 
and Wilkinson a broader theoretical underpinning by suggesting the 
mechanism responsible not only for human population growth but 
also for technological development, economic growth, resource deple­
tion, and environmental destruction, throughout the development of 
humankind. 
The Vicious Circle Principle 
Just as the demographic transition model fits well in a worldview that 
gives high priority to economic growth, so does the view that techno­
logical change is an expression of human progress. This view is, prima 
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facie, easy to understand, for most technical change appears to lighten 
people's work loads or add to their enjoyment of their leisure time. 
Though this view is attractive, it does not take account of whether the 
technological change in question is accompanied by an increase in the 
size of the population affected by the change. 
In the view presented here, in keeping with Wilkinson's, the es­
sence of technological change consists in human beings' development 
of new methods of relating to their environment so that more can be 
extracted from that environment to support a growing population. 
Thus, technological change is seen here as paradigmatically being a 
defensive move by human beings in reaction to a worsening life situ­
ation resulting from an increase in the number of people living on a 
particular area of land. The words essence and paradigmatically are in­
tended to convey the idea that technological change may well occur 
for reasons other than the one given, but that the reason given, more 
than any other, constitutes the basic driving force behind the techno­
logical development human beings have brought about, beginning 
already with the invention of the first stone tools. 
A secondary driving force behind technological development, 
however, is technological development itself. Thus, just as we might 
say with Hume, Malthus, and others, that necessity is the mother of 
invention, we might also say that invention can be the mother of 
necessity. In other words, once a new invention has been adopted in 
a society, it tends to create pressure within the society to make other 
innovative changes. Once telephones come into use, telephone cable 
technology and switchboard technology have to be developed, and 
the results manufactured and put into use; the invention and use of 
cars demands an improvement in road technology and the develop­
ment of a huge system of highways and service stations. 
A tertiary driving force behind technological development is a re­
sult of the efforts of the mercantile or business class in society. Already 
with the influx of gold and silver from the New World in the sixteenth 
century, more of the economic resources of European societies wound 
up in the hands of people who were interested in, and knew something 
about, both economics and technology. More than that, these were people 
oriented to rational profit making (not a typical orientation in agrarian 
societies) and therefore motivated to provide financial support for tech­
nological innovations that would increase the efficiency of people and 
machines (Lenski et al, 1995, 242) . Thus, capitalists' interest in maximiz­
ing their profits also tends to spur technological development. 
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This having been said, our theory, based on the vicious circle 
principle, suggests that human technological and economic develop­
ment are essentially part of a recurring phenomenon consisting of 
population growth, which increases consumption, which leads to a 
scarcity of resources, which creates a demand for technological devel­
opment, which when employed enables previously inaccessible re­
sources to be drawn from the environment. These developments trigger 
economic growth, which increases the use of energy, which in turn 
increases the production of waste while creating conditions for an 
even greater number of humans to occupy a given area of land, which 
leads to further population growth, which again results in increased 
consumption, and so on. 
Note that no suggestion is being made here as to the inevitability 
of this process. It is possible, and has been the case in many societies, 
that the size of a particular population be under control, so that the 
vicious circle need not get started. Nor need it be the case that, once 
started, the vicious circle cannot be stopped. Furthermore, the present 
view does not exclude the possibility of technological developments 
taking a new turn, so that rather than leading to an extraction of more 
from the environment, it leads to an extraction of less. 
To investigate the viability of our theory, we might return to con­
sider how far our earlier sketch of human development can be under­
stood in its light. 
Human Development Revisited 
Though one might be inclined to see the invention of early stone tools, 
such as the hand ax, as a response to population pressure, we lack 
sufficient information about the size and living conditions of the hu­
man population at that time to warrant the making of such a connec­
tion. In any case, the possibility of applying the vicious circle principle 
to human development becomes of greater relevance with the appear­
ance of our own species, Homo sapiens sapiens, in conjunction with 
what we have termed the human revolution. 
The Human Revolution 
As has been emphasized by a number of authors, at this time, about 
100,000 years ago, cultural evolution replaced biological evolution as 
the primary form of human adaptation to the environment. To this we 
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might add that, in our theory, the very innovativeness of our species, 
evident already at this time, is responsible for the ecological and de­
mographic predicament in which we find ourselves today. 
Perhaps what is most notable about cultural evolution during the 
last glacial period was the improvement in weapons, particularly the 
development from the wooden thrusting spear, to the stone-pointed 
throwing spear, to the throwing spear that could be hurled a greater 
distance with the aid of a spear thrower, and finally to the bow and 
arrow. The demise of the Neanderthals may have been a direct result of 
these latter weapons' developments occurring already with the Cro­
Magnons. Whether the extinction of the Neanderthals was at the hands 
of the technologically more developed Cro-Magnons, there is little doubt 
that increased hunting as compared to scavenging was at least partly a 
result of impovements in human weapon technology; moreover, hu­
mans with their weapons were responsible for the extinctions of many 
if not all of the megafauna that disappeared at the end of the last glacial 
period. The size of the human population began to increase about forty 
thousand years ago, at the same time as a number of technological 
inventions were made; and the disappearance of many of the megafauna 
may have resulted from the invention of the bow and arrow. 
There have been attempts to explain the extinction of megafauna 
at this time that do not see the reason in human technological inven­
tiveness. The most common is that these animals, adapted to ice-age 
conditions, could not survive changes associated with the warming 
climate. This explanation, however, does not account for the fact that 
they had survived earlier interglacial warm periods. Nor does it ac­
count for the fact that no smaller animals or plants became extinct at 
this time. Further evidence for the extinctions being caused by human 
beings is the disappearance of many large mammals both on Mada­
gascar and in New Zealand about a thousand years ago, directly after 
the arrival of humans. 
One wonders, if extinction was due to climatic change, why Mada­
gascar extinctions were not coincident with those of Africa 220 miles 
away; and why European and Ukrainian mammoths became extinct 
13,000 years ago while in North America they survived another 2000 
years. Previous great extinction waves had affected plants and small 
animals as well as large animals, but the late Pleistocene extinctions 
are concentrated on the large, gregarious, herding, or slow moving 
animals-the ideal prey of human hunters (Smith, 1992, 5). 
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Another aspect of this phenomenon is that although many megafaunal 
extinctions occurred in America, Eurasia, and Australia, none occurred 
in Africa .  The best explanation of this aspect seems to be that it was 
when human beings entered new areas, where their prey had not had 
the time to adapt to human beings' evolving predatory prowess, that 
they were driven to extinction. This effect would have been height­
ened if the newly arriving human beings were equipped with the bow 
and arrow. 
A further point is that in our theory virtually every technological 
advance at this time, no matter how minor, can be seen as directly or 
indirectly increasing the number of human beings who could occupy 
a particular area of land. Thus, developments that may seem minor, 
such as the invention of needles with eyes, or even bowls and spoons, 
contributed to creating an environment that could support a greater 
number of people at that time. 
The Horticultural Revolution 
The horticultural revolution is generally seen as a response to the 
warming climate at the beginning of the Holocene, which led to a 
focus on gardening rather than hunting as an easier way to obtain a 
livelihood. One might ask, however, why gardening was not intro­
duced at the end of the previous glacial period. One answer might be 
that the more highly evolved Homo sapiens sapiens had yet to inhabit 
larger areas of the world. On the other hand, the members of many 
hunter-gatherer societies understood and occasionally applied the basic 
principles of plant cultivation thousands of years before horticulture 
became their primary mode of subsistence (Lenski et al. 1995, 135-36). 
As to why horticulture as a means of subsistence began at all, 
archaeological evidence suggests that food production developed in 
response to problems caused by the undue success of the hunter-gath­
erers, whose rate of food extraction came to exceed the carrying capac­
ity of the environment. It also suggests that some people resisted the 
introduction of horticulture for centuries after first making its acquain­
tance (van der Merwe 1992, 370). 
Here we see, then, a clear case for the application of the vicious 
circle principle. Technological advance-the invention of weapons 
such as the bow and arrow-made sources of food available that 
were previously unavailable, paving the way for an increase in 
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population at the same time it led to resource depletion. The greater 
population coupled with the diminished resources created the need 
for new technology-horticulture-capable of extracting even more 
from the environment. 
This view is further supported by another source. 
To explain the origin of food production (and economic change in 
general), many scholars now assume that the people most likely to 
adopt a new subsistence strategy are those who are having trouble 
following the subsistence practices that are common to their group. 
Thus, ancient Middle Easterners who lived outside the zone where 
wild foods were most abundant would be the most likely to experi­
ment-leading to new subsistence strategies. Recent archaeological 
finds support the hypothesis that domestication began in marginal 
areas rather than in the optimal zones, such as the Hilly Flanks, 
where traditional foods were most abundant. 
Early cultivation began as an attempt to copy, in a less favourable 
environment, the dense stands of wheat and barley that grew wild in 
the Hilly Flanks. (Kottak, 1994, 202-3) 
Regarding the idea that technological advance leads to an improve­
ment in standard of living, as is part of the modem ethos that includes 
both the demographic transition model and economic growth as a 
political goal, both archaeological and anthropological evidence indi­
cate that the opposite occurred in the revolution from the hunter­
gatherer period to the horticultural. Human life expectancy at birth 
fell from about thirty years for hunter-gatherer peoples to less than 
twenty years during this period, despite the resultant change from 
hand-to-mouth feeding to the storing of food (Clark 1989, 84-85) . Apart 
from the effects of war, the dependence on specialized food produc­
tion meant a lack of flexibility that could lead to starvation when 
crops failed, for example, because of drought. Higher population den­
sity and trade links also contributed to the increase in the spread of 
infectious diseases, and the sedentary life-style led to more unsanitary 
conditions and the spread of parasites . 
The horticultural revolution also meant a lower standard of living 
in other respects. 
One was that food producers typically work harder than foragers do-­
and for a less adequate diet. Diets based on crops and dairy products 
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tend to be less varied, nutritious, and healthful than foragers' diet, 
which are usually higher in proteins and lower in fats and carbohy­
drates. With the shift to food production, the physical well-being of the 
population often declines. Communicable diseases, protein deficiency, 
and dental caries increase, while average stature tends to decrease. By 
contrast, most foragers are, compared with farmers and herders, rela­
tively disease-free, stress-free, and well-nourished. Other disadvantages 
accompanied food production. Social inequality increased, as elaborate 
systems of social stratification replaced the egalitarianism of the past. 
Slavery was invented. Poverty, crime, war, and human sacrifice be­
came widespread, and the rate at which human beings degraded their 
environments increased. (Kottak 1994, 216) 
Concerning, for example, the time required to meet daily needs, a 
study of modern hunter-gatherers, the !Kung San of the Kalahari desert 
of southern Africa, shows that they are engaged in sustenance-related 
activities between twelve and nineteen hours per week, much less 
than is required in a horticultural society. Furthermore, their intake of 
calories and protein during the third year of a severe drought was 
above the recommended daily allowance for people of their stature­
despite their being forced to sustain themselves in a semi-arid envi­
ronment. Furthermore, their life expectancy compares favorably to that 
of industrialized populations (Reader 1988, 144, 148). It might also be 
mentioned that the fertility level among the !Kung is low relative to 
other contemporary African peoples, a possible cause being a long 
lactation period, which also tends to increase resistance to infection for 
both mothers and children. 
Another notable aspect of the lowering of the human standard of 
living with the coming of the horticultural life-style, as mentioned in the 
previous quote, is the drudgery it involves. The development of the 
Neolithic culture that accompanied the revolution to horticulture meant 
an increasing division of labor. While women worked in gardens, a task 
involving a good deal of drudgery itself, men worked grinding, polish­
ing, and boring holes in stone tools for use in the gardens-as Mumford 
suggests, the beginning of boring work and the daily grind. 
But this is not all. Further in keeping with the vicious circle prin­
ciple we see that horticulture not only allowed for the sustenance of 
a population that had overexploited its environment with the aid of 
weapon technology but it also allowed the size of that population to 
increase. During the horticultural period the human population, despite 
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undergoing a lowering in its standard of living, grew from some 10 
million to about 80 million. 
At this point we might emphasize the distinction between societ­
ies that for some period managed to keep their population size within 
the carrying capacity of their environment and societies that did not. 
When technological change has been very slow or nonexistent, it is 
possible for a society to maintain a constant population size through 
checks of its own. These can be preventive, as in the case of contracep­
tion and late marriages, or positive, as in the case of abortion and 
infanticide. As is clear, preventive checks reduce fertility, while posi­
tive checks lower life expectancy. When such internal checks are lack­
ing, external checks come into play, checks virtually always positive in 
nature, which can be, for example, disease or famine. Both internal 
and external checks may well be operative even in such cases as when 
the size of the population is increasing. Another check to population 
size, which is external to a society, but internal to humankind, is war. 
With the accelerated population growth resulting from the horticul­
tural revolution, when the previous internal checks of the hunter-gath­
erer period were no longer in play, warfare became one way in which 
the size of the population was restrained in its rate of growth.2 As the 
horticultural period advanced, and populations and population pres­
sure grew, so did the amount of warfare. 
As has been pointed out by a number of authors, warfare was 
virtually impossible for hunter-gatherers, not only because of their 
small numbers but also because of their being unable to accumulate 
sufficient food to see them through such engagements. Thus, only 
with the horticultural era, when food could be stored, either as, for 
example, grain or livestock, did warfare bocame possible. Further­
more, it was the existence of property, which hunter-gatherers lacked, 
that constituted the immediate cause of war, as well as being a prereq­
uisite for commerce. 
Apart from the direct loss of life resultant upon such conflicts, 
warfare also functioned as a check on population size through its 
giving rise to female infanticide. By reducing the number of girls in a 
society, the group could devote its resources to the care and nurture 
of its boys. 
2. The idea that overpopulation leads to war is at least as old as Plato. See Republic, 
2 .372c and 2.373c-374a. For a description of this mechanism in the case of the modem­
day horticulturalists of Papua, New Guinea, see Reader 1988, 42-44. 
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A survey of studies of 609 "primitive" societies found that the sex 
ratio among the young was most imbalanced in those societies in 
which warfare was current at the time of the study and most nearly 
normal in those societies in which warfare had not occurred for more 
than 25 years. In the former, boys outnumbered girls by a ratio of 7 
to 5 on the average, indicating that nearly 30 per cent of the females 
born in these societies had died as a result of female infanticide or 
neglect. (Lenski et al. 1995, 152) 
The Agricultural Revolution 
In the vicious circle principle, as is in keeping with the archaeological 
and historical record, the most important cultural development after 
the beginning of the use of horticultural methods was the invention 
and use of the plow. The continuing tendency of the human popula­
tion to grow beyond what could be supported by existent techniques 
meant that the only way that the eightfold increase in population 
could be sustained was by finding a way of exploiting the environ­
ment more thoroughly, and the plow was the primary means for ac­
complishing this end. The vicious circle of population growth, 
technological innovation, and resource depletion would be repeated 
on a massive scale. 
At first, farmers moved into thinly forested regions with light 
soils, especially along river valleys. Later, as these soils became de­
pleted and populations continued to grow, the farmers cleared forests, 
creating both farm and growing land. In the process, they caused 
accelerated leaching of nutrients and soil erosion, which altered veg­
etation and soils. Worldwide, where conditions were suitable, seed 
cultivation expanded at the expense of horticulture, even though these 
crops depleted soils more quickly than the products of horticulture 
(Hole 1992, 376) . 
Once again, technological advance was not a result of a seeking 
after a better life, but the response to need imposed by increasing 
numbers of people. Though the average age at death did not change 
notably in the transition to the agrarian period, remaining at about 
twenty years, such phenomena as the drought and flooding resulting 
from changing weather were more widespread in their effects. Simi­
larly, the spread of infectious diseases had a greater impact owing to 
increased population and greater interaction between groups coupled 
with worsening hygiene, the most devastating instance being the Black 
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Death in the middle of the fourteenth century, which killed between 
a quarter and a half of the population of Europe. And just as the 
human work load grew with the move to horticulture, it grew again 
with the move to agriculture. Though oxen were eventually used to 
plow fields, at the beginning of the agrarian era it was humans who 
drew the plows. Large areas of land became the property of kings, and 
almost all of the population worked as peasants or slaves to produce 
the foodstuffs that constituted the king's wealth, or to create the 
monuments that would stand as everlasting tributes to the king's 
greatness, or to fight in the king's wars. In this latter regard it may be 
mentioned that the period after the harvest was in came to be known 
as "the season when kings go forth to war." With the amassing of 
greater amounts of property, society became more stratified, there was 
a greater division of labor, and the distance between the rich and the 
poor constantly increased. 
While standard of living declined, so too did the quality of the 
land. The removal of trees-with the aid of iron axes-to allow the 
creation of fields led to soil erosion, a process accelerated by the ex­
posure of the topsoil to wind and rain by the use of the plow. In areas 
too hilly or deficient in nutrients for agriculture, goats were let roam, 
effectually exterminating all but the hardiest bushes. The results of 
these activities remain with us today, and can be seen, for example, 
over the whole Mediterranean area. The use of irrigation to supply 
water to fields in areas that were otherwise too dry to support agricul­
ture led to salinization, leaving the soil unusable for cultivation for 
thousands of years-as may be witnessed today in the Tigris-Euphrates 
valley. Wastelands developed around cities, where the area was picked 
clean of fuel and building materials, and vegetation disappeared owing 
to the passage of many feet. The increase in the numbers of people not 
only made the move to agriculture necessary but also made its eco­
logically disastrous effects more widespread. "Agriculture created se­
rious and irreversible changes when farmers began to plough the soil, 
clear forests to create fields, move rivers to irrigate wheat or rice, and 
burn forests to gain a few extra years of agricultural productivity from 
nutrient-deficient soils . Erosion and the alteration of the balance of 
species became inevitable" (Hole 1992, 379) .  
As for other species, the spread of agriculture and the human 
population forced many from their natural habitats; and some, such as 
the wild ox, were hunted to extinction. 
Where at the beginning of the human revolution adaptation to the 
environment was cultural change rather than biologic change, with 
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the evolution of commerce and warfare much of that cultural change 
consisted in adapting to the activities of other human beings rather 
than to nature. Human beings needed no longer to fear other preda­
tors, and mostly had a dependable source of food through the domes­
tication of plants and animals. Major successes and failures consisted 
in the results of exchanges on the market or on the battlefield, rather 
than in the results of the hunt. "Nature became less the 'habitat' for 
the farmer than a set of economic resources to be managed and ma­
nipulated by the controlling group. This was particularly true of cul­
tures where the dominant class was urban-based, as in Graeco-Roman 
antiquity" (Roberts, 1989, 128-29) .  With the continual distancing of 
nature from humankind came a gradual change in conception of the 
world, with reality increasingly being thought of in other people and 
their actions. 
As human population grew because of a paucity of internal checks 
coupled with the increased productivity of the soil through the use of 
the plow, warfare also increased. In this regard the availability of bronze 
weapons, as intimated earlier, played a key role. "The emergence of 
urban centers was largely the result of the military success of villages 
that had one important advantage: bronze weapons."  For the first 
time in history, people found that the conquest of other people could 
be a profitable alternative to the conquest of nature. Thus, beginning 
in advanced horticultural societies and continuing in agrarian, we find 
almost as much energy expended in war as in the more basic struggle 
for subsistence. One might say that bronze was to the conquest of 
people what plant cultivation was to the conquest of nature: both 
were decisive turning points in sociocultural evolution (Lenski et al. 
1995, 157) .  
A s  in the horticultural period, apart from war and disease, one of 
the constraints on population growth in the agrarian era was infanti­
cide. When crops failed and famine was imminent, families often 
abandoned their newborn by the roadside or left them at the door of 
a church or monastery in the hope that someone else might raise 
them. Sometimes even older children would be abandoned by their 
parents. In some districts in China as many as a quarter of the female 
infants were killed at birth-signs were sometimes erected near ponds: 
"Girls may not be drowned here" (Lenski et al. 1995, 126) . 
The length of the agrarian period was extended by the discovery 
of America, which also allowed a continuing increase in the size of the 
human population, first through emigration from Europe. At the same 
time, however, population also increased in Europe, giving rise to 
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needs that were eventually met by the technological innovations of 
the industrial revolution. 
The Industrial Revolution 
With the industrial revolution began the largest of all turns around the 
vicious circle, giving rise to the use of vast quantities of fossil fuels, 
which have indirectly sustained almost an eightfold increase in world 
population since 1750. The increasing population in Britain about that 
time led to a shortage of both land and wood, which was used both 
as a building material and a fuel. The possibility of using coal as a 
substitute for wood led to the development first of the Newcomen 
engine and then Watt's steam engine, to pump water out of coal mines. 
Coal is an inferior substitute for wood, a fact that required the 
invention of other devices and processes, such as the use of coke (de­
rived from coal) as a substitute for wood-charcoal in iron-smelting, 
and later the invention of the coal-fired blast furnace to replace the 
traditional forge. 
With these changes and the implementation of Watt's engine, the 
use of coal increased tremendously, a result of the vicious circle mov­
ing from need-of an energy source for heating and manufacturing­
to innovation-the invention of the steam engine, among other 
devices-and on to resource depletion-through the extraction and 
use of coal. 
The next phase in the vicious circle followed directly, namely, 
greater economic activity spurred by the profit motive of capitalists, 
and with it increased use of energy and production of waste. Because 
of the existence of coal only in isolated areas, it was necessary that a 
means of distribution be found. This means-again involving innova­
tion-consisted in the construction of railways and canals and the 
development of hard surfaces for roads. All this construction activity 
demanded the expenditure of energy and constituted economic growth; 
at the same time it involved changes in the landscape and increasing 
pollution, changes that would not have been necessary if population 
pressure had not in the first place led to a failure to husband wood 
resources. As expressed by Wilkinson: "Once again it appears that a 
formidable group of innovations should not be regarded as the fruits 
of a society's search for progress, but as the outcome of a valiant 
struggle of a society with its back to the ecological wall (Wilkinson 
1973, 126). 
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Here we have an excellent example indicating why economic 
growth, the goal of so many of today's decision makers, ought per­
haps rather be seen as a measure of the failure of human beings to live 
in ecological equilibrium with their environment. The overconsump­
tion of a renewable resource such as wood makes it necessary to ex­
pend more energy to procure a nonrenewable substitute such as coal; 
and because in this case the substitute is not widespread, to expend 
yet more energy to distribute it-all of this activity constituting eco­
nomic growth. As expressed by Ellul: "History shows that every tech­
nical application from its beginnings presents certain unforseeable 
secondary effects which are much more disastrous than the lack of the 
technique would have been" (Ellul 1964, 105). In history each major 
technological advance has made possible our digging deeper into the 
barrel of natural resources, and it is only a matter of time, as long as 
we follow this procedure, until we will be scraping the bottom of the 
barrel. 
The industrial revolution also brought with it a further decrease in 
the standard of living of the common people. Instead of working out 
of doors or in cottages and enjoying the many holidays in the medi­
eval calendar, people had no alternative but to work in mines or fac­
tories for longer hours at even more specialized tasks and with virtually 
no holidays. Child labor also increased, children being used, for ex­
ample, in mines, where they could squeeze into spaces too small for 
adults. The quality of clothing also became lower, cotton largely re­
placing linen, wool, and leather. 
It should perhaps be emphasized that in this process change did 
not come about immediately upon the discovery of new technology, 
but that the new technology was implemented only when there was 
an experience of need. As has been shown by Wilkinson, the transition 
to steam power and the use of coal as a fuel did not take place in the 
United States, even though steam and coal were well known there, 
until local wood scarcities and shortages of sources of waterpower 
made their implementation worthwhile. 
The Americans chose not to use existing technology. The strength of 
the thesis that development is not chosen in preference to traditional 
methods but is a response to ecological pressures seems to be con­
firmed. "When they could, they chose to clothe themselves in furs 
and leather rather than woven cloth; they used wood rather than 
coal, water power rather than steam, primitive extensive agricultural 
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methods rather than the more intensive European ones they were 
familiar with. They went on using the older established methods and 
resources long after they need have done, when they were fully aware 
of the alternatives." (Wilkinson 1973, 161, 171-72) 
As Wilkinson suggests, the implementation of new technologies 
throughout human history has almost always meant a transition to a 
more onerous life-style. The move from the hunting-gathering life­
style to the horticultural meant increased work, as did the transition 
from the horticultural to the agricultural, and here we see again an 
increase in the burden on human beings with the advent of the indus­
trial revolution. 
At the same time, however, the vicious circle continues; the newly 
available sources of energy allow a further increase in population, in 
this case a truly tremendous increase, and one that is still continuing. 
But where the population of the world has increased by about a factor 
of five since the 1850s, the world's consumption of energy, mainly 
fossil fuels, has increased sixty-fold. For the wealthy 20 percent of the 
world's population, the industrial revolution has also led to an in­
crease in leisure time, because the fossil fuel energy resources were not 
only enormous but also unequally distributed. But even now we are 
seeing a change in this regard as the size of the population continues 
to grow while the availability of energy decreases. In our parents' 
generation a household could be supported by only one working 
person, but now two are required, and the length of the working day 
and the stress involved in work are both increasing. 
What will make the aftermath of the industrial revolution so dev­
astating is the fact that it has led to the use of such huge, yet finite, 
quantities of fossil fuels, the second of major importance being oil. 
Where coal began to be used in response to a scarcity of wood, petro­
leum began to be used in response to a scarcity of whale oil (Wilkinson 
1973, 171). At present, 88 percent of the commercial energy used in the 
world comes from fossil fuels, about 40 percent of the total commer­
cial energy coming from oil (Meadows et al. 1992, 67). Furthermore, 
oil is used in the making of myriad synthetic products, including most 
plastics and an ever-increasing proportion of textiles. 
Where the members of a family could once clothe themselves in 
woollens and leather using their own raw materials, we are now 
dependent for clothing on oil wells, oil tankers, refineries, the chemi-
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cal industry, textile-machinery manufacturers, and the metal and 
power industries needed to back them up. The same goes for our 
food, heating, transport and almost every other item we consume. 
(Wilkinson 1973, 187) 
Just as cotton became a substitute for linen, wool, and leather during 
the industrial revolution, as the world's cotton harvest decreases we 
are today witnessing the substitution of oil-based synthetic products 
for cotton. And all this is occurring at such a rate that it is expected 
that the world's oil resources will be exhausted within the lifetimes of 
most people living today. 
One might say that virtually the whole of the eightfold increase in 
the human population since the beginning of the industrial revolution 
is being maintained by the use of fossil fuels. When these fuels are no 
longer available, either because of the environmental effects to which 
their use gives rise or because they become exhausted, or when agri­
cultural production drastically drops because their overuse, the world 
will be facing a situation in which billions of people will experience 
real need, a need that there will be no way of satisfying. 
What Can We Do? 
The above considerations lead to the realization that it is imperative for 
humankind that we get off the vicious circle. That this is possible is 
clear from the fact that various societies have existed through the devel­
opment of humankind who have managed to do so. Their preconditons, 
however, were better than ours, in that they were invariably less densely 
populated and had a life-style demanding relatively little from the en­
vironment. But given the present situation in the world, when should 
we attempt to leave the vicious circle, and how? 
To answer this question we might best look at the components in 
the vicious circle again. They include population growth, which leads 
to resource scarcity, which gives rise to technological innovation, which 
leads to a more thorough exploitation of the resource base, which 
increases the production and dissemination of goods and waste prod­
ucts at the same time as it provides the basis for further population 
growth. 
First, it may be noted that, in constituting a circle, this list of 
factors has no real beginning, and furthermore that, owing to the 
enormity of the problem, efforts will have to be made to solve it at 
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every possible point. At the same time, however, we see that a key 
aspect of the circle is population growth. We must drastically reduce 
the size of the human population, in both industrialized and Third 
World countries, with the least possible delay. 
Of the various practical suggestions as to how this might be done, 
that of Kenneth Boulding warrants particular consideration owing to 
its flexibility and relative fairness. Boulding's suggestion, which has 
received the support of Herman Daly and John Cobb (Cobb 1989, 244-
46; Daly 1992, 56-61), concerns the implementation of exchangeable 
birth licenses. The idea is that each woman in a country is given the 
right by the state to have a certain number of children. This number 
is decided based on ecological and other considerations, but it is the 
same for everyone of a certain age. It could be, for example 1.6 chil­
dren. In that case, if a woman wanted to have two children, she might 
buy or receive as a gift four deci-licenses from someone else; or, if she 
wanted only one child, she could sell or give away her six extra deci­
licenses. Such a system would have to be supported by a program of 
family planning and immigration, and be keyed with statistics regard­
ing the degree of success of their implementation. 
Now, one might say that this is too much of a "top-down" proce­
dure, and that a decrease in human fertility ought rather come from 
insight at the grass-roots level. This is all very well, and we have 
elsewhere (Dilworth 1994) depicted an ecologically benign worldview 
(the "systems-ecological perspective") in which such an insight would 
have a place. The trouble is, however, that humankind cannot afford 
to wait for the spread of such a worldview. The population is too large 
now, and it is only getting larger. The possibility of taking purely 
pragmatic steps on the institutional level is not to be ignored. 
Similarly, human consumption of resources is too great now, and 
it too must be drastically reduced, independently of population reduc­
tion. Here one's first response might be to say that this is well and 
good for the rich 20 percent of the world's population, who consume 
too much anyway, but what of the poor 80 percent, many of whom do 
not consume even enough to survive? Our response to this is to sug­
gest that what is needed is a fundamentally different economic sys­
tem, operative in the Third World as well as in industrialized countries, 
in which the idea of economic growth is replaced by that of economic 
conservation. 
The ideas that have been developed furthest in this direction are 
probably those of Herman Daly (1992), who argues for the implemen-
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tation of a steady-state economy. On Daly's conception of such an 
economy, the quantity of stocks is held constant, while the output is 
minimized and the service maximized. Some of the changes required 
in the present economy to transform it to a steady-state economy, a 
transition which is to occur gradually, include politically supervising 
and limiting the size and monopoly power of corporations, setting 
upper and lower limits on income and upper limits on wealth, imple­
menting quotas for the extraction of natural resources, taxing resources 
higher than income, charging at least as much for nonrenewables as 
for their nearest renewable substitutes, stopping the subsidizing of 
energy production, and setting up tariffs to protect local industries. 
One aspect of such a steady-state economy as Daly evisages may 
be its not allowing the accruing of interest. This topic has been devel­
oped by Margrit Kennedy,3 according to whom a reduction of interest 
rates lessens the pressure for growth in an economy, zero interest being 
a precondition for the zero growth of a steady-state economy. For a 
zero-interest economy also to be an ecologically sustainable one, how­
ever, there must be a land reform and a tax reform. The land reform 
would put ownership of the land in the hands of the local govern­
ment, from whom it may be leased, thereby removing the threat of 
land speculation; and the tax reform would be like that recommended 
by Daly, by which products rather than incomes would be taxed. 
There are undoubtedly innumerable other ways in which we should 
attempt to remove ourselves from the vicious circle, the above ones 
being mentioned because they concern vital aspects of the circle, namely, 
population growth and economic growth, as well as having the poten­
tial to be wide-ranging in their effects. No matter how "environmen­
tal" we might become in our choice of articles to buy or in the sorting 
of our garbage, efforts of this sort are not sufficient to effect the fun­
damental change necessary for humankind to cope with the future. If 
we are to survive on this planet, we must see to it that our sources of 
energy, food, and materials are constantly being renewed at the same 
rate as they are being used. For this to happen we must stabilize the 
human population at a level much lower than the level it is at today, 
and we must adopt an economic system oriented toward husbanding 
resources rather than squandering them on economic growth. 
3. In Kennedy 1988. Mary Clark (1989, 350-51) points out that Keynes advocated 
a future economy in which one would have "got rid of many of the objectionable 
features of capitalism," in particular, interest on accumulated wealth. 
8. The Social Impact of Scarcity 
The Political Responses of Institutionally 
Developed Societies 
Kurt Finsterbuseh 
The human species is on an unsustainable course. The four major 
biosystems on which humans depend have been in serious trouble for 
decades (Postel 1994) . On average the topsoils on the world croplands 
are thinning and declining in quality (Brown et al. 1990; Dregne 1989; 
Oldeman, et al. 1991; Rozanov et al. 1990) . The quality of the world's 
grasslands is declining and millions of acres are turning to deserts or 
wastelands annually. The world's forests are declining and tracts that 
are managed for high productivity have problems of monoculture 
vulnerability. The world's fisheries seem to be in difficulty, for the 
world fish catch has remained fairly stable for a number of years even 
though the fishing effort has increased with more intensive technolo­
gies and the growth of on-land fish farming. Thirteen of the world's 
seventeen major fisheries are in serious decline (Mathews 1994; see 
also Swardson 1994) . In addition, pollution problems are increasing 
even though regulations have lowered the concentration of some pol­
lutants in some parts of the world. Two pollution problems currently 
exciting world concern are global warming and ozone depletion with 
potentially awful consequences for ecosystems and humans world­
wide. Another concern is the depletion of relatively accessible energy 
and mineral resources. 
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The litany of problems grows each day, but so do efforts to ad­
dress these problems. As a result there is much debate about many 
environmental issues, including whether the current rates of environ­
mental degradation and rates of use of nonrenewable resources will 
have adverse consequences for future generations. Differing conclu­
sions on these issues result in further debates over how radical should 
the changes be for addressing these problems. The dominant view is 
that environmental problems are very serious, and, therefore, strong 
measures for protecting the environment and developing more sus­
tainable life-styles are justified .  Nevertheless, the more optimistic 
minority view cannot be dismissed. It argues that resources are abun­
dant and human inventiveness and adaptiveness along with market 
pressures for conservation and efficiency will bring about sustainable 
development without requiring drastic changes in institutions and life­
styles. It can boast that many dire predictions in the past have failed 
to materialize. Past estimates of resource reserves have usually been 
revised upward and human beings find ways to solve or manage 
environmental problems when they have to. On the other hand, this 
view seems to require excessive faith in technology, believing that it 
will always come to the rescue in the eleventh hour. Many sought­
after inventions, however, have not been achieved, such as relatively 
cheap desalinization or a cure for cancer, and there is some evidence 
that the returns to investments in research and development and the 
benefits to society from new technologies have declined significantly 
over the past sixty years (Giarini and Louberge 1978; Ophuls and 
Boyan 1992). 
This chapter does not take sides in this debate but examines the 
probable social changes that would result from both the growth and 
the limits versions of the future. However, because much more is known 
about the impacts of economic growth on society than the impacts of 
scarcity, this chapter will emphasize the impacts of scarcity. It first 
develops a general theory of social change in nation-states involving 
the growth dynamic and then contrasts this theory to one involving 
no growth or an extended period of scarcity. Scarcity is herein defined 
as a decline (or no growth) in the average material standard of living 
(per capita material production and consumption). 
This chapter builds on and extends two of my earlier papers: "The 
Sociology of Nation States: Dimensions, Indicators, and Theory" (1973) 
and "Consequences of Increasing Scarcity on Affluent Countries" (1983). 
The first develops a general theory of social change for nation-states 
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drawn from the sociological literature. It identifies how prominent 
macrosociological variables interrelate with one another, but it does 
not deal with scarcity. This theory and most of the interrelationships 
of its variables undergirds the analysis provided here. The second 
identifies the impacts of both socioeconomic development and scar­
city on the extent of equality, democracy, conflict, legitimacy, distur­
bances, repression, and centralization. The identified impacts have 
subsequently received additional empirical support and thus provide 
the starting point for this chapter. Here these impacts are much more 
fully explained, the analysis of societal responses is revised and greatly 
expanded, and the social and political changes that may be necessary 
to shift to sustainable societies are identified. 
A. General Theory of Social Change 
in Nation-States 
Basic to macrosociological theory (generally the unit of analysis in 
macrosociology is the nation-state) are fifteen dimensions and their 
subdimensions: five factors in the production function, three dimen­
sions of structure, five processes, population size, and the environ­
ment. These factors do not include all the factors in the theory of 
change of nation-states developed in an earlier work (Finsterbusch 
1973), but they include all the most basic ones and the ones that are 
the most relevant for tracing the impacts of scarcity. 
The five factors in the production function are capital, labor, knowl­
edge/ technology, resources, and organization. These vary both in 
quantity and quality. Higher quantities and quality of the five factors 
make the system (whether a nation-state or an organization) more 
productive (other things being equal) . As used here the organization 
factor is broad and can include the quality of the institutional frame­
work governing productive activities and the quality of the organiza­
tional rules and management practices of the productive organizations. 
The three structural dimensions are vertical differentiation, horizontal 
differentiation, and centralization/ decentralization. Vertical differen­
tiation is labeled stratification by sociologists and involves inequalities 
in income, wealth, power, opportunities, social status, rights, and privi­
leges. Horizontal differentiation involves skills, roles, and group iden­
tities. A high degree of differentiation in skills and roles marks an 
advanced division of labor and high societal complexity, which are 
associated with socioeconomic development. High differentiation in 
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group identities is associated with low societal integration. The third 
dimension of structure, centralization, deals with the system or geo­
graphic level at which activities are coordinated and controlled. This 
should not be confused with the vertical differentiation of power, 
because centralized control could be exercised in a participatory demo­
cratic structure. 
The five processes utilized in our theory are integration, interaction, 
repression, social control and regulation, and productive labor. Integra­
tion can be viewed structurally as the height of group boundaries (or 
the obstacles to interaction), but more generally it is understood as the 
degree to which the system components work together in producing 
collective outputs and system survival. Interaction is measured in both 
quantity and quality. The quality dimension is normally measured on a 
cooperation/ conflict scale. Repression and social control are alternative 
methods for discouraging harmful or damaging behavior and for en­
couraging positive behavior. Productive labor involves both paid and 
unpaid activities that produce valued goods and services. Population is 
membership size. Finally, the environment for the nation-state consists 
of the other nation-states and the system of international institutions. 
The major dimension in this factor is the degree of threat or danger 
posed by other nations to the subject nation. 
To simplify the above theoretical framework, the fifteen factors 
can be grouped into three categories: socioeconomic development fac­
tors, progressive factors, and contextual factors. Socioeconomic devel­
opment contains eight of the above factors: the five factors of production 
(capital, labor, knowledge and technology, resources, and organiza­
tion), the differentiation of skills and roles, interaction across collective 
units, and productive labor. The progressive factor contains five of the 
above factors: the equality dimensions, decentralization, integration 
(including high legitimacy, low differentiation of identities, and low 
disturbances), social control in high compliance to collective rules, and 
low repression. This factor is progressive because it embodies the 
principles of equality, democracy, the rule of law, normative rather 
than coercive integration, decisions being proximate to rather than 
distant from the people, group tolerance, and legitimacy. These are 
the major categories for the impact analysis of the consequences of 
scarcity on nation-states and will be the focus of this chapter. The 
contextual factor includes population and the environment (for 
some purposes, area could be included), which feed into the issue of 
scarcity. 
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Theories of social change have focused on socioeconomic develop­
ment, for this is the major source of change in the past four hundred 
years. At the heart of socioeconomic development are the five factors 
of production: capital, labor, knowledge/technology, resources, and 
organization, and the many variables that generate them, such as 
education, research and development, the division of labor, appropri­
ate values, communications, dense networks, high interactions and 
exchanges, laws for contracts and property rights and their enforce­
ment, and so on. As the five factors and their associated variables 
improve and increase, they increase production but also tend to im­
prove and increase one another and thus further increase production. 
Thus, the socioeconomic development factor is a self-causing and 
maintaining factor in that it is caused by the variables within it and 
their causal interactions. Once it builds up some momentum the 
nation-state "takes off to self sustained growth" (Rostow 1960) until 
external forces (such as environmental and resource limits) or system 
disintegration stop it. 
There have been endless debates over which variable or variables 
are the most important to igniting and stimulating this self-causing 
factor. Marx and many other sociologists have credited technology as 
the prime mover, while Weber gave more credit to rational legal orga­
nization, values that encouraged savings and investments, and the 
work ethic. More recently social capital is being emphasized. Coleman 
(1988, 1990), Putnam (1993, 1994), and Drucker (1993) emphasize the 
role of knowledge and knowledge workers. It is not necessary to settle 
this debate because it is sufficient for our purposes to recognize the 
contribution of all these variables to socioeconomic development. 
In this chapter we examine the impacts of economic growth (a 
major component of the socioeconomic development) and scarcity 
on the progressive factor, drawing upon the social science literature. 
Our finding is that economic growth enhances the progressive factor 
and scarcity weakens it. Scarcity tends to decrease equality, integra­
tion, normative social control, democracy, and system legitimacy, 
while increasing conflict, regulation, disturbances, repression, and 
centralization. What is uncertain, however, is how nation-states will 
respond to these negative impacts of scarcity. It is conceivable that 
society's response to scarcity will involve reforms that make it more 
progressive than ever. More ominous predictions, however, seem more 
likely. 
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Impacts of Economic Growth and Scarcity 
on Inequality 
Under current conditions economic growth decreases inequality, and 
scarcity increases inequality. Economic growth may have had negative 
effects on equality up to the nineteenth century as most of the people 
remain at a subsistence level and the new wealth goes mainly to a 
small elite (Kuznets 1955) . Even more recently it has increased in­
equality during the early stages of technological improvement and 
industrialization in agricultural societies (Kuznets 1963) . As Kuznets 
points out, however, the fuller impact of economic growth is to in­
crease equality, and much empirical evidence for the past half century 
demonstrates this (Ahluwalia 1974; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Blumberg 
1980; Chan 1989; Gagliani 1987; Jackman 1975; Lecaillon et al. 1984; 
Lindert and Williamson 1985; Upset 1978, 1994; Muller 1988; Myrdal 
1956; Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Viditch 1980; Ward 1978; Weede 1993; 
Williamson 1990; Williamson and Lindert 1980). The main explanation 
why economic growth increases equality as expounded by Lenski (1966; 
Lenski, Lenski and Nolan 1991) is that economic growth greatly in­
creases the need for knowledge. As a result, elites can command a 
much smaller percent of the useful knowledge needed to expand pro­
duction and their wealth, so they must depend on an increasingly 
knowledgeable and sophisticated labor force. Knowledge requirements 
lead to the expansion of education (education can be considered a 
component of socioeconomic development), the middle class, and the 
professions. Elites highly reward these groups to motivate high per­
formance and greatly increase production, and thereby their wealth. 
Even though their share of the production thereby decreases, their 
wealth grows faster than if they tried to retain a greater proportion of 
the gains in production but thereby slowed its growth. 
In an expanding economy, an elite can make economic concessions in 
relative terms without necessarily suffering any loss in absolute terms. 
In fact, if the concessions are not too large, and the rate of the 
economy's growth is great enough, relative losses can even be ac­
companied by substantial absolute gains. (Lenski 1966, 314) 
Put in economic terms Lenski' s thesis is that economic develop­
ment after some threshold of industrialization results in diminishing 
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and even negative returns to elites for their monopolizing the surplus. 
He also points out that educated workers are not as vulnerable to 
exploitation as unskilled workers who must compete with masses of 
other unskilled workers. Educated workers have a better bargaining 
position that translates into higher incomes. Finally, he discusses how 
economic growth facilitates the rise of democratic institutions and these 
in tum increase the political power of lower groups that usually trans­
lates into more favorable policies and economic benefits for them. 
The above arguments point to elite concessions for their greater 
absolute benefit and lower groups wresting benefits from upper groups 
through democratic mechanisms. Another equalizing force is the dif­
fusion of education (which makes society more productive and makes 
employers richer) . When education is rare, returns to education are 
very high and incomes very unequal. When education is widespread, 
the middle class expands greatly and, as Lecaillon and others (1984) 
argue, there is increased competition among qualified applicants, which 
reduces the relative incomes of the high-skilled occupations (unless 
they organize to reduce competition) . Another equalizing force that is 
related to the diffusion of education is the upgrading of the occupa­
tional structure so that it no longer is a bottom heavy pyramid but 
bulges in the middle (Lipset 1978) . 
The above discussion looks at inequality in changes in the produc­
tion system. Economic growth also increases equality in changes in 
the consumption system (Blumberg 1980; Firebaugh and Beck 1994; 
Lipset 1978). The consumption gap among classes declines as the lower 
class gets medical care, electricity, indoor plumbing, refrigerators, tele­
phones, television, and possibly even cars. The rich have more and 
higher quality goods but their life-styles do not differ so markedly as 
elites and peasants in less developed countries. 
Another argument that identifies economic growth with greater 
equality is provided by Ophuls and Boyan (1992) . They observe that 
the normal condition for human societies is scarcity and this condition 
makes governments necessary for keeping the peace by regulating 
property to prevent the war of each against all over scarce goods. In 
keeping the peace "civilized polities have always institutionalized a 
large measure of inequality, oppression, and conflict" (189) .  Excep­
tions to this rule can occur in times of relative abundance as in the 
past several centuries, which have "made our societies and our civi­
lization what they are today-relatively open, egalitarian, libertarian, 
and conflict-free" (190). They predict, therefore, that a return to the 
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more normal conditions of scarcity would replace democracy, free­
dom, individualism, equality, and domestic peace with inequality, 
oppression, and conflict. In sum, economic growth increases equality 
and greatly improves the situation of lower groups under current 
conditions. 
In contrast to the positive effects of economic growth, scarcity has 
negative effects. There is consensus among scholars that scarcity in­
creases inequality (Blumberg 1980; Finsterbusch 1983; Gurr 1985; Lipset 
1978; Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Viditch 1980). Five arguments support 
this proposition. First, because scarcity is the opposite of economic 
growth, it should have the opposite effects. Two impacts of scarcity 
are contained in this argument: scarcity eliminates jobs and income 
disproportionately for lower groups, and scarcity reduces the willing­
ness of upper groups to support programs and policies that benefit the 
lower groups. 
Economic growth expands jobs and opportunities.  This generally 
allows lower groups choices between jobs and reduces the number 
who must accept truly exploitive wages. In contrast scarcity shrinks 
the job market, especially the marginal, unskilled jobs, and greatly 
increases the competition among the unskilled for the remaining jobs 
that tend to be offered at depressed wages. Economic growth also 
provides an expanding pie that can finance concessions of various 
kinds made to lower groups, including welfare for the needy and 
training for the unemployed. Scarcity, on the other hand, limits 
society's ability to address the needs of the needy. In political terms 
this means that the demands of lower groups for better lives in times 
of scarcity cannot be satisfied without threatening the favorable cir­
cumstances of the upper groups. Because the upper groups have the 
political power, the demands and needs of the lower groups will not 
be met. Furthermore, the lack of assistance for the lower groups can 
be justified by claims that such policies would divert resources from 
those who would invest in economic growth and harm the lower 
groups more in the long run (the trickle-down theory) . This argu­
ment seems to be contradicted by evidence that welfare policies have 
been instituted in times of hardship, but as Gurr (1985) points out, 
they were always premised on the depressed times being short-term. 
He argues that a relatively permanent scarcity would greatly limit 
welfare policies. 
The second explanation for scarcity's negative impact on equality 
is that scarcity translates into inflation, which more adversely impacts 
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lower groups (Blumberg 1980; Gurr 1985; Stretton 1976; Viditch 1980) . 
They spend a greater percent of their income than do upper groups on 
consumer goods, which have high resource inputs and will inflate 
substantially with scarcity. Upper groups buy greater quantities of 
goods but less proportionally. They also spend more on quality, which 
increases the value of most goods without using much more resources. 
Quality goods need not inflate as much from resource scarcity as lower 
quality goods. Upper groups also buy bigger homes and estates, which 
will inflate with scarcity, but as owners they will benefit when these 
appreciate in value. On the other hand, the poor pay rent and will 
experience a marked decline in their standard of living even if they 
manage to stay employed. 
The third explanation of why scarcity increases inequality is that 
upper groups can better protect themselves from the negative effects 
of scarcity (Gurr 1985; Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Streeton 1976) . They 
organize faster and more effectively to advance and protect their 
interests (see Olson 1965, 1982) . The managerial and professional 
classes and unionized labor have some control over the terms of 
their remuneration and keep them at the level of inflation, which 
increases inflation even more for the politically and economically 
weak. 
The fourth explanation of why scarcity increases inequality is that 
as resources become more scarce they become more unevenly distrib­
uted. Midlarsky (1982) presents a sophisticated mathematical argu­
ment for increasing inequality with the degree of scarcity of a resource 
and finds actual distributions closely fitting his mathematical models. 
He then reports a high cross-national correlation between population 
increase (which increases scarcity relative to land) and inequality in 
post-World War II agricultural societies. Other studies show high rates 
of population growth being correlated with high inequality (see Bollen 
and Jackman 1985; Kuznets 1955; Simpson 1990; Williamson 1991) .  
Finally, Midlarsky demonstrates scarcity is related to inequality, civil 
strife, and revolution in agrarian societies (see also Russett 1964; Tanter 
and Midlarsky 1967) . 
The fifth explanation of why scarcity increases inequality is that 
the controllers of resources, who are predominantly the rich, will gain 
in times of scarcity while the rest of the population suffers. Just as 
homeowners and renters profit from inflation and scarcity, so do those 
who control natural resources that are becoming scarce. 
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Impacts of Eeonomie Growth and Seareity 
on Integration 
Economic growth increases integration and scarcity decreases it. Eco­
nomic growth does not eliminate group identities and intergroup con­
flict, but it does mitigate the conflict between groups, reduces its violent 
expression, and channels it into legal political actions and compromis­
able demands (Finsterbusch 1983; Gurr 1985; Heilbroner 1992; Ophuls 
and Boyan 1992; Shefrin 1980; Stretton 1976) . Ophuls and Boyan (1992) 
point out that economic growth leads to rising expectations so that 
each generation expects to become richer than its parents. "Thanks to 
this expectation of growth, the class conflict and social discontent typical 
of early nineteenth-century Europe were all but absent in America" 
(237) . Throughout this century, growth continued to be a basis for 
political solidarity. It allows economic bargaining to replace conflict 
over political principle and the basic structure of society as illustrated 
by labor winning bargaining power and subsequent economic gains 
while dropping its demands for socialism. As long as everyone is 
improving economically, the demands for equality of income and 
wealth are weak, especially if upper groups can plausibly claim that 
the current unequal system is necessary for a productive economy. As 
Ophuls and Boyan observe, "American political history is but the record 
of a more or less amicable squabble over the division of the spoils of 
a growing economy" (238). Economic growth, therefore, tends to le­
gitimate the system of inequality and dampen the conflict that in­
equality stimulates. 
Shefrin (1980) similarly explains the connection between economic 
growth and low or mitigated conflict by describing how it supports 
what he calls consensus politics in America (nonpolarized, non­
ideological, and nonradical) . Actual conflict is over limited demands 
by limited strategies and resulting in limited concessions. People do 
not demand basic change or deeply resent their subordinate position 
in the economic hierarchy, because economic growth makes them 
optimistic about their economic future and makes established means 
for personal betterment appear appropriate. 
Economic growth strengthens integration not only by reducing 
conflict but also by giving people what they want, muting their pro­
tests, supporting a pragmatic bargaining style of politics, forestalling 
civil strife, and enhancing system legitimacy. Ophuls and Boyan (1992) 
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point out that economic growth provides the basis for pragmatic poli­
tics, which controls social conflict, diverting it from basic issues to 
economic bargaining, which is a matter of a little more or a little less. 
Because economic growth means that even losers win something and 
because the bargaining is continuous, even losers support the system 
because they hope to win more next time. Another way that growth 
enhances integration is by increasing legitimacy. As Upset (1960) ar­
gues, economic development creates the perception of effectiveness 
and effectiveness is a major cause of system legitimacy. 
The effects of scarcity are the opposite. There is widespread agree­
ment that scarcity is likely to reduce integration even though there is 
not much empirical evidence to draw upon. Scarcity decreases inte­
gration by increasing competition, conflict, and disturbances, and de­
creasing regime effectiveness and system legitimacy. These impacts in 
turn tend to increase repression and undermine or weaken democracy 
(Boulding 1973; Finsterbusch 1983; Gurr 1985; Heilbroner 1992; Upset 
1978, 1994; Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Shefrin 1980; Stretton 1976). Five 
explanations have been advanced in support of this proposition. First, 
scarcity negates the positive functions of economic growth for integra­
tion. Many analysts argue that scarcity will intensify class conflict 
(Blumberg 1980; Boulding 1973; Gurr 1985; Heilbroner 1992; Ophuls 
and Boyan 1992; Shefrin 1980) . Boulding' s exposition of this point is 
particularly stark. 
In the stationary state, there is no escape from the rigors of scarcity. 
If one person or group becomes richer, then the rest of society must 
become poorer. Unfortunately, this increases the payoffs for success­
ful exploitation-that is, the use of organized threat in order to redis­
tribute income. In progressive societies exploitation pays badly; for 
almost everybody, increasing their productivity pays better . . . .  In the 
stationary state, unfortunately, investment in exploitation may pay 
better than investment in progress. Stationary states, therefore, are 
frequently mafia-type societies in which the government is primarily 
an instrument for redistributing income toward the powerful and 
away from the weak. (1973, 95) 
Shefrin (1980, 3) expresses this theme thus: "In the absence of growth . . .  
more income or opportunity for disadvantaged classes necessarily 
involves attacks upon the possessions and privileges of the economic 
elite. The stratification system itself must then become the visible rea­
son for relative deprivation and the visible obstacle to advancement. "  
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Scarcity provides conditions that do not lend themselves to prag­
matic compromising politics, and issues of basic structure reemerge in 
the political arena. The expanding pie allowed new demands to be at 
least partially satisfied without sacrifice by the more powerful. It al­
lowed the government to support business interests at the same time 
that it provided welfare and defense. A shrinking pie means that more 
severe choices between these policies have to be made, and, therefore, 
basic principles come into conflict. Furthermore, environmental poli­
cies are matters of principle and are not legitimately framed in eco­
nomic terms. How much is a life worth? How much increase in future 
cancers can be justified by costs in millions of dollars? How much 
employment should be sacrificed for an endangered species? These 
are not good issues for the bargaining table. 
Another problem with a shrinking pie is that the conflict between 
classes and groups becomes a zero sum game in which someone must 
lose if someone else gains. When the contest results in big winners 
and little winners, as with the distribution of the expanding pie, the 
conflict is not as intense as when it results in winners and losers or big 
losers and little losers. Scarcity also increases resentment. Most Ameri­
cans do not complain about the obscene wealth of others when they 
can have their own piece of the American dream. With scarcity, how­
ever, the profligate consumption of the wealthy is likely perceived as 
using up limited resources and leaving less for others. Rationing or 
some other type of resource-use planning may be advocated and clashes 
over principles becomes likely. Furthermore, scarcity removes the jus­
tification for inequality, which is that the inequality is needed to pro­
duce economic growth. If economic growth is not possible owing to 
environmental limits, this argument loses force, gross inequality be­
comes less tolerable, and conflict increases . 
The second explanation of why scarcity decreases integration is 
derived from deprivation theory as developed by Gurr (1970, 1985) . 
Unless scarcity arrives very slowly to allow for gradual adjustments, 
scarcity will cause strong feelings of deprivation as reality falls far short 
of expectations. The deprivation-induced anger and collective action 
may at first be deflected away from political institutions toward com­
petitors or opponents or into self-destructive and antisocial behavior. 
One would anticipate intensified labor-management conflict and an 
increase in hostility toward minorities and politically-unpopular 
groups. The racist policies of the rightist National Front in Britain are 
156 Kurt Finsterbusch 
a case in point, and by this interpretation their policies are a form of 
scapegoating. One might also expect an increase in anomic individual 
behavior among the most deprived. A horrific model is provided by 
the black underclass in the United States, a group which has re­
sponded to institutionalized poverty during the last two decades 
with high and rising rates of interpersonal violence, substance abuse, 
and predatory crime. (1985, 61) 
In the long run, however, the anger will be directed toward the polity, 
the powerful, and the system of inequality, and more radical demands 
and forms of political action will become more legitimate and prevalent. 
The third explanation of why scarcity decreases integration is 
derived from Tilly's (1978) mobilization theory of collective action as 
reported by Gurr (1985). In times of economic decline, competition 
increases and groups that organize to protect or advance their special 
interests will do far better than individuals or weakly organized groups. 
Those who act first will gain the most benefits, because scarcity will 
rapidly deplete the government's ability to confer benefits. Further­
more, governments will increasingly respond to challengers with re­
pression, for it is less costly in the short term than concessions. 
Collective action, therefore, will become more costly, but the costs of 
inaction are likely to increase even faster. Scarcity, therefore, spurs 
interest-group organization and the intensification of conflict among 
groups. Tilly also uses the cost-benefit logic to argue that scarcity fos­
ters conditions that greatly favor revolutionary conflict, particularly 
the withering of support for the government and the shifting of the 
previously uncommitted to support the challengers. 
The fourth explanation of why scarcity decreases integration fo­
cuses on the legitimacy problems of governments in times of eco­
nomic decline. The importance of economic growth for legitimacy is a 
favorite theme of Lipset (1960, 1978, 1994) . "Legitimacy is best gained 
by prolonged effectiveness, effectiveness being the actual performance 
of the government and the extent to which it satisfies the basic needs 
of most of the population and key power groups" (1994, 8). Unpopu­
lar governments can often stay in power in times of economic growth, 
but economic failure will likely facilitate a breakdown. Established 
democracies generally have a reservoir of popular support and may 
survive economic decline for a while. Over time, however, scarcity 
erodes legitimacy, making even democracies vulnerable to authoritar­
ian movements as in the 1930s. 
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Another link between scarcity and eroding legitimacy is the type 
of government policies that scarcity requires. They will require sacri­
fice. People will have to bear costs and consume less to protect the 
environment and adjust to scarcity, and these will be unpopular poli­
cies as evidenced by the public's rejection in 1978 of President Carter 's 
five-cent-a-gallon gasoline tax. A likely scenario is that the govern­
ment will institute many relatively painless policies, which will not 
deal adequately with the problem and allow the crisis to get worse 
and more costly to deal with. Its failure will decrease legitimacy. 
Our attention has been mainly on the developed democracies. 
When we consider the Third World, the scarcity-induced declines in 
integration can lead to government collapse and anarchy. Kaplan (1994) 
provides vivid images of current anarchic situations in West Africa 
that make societal breakdown seem a very plausible impact of scarcity 
in societies with weak institutions. 
West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, 
environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges 
as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked 
crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing ero­
sion of nation-states and international borders, and the empower­
ment of private al'mies, security firms, and international drug cartels 
are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism. 
(1994, 46) 
He describes countries where the government cannot provide law 
and order over most of the country and not even in many parts of 
the capital at night. He cites a State Department report that describes 
a major African country as "becoming increasingly ungovernable ." 
His study echoes what Rashmi Mayur wrote a decade earlier (1985) 
about the devastating results of the population explosion in the ur­
ban areas of India, which included the real possibility in the near 
future of "mass starvation, widespread misery, and breakdown of 
the local and even global social fabric" (27) and "social, political, and 
institutional collapse" (28) . 
The fifth explanation of why scarcity decreases integration is that 
it aggravates all fissures in society. The shrinking pie intensifies the 
class struggle as discussed earlier, but Blumberg (1980, 220) adds that 
scarcity "will almost inevitably increase the overall level of social 
nastiness" and aggravate all fissures and cleavages, "creating social 
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conflict amid a general scramble for self-aggrandizement." He goes on 
to describe how racial, gender, educational, generational, and regional 
conflicts are likely to intensify in the United States. 
Impaet of Eeonomie Growth and Seareity 
on Democracy 
Economic growth strengthens democracy and scarcity threatens it. 
The positive effects of economic growth on democracy has been a 
major theme in Lipset's work (Lipset 1960, 1978, 1994; Lipset, Seong, 
and Torres 1993; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990), and it has strong 
empirical support (Cutright 1963; Diamond 1992; Bollen 1979; Bollen 
and Jackman 1985a; Flanigan and Fogelman 1971;  Inkeles 1991 ;  
Neubauer 1967; Olsen 1968) . The explanation, in part, i s  due to  the 
positive effects of economic growth on equality and integration, which 
both strengthen democracy. It also expands the middle class, the 
educated, and the percent of the population that have a stake in the 
system and would be adversely affected by political instability. With 
the class pyramid bulging at the middle instead of polarized be­
tween a small elite and the poor masses, power holders have much 
less to fear from losing the reigns of government in an election, for 
the change in policies would not be very radical. "A large middle 
class tempers conflict by rewarding moderate and democratic parties 
and penalizing extremist groups" (Lipset 1960, 51) .  Economic growth 
and the expansion of education also increase intermediary organiza­
tions and tolerance toward those with different views, both of which 
are essential to the effective functioning of democracy. Finally, eco­
nomic growth reduces the intensity of conflict as pointed out above 
and accommodates the resolving of issues and handling of demands 
through democratic bargaining (see Kassiola 1990; Ophuls and Boyan 
1992) . 
Many other effects of economic growth directly or indirectly 
strengthen democracy. Lipset explains some of these. 
The general income level of a nation also affects its receptivity to 
democratic norms. If there is enough wealth in the country so that it 
does not make too much difference whether some redistribution takes 
place, it is easier to accept the idea that it does not matter greatly 
which side is in power. But if loss of office means serious losses for 
major power groups, they will seek to retain or secure office by any 
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means available. A certain amount of national wealth is likewise 
necessary to ensure a competent civil service. The poorer the country, 
the greater the emphasis on nepotism-support of kin and friends. 
And this in turn reduces the opportunity to develop the efficient 
bureaucracy which a modern democratic state requires. (1960, 52) 
There is widespread agreement that scarcity is a threat to democ­
racy. We give five explanations for this view. First, as with equality 
and integration, scarcity cancels the positive effects of economic growth. 
However, it does not necessarily produce the opposite effects. For 
example, it does not necessarily shrink the middle class. On the other 
hand, it could stimulate radicalism, which a large middle class tends 
to inhibit. Scarcity also increases inequality and decreases integration, 
which in turn threaten or weaken democracy. The aggravated conflict 
and loss of legitimacy that scarcity is likely to cause are particularly 
troublesome for the survival of democracy. 
The second explanation of why scarcity weakens or threatens 
democracy is that it creates problems and crises that are hard for 
democracies to solve. Then when a democracy fails and the prob­
lems deepen, the public is tempted to jettison democracy for a more 
decisive, forceful, active, and authoritarian government. The strength 
of democracy is its responsiveness to the will of the people. This 
strength becomes a weakness in times of scarcity. Dealing with scar­
city problems requires sacrifice, restraint, coercion against enjoyed 
but ecologically harmful behavior, and coercion enforcing ecologi­
cally helpful behavior. These requirements, however, are not popu­
lar. Politicians in democracies, therefore, usually do not pass the tough 
legislation that is needed. For example, the American response to the 
oil crisis in 1973 was to lower the speed limit to 55 MPH and urge 
the public to voluntarily lower the thermostat in winter. Later it gave 
tax deductions for some insulation costs and required better gas 
mileage for cars with a very leisurely implementation schedule. Great 
sacrifice, such as an increase of $1 .50-per-gallon gasoline tax, was 
never even considered. 
Democracy, laissez-faire, and minimal regulation have together 
helped create some of the problems of scarcity. The famous "tragedy 
of the commons," or overexploitation of the environment, is the natu­
ral result of unregulated free choice. The democratic answer is mutual 
coercion mutually agreed upon, but it is hard to get that agreement. 
Ophuls and Boyan state the problem thus: 
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Under conditions of ecological scarcity, the individuals, possessing 
an inalienable right to pursue happiness as they define it and exer­
cising their liberty in a basically laissez-faire system, will inevitably 
produce the ruin of the commons. Thus the individualistic basis of 
society, the concept of inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit 
of happiness, liberty as maximum freedom of action, and the laissez­
faire principle itself all become problematic. All require major modi­
fication or perhaps even abandonment if we wish to avert inexorable 
environmental degradation and eventual extinction as a civilization. 
Certainly, democracy as we know it cannot conceivably survive. (1992, 
199-200) 
The third explanation of why scarcity weakens democracy is that 
it generates many technical issues that lend themselves poorly to 
participatory decision-making procedures. Many important decisions 
with significant distributional side effects are best handled by experts 
without much public participation. We would expect, therefore, that 
some amount of democracy would be sacrificed to technocracy. 
Ophuls and Boyan (1992) develop this line of argument at length. 
Assuming that democracies will call upon technological fixes to solve 
environmental problems with minimum material sacrifice, they observe: 
Numerous other writers of varying persuasions see the same trend : 
more technology means greater complexity and greater need for knowl­
edge and technical expertise; the average citizen will not be able to 
make a constructive contribution to decision making, so that "experts" 
and "authorities" will rule perforce; and because accidents cannot be 
permitted, much less individual behavior that deviates from techno­
logical imperatives, the grip of planning and social control will of 
necessity become a stranglehold . . . .  For these problems will require us 
to depend on a special class of experts in charge of our survival and 
well-being: a "priesthood of responsible technologists."  (209) 
In this way "democracy must give way to elite rule . . .  [because] the 
more closely one's situation resembles a perilous sea voyage, the stron­
ger the rationale for placing power and authority in the hands of the 
few who know how to run the ship" (209) .  The resulting state will be 
"more authoritarian and less democratic" (215). 
The fourth explanation of why scarcity weakens democracy is that 
it can cause fear and potentially even panic, which can undermine the 
confidence in democratic institutions required for them to function 
Social Impact of Scarcity 161 
without a strong show of force. This line of argument is more specu­
lative than the others but still highly plausible. Heilbroner (1992) 
observes: 
As the historian of ancient and modem democracies illustrate, the 
pressure of political movement in times of war, civil commotion, or 
general anxiety pushes in the direction of authority, not away from 
it. . . .  The passage through the gauntlet ahead may be possible only 
under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effectively 
than would be possible in a democratic setting. If the issue for man­
kind is survival, such governments may be unavoidable, even neces­
sary. (132-34) 
The fifth explanation of why scarcity threatens democracy is that 
lower groups in times of scarcity are ineffective in getting their de­
mands met by peaceful means, so some of them turn to more radical 
and even violent means. The state is likely to become more authoritar­
ian and repressive to deal with the dynamics of the resulting civil 
conflict (Gurr 1985) . 
Other Impacts of Economic Growth and Scarcity 
Just as economic growth has had nearly an infinite number of impacts 
over the past centuries, so will scarcity have a great range of impacts . 
These have not been discussed and empirically investigated as much 
as scarcity's impacts on equality, integration, and democracy, so we 
will not discuss them extensively here. A number of these have al­
ready been mentioned in connection with equality, integration, and 
democracy. Of special interest is Ophuls and Boyan's speculation that 
scarcity makes individualism, liberty, minimum restraints, laissez-faire, 
and inalienable rights of individuals dysfunctional. They will lose some 
legitimacy relative to competing values, so the practices associated 
with individualism could be curtailed. 
One structural change that is often mentioned in connection with 
scarcity is centralization. Scarcity requires greater planning of the use 
and allocation of the limited resources, which requires some central­
ization of control as in time of war. Ophuls and Boyan (1992) hold out 
hopes that polities can be democratic and decentralized in the long 
run but not in the short run. "During the transition to any form of 
steady state one can envision, it would be imperative to minimize 
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pollution and use resources as efficiently as possible, and this prob­
ably would mean greater centralization and expert control in the short 
term" (213). 
Another common speculation is that war and international con­
flict will increase greatly under scarcity. For example, Gurr summa­
rizes the record on this impact thus: 
Resource scarcity also has consequences for foreign policy, many of 
which are conflictual. Historically, warfare has been a common re­
sponse to ecological constraints and economic decline. Colonial ex­
pansion and conquest of weak but resource-rich neighboring states 
provided many states with new sources of supply, economic oppor­
tunities for surplus population, and new markets. Carneiro (1970) 
proposes that resource scarcity and population pressure together were 
the primary engines of state formation and imperial expansion 
throughout history. Choucri and North (1975) have demonstrated [a] 
historical European association between population pressures, in­
creased resources scarcity, and "lateral pressure" to expand territori­
ally. (1985, 65) 
Curr 's exposition focuses on wars by the strong against the weak, 
but according to Heilbroner (1992) underdeveloped countries or ter­
rorist groups might also war or terrorize rich countries, demanding a 
greater sharing of world wealth and resources. Nuclear weapons are 
spreading and nuclear blackmail could occur any day now. As na­
tional and subnational identities heighten, they make nonviolent reso­
lution to conflicts less feasible. 
If Heilbroner is right, the prospects are terrifying. Nuclear mate­
rials have become widely available through leaks from the former 
Soviet Union (Nelan 1994), and nuclear-bomb making is within the 
capabilities of many terrorist groups (Begley 1993; Lemonick 1994; 
Cetron and Davies 1994) . Biologic and chemical weapons are even 
easier to acquire and their results can be far more destructive (Cetron 
and Davies 1994) . Terrorist actions are predicted by experts to increase 
in number and in destruction even if economic growth continues 
(Cetron and Davies 1994) . With increasing scarcity the developed world 
will be in great danger. Democracies may have to tread on civil rights 
and greatly increase police powers to deal with the danger of terror­
ism. This is likely to move America further toward authoritarianism. 
Another dismal prognosis for the impacts of scarcity is societal 
regression to thoroughly corrupt governments, as "rent seeking" by 
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officials under conditions of scarcity becomes prolific and profitable. 
Though there is not strong evidence for this proposition, Lipset ob­
serves that "corruption . . .  is inherent in systems built on poverty" 
( 1994, 3) and Klitgaard (1988, 1991) demonstrates that this is the case. 
What is uncertain, however, is how likely it is for modern nonnepotistic 
bureaucracies to regress significantly. 
Somewhat arbitrarily we end our review of scarcity's impacts at 
this point. Overwhelmingly, the literature discusses only impacts that 
are negative from a progressive point of view. Some comments are 
optimistic, but they must be regarded as wishes, because they are not 
supported by analyses that show that they are likely outcomes of 
scarcity. In sum, we have not come across any good news about the 
impacts of scarcity. 
Societal Response to Seareity 
It goes without saying that predictions about how society will respond 
to relatively long-term scarcity are speculative. They are contingent 
upon many factors, including the nature and extent of the crisis, pub­
lic readiness for change, degree of government autonomy from control 
by the economic elite, and the idiosyncracies of the leader(s) . Accord­
ingly, we offer the following comments as an initial exploration of the 
topic for democratic capitalist societies. 
We focus on three principal sets of actors as central to the societal 
response: individuals, business firms, and the government. Their ac­
tions will be carried out in perceptions, values, and options. It is im­
portant to assess, therefore, the influences on perceptions and values 
on the one hand, and the constraints and forces that determine options 
on the other hand. Information and ideas as mediated by the media, 
opinion leaders, universities, and the scientific community affect per­
ceptions, while the media, educational and religious institutions, and 
opinion leaders affect values. 
The first societal response that we predict is the increased produc­
tion and diffusion of information on environmental issues with the 
result that environmental issues will be perceived as getting worse 
and requiring more collective action. Currently, the media present much 
information on the deterioration of the environment, the depletion of 
resources, pollution, ecosystem limits, environmental dangers, and 
health effects. The media is probably responding to the public's inter­
est in these issues. Surveys of public attitudes toward protecting the 
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environment continue to find strong support (Abramson and Inglehart 
1995; Dunlap 1993; Inglehart 1990, 1995; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; 
Portney 1992). Social scientists were surprised that the environmental 
movement did not rapidly rise and then rapidly decline in salience. 
This is the normal pattern for national-issue concerns. Instead, it has 
remained strong for twenty-five years. 
It appears that environmental issues have passed a threshold from 
being the concern of peripheral groups to being the concern of both 
peripheral groups and core institutions. At universities, courses, pro­
grams, and research on environmental concerns are multiplying as are 
conferences, journals, articles, and books on these topics. Environmen­
tal nonprofit organizations have become strong and have real power 
in Washington (Brulle 1995; Harper 1996). A growing number of busi­
nesses are making good profits on pollution control, waste disposal, 
and other environmental services, so there is a small but growing pro­
environment business interest lobbying on Capitol Hill. Environmen­
tal legislation and agency attention to environmental problems have 
become major concerns at the federal level. All these changes make it 
safe to predict that information gathering and dissemination on the 
environment should increase, especially because information gather­
ing faces few obstacles. 
The second societal response that we predict is technological in­
novation to reduce the costs of depleting resources and to protect the 
environment. Businesses will respond to rising costs of resources by 
using resource-saving technologies and practices .  Market forces 
should spur the development of new conserving technologies. Other 
innovations will be directed at protecting the environment in ways 
that do not threaten current life-styles. Many of the innovations will 
be stimulated by subsidies or by regulations concerning pollution, 
recycling, conservation, and hazardous substances. Regulations that 
are politically feasible are likely to have relatively low costs to indus­
try or be widely perceived as important enough to pass over indus­
try resistance. Regulations often are necessary to make it worthwhile 
for industry to develop new technologies and practices for protect­
ing the environment or more efficiently use and reuse resources. 
Another source for new technologies is the academic research com­
munity, which is subsidized by government and foundation con­
tracts and grants. As awareness of the crisis increases, it is likely that 
subsidies for research on relevant environmental issues would in­
crease substantially. 
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The third response that we predict is a range of minor behavior 
changes by individuals. Increasingly, the public wants to do some­
thing to help solve the problems. They participate in recycling pro­
grams, buy "save-the-bay" license plates, and contribute in other 
relatively costless ways. 
The crucial question is whether the above responses will be suffi­
cient to improve the environment and set society on the course of 
sustainable development. One group of scientists, led by Julian Simon, 
judges environmental problems as less severe than the view devel­
oped here and has immense faith in the inventiveness and adaptiveness 
of human beings. These scientists think that such actions would go a 
long way toward solving any problems that do exist. Perhaps a few 
new governmental policies that are not too disruptive to the economy 
might be helpful, but no dramatic changes would be needed. They 
argue that environmental problems are often exaggerated by environ­
mentalists and that there is much scientific uncertainty about their 
extent and potential impacts. They are sanguine on energy availability 
because fossil-fuels could provide for the world's energy needs far 
into the next century and nuclear fusion could provide all the energy 
that will be needed when fossil fuel production declines. (Davidson, 
the director of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, predicts that 
"an electricity-producing fusion demonstration reactor [will be] oper­
ating by 2025-or sooner if America so chooses" [1994] ). Though this 
view is plausible (fueled by reports of four- and five-passenger proto­
type cars that get 70-120 miles per gallon being tested by European 
and Japanese auto companies [Mathews 1991, 311]  ), it is highly specu­
lative and does not convince most people that the environment is not 
in crisis. 
Some analysts view the environmental crisis as far more severe 
than the above optimists, but prescribe actions for dealing with it that 
are not too disruptive to the economy and demand only modest be­
havioral changes from the public. Gore's recommendations in The Earth 
in Balance (1992) are called a "Global Marshall Plan" to indicate how 
daring it is, but it relies heavily on market adjustments, voluntary 
actions, and nonradical changes in government policies to remove 
subsidies for environmentally destructive actions and to provide more 
incentives for environmentally helpful actions. It also emphasizes in­
formation gathering and learning. His program is ambitious and un­
acceptable to the controllers of Washington today, but does not step 
hard on anyone's toes. It avoids the really painful actions that will be 
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necessary (except for population control in the Third World) . In like 
manner Brown, Flavin, and Postel (1991) are cautious in their sugges­
tions for saving the planet. Nevertheless, both books are rich in help­
ful policies and actions for addressing environmental problems. 
Other scientists who make up a much larger group do not think as 
the optimists that new technologies and minor behavior changes will 
overcome environmental scarcity nor do they think as Gore and Brown/ 
Flavin/Postel that an ambitious government environmental program 
that avoids significant costs can do the job. These scientists conclude 
that more significant changes are needed. Following in this line of think­
ing, the crucial question is, What additional responses are likely or even 
feasible? Will people make significant changes in their life-style? Will 
businesses risk some profits to protect the environment? Will govern­
ments pass tough environmental legislation? The dominant answer 
provided by these analysts to all three questions is "No!" (Gurr 1985; 
Heilbroner 1992; Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Shefrin 1980; Streeton 1976) . 
This pessimistic view is based on three arguments: the public­
goods/ free-rider problem, the business of business is profits, and special 
interests have the power to resist tough new policies. The public-goods 
argument is that it is not in the rational self-interest of individuals or 
nations to voluntarily sacrifice for the good of the environment or for 
the conserving of nonrenewable resources, because they will lose out 
to others who continue to exploit the environment or use the scarce 
resources. People will not voluntarily reduce their travel miles by au­
tomobile to preserve petroleum; they must be encouraged to do so by 
high gasoline taxes or forced to do so by gasoline rationing. Nations 
will not voluntarily reduce their use of fossil fuel to slow down global 
warming unless other nations do the same, because they would pay 
heavy costs without getting any more benefits than those who paid no 
costs. 
The argument that the business of business is profits asserts that 
solutions to environmental problems will not come from businesses 
unless government policies change their incentives. On their own they 
will conserve to save money and invent technologies that help them 
do more with less, but they will not stop doing harmful things from 
which they benefit nor will they do rightful things that cost them. 
They must be made to do these things by government policies, but, 
according to the third argument, they will prevent the passage of such 
policies (Schnaiberg and Gould 1994) . Most commentators, therefore, 
are pessimistic about the government's ability to take the necessary 
actions. They believe, therefore, that environmental problems will 
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worsen until an acute crisis forces a change in direction. At that point 
democratic societies are predicted to become much more authoritar­
ian. In the remainder of this section, therefore, we will present the 
arguments from several commentators that current democratic polities 
will fail to deal adequately with environmental scarcity problems and 
their failure will likely lead to authoritarian systems. 
Heilbroner argues that democracies in the developed world and 
all but "iron governments" in the underdeveloped world will fail. For 
the latter he argues that "the torrent of human growth imposes intol­
erable social strains on the economically backward regions" leading to 
high unemployment, widespread poverty, and urban disorganization. 
Such societies probably will be ruled either "by dictatorial govern­
ments serving the interests of a small economic and military upper 
class" or by a socialist "government with dedicated leadership, a well­
organized and extensive party structure, and an absence of inhibitions 
with respect to the exercise of power" (1992, 37, 39) . 
His analysis of the prospects for the developed countries is less 
gruesome but runs in the same iron government direction. They will 
require "the most active use of political power" (124) to respond to 
threats from the underdeveloped world and to deal with the environ­
mental problems. 
Gurr (1985) travels a somewhat different path but reaches the same 
conclusion. He posits that the governments of developed countries 
will try to stimulate economic growth, but in a scarcity-induced de­
cline they will fail and precipitate a legitimacy crisis. Thereupon, the 
politically advantaged groups will "assume increasingly autocratic and 
repressive control which will protect both their economic policies and 
positions from democratic challenges" (1985, 65) .  
Should these governments seek instead to adapt to ecological 
constraints by reducing consumption, they are likely to be defeated at 
the polls as the historical record shows. Only in an acute crisis are 
policies of restraint feasible and at that point they will be very painful 
and "probably will have sharply inegalitarian effects, and may require 
autocratic political solutions" (1985, 68) . Thus, the outcome of envi­
ronmental crisis, he predicts, is authoritarianism. His argument merits 
close attention. 
In the worst case of escalating crisis, democratic governments which 
have lost credibility because of their inability to stimulate promised 
economic growth will face growing pressures from powerful groups 
seeking to protect themselves from hardship and will be challenged 
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simultaneously by protestors and rebels who are increasingly willing 
to use violent means. It is also likely-in fact, is presently the case in 
most advanced industrial societies-that governments will be fiscally 
constrained in attempts to buffer the impact of economic change. 
These are not circumstances conducive to programmatic political and 
social reform. The more immediate consequence is paralysis of demo­
cratic decision making . . . .  In such situations governments lurch along 
from crisis to crisis while bureaucracy acts as caretaker. 
Periods of prolonged crisis often are followed by fundamental 
change in political institutions, sometimes but not always accom­
plished by revolutionary means. The path most often taken in the 
contemporary histories of democratic and quasi-democratic capitalist 
societies is toward the establishment of authoritarian governments 
which abandon democratic practices and pretenses in order to re­
solve the crisis and reestablish a stable social order. (1985, 69) 
Shefrin traces yet another path to the same authoritarian end. The 
title of his book is The Future of U.S. Politics in an Age of Economic Limits 
(1980) . He begins with a view of the U.S. government being over­
whelmed with demands by many special interest groups. Because the 
gains for the special interests are at the expense of the general good, 
he sees the political system as the new commons that is being overex­
ploited. Furthermore, the entrenched pattern of incrementalism and 
delay in American government does not solve problems but only defers 
them. Meanwhile, policy failures increase because the increasing com­
plexity of problems leads to unanticipated outcomes. The press of 
elections makes the U.S. polity very present oriented and ineffective 
on long-range issues. Finally, corporate power prevents effective envi­
ronmental regulations. All these features make the U.S. government 
unsuited for dealing with environmental issues, which get much worse 
with delay. Hence, the system is likely to fail and become delegitimized. 
In all probability the growing problem of limits spells the end of con­
sensus politics. At worst it means system collapse. In either case greater 
authoritarianism is likely. 
Ophuls and Boyan (1992) present the most extensive analysis of 
the likely American response to scarcity, and their conclusions are 
pessimistic. Their thesis is that "ecological scarcity undercuts the basic 
laissez-faire, individualistic premises of the American political economy 
so that current institutions are incapable of meeting the challenges of 
scarcity" (217) .  A major problem is that potential solutions will be 
successfully opposed by powerful interests. 
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Ophuls and Boyan identify three characteristics of the American 
polity that have prevented and will prevent it from acting effectively 
on the problem of scarcity: (1) process politics, (2) incremental deci­
sion making, and (3) power fragmentation and administrative inad­
equacy. They contrast process politics, where outcomes are accepted if 
they result from legitimate procedures, with systems politics, where 
means are subordinated to ends. The environment does not have a 
chance in process politics, because the public wants growth for its 
jobs, opportunities, and lower prices and sides with for-profit interests 
against sound environmental policies. Incremental decision making 
supports short-term self-interest and produces the tragedy of the com­
mons. It has led to the current environmental mess. The fragmentation 
of government and the numerous checks and balances that create long 
delays and weaken regulations make needed political action practi­
cally impossible. Meanwhile, the problems are growing so fast and are 
so complex that they create policy overload for the inadequate bu­
reaucracy. Thus they conclude that the American polity has failed to 
act effectively and cannot. It must be radically changed and the change 
that they expect is greater authoritarianism. 
In my earlier article exploring the consequences of scarcity, I came 
to conclusions like those presented above but predicted that democra­
cies would institute the changes necessary to transform into a sustain­
able society and remain democratic if four conditions existed. The first 
two conditions are fairly high levels of equality and integration at the 
time of the crisis. 
Interest groups are likely to sacrifice for the common good and work 
together in addressing the crisis when groups are not very unequal 
or opposed to each other and when the political system is seen as 
serving all the people rather than only a segment. In other words, if 
injustice, inequality, and intergroup hostilities are high to start with, 
the crisis could pull the country apart. (Finsterbusch 1983, 68) 
The other two conditions for successful adaptation by a democracy are 
the right kind of crisis and a charismatic leader. In a gradual crisis the 
tendency of democracies to be indecisive, inactive, and focused on the 
short term will make them likely to fail. Only in an urgent 
crisis are democracies likely to shift from their pattern of incremen­
talism, temporarily consolidate political power, and act decisively . . . .  
Finally, the survival of democracy may hinge on the degree of charisma 
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of the chief of state in the time of crisis. He will have to call for self­
sacrifice and acceptance of major changes. Unless belief in him is 
strong, his program may not succeed or discontent may be explo­
sively high. (Finsterbusch 1983, 69) 
To the above four conditions for the survival of democratic insti­
tutions in long-term scarcity should be added a degree of government 
autonomy from special interests. It has to have room to operate free of 
the constraints of powerful groups to implement a program that serves 
the public interest and is perceived as just and therefore accepted as 
legitimate. In times of crisis, such as wartime, people are willing to 
sacrifice, but only if the burdens are shared fairly. If powerful special 
interests, especially the rich and the large corporations, protect them­
selves and bias the program, it will generate resentment and civil 
strife. 
In sum, the societal response to scarcity will include research on 
the issues, technological innovations, and minor behavioral changes. 
These responses are likely because they will face little opposition. 
I also predict (in line with most commentators) that these responses 
will fail to adequately deal with environmentally induced scarcity with 
the result that democracies will drift into severe crises and the re­
sulting political struggles will probably, but not inevitably, end in 
authoritarianism. 
Social and Political C:hanges Required 
for a Sustainable Democratic Society 
The literature on sustainability includes thousands of ideas about 
changes that would make societies more sustainable. Most of these are 
technical changes and conserving behavior. Space does not allow me 
to review them here. Rather I limit my remarks to some radical changes 
in the political economy of the United States that, in my judgment, 
might be needed to attain a sustainable democratic society. I recognize 
that many of these ideas are not likely to be implemented unless so­
ciety is forced into them by an acute environmental crisis. In this 
section, however, I am not constrained by realism. The previous sec­
tion presented what was expected; the present section presents what 
is recommended. 
The first requirement for a sustainable democracy is to increase 
the ability of government to macromanage the economy to the extent 
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that it needs to be macromanaged. For this purpose I recommend a 
planning agency. It would be a fourth branch of government designed 
along the lines described by Pirages and Ehrlich (1974) (which builds 
on Tugwell's [1970] proposal for a new constitution) or the version of 
this planning branch presented by Milbrath (1989) . It would be charged 
with the tasks of 
l. "formulation and regular revision of five-, ten-, and fifty-year 
plans for America's future" (Pirages and Ehrlich 1974, 174), 
2. providing the research necessary for creating these plans, 
3. recommending "legislation directly to Congress to implement 
new macroconstraints" (175), and 
4. reporting "to the people annually on the state of the nation" 
(175) . 
At first it might contain 
l .  an Office of Environmental Protection for environmental plan­
ning and recommending environmental legislation, 
2. an Office of Natural Resources for evaluating resource reserves 
and future needs and developing resource utilization plans including 
resource-depletion quotas, 
3. an Office of Social Ecology for planning the social aspect of the 
transition to the sustainable society, 
4. an Office of Economic Priorities for performing the duties of 
the Council of Economic Advisers and propose legislation for redirect­
ing the economy to sustainability, and 
5. an Office of Technology Assessment for evaluating major new 
technologies and designing research and development priorities. 
The major social-design problem for this new branch of govern­
ment is how to keep it independent from special-interest politics. Both 
Pirages and Ehrlich and Milbrath provide a number of suggestions for 
achieving this independence. Their most important recommendations 
are a constitutional mandate to make it an independent fourth branch 
of government and putting its governance in the hands of a distin­
guished board of directors. The directors would be prominent and 
broadly knowledgeable scientists, appointed by the president, con­
firmed by the Senate, serving for ten- or twelve-year staggered terms, 
and removable by impeachment only. 
Our proposal for a fourth branch of government for planning 
sustainable policies would increase the centralization of society. Much 
of the sustainable society literature, however, presents a far more 
decentralized sustainable society than we do. Though we agree with 
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the values that guide their vision, we believe that the crisis must be 
dealt with at the macro level first because of the way that power is 
structured both in nations and the world. Perhaps after national and 
global reforms are instituted, localism could flourish. 
The second requirement for a sustainable democracy is for the 
power of major corporations to be brought under some measure of 
public control. They present the greatest threat to pluralist democracy 
today and effect the greatest special-interest bias in the government. 
Presently, they possess unaccountable power. The reform that we rec­
ommend is the federal chartering of all corporations that do interstate 
business and exceed some minimal size. In the beginning of the days 
of corporations, they were chartered by the states and had to report 
each year on how they served the public good to get their charter 
renewed. Then Delaware relaxed the chartering and renewal process 
to the point of providing no oversight and giving the corporations 
carte blanche. As a result so many corporations incorporated in Dela­
ware that it did not need to have a personal income tax for a long time 
and it still does not have a sales tax. Very quickly New Jersey followed 
suit and also won handsomely in the corporation sweepstakes. Other 
states had to become similarly lax or lose out in the competition be­
tween states to recruit and retain businesses. The resulting unaccount­
ability of corporations can be reversed by federal chartering and making 
charters contingent upon their demonstration of service to the public. 
In this way environmental impacts, plant closings, safety records, treat­
ment of workers, and so forth could be monitored and the corpora­
tions disciplined more effectively than at present. 
Another recommendation directed at the corporations is that cor­
porations larger than some minimum size and conducting interstate 
business would pay government taxes in stock shares instead of money. 
This would cause a gradual dilution of its stock until the government 
owns 50 percent of its shares. Then what is good for General Motors 
would be good for the United States. The board of directors would be 
restructured to contain representatives of the government, communi­
ties containing its facilities, and other interests. In this way values 
other than profits would have to be honored, though profits would 
still be their main goal. 
The above recommendations have addressed the capacity and 
fairness of the political economy but have not included reforms that 
directly deal with environmental problems. The major recommenda­
tions for this have been developed by Daly (1977) and are included 
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here (and in nearly everyone's list of proposals for sustainability) . 
They are: 
l. setting of minimum and maximum limits on income and a 
maximum on wealth to discourage excessive consumption and miti­
gate inequality, 
2 .  transferable birth licenses allocated 2.1 per woman by the gov­
ernment and marketable to achieve zero population growth, and 
3. depletion quotas for all nonrenewable resources, set by the 
government to regulate the annual consumption of each resource, and 
auctioned to resource buyers. The quotas would slow depletion 
and lead to higher prices, which would encourage efficiencies and 
innovations. 
All three procedures provide macroconstraints but do not inter­
fere in the microprocesses that are governed by free markets and in­
dividual choices within those constraints. 
Because the major natural resource in a country is its land, our 
final recommendation is a national land-use plan that would synchro­
nize with state land-use plans. Real estate interests would provide 
formidable opposition to this policy to protect their financial interest 
in using or selling land for the highest price. Nevertheless, it is nec­
essary to preserve agricultural lands, forests, and complex ecosystems 
and to deal with a wide range of environmental problems. Zoning is 
necessary in urban areas and now is necessary in other areas for many 
of the same principles. A current land-use trend that the plan would 
try to contain is the increasing dispersion of population to low-density 
housing, which causes high energy and transportation consumption, 
infrastructure inefficiencies, and greater ecosystem disruption. 
The above seven recommendations are radical by current stan­
dards of political change. They could not be enacted except in an acute 
environmental crisis . Many other changes would also be needed for 
sustainability, including a major realignment of the culture and value 
system from an emphasis on material consumption and individualism 
to an emphasis on environmental vitality, inner development, and 
connections with others (see Brown 1980, Milbrath 1989) . We do not, 
however, specify further the changes required to attain the sustainable 
society, because the problem is not a dearth of knowledge about what 
needs to be done, but the current lack of support for the needed 
changes. 
9. Competition, Expansion, 
and Reaction 
The Foundations of Contemporary Conflict 
Joseph A. Tainter 
The Social Environment and Reactive Process 
We live, in some ways, in fortunate times. In a book that concerns 
present and future calamities, such a statement may seem incongru­
ous. Yet amid all the present misfortunes we have the opportunity to 
learn, better than any previous people, the reasons for our problems. 
Any human event or process is a mere moment of reaction to previous 
events and processes. It is impossible to predict the future consequences 
of present events without understanding how the present itself has 
come to be. Historical knowledge is fundamental to designing a sus­
tainable future. We are fortunate to have more such knowledge than 
any people who preceded us. We can become the first people to know 
where we are in history. 
History is substantially a chronicle of reactive processes. For most 
societies and many people, the primary context to which they must 
adapt is not the natural environment, but other societies and other 
people. Responding to external pressures determines much of the 
political behavior of states and the cultural behavior of other types of 
institutions. The need to maintain a defensive posture, to protect citi­
zens, to preserve territory, or merely to remain competitive drives 
much consumption of resources, regardless of cost. If the cost of pro-
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tecting resources for the future is to lose autonomy, territory, or cul­
tural identity today, resource conservation will always be foregone. 
This may be one of the most predictable regularities of political his­
tory. It represents an enduring conflict between surviving today at the 
expense of tomorrow and providing for tomorrow while accepting 
extinction today. Not surprisingly, history provides no example of a 
society that has chosen the latter. 
One of history's clearest examples of reactive processes is the for­
mation of what are called secondary states. Although states are costly 
organizations and require high levels of resources (Tainter 1988), they 
usually have a competitive advantage over less-complex systems. They 
also tend to be expansive, so that their less-complex neighbors are 
always in danger of being dominated or absorbed. Neighbors of states 
that wish to avoid this fate must develop organizational features that 
allow them to compete with states. This is secondary state formation. 
It is a major process by which the world has come to be filled with 
states. Archaeologists have been able to document only six cases of 
primary state formation in all of human history.1 Every other state has 
formed secondarily, many by reactive processes. 
Reactive processes have been responsible both for the formation 
of much of today's world political system and for what may be its 
impending dissolution. The world system is showing clear signs of 
fragmenting, manifested in the intensification of cultural identity, the 
formation of new cultural groups, the equation of cultural distinctive­
ness with political autonomy, and the establishment of new, smaller 
nations. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the historical reasons 
behind today's culturally defined conflicts. Those conflicts can be un­
derstood in the historical context of competition among European na­
tions, their global expansion and colonization, and the reaction of much 
of the world to Euramerican domination.2 Politicians, diplomats, and 
international workers who confront today's disintegration and vio­
lence are working with a great handicap if they do not understand the 
origins of these problems or their reactive nature. Historical processes 
1. These are: Mesopotamia and Egypt, ca. 3500-3000 B.c.; China and the Indus 
River Valley, ca. 2500 B.c.; and Mexico and Peru in the last few centuries B.C. (Service 
1975,5) .  
2 .  Because this chapter is primarily historical, I do not discuss the recent cold war, 
nor its influence on the Third World. That influence was substantial and exacerbated the 
reactive processes described here. 
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have shaped contemporary violence and must be understood to com­
prehend that violence. 
Two types of reactive historical processes are pertinent to under­
standing the many problems that confront the world today and threaten 
to intensify in the future. The first is the pattern of competition that 
forms when polities with equivalent military abilities contend for 
dominance. Borrowing a term from archaeological literature, that pro­
cess is called peer polity competition (Renfrew 1982, 1986; Tainter 1992; 
see also Price 1977) . The second is the pattern by which much of the 
world has reacted to 500 years of European expansion and 150 years 
of Euramerican domination. These processes in combination have set 
the foundation for the disintegrative forces of contemporary world 
politics.3 
Peer Polity Competition in European History 
For at least the past four thousand years, one of the fundamental 
historical processes has been competition among societies organized 
at near-equivalent levels of population, territory, technology, organiza­
tion, per capita product, and military capability (Tainter 1992, 104-5).  
Such societies are termed peer polities (Renfrew 1982, 1986). Some 
examples include the warring states of post-Chou China, the Mycenaean 
polities, the city-states of classical Greece, the Italian city-states of the 
ancient, medieval, and Renaissance periods, the southern lowland 
Maya, medieval and Renaissance Europe, and our current era. It is 
characteristic of peer polities that their evolution is stimulated, not by 
reaction to a dominant power, nor by relations between cores and 
peripheries, but by their interaction. 
The relations among peer polities typically involve both trade and 
competition. Trade does not concern us here; competition is a powerful 
stimulator of sociocultural change (Tainter 1988, 1992) . Where natural or 
3.  This chapter represents a convergence of two lines of research. The first, on peer 
polity competition, was developed for the conference "Effects of War on Society," orga­
nized by Giorgio Ausenda. It was held May 26 to June 1, 1991, under the auspices of 
the Department of Public Education and Culture, Republic of San Marino (Ausenda 
1992). The second, on contemporary culturally defined violence, was stimulated by the 
conference "The State under Siege: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War Era," 
organized by R. Brian Ferguson. It was held at the New York Academy of Sciences, 
April 22-24, 1994. 1 am grateful to Professors Ausenda and Ferguson for the opportu­
nities to participate in these conferences. 
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fiscal resources are sufficient, peer polities may engage in conflict that 
stretches over generations or even centuries. Such conflicts may involve 
endless maneuvering for advantage, forming and dissolving of alliances, 
and continual striving to expand territory or influence at a neighbor's 
expense, or prevent the neighbor from doing the same. Peer polity com­
petition selects for growth in the size and complexity of military sys­
tems; increases in the scale of warfare; innovations in technology, strategy, 
tactics, and logistics; and the reorganization of society to support com­
petition (Tainter 1992) . 
In Europe of the past millennium, peer polity competition and 
warfare selected inexorably for larger states and greater capabilities 
for making war.4 This competition was fundamentally related to the 
technological innovation that allowed European nations to dominate 
the globe over the past half millennium (Kennedy 1987; Parker 1988) . 
The challenge to each polity to finance such a system of escalating 
competition is the key to comprehending how European peer polity 
competition came to change the world. 
Europe before 1815 was almost always at war somewhere; scarcely 
a decade went by without at least one battle. From the twelfth through 
the sixteenth centuries France was at war from 47 percent of all years 
in some centuries to 77 percent in others. For England the range was 
48 to 82 percent; for Spain, 47 to 92 percent. Even in the most peaceful 
centuries these nations were involved in war, on average, nearly every 
other year. In the entire sixteenth century there was barely a decade 
when Europe was entirely at peace. The seventeenth century enjoyed 
only four years of total peace; the eighteenth century, sixteen years 
(Parker 1988, l; Rasler and Thompson 1989, 40). History provides few 
comparable examples of such lengthy peer polity conflict, with so 
many innovations and such far-reaching consequences (Tainter 1992). 
An account of the history of this competition could be initiated 
almost anywhere. Its foundation was established with the collapse of 
4. To characterize European states of the past millennium as peer polities is not to 
downplay the very significant differences in the organization of those societies. In the 
nineteenth century, for example, European societies ranged from feudal to industrial. 
Two factors make the peer-polity concept useful for evaluating European history, par­
ticularly for western and central Europe. The first is that competition demonstrably 
spurred lockstep developments in technology, organization, and finance, so that com­
petitive states always tended to have approximately equivalent capabilities. The second 
is that, although states varied widely in size, population, and natural resources, the 
formation of alliances has tended to even out these inequities (Tainter 1992, 104). 
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the western Roman Empire and the formation of smaller successor­
states. A starting point closer to the present will suffice, however. The 
development of siege warfare in the middle centuries of the present 
millennium is a useful point of reference, for it is directly related to 
subsequent developments in technology, strategy, and logistics. 
The development of siege guns in the fifteenth century ended the 
advantage of stone-built castles and required changes in the strategies 
and technology of defense. From the early fifteenth century, fortifica­
tion builders designed walls that could support defensive cannon. A 
short time later walls were built that could also withstand bombard­
ment. By 1560 all the elements of the trace italienne had been devel­
oped: a fortification system of low, thick walls with angled bastions 
and eventually extensive outworks. It was an effective but expensive 
method of fortification, requiring much labor to construct. The city of 
Siena in 1553, for example, found it so expensive to build fortifications 
in this manner that no money was left for its army or fleet. Siena was, 
ironically, annexed by Florence, against which its fortifications had 
been built (Creveld 1989, 101-3; Parker 1988, 7, 9, 12). 
The trace italienne was effective. To capture a place fortified in this 
way could take months or years. Offensive tacticians responded with 
more complicated siege methods, and their costs rose as well. A be­
sieging force of perhaps fifty thousand had to be kept in place for 
weeks or months. Such a force required 475 tons of food per day, to 
which must be added ammunition, powder, and building materials. 
From this time on, local lords could not afford to build and defend an 
effective fortress, nor to attack one. The resources for war were no 
longer found in the feudal countryside but in capitalist towns (Creveld 
1989, 106-8; Parker 1988, 13) .  
There were parallel developments in open-field warfare. In the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries two developments made the armored, 
mounted knight obsolete: massed archers and the pike phalanx. These 
in tum were gradually superseded by firearms. To make the most 
effective use of firearms, infantry came to be drawn up in ranks, so 
that those in the rear could reload while the lead musketeers fired 
(Creveld 1989, 89-91;  Kennedy 1987, 21; Parker 1988, 16-20).  
As commanders maneuvered for battlefield advantages, tactics 
were developed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of firing. 
Training and battlefield coordination became more important. Unedu­
cated soldiers had to be familiar with what were history's most ad­
vanced weapons. Ranks had to open and close on signal. Victory came 
Competition, Expansion, Reaction 179 
to depend on the right combination of infantry, cavalry, firearms, can­
non, and reserves. Textbooks of drill sprouted across the continent and 
tactics became a gentleman's topic of study (Creveld 1989, 92-94; Parker 
1988, 18-23) .  
War came to involve ever-larger segments of  society and became 
correspondingly more burdensome. Several European states saw the 
sizes of their armies increase tenfold between 1500 and 1700. Louis 
XIV's army stood at 273,000 in 1691 .  Five years later it was at 395,000, 
and nearly one-fourth of all adult Frenchmen were in the military. Be­
tween 1560 and 1659 Castile lost about 11 percent of its adult male 
population in the constant wars (Sundberg et al. 1994, 13). Each day, a 
field army of 30,000 needed 100,000 pounds of flour, and 1500 sheep or 
150 cattle. This was more than was required to feed all but the largest 
cities of Europe (Creveld 1989, 112-13; Parker 1988, 2, 45-46, 75) . 
Yet for all these developments, land warfare of the time was largely 
stalemated. There were few lasting breakthroughs. The new military 
technologies, and the mercenaries to put them to use, could be pur­
chased by any power with enough money. No nation could gain a 
lasting technological advantage. Moreover, when a nation such as Spain 
or France threatened to become dominant, alliances would form to 
counter its power (Kennedy 1987, 21-22) .  Major wars of the time were 
therefore long, and tended to be decided by cumulative small victories 
and the slow erosion of the enemy's economic base. Defeated nations 
quickly recovered and were soon ready to fight again. Land warfare 
had to be augmented by what amounted, in effect, to global flanking 
operations. European wars turned into contests for power and influ­
ence overseas (Parker 1988, 43, 80-82) .  
The great wealth from the New World was one of the factors that 
allowed Europeans to minimize the threat from their old enemy, the 
Ottoman Empire (Lewis 1958). They used this wealth also to sustain 
their ever-more costly competition among themselves (Kennedy 1987, 
24, 27-28, 43, 46-47, 52; Tainter 1992, 110, 124) . In 1760 the Duke of 
Choiseul noted that "in the present state of Europe, it is colonies, trade 
and in consequence, seapower which must determine the balance of 
power upon the continent" (Parker 1988, 82) .  The naval powers of the 
time were England, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark/Norway, 
France, and Spain. From 1650 to 1680 the five northern powers in­
creased their navies from 140,000 to 400,000 tons. By this time England 
had to import critical supplies for its fleet, including masts, tar, and 
pitch from Sweden, and tried to develop a tar industry in its North 
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American colonies. In the 1630s the Dutch merchant fleet required the 
building of three hundred to four hundred new ships each year, about 
half of which were used in trade in the Baltic. Between the 1630s and 
1650 the Dutch merchant fleet grew by 533 percent (Sundberg et al. 
1994, 38, 42) . 
This naval strategy also led to problems of increasing complexity 
and cost. In 1511, for example, James IV of Scotland commissioned the 
building of the ship Great Michael. It took almost one-half of a year 's 
income to build, and 10 percent of his annual budget for seamen's 
wages. It ended its days rotting in Brest harbor, having been sold to 
France in 1514 (Parker 1988, 90) . 
As the sizes of armies continued to grow through the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, new fields of specialization were needed. 
There was demand for skills such as surveying and cartography. It 
was necessary to have accurate clocks and statistical reporting. In the 
eighteenth century some armies carried their own printing presses. 
Organization became more complex. Staff and administration were 
separated. Armies no longer marched as a unit, but could be split into 
smaller elements that traveled, under instructions, on their own. Battles 
came to last up to several months. In France, the levee en masse (mass 
conscription) was begun in 1793. In 1812 Napoleon invaded Russia 
with an army of 600,000, including 1 ,146 field guns, on a 400-kilometer 
front (Creveld 1989, 114, 117-22; Parker 1988, 153) . 
In 1499, as he was embarking on a campaign in Italy, Louis XII 
asked what was needed to ensure success. He was told that three 
things alone were required: money, money, and still more money 
(Sundberg et al. 1994, 10) .  As all things military grew in size and 
complexity, the main constraint came to be finance. In the decades 
before 1630 the cost of putting a soldier in the field increased by 500 
percent. The increasing expense of wars meant that nations spent 
more of their income on them. In 1513, for example, England obli­
gated 90 percent of its budget to military efforts. In 1657 the figure 
was 92 percent. In 1643 expenditures of the French government, 
mainly on war, were twice the annual income (Kennedy 1987, 58, 
60, 63) . In the mid-eighteenth century Frederick the Great also spent 
90 percent of his receipts on war. He found it necessary to debase 
his currency and to extract both contributions and plunder from 
civilians. 
Sweden used its vast forest resources to pay for its wars. Copper, 
steel, and tar produced by the use of forest resources amounted to 90 
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percent of Sweden's exports. The money earned in this way was the 
major basis for Sweden's war efforts. In 1701, 86.5 percent of England's 
tar came from Sweden. Between 1658 and 1814 England sent twenty 
fleets to the Baltic to secure the trade in masts and timber (Sundberg 
et al. 1994, 28-29, 40, 42) . 
Sweden enjoyed a combination of low population, untapped for­
est reserves, and markets for its products among the combatants. The 
major states, lacking such circumstances, came to rely on credit to pay 
for their wars. Notwithstanding the flow of precious metals from her 
New World colonies, Spain's debts rose from 6 million ducats in 1556 
to 180 million a century later, and bankruptcy often undermined Span­
ish military operations. The cost of war loans grew from about 18 
percent interest in the 1520s to 49 percent in the 1550s. Both France 
and Spain often had to declare bankruptcy, or force a lowering of the 
rate of interest. Governments coerced bankers into extending new loans 
by refusing to make payments on existing debts. From the sixteenth 
through the eighteenth centuries the Dutch, followed by the English, 
overcame fiscal constraints by gaining access to reliable short-term 
and long-term credit. They were careful to pay the interest on loans, 
and so were granted more favorable terms than other nations. They 
used this advantage to defeat opponents, France and Spain, that were 
wealthier but were poor credit risks (Parker 1988, 63-67; Rasler and 
Thompson 1989, 91,  94, 96, 103) . 
The wars did not directly augment net national wealth. Sweden's 
expenditures on wars, calculated as energy, exceeded the return by 
240 percent (Sundberg et al. 1994, 25). The wars raised permanently 
the cost of being a competitive state, and war-induced debt levels 
persisted long after the fighting ceased. Power always shifts, and vic­
torious nations could never dominate for very long (Kennedy 1987; 
Rasler and Thompson 1989, 106, 1 75-76). Many people of the time 
understood the futility of European wars. William Shakespeare cre­
ated in Hamlet the scene of Fortinbras and his army of twenty thou­
sand who "fight for a plot, Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause, 
Which is not tomb enough and continent To hide the slain."5 The 
image of Fortinbras fighting for a plot of land not large enough for the 
battle, nor to entomb those killed, was echoed explicitly and eloquently 
in 1775 by Frederick the Great. 
5. Hamlet, act 5, sc. 4. 
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The ambitious should consider above all that armaments and mili­
tary discipline being much the same throughout Europe, and alli­
ances as a rule producing an equality of force between belligerent 
parties, all that princes can expect from the greatest advantages at 
present is to acquire, by accumulation of successes, either some small 
city on the frontier, or some territory which will not pay interest on 
the expenses of the war, and whose population does not even ap­
proach the number of citizens who perished in the campaigns. (quoted 
in Parker [1988, 149]) 
Global Consequences of European Wars 
European peer polity competition stimulated technological innovation, 
development of science, political transformation, and global expan­
sion. The development of sea power and acquisition of colonies be­
came aspects of strategy in stalemated European warfare. European 
war thus ultimately affected and changed the entire world. By 1914 
the nations of Europe, and their offshoots, controlled fully 84 percent 
of the earth's surface (Parker 1988, 5) .  
For all the growth in size, complexity, and costliness, European 
wars of this period, as noted, rarely produced decisive results. States 
grew larger in territory and population, but whenever a power threat­
ened to become dominant, its competitors formed alliances to counter 
it. A peer polity stalemate evolved over several centuries. At times, 
such as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this balance of power 
was even formalized through diplomatic arrangements. 
As land warfare in Europe produced no lasting advantages, the 
expansion of competition to the global arena was a logical consequence. 
Competition expanded to include trade, the capture of overseas territo­
ries, the establishment of colonies, attacking adversaries' colonies, and 
intercepting the wealth that flowed from them. The Thirty Years War 
(1618-48) is sometimes called the first global war for this reason. The 
balance of power in Europe came to rest in part on such matters; over­
seas resources were needed to sustain European competition. These 
were societies that, until the nineteenth century, were powered almost 
completely by solar energy. Sweden's support base in the seventeenth 
century consisted nearly entirely (87 percent) of renewable resources. 
Lacking colonies outside its region, almost half of Sweden's forest-based 
exports went to finance foreign wars (Sundberg et al. 1994, 18, 20). 
England's wars in the 1540s cost about ten times the crown's income 
Competition, Expansion, Reaction 183 
(Kennedy 1987, 60) . For societies powered by solar energy, and using 
that energy so heavily within the limits of their technology, the main 
way to increase wealth was to control more of the earth's surface where 
solar energy falls. It became necessary to secure the produce of foreign 
lands to subsidize European competition. New forms of energy, and 
nonlocal resources, were channeled into a very small part of the world. 
This concentration of global resources allowed European conflict to reach 
heights of complexity and costliness that could never have been sus­
tained with only European resources (Tainter 1992, 123-25). 
European rulers of the time faced unbearable pressure to extract 
wealth from their colonies. Yet even that wealth could not meet the 
cost of some campaigns. In 1552 the Hapsburg emperor Charles V 
spent 2.5 million ducats on a campaign at Metz, an amount equal to 
ten times his American income. By the 1580s Philip II was receiving 
2 million ducats a year from American mines, but the ill-fated armada 
of 1588 cost 10 million ducats (Kennedy 1987, 46-47) . Even with this 
massive transfer of bullion from the New World, Spain's debt grew 
3,000 percent in the century following 1556, and bankruptcy caused 
Spanish military operations to fail. Clearly, they would have failed 
much earlier (or not been undertaken) if Spain had not been able to 
draw upon New World wealth. 
Peer polity competition not only forced Europeans to search for 
foreign lands and resources but it also virtually guaranteed them 
success in doing so. Such conflict, particularly when it is stalemated 
in balances of power, selects for continual innovation in technology, 
organization, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Any power that does not 
match its competitors in these areas risks defeat and domination. A 
nation that survives this process will be so proficient at making war 
that, outside of its group of peers, there may be no other military 
force that can withstand it. The inexorable pressure on European 
states to become ever better at making war meant that, when they 
ventured outside Europe, they often had a competitive advantage 
over other powers, whether organized as states or not (Kennedy 
1987, 16-30) .  Time and again over the past five hundred years, com­
paratively tiny European forces have defeated much larger forces in 
the New World, Africa, and Asia. Nor was this unusual. Such abili­
ties are a common consequence of peer polity competition. The glo­
bal dominance of Europe in the past half millennium came from the 
same type of process that once allowed numerically inferior Greek 
and Macedonian armies to defeat much larger Persian forces, and 
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the Romans to conquer the Mediterranean. A state that survives peer 
polity competition may find the rest of the world at its command 
(Tainter 1992, 125) . 
European expansion as a competitive strategy set the stage for a 
continuing chain of reactive processes in the rest of the world. Under­
standing those reactive processes is the second historical ingredient to 
comprehending the ethnopolitical problems we now face. 
Patterns of Reaetion to Global 
European Expansion 
An epoch of more than four hundred years of colonial expansion, 
followed by a century of Western economic and cultural penetration 
of all parts of the globe, has resulted in a world system in which most 
people must define themselves partly in reaction to Europe and North 
America6 (e.g., Marx 1993, 159; Friedman 1993, 229). It was inevitable 
that many such peoples would define themselves in opposition to 
Euramerican dominance. This has led to the development of such 
movements as Islamic fundamentalism, Sendero Luminoso,7 (the Peru­
vian Shining Path Maoist group) ,  and some cases of reactive 
ethnonationalism. What is not always so clear, and in consequence is 
typically misunderstood, is that European expansion has also caused 
violence among non-Western peoples themselves. 
These processes began with the earliest phases of European ex­
pansion. Europeans in many areas commented upon the frequency 
with which indigenous peoples engaged in conflict (against Europe­
ans or among themselves) and the ferocity with which they did so. 
Classic examples include the Yanomami of the Amazon Basin and the 
Iroquois of northeastern North America .  War by such people led to 
much social speculation, from Hobbes to the present day, about the 
nature of war in nonstate societies, about the role of conflict in the 
development of state institutions, and even about the supposedly 
6. I have not included in this analysis a discussion of Japan, whose economic 
development was itself a reaction to European expansion. Japan's economic penetration 
of the world is comparatively recent, but reactions to it are already building. The devel­
opment of a global reaction to Japanese commercial expansion will bear watching in 
coming decades . 
7. A violent, rural, Marxist movement in Peru, originally proclaiming millenarian 
aspirations. 
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aggressive nature of our species. Contemporary research is showing 
that this violence has been misunderstood from the beginning. 
European expansion transformed indigenous societies from the 
outset, and often before actual contacts had been made. The immedi­
ate consequences of expansion were disease, introduction of new plants 
and animals, and technological change (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992, 
8-11) .  Such effects often arrived before Europeans themselves, so that 
even the very first descriptions of indigenous societies were some­
times of people who had already been significantly changed. Among 
these changes were the formation of pan-tribal confederations and 
new ethnic groups, where previously these had not existed8 (Ferguson 
and Whitehead 1992, 12-13; Whitehead 1992). Both tribes and ethnic 
groups appear to have formed in response to expanding states, and 
may not have existed before the state. 
It now appears that in the era of European expansion, many epi­
sodes of conflict among indigenous peoples, and between them and 
Europeans, concerned access to European goods (e.g., Abler 1992; 
Ferguson 1992, 1995a) .  The circulation of goods beyond state frontiers 
has long been an element of state-nonstate relations. With its capac­
ity for mass production, European expansion magnified this factor. 
European goods were valued by indigenous peoples not only for utili­
tarian reasons but also because they came to be embedded in social 
relations. Manufactured goods were used to validate claims to status 
and were intimately involved in wars and alliances. War among indig­
enous peoples, and between such peoples and Europeans, often had 
much to do with access to European technology (Ferguson and White­
head 1992, 10-11) .  It was an early manifestation of the reactive process. 
The Yanomami of the Amazon Basin illustrate these points. Long 
noted in anthropology for the frequency and severity of their violent 
behavior, they have been brought to public attention with labels such 
as "the fierce people" (Chagnon 1968) . The Yanomami are depicted as 
representing the Hobbesian state of anarchic war in which all nonstate 
peoples supposedly once lived (Chagnon 1968, 1974) . Yet, contempo­
rary analysis of the Yanomami case by Brian Ferguson (1992, 1995a) 
8 .  This too has been a recurrent reactive process. Along the fringes of the Roman 
Empire, from the second through the fourth centuries A.D., tribal confederations emerged 
among people who were often in conflict with Rome, and among themselves. These 
transformations were a direct reaction to Roman expansion (Tainter 1994). 
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reveals that nothing is pristine or intrinsic about their violence. To the 
contrary, every reported incident of Yanomami conflict is, directly or 
indirectly, about access to or control of manufactured goods. Yanomami 
with direct access to Western goods try vigorously to monopolize them, 
which creates tension with outlying villages, and even within villages. 
The problem of access to goods manifests itself not only through vio­
lence but also through a set of conflict-related structural changes. These 
include changes in kin relations, relocation of villages, population 
aggregation, village alliances, feasting, economic specialization and 
exchange, the authority of headmen, and the treatment of the Yanomami 
as a cultural entity. Manufactured goods so significantly transformed 
Yanomami society that its recent configuration cannot be considered 
to represent accurately the precontact society. Ironically, some anthro­
pologists who have taken manufactured goods on their visits to the 
Yanomami may have inadvertently stimulated episodes of the "pris­
tine" violence that they subsequently described (Ferguson 1992, 1995a, 
and personal communication 1994) . 
The Iroquois in colonial North America were a group of indepen­
dent "nations" often noted for their fierceness and territorial ambi­
tions. Although Iroquois conflicts may have originated in the prehistoric 
period, in the historic era the Iroquois made war well out of propor­
tion to their disease-reduced numbers. This practice was closely linked 
to their need for European goods. With the new importance of mus­
kets in warfare, and a reduction in the local supply of beaver pelts, the 
Iroquois in the seventeenth century faced marginalization and ulti­
mate obliteration. Pelts had to be obtained to trade for muskets. At the 
same time, losses to European diseases were so high that the Iroquois 
nations had constantly to replenish their populations with war cap­
tives and refugees. The Iroquois took to ambushing canoe fleets in 
Canada for pelts, and concluded that the solution to the shortage of 
beaver was to expand their hunting territory. Their wars were ulti­
mately concerned with obtaining European goods (Abler 1992). Thus, 
the nature and intensity of Iroquoian conflict were transformed by 
European contact. 
As frontier encounters were transformed into colonial administra­
tions, and ultimately into independent states, political and economic 
processes in much of the world were transformed into the European 
model of the nation-state. Yet, the fundamental reactive nature of many 
processes did not change. Many of today's conflicts can trace their 
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origins to the expansion, domination, and meddling of the great pow­
ers. Political and territorial arrangements in the areas of former colo­
nies, and in what were the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Soviet 
empires, have caused cultural groups to stress their differences as they 
compete for control of state institutions (Ferguson 1995b). Peoples that 
have coexisted for centuries now stress the "traditional" nature of 
their conflicts. New cultural identities are emerging, as among the 
Maya of Guatemala (LeBaron 1993; Warren 1993) and in contemporary 
Tajikistan (Schoeberlein-Engel 1994). Ethnogenesis was apparently a 
policy of the former Soviet Union (Aklaev 1992; Rudensky 1992; 
Entessar 1993). On a smaller scale, the role of the state in ethnic for­
mation can be seen in Bedouin resistance to Israeli attempts to assign 
them an ethnic classification. The principal of a Bedouin school once 
complained, " [I]f it was not enough what they [the Israeli administra­
tion] are doing to us, now they tell us we are an ethnic group" 
(Jakubowska 1992, 85). 
Colonial policies have in many cases exacerbated cultural antago­
nisms, or even created them. When the British displaced the Moslems 
as rulers of India, for example, they used Hindus to run the colonial 
administration, and emphasized the differences between the religions. 
Hindus were sent to English schools and recruited as minor officials. 
Moslems largely attended Islamic schools, where the teachings con­
cerned religious orthodoxy rather than secular advancement (Zeldin 
1994, 266) . In the postcolonial era continued poverty, lack of access to 
power, and disillusionment with Western-derived models of "moder­
nity" have contributed to the rise of Hindu, Moslem, and Sikh nation­
alism (Spitz 1993) . Throughout south Asia, politicians are exploiting 
these intensifying cultural differences for personal advancement, pro­
voking recent violent events . In such a situation, an aura of antago­
nism can be rapidly created by unscrupulous leaders, and manipulated 
to further political ambitions. 
One conflict that has deeply impressed itself on the world's con­
sciousness is the tragedy in Rwanda. The true origins of this conflict 
are little known to the public. A century ago European colonists (first 
German, then Belgian) found in what is now Rwanda a centralized 
kingdom consisting of numerous clans, and three groups largely de­
fined by occupational status. There were no distinct ethnic groups. 
The European administrators transformed the occupational hierarchy 
into an imaginary racial classification. The minority Tutsi rulers were 
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proclaimed by Belgian missionaries to have a cultural and racial heri­
tage in Ethiopia-and thus nearer Europe. As the Tutsi converted to 
Catholicism they adopted this new "history" to legitimize their con­
tinued rule. Hutu cultivators were consigned to a life of toil. Such 
recruitment of the native hierarchy is a common ploy in colonial 
regimes. 
In 1959, on the eve of independence, the Belgians reversed both 
their policy and the order of Rwandese society. They assisted in elimi­
nating the Tutsi monarchy and in the installation of a Hutu republic. 
The Hutu have since seized upon the myth that the Tutsis originated 
elsewhere, condemning them now as foreigners. The fact that Tutsi 
and Hutu "ethnic" and "racial" identities were recently created by an 
outside power is now irrelevant. As they persecute each other and 
fight to control the Rwandan state, Tutsi and Hutu identities have 
emerged of a kind that never existed before. Survival now demands 
that they must be ethnic groups. 
In the 1930s the Belgians issued identity cards, categorizing people 
as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa (low-caste hunter-gatherers who do not emerge 
in today's journalism) .  Unable to implement their racial typology in 
practice, the Belgian administrators classified people by the owner­
ship of cattle. Those with ten or more were Tutsi in perpetuity; those 
with fewer were Hutu. These identity cards still exist, and were used 
to categorize people in the recent massacres. Upon such a distinction 
500,000 people were killed (Wall 1994) . 
Summary 
There has been a persistent pattern of reaction to European expansion. 
That pattern consists of tribalization and ethnogenesis, intensification 
of cultural identity, and violence. The reasons for conflict range from 
control of Western-manufactured goods to control of Western-style 
governments. These patterns are seen historically among the Iroquois, 
in recent decades among the Yanomami, and today both in those con­
flicts that receive public attention and those that do not. In such places 
as the Balkans, Iran, central Asia, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, and 
Liberia, violence is shaped by cultural and political reactions to exter­
nal forces. Though the forms of these conflicts differ, the factor that 
unifies them is that each is in part a response to former colonial, 
imperial, or other global powers. 
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Synthesis and Implications: 
The IDstorical Foundations of Contemporary 
Violence 
There is a significant history behind the contemporary outbreak of 
violence. Its foundations can be traced to remote events that few people 
involved in today's conflicts would anticipate. It is understandable 
primarily as an example of a common historic process-the develop­
ment of reactive patterns. From secondary-state formation, to core­
periphery relations, to peer polity interaction, reactive processes have 
been a dominant, driving force in history. 
With the collapse of the western Roman Empire, Europe found 
itself with a host of small, successor states. As these increased in size 
and complexity, their conflicts formed into a peer polity pattern. Alli­
ances were formed and broken, investments were made in more com­
plex ways of making war, and rulers continually looked for more 
money. As continental warfare was stalemated, Europeans sought 
subsidies through global expansion-trade and colonization. These 
too became elements of the competitive spiral. By the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries European powers were acquiring colonies largely 
to prevent their competitors from doing so. 
The expansion of Europe generated global changes that we are 
still experiencing. All societies that it touched were transformed, but 
none more so than indigenous, nonstate peoples. With disease, envi­
ronmental change, and the availability of manufactured goods, such 
peoples were affected in ways that will never be fully calculated. 
Through phases of frontier contact, colonialism, and the formation of 
nation-states, the reactions to European expansion have included tribal 
formation, ethnogenesis, and violence. Where that violence focused on 
resisting European or American encroachment, the great powers have 
found it comprehensible if disagreeable. Yet, much of today's violence 
has seemed so incomprehensible because it is directed internally. Eu­
ropeans and Americans have not understood that their own expansion 
has stimulated much of today's culturally defined conflict. There is a 
direct line of cause and effect from warfare in medieval and Renais­
sance Europe, to global expansion and colonialism, to today's events 
in places like Rwanda, Somalia, and India. 
A casual reading of this text might suggest two facile but errone­
ous inferences. It is worthwhile exposing these and dispensing with 
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them. The first is that European states, and other colonial, imperial, or 
capitalist powers, are morally responsible for the current state of the 
world. If today's violence is even in part a reaction to European ex­
pansion, some will feel inclined to assign blame for this violence ac­
cordingly. Although this might give a measure of psychological 
satisfaction, it would be a short-sighted use of history. The identifica­
tion of historical scapegoats too easily becomes an excuse for failures 
of contemporary action. Moreover, to the extent that European colo­
nial expansion was made likely by previous events and processes, 
such as peer polity competition, the search for a scapegoat can always 
be shifted further back in time. A morally neutral approach to history 
must be adopted or else dialogue reduces to accusations and defen­
siveness.9 Historical events are neither good nor bad; they are simply 
a set of potential understandings. To blame any nation or part of the 
world for its history does little but guarantee further reactions.10 
The other facile inference would be that this essay denies to today's 
peoples and nations the ability to behave other than reactively. Clearly, 
no sensible historian or social scientist would suggest such a thing. 
One purpose of international policy making should be to encourage 
those who perpetrate today's violence to use their faculties of choice, 
and act more responsibly. Yet, history is filled with examples of reac­
tive processes, and an understanding of today's troubles that ignores 
their origins is bound to be superficial. People always have the ability 
to choose, but choice requires information. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to generate an awareness of the origins of today's behavior. 
Among the benefits of this awareness is that it allows the actors them­
selves to decide whether to modify their actions. 
The discussion in this chapter suggests two implications that are 
essential to understanding today's and tomorrow's difficulties. The 
9. This is written when the participants in World War II have just finished observ­
ing the fiftieth anniversary of the end of that conflict. It is a period filled with demands 
for apologies, acknowledgments of responsibility, and compensation of victims. With 
respect for the deep feelings of the participants in that struggle, I suggest that humili­
ation of any nation guarantees a future reaction, perhaps a violent one. Public demands 
for apologies are not wise, long-term policy. I do not condone any of the things done 
in that war, merely suggest that a mature understanding of it requires a dispassionate 
approach. 
10. Consider also the contradiction of blaming Europeans for the consequences of 
their competitive spiral while admiring the consequences of peer-polity competition in 
ancient Greece-the defeat of the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 H.c.  
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first, raised at the very beginning, is the importance of knowing where 
we are in history (Tainter 1995) .  Historical patterns may develop over 
generations or even centuries. Rarely can an individual in a lifetime 
come to understand fully the origins of an event or a process. Yet, to 
remain ignorant of the origins of today's problems is to condemn 
ourselves to manage them ineptly, and to condemn others to the con­
sequences of that mismanagement. As for the future, it is folly to 
suppose that we can use present conditions to predict the twenty-first 
century if we do not understand how the present came to be. Manag­
ing political and cultural problems requires that we know where we 
are in history. 
The culturally defined conflicts of today cannot be understood 
except in the context of global European expansion. Western nations 
that attempt to ameliorate or manage conflicts need to understand 
how their own histories have stimulated many of these problems. If 
today's culturally defined conflicts are a response to European politi­
cal and economic expansion, interference carries the risk of provoking 
further reactions. On one level this can be seen clearly. Video clips 
released, for example, by Moslem fundamentalists in Lebanon, by the 
government of Iraq, and by the Bosnian Serbs are clearly intended for 
Western news broadcasts. The Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front 
has legitimized its claim to rule Rwanda by asserting that its struggle 
is based on social transformation rather than ethnicity, that its troops 
are well disciplined, and that it has no wish for revenge against Hutus, 
only justice. These messages are meant for European and American 
ears (Wall 1994, 4). Beyond these obvious reactions to Western inter­
vention, there is a likelihood of more subtle and far-reaching conse­
quences. These include continuing ethnogenesis, further intensification 
of existing cultural identities, and the emergence of new culturally 
defined conflicts. In effect, historical processes will continue. 
The point of this discussion is not to suggest that the West (or the 
United Nations) should abstain from involvement in the rest of the 
world, merely on the possibility of stimulating unforeseen reactions. 
In an era of global travel, communication, and economic linkages this 
is obviously impossible. The point is that those who design interven­
tions in world conflicts must do so with the realization that involve­
ment by dominant nations always stimulates unanticipated reactions. 
A second implication concerns Western perceptions of cultural 
conflicts. Many in Western nations (including, unfortunately, journal­
ists) assume that cultural differences are innate, immutable, and lead 
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automatically to violence (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992: 27-28, 
Ferguson 1995b).  Both journalistic and some scholarly reporting tend 
to "explain" violence as the irrational but inevitable result of "ancient 
tribal feuds. "  It is assumed that contemporary expressions of cultural 
differentiation represent both actual history and the "natural" divi­
sions of our species. Scarcity of land or other resources, in some argu­
ments, interacts with these intrinsic divisions to generate violence (e.g., 
Homer-Dixon 1994) . 
Cultural differentiation in today's conflicts is, to the contrary, flex­
ible and shifting, and responds to history, external stimuli, and delib­
erate manipulation. Current conflicts in central Asia are a clear example, 
where new cultural identities (such as Ozbek) are emerging, stimu­
lated substantially by the involvement of external powers (Schoeberlein­
Engel 1994) . In places such as the Balkans, "ethnic entrepreneurs"11 
manipulate cultural identity for political mobilization. This manipula­
tion masks the underlying issues, sometimes deliberately. To a casual 
observer it is easy to suppose that conflicts between cultural groups 
are conflicts about culture. Often the conflicts are about relations to the 
West, about the relations of local groups to Western-style central gov­
ernments, or, as in Somalia and Liberia, are about the control of those 
governments (Ferguson 1995b ). In such struggles, appeals to culture 
raise the moral authority of the political claim and tap profound 
emotions. This is an effective strategy of political assertion, but ob­
servers should understand that the label "cultural conflict" conceals 
more than it reveals. 
If the arguments developed here have merit, the conflicts of today, 
and those of the twenty-first century, cannot be avoided or managed 
if we consider only conventional, short-term factors. The present analy­
sis suggests a complex picture, in which reactive historical processes 
may combine with scarcity, power, politics, and culture to provoke 
violence, or may operate independently of them. The implications for 
preventing violence in the next century are complex as well : nothing 
can be more difficult in the management of conflict than to know that 
intervention itself may generate further violence. No doubt many who 
work in the crisis-laden world of international relations will be reluc­
tant to accept the additional burden of gaining a historical perspec­
tive. Yet, if we accept the simple premise that problems can rarely be 
11. A term suggested by Dr. Airat Aklaev of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
Moscow. 
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solved if their causes are not understood, historical knowledge is es­
sential. Diplomats, politicians, and other international workers cannot 
hope to achieve lasting resolutions to conflicts unless they first under­
stand the importance of knowing where we are in history.12 
12.  I am pleased to express my appreciation to Drian Ferguson for stimulating my 
thinking about contemporary violence, and to Carol Raish for comments on an earlier 
draft of this chapter. 

PA R T  T H R E E  
Case Studies of Seareity 
and Mass Death 

Introduetion 
The tragic violence we have witnessed recently in Bosnia, Somalia, 
Haiti, and Rwanda have some common roots. Resource scarcity is a 
necessary precondition that apparently activates group conflict and 
transforms it into the virulent ethnonationalist violence we are seeing 
with greater frequency. It may be a precursor of genocidal incidents 
and tendencies that will only be more pronounced as resource-scarcity 
problems and population pressures continue to intensify in the com­
ing decades. If current trends continue apace, including a combination 
of environmental damage, loss of agricultural lands, dwindling fuel 
resources, and a doubling of population to between 8.5 billion and 9.5 
billion by 2025, this will lead to conditions of extreme hardship, even 
disaster, in many parts of the world. These areas, as Roger Smith, 
David Smith, and Waltraud Morales point out, are the very places 
where much of genocide since 1945 has taken place. To forestall what 
may be likely, if not inevitable, we need major paradigm shifts in 
values, psychology, politics, and economic organization. The authors 
in this final section begin to address the threat of proliferating geno­
cides and offer some possible solutions. 
197 

IO. Seareity and Genoeide 
Roger W. Smith 
Few scholars have addressed the relationships between scarcity and 
genocide, and the few who have provide sweeping accounts that dis­
tort the facts. Richard Rubenstein, for example, has made the relation­
ships between scarcity and genocide the heart of his explanation of 
genocide (Rubenstein 1978, 1983). He argues that modernization in­
herently leads to a "surplus" population, which in turn leads to at­
tempts to eliminate those who are "excess." Rationalism, which fuels 
modernization, dissolves both community and moral limits; persons 
become "resources" rather than "human beings"; efficiency becomes 
the chief value. There are, however, severe problems with his theory. 
The basic concept of a "surplus" population is never defined. More­
over, the problem of genocide mostly has not been that there are too 
many people for the resources available, but that those in power de­
cide to eliminate groups that are perceived, not as surplus, but as 
having the "wrong" characteristics-wrong religion, race, social ori­
gin, ethnicity, and so on. Yet, in Rubenstein's grammar of motives, 
there is only one motive-all behavior is reduced to economic motive. 
Such a theory, though suggestive, cannot explain any of the cases of 
genocide in the twentieth century. 
Hannah Arendt also has some striking comments about the rela­
tionships between scarcity and genocide, but they are brief and not 
developed (Arendt 1958b, 457-59) . She does not, in fact, speak of "scar­
city," but of "superfluous man." Humans are becoming "superfluous," 
and in the future, with an ever-increasing population, will become 
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even more so on an "overcrowded earth" (1958b, 457) . They are super­
fluous in the sense that they no longer have a meaningful place in 
society: many are unemployed, many are homeless, they no longer 
contribute to the functions of society. They are not individuals, but lost 
in the swell of population; they become the "masses. "  Given the pre­
vailing utilitarian outlook, such humans are useless, they have no 
meaning. Arendt thinks that the very perspective involved in utilitari­
anism-judging in use-leads us into meaninglessness, for one can 
never come to the end of the ends-means chain: what, she asks, is the 
use of use? (Arendt 1958a, 154-59) . Humans are thus viewed essen­
tially in terms of efficiency and as resources, not in any moral terms: 
as with other things that become useless, they can be cast aside. 
Without being specific, Arendt suggests that "political, social, and 
economic events" all work toward making "men superfluous" (1958b, 
459) .  She thinks that the masses understand the "temptations" that are 
embodied in their lack of purpose and place. She also thinks that the 
Nazis and Stalinists demonstrated in their "factories of annihilation" 
the "swiftest solution to the problem of over-population, of economi­
cally superfluous and socially rootless human masses" (1958b, 459). In 
Arendt's view, such a demonstration serves not only as a "warning" 
but also as an "attraction."  Her fear is that totalitarian solutions are 
not a part of the past, but may become part of the present and future. 
"Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes 
in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it 
seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a 
manner worthy of man" (1958b, 459) .  
Arendt's vision is breathtaking but it misleads. If the killing she 
expects begins, it will have as its victims, not "men," but members of 
groups who are, on noneconomic grounds, being singled out for death. 
The Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews was not, contrary to her 
view, an attempt to solve the problem of overpopulation. Her mistake 
is that of Rubenstein, but on a larger scale. 
Despite false starts, the question of the relationships between scar­
city and genocide is important, both in understanding the causes of 
genocide and in anticipating the prospects for genocide in the next 
century. If current trends continue, a combination of environmental 
degradation, loss of agricultural land, depletion of fish stocks, dwin­
dling of fuel resources, and a doubling of population to about 11 bil­
lion in the latter part of the twentieth-first century will lead to extreme 
hardship, even disaster, in many areas of the world (Homer-Dixon 
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1991, 76-116; 1994, 5-40.)  These areas, mainly in the Third World, are 
the very places where much of the genocide since 1945 has taken place 
(Fein 1993, 87) . 
The genocides that have occurred in Bangladesh, Burundi, Cam­
bodia, Indonesia, and Rwanda, however, have not been brought about 
by material scarcity. Genocide, with some exceptions to be noted later, 
has seldom been the result of material scarcity, whereas material scar­
city has often been a direct result of genocide. Nevertheless, in a world 
that in the twentieth century has displayed an unparalleled capacity 
for mass slaughter, it would be surprising if severe shortages would 
not exacerbate existing tendencies toward resolving social and politi­
cal problems through the elimination of the groups thought to consti­
tute the problem. 
This chapter attempts to clarify "scarcity"; identify the historical 
relationships between scarcity and genocide; indicate why scarcities 
could be a more decisive factor in genocide in the future; and outline 
strategies for preventing genocide, partly through controlling scarci­
ties and partly through political and institutional means. 
To point out certain plausible scenarios of genocide, to make ex­
plicit the logic of genocide, and to analyze the relationships between 
scarcity and genocide does not mean that genocide is somehow the 
inevitable result of scarcity or of any other "cause." Genocide is never 
inevitable; it is a political choice. But political choices, including geno­
cide, are affected by many different forces, internal and external, to the 
society in question. If present trends continue, scarcity will increas­
ingly be one of those forces in the not-so-distant future. 
Seareity 
"Scarcity" includes both the relative and the absolute. For those used 
to affluence and abundance, a mild reduction in goods available to 
them will be perceived as scarcity; similarly, they may feel worse off 
if other persons improve their material condition while they remain at 
their previous level (Runciman 1966) . Scarcity, in these instances, is 
not only relative but also psychological: desire is confused with need 
(Rousseau 1960, 275) . Psychological scarcity is an important facet of 
the "developmental" genocide that indigenous peoples have faced, 
and, most likely, will face. Scarcity may also be both absolute and 
material: if one lacks the necessary food and water for a certain pe­
riod, one simply dies. 
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Should one consider scarcity only in material goods, resources, or 
employment, scarcity can take at least two different forms. It is impor­
tant to highlight these distinctions, which not only indicate different 
sources of scarcity but also suggest possible solutions to conflict that 
arises, at least in part, from the effects of "scarcity. "  First, there may be 
a scarcity of resources-little usable land, few fish, forests that have 
been depleted, minerals long ago extracted from the soil. Some of 
these resources can be renewed, others are simply no longer there. 
Whether resources are renewable is itself an important dimension of 
overcoming scarcity and any role it may have in prompting murder­
ous conflict. Second, resources may be scarce because of the size of the 
population: even if all goods were distributed equally, there would 
still be generalized poverty. To overcome this kind of scarcity, either 
the material resources would have to be increased (the green revolu­
tion in agriculture, for instance) or the population would have to be 
decreased. Ominously, in the accounts of Arendt and Rubenstein, 
population reduction is procured through genocide. What are the other 
ways in which population can be reduced? Will they be tried and, if 
so, will they be effective? These are questions that we shall return to 
when we consider how the links between scarcity and genocide could 
be removed, leaving open the issue of whether they will be. 
Besides psychological scarcity and the material scarcities described, 
there is a kind of scarcity-political scarcity-that includes material 
and political deprivation. Some scholars, however, note only the re­
source deprivation and thus think of this as a third type of material 
scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1994, 9) .  
Where political scarcity exists, there may be sufficient resources to 
meet everyone's needs (though not desires), but the allocation of re­
sources favors certain groups and discriminates against other groups.  
In practice, there will often be a scarcity of resources and an expand­
ing population, and both may contribute further to policies of unequal 
distribution of goods (Homer-Dixon 1991, 109-11) .  Such situations 
frequently exist in ethnically divided (or "plural") societies and help 
drive demands for equal treatment, demands that may be met with 
repression and, if the conflict persists, with an attempt at partial or 
total genocide. 
The political deprivation consists of exclusion from power and from 
being viewed, and treated, as an inferior group. Each dimension of this 
deprivation is not only related to but also explains the material depri­
vation members of the group also experience beyond that of other groups. 
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There are psychological elements present; however, they are not 
just matters of desire but of substantial political need-to be assured 
of a stable, secure, and just place within society and the political sys­
tem. The lack of this assurance in the plural society is one of the major 
sources of genocide in the twentieth century (Kuper 1981, 57-83, 93) . 
Under conditions of material scarcity that are likely to worsen in the 
twenty-first century, such conflicts seem more likely still. But again, 
the solutions to this type of conflict are suggested by the nature of the 
scarcity. Power sharing, protection of basic rights, and equality of treat­
ment could go a long way in overcoming the difficulties otherwise 
exacerbated by deteriorating resources and expansion of population. 
Relationships between Genoeide and Scarcity: 
The Basie Patterns 
The relationships between genocide and scarcity fall into five broad 
patterns. 
1. Genocide that leads to scarcity. The scarcity is unintended but 
is the consequence of genocide, committed for any number of reasons, 
such as ideology or to remove a threat to the regime. Examples in­
clude Cambodia and Rwanda. 
2. Genocide and direct conflict over resources. Direct conflict over 
scarce resources is most likely to occur in one of three situations: migra­
tion, "development," and some instances of societal fragmentation. 
3. Genocide as "advertent omission," where the intent is to take 
advantage of a natural disaster to reduce the population of a despised 
group. Here the dominant power does not cause the fatal condition, 
such as famine or disease, but does not provide the necessary aid to 
support the afflicted group. An example that comes close would be 
Britain at the time of the Great Famine in Ireland. 
4. Genocide that takes place largely through the creation of scar­
city, most commonly by depriving the victims of food. The best mod­
ern example of this is Stalin's attempt to force collectivization of 
agriculture and to suppress nationalism in the Ukraine through the 
manmade famine of 1932-33. 
5 .  Scarcity as a contributing factor in the decision to resort to 
genocide. Here "scarcity" includes: degradation and depletion of natu­
ral resources, fewer goods per capita owing to population growth, and 
unequal resource distribution. It also includes the psychological and 
political scarcities that play a large role in the genocide of indigenous 
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peoples and minorities in plural societies. Each form of scarcity can 
contribute to the conditions that make genocide more likely: these 
include conflict over resources; population displacement and ensuing 
conflict between groups; allocation of resources along racial, religious, 
or ethnic lines, resulting in demands for autonomy or independence; 
weakening of the legitimacy of the state, followed by either revolu­
tion, an attempt at secession, or a growing authoritarianism that seeks 
to resolve social and political problems through force. New ideologies 
may also spring up with the decline of the state-these are likely to be 
formulated along lines of ethnicity, but other bases, such as religion, 
may also occur. In some instances, states may fragment into warring 
groups, with no group able to achieve dominance. Here a small-scale, 
but continuing, genocide may be acted out. 
Genocide That Leads to Scarcity 
Genocide typically produces scarcity: it creates social chaos, disrupts 
the economy, destroys the lives of hundreds of thousands, even mil­
lions, of persons who possess skills and productive abilities, whether 
in farming, manufacturing, or medicine, and diverts the perpetrators 
themselves from their role in economic life, turning them into those 
who destroy rather than produce and create. In extreme cases, such as 
that of Rwanda, economic production may cease altogether (Block 
1994, 3-8). Moreover, in many instances, disease may sweep through 
the society, facilitated in part by famine, water sources contaminated 
by the dead, and by lack of sanitation. Where the genocide occurs in 
the context of war, as in Bosnia, human habitations, production facili­
ties, and the environment itself may all suffer damage, creating addi­
tional material scarcities. 
If genocide falls most heavily upon the intended victims, the per­
petrators are not immune to the scarcities it induces. In Cambodia, for 
example, hundreds of thousands of those whom the Khmer Rouge 
tried to tum into the foundation of a peasant society died from mal­
nutrition brought about by its agricultural policies (Martin 1994, 173-
78; Becker 1986, 248-53) . Although humanitarian aid in the form of 
food and medicine was available, the Khmer Rouge would not accept 
it for ideological reasons: its vision was of a self-sufficient peasant 
society; moreover, if food was scarce, it was due to sabotage by "en­
emies of the revolution," not any failure of the revolutionary design 
itself. Similarly, in Rwanda, after the Hutu government had unleashed 
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its militias, resulting in the killing of half a million Tutsi and moderate 
Hutu within three months, its own army was driven from the country 
by an invading force of Tutsi refugees, victims of an earlier genocide 
in Rwanda. Several million Hutu thus fled into neighboring countries, 
where they were placed in squalid, disease-ridden camps; fearful of 
returning home, they eke out their existence on meager rations pro­
vided by humanitarian aid. 
Perpetrators may be so intent upon destroying a group that they 
fail to calculate the effects that their actions will have on themselves. 
Or there may be a recognition of this, but the calculus used to assess 
costs and benefits stresses ideology, revenge, or power rather than the 
material well-being of the perpetrator group. Put differently, the po­
litical economy of genocide has its own logic. 
In fact, since 1945 almost all genocides, Bosnia is the major excep­
tion, have taken place within the Third World in countries already 
impoverished; most persons in such societies, with their dense popu­
lations, fragile economies, and maldistribution of wealth, were already 
living amid scarcity. Nevertheless, genocide, except developmental 
genocide, has frequently brought the societies in which it occurs even 
closer to collapse. In one type of genocide, however, scarcity falls al­
most entirely upon the victims. In developmental genocide, the indig­
enous people's land is taken and their sources of food eliminated. The 
perpetrators, on the other hand, gain land, gold, timber, or cheap elec­
tricity from the hydroelectric projects erected on the indigenous people's 
territory. 
Scarcities that stem from genocide may be either short-term (a 
temporary shortage of food, for example) or long-lasting (where much 
of the existing housing is damaged or destroyed, as in Bosnia). In 
some cases, the damage to the economy will continue for generations: 
eighty years after the genocide of the Armenians, lands once highly 
productive lie barren in eastern Turkey. In Rwanda the basic infra­
structure (social and physical) of the country under the best of circum­
stances would take years to rebuild, but more immediate is restoring 
agricultural production, something hard to do with several million 
refugees afraid to return, and the continued threat of new wars and 
genocides as those ousted seek to return to power (Block 1994, 3-8). 
Rwanda will be almost completely dependent upon outside aid to 
overcome the impact of the genocide. At some point, however, donor 
fatigue will set in; how rapid is hard to predict, but for Somalia it took 
just a little more than a year. 
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Genocide and Direct Conflict over Resources 
There are three situations in which direct conflict over scarce resources 
is likely to occur and each of these is compatible with genocidal ac­
tions. The first is the result of migration into areas already occupied by 
other groups (Homer-Dixon 1991, 108-9) .  A well-known example is 
the Israelite exodus from Egypt, their migration into Canaan, and the 
ensuing wars over resources that the early books of the Bible invari­
ably depict as wars of extermination. Migration may itself result from 
lack of adequate resources, but more commonly in the modem world 
from persecution, war, and genocide. Direct conflict over material 
resources is also likely where resources held by indigenous peoples 
are slated for "development" (Arens 1976; Bodley 1982; Burger 1987; 
Davis 1977; Independent Commission on International Humanitarian 
Issues 1987). Here traditional uses of the land will be replaced by 
cattle, timbering, strip mining, and hydoelectic plants. To some extent, 
development will involve migration, but much of the migration will 
be of machines and corporate enterprise rather than individuals and 
groups trying to establish a home for themselves. Moreover, much of 
the scarcity perceived by those who set development into motion in­
volves a lack of abundance rather than economic hardship. 
The second form of scarcity involved is that of a maldistribution 
of resources, particularly land, within the perpetrators' territory, rather 
than a lack of resources. One of the reasons that development ap­
peals to political and economic elites is that it offers a kind of safety 
valve to release the frustrations of the landless and the impoverished 
without requiring any redistribution of resources held by the elites. 
The costs of development will be borne instead by those whose lands 
are taken. Another reason that development is subscribed to is that 
it rests upon an ideology of progress, one that views an ever-growing 
economy and a limitless supply of goods as the goal of society (Bodley 
1982, Walzer 1980, 23-53). That the encroachment on the territory of 
indigenous peoples will lead to direct conflict, the destruction of a 
people's habitat, and the eventual disappearance of such groups is 
understood by those who pursue development strategies, but they 
are prepared to accept them in the name of progress and economic 
growth. 
There are currently some 200 million indigenous peoples around 
the world, most of whom are already vulnerable to existing pressures 
for greater and more productive utilization of resources (Burger 1987, 
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11) .  Given an age of scarcity in the twenty-first century, the future of 
indigenous peoples appears to be bleak. 
The third basis for direct conflict over resources occurs when a 
state collapses, followed by fragmentation, with no group capable of 
gaining power or control (Van Creveld 1991) .  When a state fails, with 
the consequent breakdown of security for life and property, scarcity 
can be expected to increase, leading to struggle over basic resources. 
This struggle will itself lead to further scarcity. Thomas Hobbes 
(reprint 1960, 82) captures this well in his description in 1651 of a 
chaotic and violent "state of nature. "  
I n  such condition, there i s  no place for industry; because the fruit 
thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no 
navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; 
no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing, 
such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the 
earth; no account of time; no art; no letters; no society; and which is 
worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death. 
In principle, a dominant group may arise out of the fighting and 
impose a repressive order. But it is possible that various groups, differ­
ent perhaps in different areas of the former state, will sustain the low­
level conflict for many years, repeated genocidal attacks being made by 
all sides. In this event, genocide, rather than being exceptional, would 
have become part of an equilibrium of destruction. Here, "the life of 
man," as Hobbes put it (reprint 1960, 82), would truly be "poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short." In this situation, any distinction between war and 
crime and war and genocide would blur or disappear. 
Natural Disaster, Advertent Omission, and Genocide 
Ben Whitaker, in his United Nations report on the Genocide Conven­
tion (Whitaker 1985) notes that some acts of genocide may not only be 
carried out by acts of commission but also "may be achieved by con­
scious acts of advertent omission. In certain cases, calculated neglect 
or negligence may be sufficient to destroy a designated group wholly 
or partially through, for instance, famine or disease" (par. 40) .  He 
therefore recommends that the United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide be amended, adding at the 
end of Article II (which specifies what acts constitute genocide) :  "In 
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any of the above conduct, a conscious act or acts of advertent omission 
may be as culpable as an act of commission" (par. 41) .  
There seem to be two situations where genocide by omission might 
be possible: (1) where there are indigenous peoples, or other distinct 
groups, that live in relative isolation from the dominant population; 
(2) where there is a colonial relationship through which the people of 
one state control the lives of those in another society. Today these 
situations would be possible only where they could be hidden: once 
there is knowledge by the outside world that an epidemic or famine 
is decimating a particular group, it is likely that international relief 
efforts would be made. In this case, the group that wished to take 
advantage of the natural disaster would either have to yield or move 
from genocide by omission to genocide by commission. In genocide 
by commission, it would bar, for example, any relief, or adequate 
relief, to come into the afflicted areas. 
Nevertheless, if we look into the middle-to-latter part of the twenty­
first century, the increase of population and the continued loss of crop 
land, and depletion of fish stocks, will result in malnourishment in 
many countries. Should famine develop in any of these areas, and 
particularly several places at once, it seems unlikely that the rest of the 
world would provide the necessary food for more than a short period. 
In that case, genocide by omission would turn all wealthy nations into 
either perpetrators or accomplices. 
Although genocide by omission by a colonial power would seem 
to be possible, even likely, no examples of it are fully convincing. The 
British government's reaction to the Great Famine in Ireland from 
1845 to 1848, however, is suggestive of what such a case might involve 
(Edwards and Williams 1957; O'Neill 1957, 209-59; MacArthur 1957, 
263-315; Woodham-Smith 1962; Rubenstein 1983, chapter 6) .  
The Irish were a conquered people, ruled from abroad; most of the 
land was held by English landlords who rented small plots to tenants 
who were subject to eviction. Population growth in Ireland was high, 
and poverty was widespread and often pronounced. Not surprisingly, 
there were organized Irish political movements that sought the end of 
British rule. 
Most people survived on a single crop-the potato-but in 1845 a 
blight ruined much of the crop; in 1846 the crop failed almost entirely, 
and again in 1847. By the time the blight was over, the population had 
declined by some 2.5 million, almost half of the loss due to emigration 
and half to starvation and various diseases that accompanied the fam­
ine (Woodham-Smith 1962, 411-12). 
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By all accounts, except that of Charles Trevelyan who was in 
charge of relief, the British response to the famine was a disaster. It 
was driven by an ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics 
even facing mass starvation, by a disdain, if not hostility, toward the 
Irish peasants, and by an extreme parsimony. Food was exported 
from Ireland amid famine; starving men unable to pay their rents 
were driven from the land and their huts demolished; and food in 
government reserves was made available (at market prices) in only 
the western part of the country. Medical attention, facing typhus and 
other diseases, was woefully inadequate, and disease was spread 
rapidly by concentrating the destitute in workhouses (MacArthur 
1957, 263-315) .  
Despite the enormous loss of life, the British government treated 
the whole matter as a minor crisis. In all official reports, correspon­
dence, and speeches the term used to refer to the famine was "dis­
tress"  (O'Neill 1957, 259).  As late as 1848, when the enormity of the 
Irish tragedy should have been clear, Trevelyan still spoke of "local 
distress" instead of famine (O'Neill 1957, 259). 
Still, some relief was either provided or allowed, grudgingly to be 
sure, but without it many more lives would have been lost. Some food 
was made available, soup kitchens were finally opened, public em­
ployment (mainly building roads) was instituted for portions of the 
population, and others were taken into workhouses. Then, too, private 
groups, notably the Quakers, provided relief, importing food and 
operating their own soup kitchens. 
Was the British response to the Irish famine a case of genocide by 
advertent omission? Not if by "genocide" one means an attempt to 
eliminate an entire group. But the case for a partial or "managed" 
genocide, though not conclusive, cannot be easily dismissed. We know 
from Trevelyan's own words that he was grateful to "an all-wise Provi­
dence" for bringing about a sizeable reduction of the population in 
Ireland, allowing for, in his view, a better balance between population 
and resources. In October 1846 he wrote to Lord Monteagle: "This 
[problem] being altogether beyond the power of man, the cure had 
been applied by the direct stroke of an all-wise Providence in a man­
ner as unexpected and unthought of as it is likely to be effective" 
(O'Neill 1957, 257) . 
Whatever may have been the case with others involved in the 
making and implementation of British policy, the person who was at 
the center of the government's response to the Irish famine held views 
that are compatible with partial genocide by advertent omission. 
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Genocide with Scarcity as a Principal Means 
The history of genocide provides many examples of the act being 
carried out primarily through depriving the victims of food. Ancient 
warfare was synonymous with genocide, the men being killed and the 
women and children enslaved. When a walled city offered resistance, 
the perpetrators would resort to siege warfare, cutting the inhabitants 
off from fresh supplies of food and drink. Most cities would lay in 
large quantities of necessities, but sieges could go on for months. When 
supplies began to dwindle, the leaders within the city would often 
drive out their own sick, elderly, and young to conserve food for those 
capable of fighting if the walls were breached. In time, those within 
the city would starve or they would capitulate and then be killed or 
enslaved (Jonassohn 1991, 3-10). 
In other places, as with the Spanish "conquest" of Mexico, Indians 
would be forced into submission or would die by starvation when 
their supplies of food were confiscated and their crops burned. Then, 
too, the control of food in the ghettos and the camps was a calculated, 
if sometimes wavering, act by the Nazis to weaken and destroy Jews 
and others while also extracting labor from them; in the case of the 
Soviet prisoners, millions were starved to death (Browning 1992, 28--56; 
Streit 1990, 142-44). Another modem example, but one not well known, 
will be used to illustrate further the creation of scarcity as the primary 
means to genocidal ends: the Stalinist manmade famine of 1932-33 in 
Soviet Ukraine (Conquest 1986; Dolot 1985; Krawchenko 1986, 15-26; 
Mace, 1986, 1-14; Commission on the Ukrainian Famine 1988) . 
In 1932-33 the Ukraine suffered a manmade famine that led to the 
death by starvation of some five million Ukrainians, most of them the 
very peasants who had produced the grain that was confiscated from 
them (Conquest 1986, 306) .  A calculated policy to force peasants into 
collective agriculture and to crush a rising Ukrainian nationalism led, 
in two years, to the death of almost 20 percent of the population 
(Conquest 1986, 306). The means was the setting of impossibly high 
quotas for grain to be turned over to the Soviet government. When 
signs of mass death through starvation were everywhere, the Soviets 
ignored them. People were shot for taking a single ear of wheat or a 
sugar beet (Mace 1986, 7) . Borders were sealed between Russia and 
the Ukraine to prevent the starving to find food. For the few who did 
manage to travel into Russia and find food, it was seized on their 
attempt to return to the Ukraine (Conquest 1986, 327-28) .  
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James Mace summarizes some of the survivors' testimony: 
[T]hey tell us of an "entire village population swelling up from star­
vation, of the numbers of dead exceeding the capacity to bury them 
decently so that each day a dead wagon would pick up bodies which 
would then be dumped in large pits; they tell of whole villages be­
coming deserted, of literal armies of homeless children . . .  roaming 
the country in search of a way to survive and of railway stations 
literally flooded with starving peasants who had to beg lying down 
because they were too weak to stand." (Mace 1986, 8) 
Meanwhile, the Soviet response was to hold back food contained in 
state reserves in the Ukraine, continue to export grain to buy machin­
ery, reject offers of international aid on the grounds that there was no 
need for it, and ban foreign journalists from the areas affected by 
famine (Krawchenko 1986, 21;  Conquest 1986, 328) .  
In 1930 Stalin learned the uses of famine for political purposes, 
and this by accident. When he attempted to force the Kazakhs, who 
were mainly herdsmen, onto collective farms, they resisted and slaugh­
tered most of their livestock rather than tum it over to the state. As 
Mace (1986, 6-7) observes: "Rather than extend them aid, the regime 
decided to teach them a lesson by letting them starve. So many died 
that the 1939 Soviet census shows 21 .9% fewer Kazakhs in the USSR 
than there had been in 1926. But resistance among them ceased. The 
lesson was obvious. Famine could be a highly effective weapon." 
The lesson was applied with thoroughness in the Ukraine, but 
was also supplemented with executions of intellectuals and by the 
reassertion of control by Moscow. By 1934 Stalin had achieved his 
goals in the Ukraine: the peasants were defeated, and the flowering of 
Ukrainian religious and cultural life had been brought to a halt (Con­
quest 1986, 328). 
Scarcity as a Contributing Factor in Genocide 
Genocide is a calculated act rather than an explosion of passion. Once 
genocide is set in motion, unless more powerful forces from either 
within or outside the society can intervene, it runs its course. Barring 
intervention, which need not always be military intervention, the 
destruction of the "enemy" will continue until the goals of the perpe­
trators are realized. Genocide is resorted to largely because it has so 
often been successful-undeterred, not punished, later forgotten, and 
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highly effective in achieving its goals of, for example, eliminating any 
threat to the dominant group's power, creation of a homogeneous 
society, or enriching the perpetrators at the expense of groups that 
have assets that the perpetrators covet. Motives for genocide are typi­
cally mixed, but in their pure form include conquest, retribution, power, 
material gain, and, where certain ideologies are involved, a kind of 
salvation/purification that requires the total remaking of society (Smith 
1987, 23-27) .  
What is  striking about the motives for genocide is  not that mate­
rial gain has often been a factor in such destruction. Rather, it is that, 
from ancient times to the present, initiating genocide to overcome 
material scarcity, in the absolute sense of maintaining the group's 
physical existence, has rarely been a factor. There are exceptions, pre­
viously mentioned, but mostly, one will come closer to understanding 
the historical role of scarcity in genocide if one views scarcity in its 
psychological form-desire rather than need-and in its political form­
insecurity and inequality. Thus, to consider the plight of indigenous 
peoples in the twentieth century is not to focus on some kind of material 
necessity, but on the psychological and political dynamics of what has 
come to be called "development. "  
I t  i s  not only a question of  understanding the historical relation­
ships between genocide and scarcity but also of finding ways to over­
come the psychological and political scarcity that can feed genocide. 
Later we shall consider measures that can reduce scarcity, helping 
reduce the pressures that contribute to genocide. First, we consider the 
possible effects of material scarcity-declining resources and increas­
ing population-on genocide in the future. It is likely that many of the 
motives and pressures for genocide that have existed up to the present 
will continue, but there will likely be additional pressures that stem 
from material scarcities expected to characterize the twenty-first cen­
tury. What are these pressures? How do they relate to possible deci­
sions to commit genocide? And what can be done about them to lessen 
the likelihood of genocide, at least that related to the material basis of 
society? 
The possible effects of scarcity in contributing to genocide and 
other mass violence are many; similarly, circumstances in particular 
cases can vary greatly. One, thus, can neither predict every outcome 
nor indicate in full how various forms of material scarcity can contrib­
ute to genocide. What is possible, however, is to suggest certain see-
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narios, illuminate particular tendencies, and point to a logic of atrocity 
that is furthered by scarcity in societies with particular characteristics. 
For example, where the legitimacy of the state or the ruling group 
in a plural society is challenged, it is likely that the old regime will 
resort to authoritarian solutions to hold onto power. But in so doing, 
it will further alienate the minority groups that it has previously ex­
cluded from power. This effect will provoke further challenge to the 
elite's  authority, which will be met with greater force, including mas­
sacres. This is, in fact, the classic case of what leads to genocide in 
ethnically divided, plural societies (Kuper 1981, 57-83). If there is also 
the problem of material scarcity, increasing demands will be made on 
those in power. These demands, owing to lack of resources, compe­
tence, or fairness, will not be met, resulting in further erosion in the 
legitimacy of rule by the dominant elite (Homer-Dixon 1994, 25-31) .  In 
such a situation, the tendency is to crack down on those making the 
demands, but also to allocate scarce resources even more decidedly 
along ethnic lines, favoring those of the dominant group. This favor­
ing in part might be called a politics of identity, in which one favors 
one's own group, but also in part a strategy to reward those thought 
to be loyal to those in power. The result will be that in times of scar­
city, the regime will move from its usual pattern of discrimination to 
a policy that increases hardship and, at the extreme, leads to destitu­
tion. At that point, migration will take place, leading to possible vio­
lence from neighboring societies, or the destitute will, if they have the 
means, resort to counterviolence .  This violence will in turn initiate a 
new spiral of repression, beginning with massacres, which are a way 
of keeping a group in its place, and possibly ending with genocide, 
which attempts to eliminate the group itself. 
In this scenario, a type of society (plural), a type of regime (au­
thoritarian), a type of policy (unequal allocation of resources), a chal­
lenge to that policy (by the group that is viewed as inferior and 
excluded from power), and material scarcity (whatever its sources) 
come together in a fatal mix. 
Or one might look to examples of state collapse, or being on the 
verge of collapse, because of, for example, defeat in war, the persis­
tence of internal war, loss of legitimacy, or prolonged ecological crisis. 
In such cases, one possible outcome is that a new power arises, often 
buttressed with an ideology that will form the basis for a new legiti­
macy. Typically, such ideologies will create cleavages between groups 
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that belong to the society ("the people") and those that are perceived 
as either "the enemy," groups to be eliminated, or groups that are seen 
as marginal and inferior, but that can have a second-class existence 
within the society (Melson 1992, 18-19, 267-71) .  In the case of a second­
class status, we are back again to the plural society. 
Where resources are available and are distributed in ways that are 
not equal, but at least meet the needs of the suppressed group, vio­
lence might be avoided; where resources are scarce, however, the like­
lihood of confrontation and repression increases (Gurr 1985, 71) .  Those 
in power will fall back upon the ideology to determine who gets what: 
in a given case, the ideology may make the division along lines of 
class, race, religion, or ethnicity, but judging from the rise of religious 
fundamentalism and the power of ethnicity in the post-cold war era, 
religion and ethnicity seem the most likely bases of ideology in the 
age of scarcity. 
Preventing Genocide 
Those who study genocide do so to understand why such extreme 
violence takes place and why it is directed at particular groups. The 
quest to understand, however, is not only a desire to know but also to 
find ways in which that understanding can be used to prevent future 
acts of genocide. As previously mentioned, nothing is inevitable about 
genocide; nevertheless, there are certain predisposing elements and 
the likelihood of preventing genocide is enhanced if these can be 
overcome. The chapter will conclude with some reflections upon pos­
sible means of removing the links between genocide and scarcity. 
The means fall into two broad patterns. First, there is the question 
of how "scarcity" (in all the senses that have been identified) can be 
dealt with so that it does not put pressure on regimes to commit 
genocide. Second, there is the more general question of how genocide 
can be prevented, even if such pressure cannot be wholly removed. 
Reducing Scarcities 
As we have seen, "scarcity" takes three forms: psychological, political, 
and material. Let us consider each in turn. 
"Desire" and its control were central features of the work of think­
ers such as Plato, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and Durkheim. On the other 
hand, the more modern view, one that underlies ideas of progress and 
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development, is that the expansion of desire and continual efforts to 
satisfy the expectations thereby created is the principal reason for social 
existence (Walzer 1980, 23-53) . This artificial scarcity, a scarcity created 
by desire rather than need, largely drives the development projects 
that have destroyed the lives of indigenous peoples in the name of 
"progress" (Bodley 1982) . 
Given the central place that the expectation of ever-increasing ma­
terial satisfaction plays in the modem worldview, it may be impossible, 
for example, to curb the destruction of rain forests. But if there is to be 
a check on such destruction, with the resulting deaths of individuals, 
peoples, and cultures, there seem to be only two ways in which this 
could be done. The first would require a reorientation within the mod­
em worldview: instead of attempting to dominate nature, we would 
respect it and work with it, seeing ourselves as part of nature, and 
dependent upon it for our very existence. The other approach, which is 
compatible with the first, would call attention to the fact that cutting 
down rain forests is not the best use to which they can be put, in part 
because their ecosystems are extremely fragile and in part because the 
forests are the lungs of the earth. Moreover, many large-scale develop­
ment projects in indigenous areas have been failures, but failures at 
great cost in lives, money, and damage to the environment (Davis 1977, 
chapter 9). If it is not possible to still the desire to "open up" the Amazon, 
it is possible for organizations like the World Bank in making loans for 
development projects to exert much more scrutiny in the viability of 
proposed schemes and their ecological and human impact. 
Deprivation, on the other hand, is the hallmark of political scar­
city. It contains three elements: deprivation in power, material well­
being, and respect. Plural societies often display these forms of 
deprivation, prompting challenges to the structure of authority, and 
leading in turn to repression, renewed demands for equality or au­
tonomy, and, without outside intervention, genocide. In fact, the most 
frequent source of genocide in the twentieth century has been that 
which springs from the political scarcity imposed by domination and 
exclusion (Smith 1987, 25-26) . This is a question, however, of not only 
a divided society but also an authoritarian government. The widely 
held view that democratic regimes do not commit genocide, while not 
valid for the nineteenth century, is borne out by the history of geno­
cide in the twentieth century (Fein 1993, 79; Rummel 1994, chapter 1 ) .  
The conditions for averting genocide that arises in part from po­
litical scarcity are reasonably clear. First, genocide would not occur if 
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the society were homogeneous. Oddly, homogeneity is one of the goals 
of perpetrators of genocide in plural societies. Second, assuming that 
the society is divided, some form of power sharing would be neces­
sary. The precise form this would take could vary from society to 
society, but it might involve, for example, federalism, a degree of 
autonomy, or certain offices, or a percentage of offices in the military, 
bureaucracy, or parliament, being reserved for members of the previ­
ously subordinate group. Third, it would require justice in the alloca­
tion of goods. Finally, it would require some degree of acceptance of 
the minority group as persons, and the repudiation of stereotypes and 
prejudices that had served as justifications for exclusion from equal 
treatment. 
The conditions are easily stated, but societies have their own his­
tories, and their social arrangements, including political domination 
and prejudice, are not accidental, though some of them are of very 
recent origin. If one gives up on changing the existing arrangements, 
but still believes that genocide must be prevented in such societies, the 
only other solution is outside intervention. But the refusal of states to 
intervene in Rwanda both before the genocide (there was strong evi­
dence that it would take place) and after half a million persons had 
been killed does not bode well for this approach either (Adelman 
1995) .  
The third form of scarcity is, at  once, the most obvious and the 
most difficult to overcome. Material scarcity has two possible sources: 
resources are either not available or have been degraded in ways that 
make them less productive; and there may also be fewer goods per 
capita because of population expansion. The solutions to resource 
scarcity and population explosion are technical and political. Further, 
these two sources of scarcity are so entangled that it is not possible to 
solve one without the other. 
Rapid population growth in an affluent society, with a large re­
source base and fair allocation of goods, could be accommodated with 
few adverse effects on the stability of society or material satisfaction 
of individuals. But high growth rates in population tend to occur 
precisely in societies that can least afford them, those that are already 
resource scarce or that allocate resources in ways that favor some groups 
and deprive others. Given the existing strains in such societies, rapid 
population growth will lead to increased scarcity, violence, and pos­
sible genocide. The spiral of scarcity will increase both because goods 
now have to be divided among more people and because attempts to 
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increase production (especially of food and shelter) often produce severe 
ecological damage, undermining further the ability to meet material 
needs (Homer-Dixon 1994, 15-16). Fish will be taken at a rate that 
depletes their stock; forests will be denuded of their timber, with major 
consequences for erosion and silting of rivers; and, with the complex 
changes in the fragile ecosystem, there will be loss of topsoil and, in 
some cases, the ability to continue irrigation (Homer-Dixon 1991, 91-
97) . Those unable to provide for themselves will migrate to the cities, 
where they will be viewed as a burden, or they will migrate to neigh­
boring states, with prospects of either squalid refugee camps or being 
turned back by violence (Gurr 1985, 71) .  On the other hand, if great 
development projects are begun on the lands of indigenous peoples, 
these groups will likely face extinction within a few years, as their 
habitat is destroyed, retributive attacks are made upon them as they 
defend their territory, and they are brought into contact with diseases 
from the outside world. Finally, as the society struggles with the ef­
fects of a sharp increase in population, the usual cleavages in plural 
societies may reassert themselves, with a rise in authoritarianism, 
challenges to the regime, increasing repression, material rewards for 
those in the dominant group and deprivation for others, and, in the 
end, if there has been no outside intervention, a distinct possibility of 
genocide. 
Populations in the past have been reduced within a specific terri­
tory by migration, disease, famine, war, and genocide. These causes 
may operate in the future: Hannah Arendt saw genocide as the likely 
"solution" to a world overcrowed with "superfluous men"; others 
foresee a global threat from infection from emerging diseases that will 
kill off billions of people worldwide (Arendt 1958b, 457; Garrett 1994) . 
Less apocalyptic visions, however, are possible, though they are not 
without their own difficulties in implementation. High birthrates will 
tend to fall where four conditions are present: a low mortality rate; a 
relative improvement in earnings; the availability of family planning 
and birth control; and an equal status for women. 
Where there is a low mortality rate, parents do not need to pro­
duce many children to improve the odds of having one child survive 
to look after them in old age. An improvement in economic condition 
provides an incentive to limit the number of children to live better 
oneself. Family planning services and birth control provide the tech­
nical means for men and women to exercise choice. And an equal 
status for women has several effects in the number of children: it 
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usually means a later age for marriage and leads to women taking 
more control over their fertility. Where these conditions are not met, 
the surge in population will most likely continue, leading both to 
increasing impoverishment and long-term environmental damage. 
Solutions to the problems of resource scarcity are likewise diffi­
cult to implement, but some progress can be made if the size of the 
population can be stabilized. Too often, however, the response to 
growing population has been to adopt means that may offer some 
temporary relief, but lead to even more resource scarcity in the fu­
ture. Thus, fish stocks may be depleted, forests devastated, and soil 
eroded in the unending quest to provide the necessary resources to 
care for the expanding population. What is required in part is a more 
careful assessment of the long-term implications of resource utiliza­
tion. It may also be possible to use resources more efficiently. Or it 
may be necessary to reduce utilization of dwindling resources, al­
lowing the standard of living to fall . All of these solutions require 
bureaucratic and entrepreneurial competence, and many would re­
quire a high degree of social discipline. International aid in the form 
of technical assistance can also be of great help, but in the past, it too 
often has itself been hitched to programs that end up damaging the 
environment (Burger 1987, 250-56; Independent Commission on In­
ternational Humanitarian Issues 1987, 109-31) .  Finally, in some in­
stances, international aid in the form of food may be necessary on a 
long-term basis . To say that it is necessary is not, however, to say 
that it will be provided. 
Institutional and Political Means 
Scarcities exacerbate the conditions that favor genocidal choices, but 
they do so within societies already divided along racial, religious, or 
ethnic lines and governed by authoritarian regimes. We come, then, to 
the more general question of how genocide can be prevented, even if 
not all of the pressures exerted by scarcities can be removed (Kuper 
1985; 1992, 135-61; Hirsch 1995, 161-216) .  This question encompasses 
the cases in which scarcity is the result of genocide, not a source of it; 
where a perpetrator takes advantage of scarcity to commit genocide, 
but does not create the scarcity; and where the scarcity, usually fam­
ine, is deliberately created for carrying out genocide. This question, in 
other words, brings us back to the full range of cases involving vari­
ous relationships between scarcity and genocide. 
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Numerous steps can be taken to prevent genocide. A carrot-and­
stick approach might be adopted by states and international organiza­
tions to support social and political transformation in divided and 
repressive societies. Societies that are likely to resort to genocide can 
be identified and closely monitored. Early warning systems can be 
devised to forecast the likelihood of genocide, allowing governments 
and international bodies time to decide upon appropriate responses. 
Publicity and the mobilization by nongovernmental organizations of a 
human rights constituency to pressure governments to act are also 
important in this context. Efforts can be made to dry up the ready 
supply of arms that repressive governments turn against their own 
people. 
Not only must international law be strengthened, but there needs 
to be brought into being a standing, permanent tribunal to judge those 
who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
Punishment can play only a limited role in deterring genocide, but it 
would strengthen international norms against mass killing for politi­
cal ends. Also, the right of humanitarian intervention must both be 
recognized and made effective (Harff 1991, 146-53).  Individual states 
now have the ability to intervene, and the United Nations can put 
together a coalition of forces, as in Bosnia and Somalia. But far more 
effective, and most likely a precondition for preventing genocide, is a 
permanent, standing international force that can be rapidly deployed. 
What is also crucial, for it is unlikely that the other steps will be 
undertaken to any extent without it, is for states to enlarge their defi­
nition of national interest to include the prevention of genocide (Smith 
1992, 232-33). 
Conclusion 
Many, if not all, of the strategies for preventing genocide and reducing 
the scarcities-psychological, political, material- that can contribute to 
it could be effective, if implemented. The prevention of genocide, how­
ever, is less a matter of knowledge than of political will. Two related 
questions thus hang over the future: Will the states, and international 
organizations, of the world continue to be bystanders to genocide, look­
ing on and doing little? Or will a human ability to resolve political and 
social problems in a manner befitting humankind finally assert itself in 
the next century? The questions are real; the answers uncertain. The 
consequences of doing nothing, however, are not in doubt. 
I I. Posteolonial Genocide 
Scarcity, Ethnicity, and Mass Death in Rwanda 
David Norman Smith 
I 
The scale and speed of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 took the world 
by surprise. 1  Well over 500,000 people were killed in just fourteen 
weeks, capturing the horrified attention of a global audience which, 
until then, had known little or nothing about Rwanda. Soon, however, 
surprise yielded to journalistic "explanations" that reduced the com­
plexity of this startling episode to misleading cliches. The problem, we 
were told, lies with the Rwandan people, whose atavistic hatreds can­
not be contained. Primordial antagonisms, whether "tribal" or "eth­
nic," are said to be the ultimate cause of mass murder. 
The implication of this line of reasoning is that genocide, in a 
sense, is a murderous fact of life, an ineliminable danger as long as 
societies are ethnically divided. In the Rwandan case, this train of 
thought has led many people to think that the only hope for a lasting 
solution lies with forces above or outside the public: international 
lending agencies, once they learn the "policy lessons" of the genocide; 
the Rwandan state, duly reformed; and perhaps even a "return to 
colonialism," if all else fails. 
The fatal flaw in this perspective, however, is that it rests on a 
grave misreading of the causes of the genocide-and finds hope in the 
1 .  For help with this chapter I am grateful to John Nagel, Kevin Anderson, Ken 
Lohrentz, Scott Kerrihard, Isidor Wallimann, and Michael Dobkowski. 
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From Rwanda: Histoire d'un Genocide by Colette Braeckman (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1994). 
Courtesy of Fayard © 1994. 
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very forces that spurred mass death in the first place. In what follows, 
I will contend that, far from being the singular source of the ills that 
gave rise to genocide, the Rwandan people are in fact the only force 
with a realistic chance of curing those ills. Rwanda's problems-politi­
cal, military, ethnic, demographic and environmental-require popular 
solutions which existing states and markets are all too likely to oppose. 
On the eve of the 1990s, Rwanda seemed to be an "oasis" of order 
and progress in east central Africa, in striking contrast to neighboring 
Zaire, Uganda, and Burundi (Braeckman 1994, 86) . The ruling party 
had been in power uninterruptedly since 1973, and the human rights 
situation, though "less than perfect," /1 contrasted favorably" with most 
other African nations (Reyntjens 1994, 35). So much violence had 
wracked bordering nations (see map 1) that many schools, missions, 
and development agencies had sought a safe haven in Rwanda 
(Newbury 1992, 201) .  
Rwanda also seemed to be thriving economically. In 1990, though 
still relying on agriculture for nearly 40 percent of its total GDP, Rwanda 
had reduced its reliance on farming more since 1965 than any other sub­
Saharan country save Lesotho.2 This shift from agriculture is doubly 
impressive when we consider that Rwanda also sustained a high level 
of agricultural productivity. Since 1965, for example, Rwanda had en­
joyed more success than any other sub-Saharan nation in turning pas­
ture land into cropland, and in the 1970s, when the ratio of food 
production to population growth fell for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, 
Rwanda enjoyed a modest increase (Pottier 1993, 12). In the mid-1980s, 
only one other sub-Saharan nation enjoyed a faster growth rate in ag­
ricultural exports (Cleaver 1993, tables A-9, A-5), and though Rwanda 
was hardly unique in its export profile-relying mainly, like many sub­
Saharan nations, on coffee production3-its marketing system was com­
paratively so sound that growers in Za!re, Uganda, and Burundi routinely 
smuggled in coffee for sale on the world market (Newbury 1992, 201) .  
2.  In  1965 Rwanda was more dependent on peasant labor than any other sub­
Saharan country, relying on agriculture for 75 percent of its GDP. By 1990 this percent­
age had been cut in half, falling to 38 percent-the eleventh highest figure among 
thirty-four sub-Saharan nations (see Cleaver 1993, table A-2a). 
3.  World Bank research shows that coffee is by far the most widely produced 
agricultural export commodity in sub-Saharan Africa (Cleaver 1993, table A-5). Almost 
half of forty nations listed in a 1992 study specialized in coffee production (19), while 
more than 25 percent specialized in cotton production (11), and the remaining 25 per­
cent specialized in other products-cocoa, rice, and so on. 
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Though still extremely poor, Rwanda was clearly on an ascending 
curve. Once the most impoverished of the five Great Lakes nations, 
Rwanda was "the least poor" in 1990 (Reyntjens 1994, 35) . It was not 
a great surprise, then, when Rwanda became one of four African na­
tions invited to participate in the Food Strategies program of the 
European Community in the 1980s (Pottier 1993, 5), or that the World 
Bank, looking back on nearly a decade of African development, gave 
Rwanda its highest accolade, calling it an "enabling environment" for 
private production and trade (1989, 105) . Rwanda is a "successful case 
of adaptation," the World Bank concluded (Newbury 1992, 193). 
Few observers in the immediate postindependence period would 
have predicted so much optimism a quarter of a century later. Rwanda 
was very poor, very small (about the size of Vermont), and notoriously 
extreme in many ways-"extremely landlocked," with "an extremely 
high population density, an extremely high population growth, and an 
extremely low degree of urbanization" (Braun, de Haen, and Blanken 
1991,  15) .  Of almost no geopolitical significance, Rwanda was almost 
an afterthought even for its colonial conquerors. Imperial Germany, 
which ruled Rwanda from 1899 until 1916, was less interested in the 
Rwandans than in running a transcontinental railroad through 
Rwanda's hills. Even Belgium, which seized Rwanda and nearby 
Burundi during World War I, initially hoped to trade "Ruanda-Urundi" 
to Portugal for territory elsewhere in Africa. When this trade failed to 
materialize, the new Belgian rulers decided to use Rwanda as a source 
of food and labor for the Katanga copper mines in the Belgian Congo 
(now Zaire). The Congo was vast and thinly populated, with com­
paratively few resources to support its rapidly growing mining cen­
ters. Rwanda, small but dynamic, seemed ideally suited for a 
supporting role. 
Nestled east of the Congo in a fertile part of the Great Rift valley 
just below the equator, Rwanda was one of the most productive farm­
ing regions in all of Africa, rich in bananas, sorghum, and more than 
two hundred kinds of beans (Gravel 1968). This food had little export 
value, but it was perfect for Katanga. And although Rwanda as a 
breadbasket for others placed the Rwandan people at risk for famine, 
this was a risk, evidently, that the Belgians were willing to take. In the 
1920s, Rwanda therefore sent an abundance of food and thousands of 
laborers to the Congo (while others fled to greener pashires in Uganda) .  
All this changed, however, when the copper market collapsed at  the 
start of the Great Depression. Since Katanga now ceased to be a magnet 
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for food and labor, the Belgians decided to optimize their income from 
Rwanda itself. 
Accordingly, like the British in Uganda, the Belgians in 1931 brought 
coffee to Rwanda, which they forced the peasants to grow for the 
world market. The peasants, who paid taxes from the resulting in­
come, were also compelled to perform a great deal of "akazi" (forced 
labor, corvee).  Over time, as Belgian labor exactions grew increasingly 
onerous, the conditions of life in Rwanda worsened drastically, setting 
the stage for the spiral of disasters to come. 
During the Second World War the peasants were forced to work 
at redoubled speed, and even amid a long drought "they were forced 
to sell beans to European middlemen for one franc per kilo" (Newbury 
1988, 158; cf. Dorsey 1994) . Soon the combined effects of drought, 
labor corvees, and labor flight to Uganda yielded a famine of epic 
proportions, in which at least three hundred thousand people died-
10 percent of the population. 
Additional misery and tension sprang from the heightened polar­
ization of Rwandan society. Precolonial Rwanda had been divided into 
two ethnically tinged social classes, the Tutsis (warrior nobles) and a 
"Hutu" peasantry with roots in a mix of Bantu-speaking farm peoples 
who were already present when the cattle-rearing Tutsis arrived about 
five centuries ago (Newman 1995) . The key to early Rwanda is that the 
term "Hutu" refers not to a primordial ethnic group, as journalists as­
sume, but to a servile class drawn from a spectrum of peoples whose 
shared identity as "Hutus" (literally, "subjects" or "vassals") reflects 
their common subjection to the Tutsi nobles, who exploited yet also 
protected them. The Rwandan empire, which soared to prominence in 
the late precolonial period, was the joint product of both classes. When 
this empire fell to Europeans, the mutuality of Rwandan class relations 
declined sharply. The Germans and especially the Belgians recast the 
Tutsi nobility as a stratum of tax collectors and corvee labor bosses, 
whose power over the peasants rose as their obligations to them declined. 
Hostility to the Tutsis swelled as Belgian exactions increased, reach­
ing a crescendo in the 1950s. A proudly Hutu regime surged into 
power on a wave of emotion in the early 1960s, leaving thousands of 
Tutsis dead and many more in exile, the victims of a harsh Hutu 
nationalism that manifested signs of racism (for many Hutus accepted 
the Belgian myth that Tutsis are "black Caucasians," racial enemies of 
the Bantu peoples) . The cycle of violence that climaxed in Rwanda in 
1994 had begun. 
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The second act in this classical tragedy unfolded in Burundi 
(Lemarchand 1994, 1 74), where Tutsi supremacy had been left intact 
when Belgium withdrew. Fear of Hutu nationalism, however, and the 
rise of the extremist "Tutsi-Hima" wing of the ruling minority led to 
a fateful hardening of Tutsi chauvinism. In 1972 a flicker of Hutu 
insurgency served as a pretext for a "selective genocide" (Lemarchand 
and Martin 1974) . In short order, the Tutsi military killed at least a 
hundred thousand Hutus, including every actual or potential leader 
they could identify. Smaller but similar Burundian massacres that 
occurred later (most notably in 1988 and 1993) can be understood only 
in the light of this chilling precedent. 
Yet another act in this tragedy took place in strife-torn Uganda, 
where more than a million Rwandans had fled to escape famine or the 
pogroms of the 1960s. In 1981 an insurgency backed by many Rwandans 
provoked a scorched-earth campaign by the Obote government in the 
Luwero Triangle in central Uganda (Mutibwa 1992) . At least three 
hundred thousand people were killed in this campaign, including about 
sixty thousand Rwandans (Watson 1991, 11) .  
After Obote was defeated in 1986, several Tutsis assumed top 
positions in the new regime-but they, like most Rwandans, were 
disconnected in Uganda. Bias against them was rife, and memories of 
the recent slaughter were indelible. When petitions to return from 
exile were rebuffed by the Rwandan government, Tutsi-led regiments 
of the new Ugandan military reconstituted themselves as the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front. In October 1990 RPF troops entered Rwanda to over­
throw the one-party Hutu state with a "multi-party, multi-ethnic" 
regime. In 1 994, after Habyarimana and nearly a million other 
Rwandans perished in a genocidal massacre planned and led by 
Habyarimana's closest associates, the RPF did indeed come to power. 
Rwanda's "enabling environment" had turned into a vast killing 
field, and the World Bank's talk of "successful adaptation" now sounds 
like hollow rhetoric. Why? Why did social relations in Rwanda polar­
ize to this extent? What forces plunged Rwanda into this vortex of 
murder and mass death? 
As Patrick Chabal points out, it would be easy to conclude that Africa 
is simply "a continent of violence, perennially on the edge of survival" 
(1992, 179). Violence is indeed epidemic. Leaving southern Africa aside, 
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Richard Sandbrook shows that 4.5 million people died in political strife 
in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 1987-a figure vastly greater than 
in Latin America or Asia. Almost all of these deaths (nearly 4 million) 
occurred in civil wars, insurrections, and other internal conflicts (see 
table).  Since 1987 the death toll in Africa has continued to spiral, as 
Somalia, Liberia, and now Rwanda have been engulfed in deadly strife. 
The "ultimate reason," Chahal argues (1992, 189), "has more to do 
with the flaws in the construction of the post-colonial political order 
than with the inevitability of atavistic hostility."4 Is this claim accu­
rate? To what extent, we might ask, is the spiral of violence in Rwanda 
the result of flaws in the political order? And how, if at all, is ethnicity 
bound up with this disorder? 
I have argued elsewhere (Smith 1995) that ethnicity and ethnocen­
trism remain pivotal to Rwandan society, as they have been for cen-
T A B L E  
Deaths in Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1987 
Country Opponent Date Deaths 
Angola UNITA 1975-1987 213,000 
Burundi Hutu/Tutsi 1972 100,000 
Chad various 1980-1987 7,000 
Ethiopia Eritrea 1974-1987 546,000* 
Mozambique REN AMO 1981-1987 401,000* 
Nigeria Biafra 1967-1970 2,000,000 
Sudan North/South 1963-1972 500,000 
Sudan North/South 1984-1987 10,000 
Uganda various 1981-1987 102,000** 
Zaire Katanga 1960-1965 100,000 
Zimbabwe Ndebele 1983 2,000 
Total 3,981,000 
*This figure includes war-induced famine deaths. 
**This figure indicates the caution of Sandbrook's estimate, since it omits every death 
attributable to Idi Amin's regime and-if we are to belive the International Committee 
of the Red Cross-it understates the deaths in the Luwero Triangle by a factor of three 
(Watson 1991) .  
Source: Sandbrook 1993, 51 .  Reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press. 
4. Writing in 1992, before the latest Rwandan and Burundian slaughter, Chabal 
listed Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda as the sites of three of the most "dreadful" civil 
wars in recent history (189). 
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turies. Rwandan "ethnicity," however, is so mutable, so much a part 
of the discourse of genocide, and so fatally entwined with state and 
class power that it must be analyzed with extraordinary care. Briefly, 
I would argue that, in the interval from the Belgian withdrawal to the 
genocide (from 1962 to 1994), the "ethnic" division between Tutsis and 
Hutus had grown progressively less significant in real terms. Ethno­
centric feeling persisted, as the genocide proves-but the object of this 
hate was an increasingly ephemeral social construct, a memory of 
oppression more than an actual social division. The new oppressors (a 
"Hutu" ruling clique from the northwest) sought to exploit residual 
anger toward the remnants of the former oppressors to legitimate their 
own predatory rule. 
Ethnicity, in other words, increasingly served as an ideological 
counter in the period that culminated with the genocide. What, for­
merly, had been a real antagonism turned into a legitimating myth­
a myth used to justify murder. 
To grasp this point we must turn to the history of Rwandan 
ethnicity. In the earliest phase, when the Tutsi/Hutu nexus was first 
established, the division between them was more purely "ethnic" than 
in any later period. The original "Tutsis" were a mix of the Lwo­
speaking peoples who fled the western Nile to escape Dinka raiders. 
Newly settled in the Great Lakes region, these immigrants soon coa­
lesced into a stratum of cattle-breeding warriors with an ethnic profile 
very distinct from that of the Bantu-speaking farmers they soon began 
to dominate (as "Hutus"). In the next phase, however, the terms "Tutsi" 
and "Hutu" acquired a primary class connotation (Newbury 1992; 
Vidal 1985; Chretien 1985; Freedman 1979; Des Forges 1972; d'Hertefelt 
1971 ) .  Precolonial Rwanda was most fundamentally divided between 
patrons and clients, who were bound by the labor obligations that 
clients owed patrons in return for lordly protection (Newbury 1992; 
Freedman 1974; Vidal 1969; Maquet 1954, 1961).  Although the lords 
were nominally "Tutsis," this had ceased to be a strictly ethnic desig­
nation. Wealthy "Hutus," for example, who renounced "Hutuness" 
(servility) by an act of "kwihutura" were welcomed into the ranks of 
putative Tutsis. Thus, by the dawn of the colonial period, the Tutsi/ 
Hutu connection was above all a class affair. 
Ironically, at this point, the colonial rulers of Rwanda put a renewed 
ethnic spin on the old distinction. Convinced that the Tutsis were ra­
cially superior to the Hutu masses, the Germans and (after 1916) the 
Belgians not only forced Tutsi "chiefs" to coerce rising quantities of 
labor from the Hutu peasants but also justified the many privileges they 
228 David Norman Smith 
granted the Tutsis on overtly racial grounds. This racism drove a wedge 
between the Hutu masses and the newly christened Tutsi "Hamites," 
simultaneously hardening the class division between them and confer­
ring a new ethnic quality on this division. Accordingly, under Belgian 
rule, the Tutsis became objects of a passionate hatred among Hutu 
peasants, who, in turn, became objects of Tutsi disdain. A class division 
thus became what Fein (1993, 89) rightly calls an "ethnoclass" hatred. 
This hatred burst into the open during the anti-Tutsi violence that 
marked the inaugural period of Rwandan independence. However, in 
the generation that followed, the Tutsi/Hutu conflict dissipated. The 
division between the two groups diminished to the vanishing point, 
as most "Tutsis" became peasants, subject to the depredations of the 
very same "Hutu" regime that also preyed upon "Hutu" peasants. As 
the class difference evaporated, only ethnocentrism was left-an eth­
nocentrism that drew its charge from unhappy colonial-era memories 
and was nursed by predatory regimes for whom "Hutu" status was a 
claim to legitimacy (Omaar and De Waal 1994) .  
To summarize: the Tutsi/Hutu division was originally ethnic; 
subsequently class-based; acutely and simultaneously ethnic and class­
based during the colonial period; and then "ethnic" once again in the 
postcolonial period, when the Rwandan state found it expedient to 
promote Hutu chauvinism in lieu of political and economic justice. 
Should we conclude, then, that ethnicity is simply a mirage in 
Rwanda? That "Tutsi" and "Hutu" are simply empty words? I think 
not. Although the Tutsi/Hutu divide has been reinvented time and 
again, it remains very real to many Rwandans. Claudine Vidal is right, 
I think, to resist the temptation to say "that Tutsi and Hutu 'do not 
exist,' or that they are merely an 'invention' springing from ignorance 
and colonial Machiavellism" (1991, 24) . It is certainly true that modern 
Rwandan identities are "socially constructed"-yet, they have real 
consequences. For the Hutu chauvinists of the genocidal regime, Tutsi 
status was an invitation to murder. The Tutsis in Rwanda are thus 
what Vidal (echoing Sartre) calls an "objet negatif," for which "it is not 
enough to establish, from the viewpoint of truth, the mythical aspects 
of ethnicity" (1991, 24) .5 On the contrary. Ethnicity, once constructed, 
can be exploited-and it is a vain hope to imagine that pointing to its 
constructed character will deprive it of its sting. 
5. Vidal cites Sartre (1960, 344); see the English-language edition (Sartre 1976, 293-
307). By the same logic the Hutus in Burundi are equally an "objet negatif. " 
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Ethnicity, then, is a powerful force. Yet as Bayart and Chabal agree, 
other factors are at least equally influential. In Rwanda in 1994, a four­
sided struggle embroiled a predatory state, a popular opposition, a 
guerrilla army (the RPF), and international lending agencies (mainly 
the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and World Bank) . Tutsi peas­
ants were the focus of racist propaganda in this conflict and they 
suffered its consequences more horribly than anyone else, but they 
were not its raison d'etre. An authoritarian regime, caught in a vise 
between the IMF, the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), and domestic 
opposants, lashed out with cold calculation and visceral fury. Their 
plan was to stay in power by sheer coercive force, to keep a death grip 
on the means of accumulation, to rule without consent. Hutu racism 
served this party, but power and profit were its main motives. 
My thesis in this chapter is threefold: that the Rwandan genocide 
was not the "elemental outburst" that the media portrayed, but was, 
rather, meticulously staged by a state that hoped to profit from the 
fear and anger of its citizens; that the impetus for this gamble was a 
grave legitimation crisis; and that the IMF and World Bank played 
shadowy but pivotal roles in driving the state to the edge of the abyss­
and over. 
My first proposition, that the genocide was engineered by the 
state, has been massively documented (Omaar and de Waal 1994; see 
Human Rights Watch 1992, 1994a, 1994b). The evidence reveals just 
how coercive the ruling MRND was prepared to be when consent 
vanished and the IMF /RPF vise tightened.6 That this ruling party had 
lost its legitimacy-my second proposition-is the final chapter in a 
long saga. I will contend that the MRND's legitimation crisis was the 
terminus of a long process by which power in Rwanda was desacralized 
and "depatrimonialized."  A royal state, which, in the precolonial pe­
riod, staked its claim to authority on the sacredness and fatherly lib­
erality of its kings, was transformed by colonialism into a predatory 
bureaucracy, relying less on the loyalty of its subjects than on forced 
coffee cultivation for the export market. 
In the postcolonial period, after toppling the Tutsi king and nobility, 
the new rulers made a half-hearted effort to leaven their forced-labor 
agenda with neopatrimonial concessions to the peasantry (most notably 
6. MRND (Mouvement Republicain pour le Developpement et la Democratie) is 
usually pronounced "emerendi." Until falling in 1994, this party ruled Rwanda for 
nearly two decades. 
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by forming producer cooperatives) .  But the main object of these conces­
sions, to mask and rationalize the regime's predatory agenda, became 
less compelling in the 1980s, when a sudden influx of international 
loans sharply reduced the state's dependence on the world coffee mar­
ket (and thus on the peasantry). Less worried now about the loyalty of 
the coffee producers, the MRND became even more predatory than 
before. Hence, when the coffee market collapsed in 1988, it was second 
nature for the party to turn the screws on the peasants to recoup its 
losses. When the public resisted, and when the IMF /World Bank ex­
erted great pressure on the MRND to relinquish its monopoly on power, 
the party leaders felt that they had been backed into a corner. Rather 
than gracefully accepting defeat, they chose the most violent alternative 
available to them-total war on much of their own public. 
Thinly veiled as an eruption of communal violence, the genocide 
was a calculated gamble. The hope was that, by eliminating the politi­
cal opposition, the MRND could stave off the IMF / RPF juggernaut. 
The Tutsi peasantry bore the brunt of this genocide for several rea­
sons: a measure of real ethnocentrism on the part of the killers; the 
MRND's cynical and desperate wish to exploit residual ethnic hatreds, 
in a final bid for a shred of legitimacy; and the assumption that all 
Tutsis were naturally opposants. But hundreds of thousands of Hutus 
were massacred as well, mainly for political reasons. They opposed 
the regime. They exposed-and could exploit-the MRND's fatal lack 
of legitimacy. 
The Rwandan state, desacralized and depatrimonialized, could rely 
only on violence to fight its enemies. And yet even violence on the 
most appalling scale proved unavailing in the end. 
3 
Readers familiar with Africanist literature may see parallels between 
my argument and related positions-Migdal's theory of "strong states" 
dominating "weak societies" (1988), Lonsdale's thesis of the decline of 
"political accountability" (1986), Sandbrook's concern about the col­
lapse of consent (1993), Hyden's account of the crisis of "reciprocity" 
(1992), and Patton's analysis of the rise of "predatory rule" :  "As 
quasivoluntary compliance diminishes," Patton writes, "coercion in­
creases" (1992, 4) .  
My thesis is,  in fact, a variation on Goran Hyden's influential 
theme of the "uncaptured peasantry" (1980). Briefly, Hyden says that 
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although peasants may have less clout than proletarians vis-a-vis the 
state, they are far from defenseless. Since most African states rely on 
export taxes for the bulk of their revenues, they have to treat export 
producers with a degree of diplomacy. If states overtax the coffee, 
cocoa, and cotton that peasants produce for the export market, they 
risk driving them back to subsistence farming and away from export 
crops entirely. This would be tantamount to killing the goose that laid 
the golden egg. Hence, African states have good fiscal reasons to re­
tain the goodwill of their peasants. 
African history is "replete" with episodes that reveal the sound­
ness of Hyden's theory (Isaacman 1993, 239f.) .  Peasants in many places 
have uprooted crops, boiled seeds, burned harvests, or turned to the 
black market. But as many critics point out, Hyden seldom takes com­
plicating or contrary facts into account (Lemarchand 1989) .  This prac­
tice leads some scholars, like Kajsa Ekholm Friedman, to conclude that 
Hyden's theory is simply "the opposite" of the truth. In the formerly 
"Marxist-Leninist" Congo, she writes, the state "has disengaged itself 
from the people . . . .  It is not dependent upon ordinary people in any 
significant way, and it can therefore tum its back to them" (1993, 225). 
The truth of this claim vis-a-vis the Congo is not in question (see 
Mpele 1993) . It is not obvious, however, that Hyden's thesis is irrel­
evant in cases of the Congolese kind, where the peasantry seems to 
have been decisively "captured." In Rwanda, too, the state seemed 
to have captured the peasants. It was able to do this, however, only to 
the extent that the World Bank freed the MRND from its dependence 
on the market. Nearly 95 percent of all Rwandans are peasants, and 
coffee revenues are always crucial. Hence, the state can never be wholly 
deaf to peasant concerns. But the infusion of foreign aid here, as else­
where, had a liberating effect on the state. This seems to have been 
true in Congo, too, since Friedman lists "aid and foreign loans" as two 
of the state's three main income sources. 
In Uganda the parallel is even clearer. This is plain in a study by 
Stephen Bunker, whose fieldwork initially seemed to confirm the origi­
nal Hyden thesis. Before the lending boom, the Bugisu coffee coopera­
tive was clearly uncaptured: "I found, however, when I returned to 
Uganda during the summer of 1983, that [the new] regime was far less 
susceptible to local political demands than . . .  any of the previous na­
tional or colonial governments had been" (1987, 228). Instead of court­
ing coffee growers, Obote was preoccupied with foreign loans. From 
1981 to 1985 there was "a dramatic increase in external borrowing" 
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(Mugenyi 1991, 65) . Hence, although "still dependent . . .  in the long run 
on peasant crop production," Obote's "more immediate need was to 
satisfy the demands of these agencies" (Bunker 1987, 229). 
In the short run, Obote showed merciless disdain for the Ugandan 
people. He squeezed the coffee growers, and scourged the Luwero Tri­
angle. It seemed, that is, that the Obote regime was a classically "strong" 
state; backed by the IMF and World Bank, Obote was free to impose his 
will on an ever "weaker" society. The 1986 victory of the insurgency 
against Obote calls this appearance into question. Without legitimacy 
Obote could not save himself even by slaughtering three hundred thou­
sand people. In Rwanda the numbers differ but the logic is the same. 
My stress on the IMF and World Bank parallels a recent current of 
thought in IMF circles. Prefigured by Sidell (1988) and Nelson (1990), 
this current is now best represented by Jean-Dominique Lafay. Per­
turbed that "unexpected violent reactions . . .  have accompanied some 
stabilization or IMF programs," Lafay and his associates scrutinized 
data on twenty-three African nations (including Rwanda) to find cor­
relations between IMF policies and various forms of political conflict 
(Lafay, Morrisson, and Dessus 1994, 175-76) .  The results they obtained 
are sobering. 
In a model that revolves around a trio of "decision-making 
forces"-the IMF and World Bank, the state, and the public (176), 
Lafay tracks an arrow of causality that runs from the IMF /WB, acting 
through the state, to the public, whose protests evoke state reactions.7 
Often, the result is a spiral of violence. 
IMF aims are well known, Lafay says (1994, 180-81) :  cuts in "pub­
lic expenditures . . . an increase in consumer goods prices . . .  more 
rigorous monetary policy, devaluations, and cuts in public employ­
ment." However, the political effects of IMF interventions are seldom 
studied. It is often said that international lending policies are harsh 
and unpopular-but Lafay goes further to show that only one of six­
teen carefully coded IMF and World Bank interventions is even re­
motely popular. Spending cuts, rationing tax hikes, and price increases 
prompt both strikes and demonstrations, often over a long period of 
time. Wage cuts spur strikes; job cuts, devaluations, and privatizations 
spark demonstrations (1994, table 9.2) .  
7. From this point on, for ease of reading, I refer to Lafay as the author of 
the study cited below. It should be kept in mind that Morrisson and Dessus are his 
coauthors. 
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There are, in fact, so many correlations between protests and IMF I 
World Bank policies that it can hardly be denied, Lafay says, "that 
economic adjustment is a risky venture" (1994, 182) . The magnitude of 
this risk is manifest when we consider Lafay's finding that African states 
typically greet protests with violence, arrests, and measures to ban unions 
and parties, censor the media, forbid rallies, and close schools and 
universities (1994, table 9.3). Indeed, the "suppression of demonstra­
tions is much more violent than in developed countries" (1994, 183). 
The African state is so dictatorial and rigid that virtually "any conflict 
turns into a dispute over the legitimacy of the regime" (1994, 184). 
In Rwanda this had not always been true. Indeed, the political 
process that led to the genocide can be understood as a long-term 
decline in the legitimacy of a once-" sacred" state. The kings who ruled 
in the precolonial period were regarded as divine personifications of 
the highest power, imaana, which they showered upon the Rwandan 
people through royal rituals. This observance, it was believed, en­
sured the fertility of Rwandan women, cattle, and land (Coupez and 
d'Hertefelt 1964, 460; see Taylor 1992, Bonte 1991) .  The kings were also 
classically "patrimonial" figures in the Weberian sense that they main­
tained a degree of real reciprocity with the peasants and minor nobles 
in the pyramid beneath them (see, for example, Weber [1922] 1978, 
1010) .  While relying on the public to fill their granaries and feed their 
entourages, they also sought to play the role of generous "fathers of 
the people," granting favors and even opening their granaries during 
famines (Vanwalle 1982, 73; in Pottier 1986: 222-23) .  
Toward the end of the precolonial period, the balance of power 
tilted in favor of the kings, leading to a diminution of reciprocity be­
tween the monarchy and the Rwandan people (Des Forges 1972, passim). 
But the tie that bound them was not severed until the Germans and 
Belgians entered the scene. A stream of colonial decisions so weakened 
and humiliated the royal house that, by the end of the colonial era, 
royalty was no longer sacred in Rwanda. The king had been reduced to 
a spectral figure, who was relevant in the contemporary setting only as 
the greatest of the Tutsi lords. When many of the now-hated Tutsis were 
driven into exile in the early 1960s, the king went with them. State 
power in Rwanda had been radically desacralized. 
Meanwhile, the state was also undergoing "depatrimonialization." 
Reciprocity between rulers and ruled had declined drastically during 
the colonial years, as the Belgians, whose power sprang from Euro­
pean sources, effectively "captured" the Hutu peasants . A flicker of 
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hope burst into flame when Hutu nationalists came to power in the 
postcolonial era, but patrimonial relations were not restored. This 
became particularly clear during the second decade of the "Second 
Republic," which was born in a coup in 1973.  Reciprocity, it seemed, 
was not on the agenda. The state was bent on capturing the peasants 
just as thoroughly as they had been captured by the Belgians. 
In the short run, this objective was easily attained, for (until re­
cently) there has been virtually no civil society in Rwanda. Even the 
capital, Kigali, was a town of just a few thousand as late as 1970, and 
most Rwandans do not live in towns or even villages, but are dis­
persed in family farming compounds. Desperately poor, and willing, 
at first, to give the new "Hutu" regime the benefit of the doubt, the 
peasants grew increasingly unhappy. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the 
state fell precipitously, setting the stage for the decidedly post­
patrimonial conflict of the present period. To this we now turn. 
4 
The fall of the Tutsi bureaucracy profoundly changed the political 
physiognomy of Rwanda. Power now devolved upon circles of Hutu 
intellectuals (the so-called evolues), who had formed two parties in the 
1950s to press for independence. Parmehutu, a "Hutu" party with 
chauvinist impulses, drew its main support from Gitarama, in central 
Rwanda, and from the northern provinces (Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and 
Byumba). Aprosoma, a party based in the southern province of Butare, 
was multiethnic in ideology and composition. 
The regional division here is crucial. The peoples of the north­
west-the "Abakiga"-had been the last of the independent Bantu­
speaking peoples of the Great Lakes region to be annexed to Rwanda. 
They had been conquered, in fact, only in the 1920s, and they had 
never adjusted to the foreign idea that they were "Hutu" pawns in a 
Belgo-Tutsi chess match. Indeed, as late as the 1970s, many Kigans still 
considered it an insult to be called a Hutu (Freedman 1979) .  Neverthe­
less, in the first decade of independence, avowedly "Hutu" evolues 
from Gitarama (where Tutsi/Hutu relations had prevailed for centu­
ries) joined with anti-Tutsi forces from the Abakigan northwest to forge 
a common "Hutu" front. 
Parmehutu emerged as the leading force in independent Rwanda 
after a quasi-revolutionary initial phase in which peasant anger, har­
nessed to the ends of anti-Tutsi nationalism, drove most wealthy Tutsis 
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into exile (while many Tutsi peasants stayed in Rwanda, eking out a 
precarious, almost rightless existence in a setting where everyone was 
assigned an official ethnic identity, and where most privileges were 
reserved for "Hutus") .  Without reviving forced labor, the new regime 
nevertheless soon proved to be a worthy heir to the Tutsi bureaucracy. 
As early as 1965 Parmehutu became the nucleus of a one-party state, 
and by the late 1960s the "Gitaramistes" in the party had elbowed 
aside the Abakigan northerners. The inner circle of politicians from 
Gitarama (grouped around the party leader, Gregoire Kayibanda) soon 
emerged as a noblesse d'etat, bent on self-enrichment through the me­
dium of the state. 
The main instrument of this quest was the state-run marketing 
system TRAFIPRO, which channeled export profits to Gitaramiste leaders 
and businessmen. "The economic power of TRAFIPRO was much feared 
in the northern prefectures. Controlling 27 shops nationwide and 70 
buying-up points for coffee (in 1966) TRAFIPRO was accused by influen-
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tial Northerners of running a monopoly that strangled other forms of 
economic enterprise, especially in the North" (Pottier 1993, 11; see 
Reyntjens 1994, 511f) .  
The leading northern politicians were incensed not only because 
they themselves were left out in the cold but also because they saw the 
Kayibanda regime as an enemy of traditional Abakigan property rela­
tions. Unlike the Gitaramistes, for whom the regime itself was the 
locus classicus of predatory accumulation, the northerners wished to 
put the state at the service of the abakonde, a stratum of Kigan land­
owners whose wealth and power sprang from ubukonde clientship.8 
Although ubukonde closely resembled hated forms of Tutsi land tenure 
that were now banned, it was protected by the Gitaramiste regime as 
a "Hutu" institution. Hence, when Jim Freedman carried out field­
work in the north in 1971, he found a way of life very much like the 
one described in the ethnohistorical records. In particular, "ideas about 
how social units settle on the land and the principles by which these 
social units identify themselves, form and fissure, seemed to remain in 
principle very much the same" (1974, 42) . When Freedman returned 
six years later, he found that the situation had greatly changed. The 
source of this change was the coup of 1973.  
The coup leader, Juvenal Habyarimana, was a military commander 
from the northwestern province of Gisenyi whose wife belonged to a 
powerful abakonde family. In June, Kayibanda evidently crossed a fatal 
line when he announced a new bureau, ONACO, which assumed state 
control over private commerce. For property owners, this may well 
have been the last straw. In early July, Habyarimana seized power and 
"suspended" ONACO, which his regime vilified as "communist" 
(Reyntjens 1985, 505-6).  
Quickly showing that he was no populist, Habyarimana took the 
bold step of reviving corvee labor in 1975. Under the aegis of a system 
called umuganda, all adults were required to participate in labor teams 
every Saturday under state direction; the penalty for refusal was im­
prisonment (Omaar and de Waal 1994, 16) .9 In other respects, too, 
8. Ubukonde was also common in the southwestern region of Kinyaga, which, like 
Kiga, was incorporated into imperial Rwanda at a very late date. See Newbury 1988, 
passim. 
9 .  The reactionary daring of this step can be gauged by the fact that travail-corvee 
had been expressly singled out in the revolutionary 1957 "Manifesto of the Bahutu" as 
a practice "no longer adapted to the situation and psychology of today" (see Newbury 
1988, 192). No other single feature of Belgo-Tutsi rule had been more hated. 
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Habyarimana "greatly intensified" the process of "centralizing and 
reinforcing the postcolonial state" (Newbury 1992, 198). 
The new ruling party, the MRND, was declared the "party of the 
Rwandan people," and the party slogan, "responsible democracy," was 
explained in classically Orwellian terms by a spokesman as "the free 
expression of ideas on condition that they are seen as useful to the 
collectivity" (Mfizi 1983, 61; cited by Newbury 1992, 198). 
The undisguised class and nordiste biases of the new regime gave 
rise to concentric circles of winners and losers. Standing at the very 
heart of the regime was an inner circle known as the Akazu, "the little 
hut," which consisted of Habyarimana's intimates, many of whom were 
Bushiru from Rambura in Gisenyi (Reyntjens 1994, 276). Among the key 
figures in this group were Habyarimana's wife, Agathe; three of her 
brothers (Seraphin Rwabukumba, former head of the national bank and 
director of the Centrale, which enjoyed a near monopoly on food im­
ports; Protais Zigiramyirazo, former prefect of Ruhengeri; and Elie 
Sagatwa, Habyarimana's secretary); and the former defense minister 
Theoneste Bagosora, who is widely viewed as the architect of the geno­
cide (Omaar and de Waal 1994, 94-105; Braeckman 1994, 104). 
Guarding the inner circle was the elite Presidential Guard, "ninety 
percent of whom," a former finance minister says, "are from Habyari­
mana' s area, practically from his hill" (interviewed by Omaar and de 
Waal 1994, 91) .  
Many other northerners (politicians, landlords, and merchants) 
orbited the Akazu. So wealthy did this stratum grow that Vidal speaks 
ironically of a "fourth ethnicity" in Rwanda-the governing rich, de­
fined by their opposition to the peasantry (1991, 88, cited by Reyntgens 
1994, 223). "Those in government," Omaar and de Waal conclude, 
"had a license to print money" (1994, 21) .  
Habyarimana professed to speak for all Rwandans, but it  was self­
evident, a former ambassador reports, that "in reality he was only 
interested in the Bakiga people . . .  especially those from Gisenyi" (in­
terviewed by Omaar and de Waal 1994, 40). Gitarama and Kibuye, 
with 20 percent of the population, received just 1 percent of rural 
investments (excluding donor funds), while Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kigali, 
and Cyangugu shared almost 90 percent of the total (Guiachaoua 1989a, 
173; see Newbury 1992, 203) .  Analogous disparities were plain else­
where (Reyntjens 1994, 33). 
In a book finished less than two months before the genocide, 
Reyntjens reported that the Tutsi/Hutu conflict had been "surpassed 
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by a regional conflict" (1994, 34) . The north, prospering at the expense 
of the south, made a mockery of the old rhetoric of "Hutu" unity. Yet, 
even the north was not free of conflict and class division. When Freed­
man returned to Kiga in 1977, he found that ubukonde, torn from its 
moorings by an influx of money, had given rise to a sharply divided 
society. For the Abakiga poor, the "devil word is amataranga" -money 
(1979, 15). The landowners had capitalized on the new money economy 
to lure peasants into debt, a process leading to the "concentration of 
land holdings in the hands of a few" (1979, 3; cf. Pottier 1993, 15). An 
abyss had opened up between the wealthy and the land-poor, the 
abakene, many of whom could no longer support families. 
Elsewhere conditions were equally desperate. A 1984 study showed 
that 42.9 percent of the land was controlled by 16.4 percent of the 
families (Reyntjens 1994, 223) .  Average land holdings shrank (Pottier 
1993, 12), landlessness became widespread (Jazairy, Mohiuddin, and 
Pannucio 1992, 50), and peasant incomes fell to levels of "pauperi­
zation" well beyond "what is acceptable" (Bezy 1990, 58, cited by 
Newbury 1992, 203). Overall, Newbury says, Habyarimana's Rwanda 
revealed "a growing gap between rich and poor as well as a more 
vigorous assertion of class interests by those in power" (1992, 203). 
When the IMF, the RPF and a democratic opposition put this preda­
tory system in question, the Akazu decided to take action. 
5 
"The old is dying and the new cannot be born," Antonio Gramsci once 
wrote, musing over the miscarriage of capitalism in southern Italy. "In 
this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." 
For Rwanda and the many African nations that share its political 
and economic profile (Sandbrook 1993; Bayart 1993), the twentieth 
century has been a time of plague and locusts. The old precapitalist 
ways were irrevocably destroyed, and yet the capitalist millennium 
never arrived. Corvee labor and coffee exports broke an empire but 
did not offer emancipation. A multiclass and multiethnic mosaic be­
came a deadly dialectic. 
Is there a solution? Is there a path forward for Rwanda and Africa? 
The conventional wisdom is that Rwanda has been sabotaged by 
its own irrepressible past. Primitive hatreds, pulsing beneath the ve­
neer of civilization, have been reawakened. The solution, hence, can 
only lie outside Rwanda. This is the apparent rationale for a proposal, 
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in Foreign Affairs, for a new colonialism: "If anybody is competent to 
deal sympathetically with these countries, the Europeans are" (Pfaff 
1995, 5) . 10 This proposal is, at least, imaginative. 
A second, equally imaginative way to blame the Rwandan people 
for the cycle of violence is to focus, not on their "indelible hatreds," 
but on their soaring birthrate. Population pressure is surely a grave 
problem for the Rwandan people, yet it is wrong to say, in neo­
Malthusian tones, that violence is a simple reflex of "excess" popula­
tion density. And it is mistaken to imagine that paternalistic birth 
control campaigns, or anything short of genuine progress in the wel­
fare of Rwandan families, will permanently ease population pressures. 
This becomes quite clear when we review the demographic facts. 
The gravity of the population crisis in Rwanda is plain. Since the 
turn of the century, the population has risen nearly ninefold, from 
about a million when the Germans arrived (Des Forges 1986, 313) to 
three million at the start of the 1943-44 famine (Omaar and de Waal, 
14) to a pregenocide total of close to nine million. The Rwandan birth­
rate, meanwhile, is extraordinarily high, whether measured by African 
or by global standards. Of all sub-Saharan African countries, Rwanda 
has the highest total fertility rate-8.3 children per woman.11 In 1985 
each hectare of land supported 5.5 "adult-equivalent persons," yield­
ing a population density seven times greater, for example, than that of 
Uganda (Braun, de Haen, and Blanken 1991, 12). And pregenocide 
projections showed that this total would double, at least, by 2005. 
Considering how often Rwanda has been afflicted by famine, it is 
plain that concerns about population pressure are definitely warranted. 
But why exactly is this so? 
Isidor Wallimann goes straight to the heart of the matter when he 
observes that "the more vulnerable people become economically . . .  the 
10. Equal amnesia, if less hope, was revealed by a former British ambassador, who 
lamented that Belgian charity had failed, alas, to pull up "Rwanda's bloody roots" long 
ago. It is "chastening," he says, to think that "bringing Rwanda peacefully to indepen­
dence as a democratic society [may have been] beyond human ingenuity and states­
manship" (New York Times, Murray 1994, A-19). Enlightened opinion, in other words, is 
divided about the likelihood that well-meaning Belgians can solve Rwanda's problems. 
11 . The total fertility rate, Kevin Cleaver explains (1993, table A-1), "is the average 
number of children who would be born alive to a woman . . .  during her lifetime if she 
were to pass through her childbearing years confirming [sic] to the age-specific fertility 
rates of a given year." No other sub-Saharan nation has a TFR above 8.0, and only three 
exceed 7.0. Burundi is one step removed at 6.8. 
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more they are inclined to maintain birth rates that enhance population 
growth" (1994, 45) . Far from being "irrational," this is an illustration 
of the kind of peasant rationality that Alexander Chayanov clarified 
long ago. In a peasant economy-where, as Freedman notes, "birth is 
nearly the only form of labor recruitment" (1984, 76)-prosperity and 
progeny are practically synonymous. 
This comes as no surprise to Rwandans, for whom fertility has 
long been a veritable obsession (Taylor 1992) . Indeed, the very idea of 
well-being is tied to female fertility in the Rwandan language: "the 
verb 'to be fertile,' for a woman, is most accurately rendered by the 
verb which describes a general state of well being. This is kwera," a 
term that (with an implication of purification or "whitening") desig­
nates "good fortune in the reproduction of children, animals, and the 
productivity of fields" (Freedman 1974, 144, 147) . The customary term 
for a home, meanwhile, is urugo, which also means a pregnant body. 
And the circular outline of a home under construction "is explicitly 
identified with the womb" (Freedman 1974, 136, 85) . 
It is hence no wonder that, in Rwanda, prosperity and progeny 
are quite literally synonymous. "Poverty and existence without a 
family . . .  are rendered by the same Rwandan noun: ubukene" (Freed­
man 1979, 6) .  
Are the peasants wrong to make this connection? Not at all. Soar­
ing birthrates are undoubtedly a danger in the long run, but in the 
short run, for each family, children are still the most precious of re­
sources. "Contrary to [our] study hypothesis," Braun and others re­
ported in 1991, "an increased household size is found in this sample 
in northwest Rwanda to be positively related to nutritional improve­
ment and significantly so for the long-term" (94) . The solution to the 
population problem in Rwanda, then, lies not in isolated measures to 
curb birthrates, but in efforts to raise living standards. Not until chil­
dren cease to be an economic necessity will birthrates stabilize. 
The prospect of raising living standards, meanwhile, is far from 
hopeless. In 1990, though the Rwandan population was far greater 
than it had been during the colonial era, "hunger was less pervasive" 
(Omaar and de Waal 1994, 17) .  And although the Habyarimana regime 
cynically used the rhetoric of "overpopulation" to keep Rwandan exiles 
in Uganda, the data suggest that, as crowded as Rwanda has been, the 
saturation point has not yet been reached. Most nations in Asia "have 
to sustain populations which are infinitely larger in absolute and rela­
tive terms than they are anywhere on the African continent," as Chahal 
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observes.  "Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Africa is not 
overpopulated in the sense in which these Asian countries are" (1992, 
184). 
Braun, de Haen, and Blanken report "the interesting finding . . .  that 
increased land scarcity [in Rwanda] can still be substantially compen­
sated for by intensification of labor and capital input per unit of land" 
(1991, 12).  Scarcity in Rwanda is not, it appears, primarily a result of 
insuperable environmental barriers, but of policy limitations. Pottier 
(1993, 1986), for example, reports that, besides forcing the peasants to 
devote scarce time and land to badly paid coffee production, 
Habyarimana's state imposed restrictions on cultivation that kept 
subsistence production well below optimum levels. And by forcing 
farmers to specialize in particular crops, the state created a situation 
of artificial scarcity in which it profited by selling farmers staples that 
it prevented them from producing. 
The solution, plainly, is to abolish forced labor, establish demo­
cratic control over coffee production (and revenues), improve farming 
methods and technology while encouraging cooperative production 
and distribution. 
This is not, unfortunately, the path taken by the IMF and World 
Bank. It was, in fact, precisely Habyarimana's success in organizing 
forced labor that first attracted the attention of international lenders in 
the 1970s (Pottier 1993, 5) .  This remained true thereafter: "In the eyes 
of the U.S. government and other donors, Rwanda before the [geno­
cide] was a model of development efficiency. Every Rwandan citizen 
had to participate in collective labor on Saturdays. 
The system was harsh but effective-roads were built, trees planted. 
During the 1980s, the U.S. provided the Rwandan government with 
significant development aid" (Hilsum 1994, 16; see World Bank 1989, 
58). 
Other donors were also impressed, and many were generous. From 
1980 to 1986, Rwanda received at least $200 million in new aid commit­
ments every year except one. In 1987 the total soared to $340 million. 
The result, as Catharine Newbury observed in 1992, is that "Rwanda 
depends, to an extraordinary degree, on foreign assistance" (199). 
This made the Habyarimana regime all the more vulnerable when 
the coffee market collapsed in 1988 and export earnings fell 50 percent 
by 1991 (Chossudovsky 1995) . Rwanda was compelled to seek assis­
tance from the IMF for the first time, agreeing to a Structural Adjust­
ment Program with stringent "conditionalities."  This was a very 
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inauspicious time to start a SAP, since the IMF had just decided to 
demand rigorous compliance with far stricter requirements. And the 
collapse of the Soviet Union gave the IMF a freer hand to push for the 
decentralization of states that blocked the free action of the market. 
Authoritarian allies of the West were no longer automatically exempt 
from the pressure to "democratize"; and the IMF, which had been 
preaching the gospel of laissez faire since the early Reagan/Thatcher 
years, began to push Rwanda as hard as anyone (Omaar and de Waal 
1994; Chossudovsky 1995) . 
The Habyarimana regime was soon in great difficulty. In October 
1990, the RPF invaded from Uganda. The early invasion was re­
pulsed (with French help), but the RPF and its battle-tested leaders 
remained dangerous . On the domestic front, after reluctantly bowing 
to Western pressure to begin a process that would lead to full 
"multipartyism" in a few years, the Habyarimana forces witnessed a 
proliferation of opposant  parties and papers. Old Gitaramiste forces 
sprang from the woodwork, to be joined by a plethora of others, 
including, for example, the Parti des ecologistes, the Rassemblement 
travailliste pour la democratie, the Mouvement des femmes et du 
baspeuple (Reyntjens 1994, 135) . In 1992, suffering the consequences 
of the coffee crisis doubly and trebly as the state intensified its 
exactions-and refusing to be wholly "captured"-peasants uprooted 
three hundred thousand coffee trees (Chossudovsky 1995) . This was 
an act of defiance and desperation, and strictly illegal (Pottier and 
Nkundabashaka 1991, 151 ) .  
In 1993, after further fighting with the RPF and increased pressure 
from the IMF and its allies, Habyarimana signed the Arusha Accords, 
committing the regime to carry reform through to completion. This 
apparently convinced the Akazu extremists (organized as "Network 
Zero") that they would have to fight the RPF and the democratization 
of Rwanda with or without Habyarimana. Bagosora, on leaving the 
Arusha meetings, told colleagues that he was going home "to prepare 
the Apocalypse" (Omaar and de Waal 1994, 79) .  Death squads, thou­
sands strong, had been in training since the early 1990s. Open threats 
of genocide became common, and it was well known that opposition­
ists were in danger. Many were assassinated. 
The signal for the start of the genocide was Habyarimana' s death 
in a plane crash on April 6, 1994. In the ensuing days the regime's 
death squads, aided by the military, fanned across Rwanda, killing as 
many actual and potential oppositionists as possible, many of whom 
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had been marked for death ahead of time. Peasants on many hills and 
in many prefectures were bribed, coerced, and cajoled to participate in 
the slaughter; many did, and many did not. 
In barely three months, a shower of death rained on the Rwandan 
people, leaving as many as 750,000 dead (Omaar and de Waal 1995) . 
The genocide came to an abrupt halt in July, when the RPF captured 
Kigali. Since then the situation has remained pregnant with danger. 
Burundi is profoundly volatile, and the remnants of the genocidal 
Akazu regime dominated the refugee camps in Zaire until the camps 
dissolved in late 1996. The cycle of conflict and mass death, in other 
words, is not necessarily at an end. Nor is concord truly likely until 
the underlying factors that promote conflict are resolved. 
As long as Rwanda remains at the mercy of the world market, it 
is always in danger of reconstituting forced-labor. Tellingly, the geno­
cidal death squads were known as interahamwe-a name formerly 
reserved for the teams organized to perform corvee labor. And the 
slang term for murder itself is "work" (Omaar and de Waal 1994, 70) . 
The distance from forced labor to forced murder is evidently not as 
great as it might seem. And whenever power rests with a forced-labor 
state, there is a prospect of resistance-greeted, in normal cases, by 
repression. 
In late 1994 the Rwandan human rights activist Monique Mu­
jawamariya was asked, "What happened in your country?" "The 
people," she said, "revolted against a well-armed dictatorial regime 
and they are paying a high price for their attempt to install democ­
racy . . . . The dictator's clan knew that, as a result of international 
pressure and the mobilization of the people, it would have to share 
power. People had massively joined opposition parties; this threw the 
regime into a fever. So it decided to crush the moderate opposition, to 
eliminate the intellectuals, to kill everybody who could have laid claim 
to power. It is a revolution, within which a genocide has taken place" 
(Saint-Jean 1994, 13). 
The comparative calm in the first year after the genocide gives us 
reason to hope that new episodes of mass death can be avoided. But 
as long as Rwanda remains an orphan in the world economy, with few 
resources and fewer genuine friends, conflict will remain a permanent 
danger. Western banks and governments may express their "concern."  
But "it i s  one thing," as  David Keen reminds us, "to condemn vio­
lence; it is another, and more useful, exercise to sponsor a pattern of 
development that makes violence less likely" (1994, 445). 
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Only the Rwandan people, and others who share their plight, can 
take the steps needed to avert mass death in the future. Unless this 
happens, Rwanda will likely remain adrift in the postcolonial twilight. 
Wandering between two worlds, 
one dead, 
The other powerless to be bom.12 
Powerless to be born? Only time will tell. 
12. Matthew Arnold, "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" 
12. Intrastate Conflict and 
Sustainable Development 
Lessons from Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti 
Waltraud queiser Morales 
The Seareity Connection 
A community, alas, cannot be built on the unrelenting degradation of its 
inhabitants. 
-Gerald Early 
"Super Fly Meets Our Daily Bread" 
Theoretical and philosophical literature on social revolution and soci­
etal instability have long isolated the central role of scarcity in provok­
ing violence. Marxian and neo-Marxian theories of class struggle have 
emphasized the effects of oppression, exploitation, and emiseration of 
a subservient economic class. Liberal and neoliberal explanations have 
focused on the individual's political and economic deprivations and 
personal injustice.  On the other hand, recent nationalist perspectives 
suggest a more ambivalent and secondary role for economic scarcity 
as a facilitator of violence. Culturalist theories, as many nationalist 
ones often are, point to social fragmentation, or what some have termed 
"balkanization," as the major cause of conflict within states. However, 
this explanation begs the question of why and when balkanization trig­
gers violence. Ironically, despite, or perhaps because of, contemporary 
attention to multiculturalism and diversity, internal violence may be 
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facilitated by a postmodern climate. Questions such as what kind of 
diversity, how much diversity, and the historical timing and political 
and socioeconomic context of diversity have become extremely signifi­
cant. The global spread of democratization, and the consequent changes 
in ethos, values, and sociopolitical structures, may be instrumental in 
the spread of ethnic and nationalistic violence. And radical and rapid 
shifts in the structure of minority-majority relations, especially under 
conditions of actual or perceived scarcity and deprivation, may en­
courage intrastate conflict and political instability.1 
Scarcity-induced ethnic or racial violence is everywhere, not just 
in the Balkans, Somalia, or Haiti, but even in the United States. No 
society is immune. Explanations of increased violence in Florida draw 
upon the classic 1949 study of the political scientist, V. 0. Key, Jr. The 
theory suggests that Florida's historical fragmentation impeded the 
development of a workable political structure, and that its physical 
geography created "a significant impediment to unity. " Recent waves 
of emigration from the Caribbean and Central America have further 
exacerbated "the state's internal divisions" (Colburn 1993, G-3). Root­
lessness and the absence of a shared culture and a sense of shared 
community are additional important causes of ethnic and racial con­
flict. These factors are further aggravated by the heightened political 
opportunism of political leaders, especially those who may manipu­
late xenophobia and the fear of outsiders. Without enlightened lead­
ership Florida's people, not unlike others around the world, will 
continue to succumb "to the social and geographic pressures that iso­
late them," leaving few to believe in "a common heritage and similar 
needs" (Colburn 1993, G-3). 
An important causal element, often only implied in these theories 
but which facilitates racial, ethnic, and nationalistic intrastate conflict, 
is economic scarcity. Although theoretical explanations may ignore or 
downplay the critical ingredient of scarcity-whether actual or per­
ceived, or primarily economic, sociocultural, or a mixture of these­
scarcity activates "balkanization."  Both the "objective" and "subjective" 
increase in socioeconomic competition for scarce state resources is an 
1. Intrastate conflict is defined as violence between or among one or more 
advantaged or disadvantaged minority or majority groups, and one or more of these 
groups and the political/juridical state, to gain either a greater share of limited re­
sources or control or autonomy or both over the territorial state. Violence may take on 
ethnonationalist, indigenist, or religious dynamics. 
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essential (but not necessarily sufficient) precondition of intrastate vio­
lence. Scarcity establishes, triggers, and heightens the "us" versus 
"them" polarization of society. Therefore, explanations close to home 
isolate many of the same structural and cultural preconditions of in­
trastate conflict found in our three case studies and other similar cases 
around the world. The central argument of my analysis does not sup­
pose that socioeconomic scarcity represents a unicausal explanation 
for global wars, ethnic violence and civil unrest within states (or be­
tween and among states) . However, it does assert that the important 
conditioning and motivating role of scarcity may be obscured by over­
emphasis on cultural, ethnic, and nationality factors alone.2 Analysis 
of intrastate violence in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti will attempt to 
support this interpretation. 
Theories of Intrastate ConOiet 
Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfa­
vored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. 
-William H. Chafe 
"Providing Guarantees of Equal Opportunity" 
Contemporary theories of intrastate conflict reinterpret both classical 
and contemporary theories of revolution and civil violence; indeed, 
the well-known social scientist Harry Eckstein presciently termed such 
conflict "internal war," and recently Ted Robert Gurr 's theory of "why 
men rebel" has been revisited as "why minorities rebel" (Morales 1973-
74; Eckstein 1964; Gurr 1970, 1993a, 1993b, 14: 161-201;  Johnson 1966; 
Davies 1971; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979) .  Moreover, the convergence of 
theories of revolution, war, and violence with both classical and cur­
rent studies of nationalism, ethnonationalism, and racial and indig­
enous resurgences has revitalized interdisciplinary theoretical and 
policy investigations (Wickham-Crowley 1991; Kellas 1991; Smith 1986; 
Shaw 1987, 31 :  5-31;  Gurr 1993b) .  Nor does the substantive overlap 
2. For example, Colombia has long been characterized as one of the world's most 
violent countries and as the "murder capital of the world" with eight times the murder 
rate of the United States. Sociologists have blamed this violence on a history of violence, 
proliferation of weapons, weak law enforcement and adjudication, drug wars, and 
decades of guerrilla warfare. However, a triggering factor or essential precondition 
would seem to be the economic inequality and scarcity endemic to the society. For 
recent statistics see the Orlando Sentinel (1995, A-14). 
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and theoretical cross-fertilization stop here. The precarious narrow line 
between internal and external conditions of strife, or domestic and 
international dimensions of conflict, has also been compromised. 
Nationalism and ethnopolitics pose major domestic as well as interna­
tional and global challenges (Midlarsky 1992; Gurr 1990, 1 :  82-98) . 
With this convergence in mind, Joseph Rothschild's term, "politicized 
ethnicity," includes "all types of nationalism in international relations" 
and explains both intrastate and interstate conflict (quoted in Kellas 
1991, 147) . Rothschild asserts that "politicised ethnicity has become 
the most keen and potent edge of intrastate and interstate conflict, 
displacing class and ideological conflict, and it asserts itself today, 
dialectically, as the leading legitimator or delegitimating challenger of 
political authority" (quoted in Kellas 1991, 147; Rothschild 1981 ) .  In­
deed, "real world" conflict management and many academic discplines 
(comparative politics, comparative sociology, and international relations) 
are in turmoil because of extensive cross-penetration of internal and 
external violence in the post-cold war period. Decision makers have 
had to reassess their bag of "how-to's" and scholars their conceptual 
orthodoxies. Although the war in Bosnia is an example of the unprec­
edented substantive and theoretical overlap that confounds the condi­
tions of war and revolution, and interstate and intrastate conflict, the 
multilateral interventions and peacekeeping operations in Somalia and 
Haiti also demonstrate significant deterioration in state boundaries, 
authority, and sovereignty. For this reason, despite the emphasis on 
intrastate conflict in this chapter, the potential for a violent spillover into 
the international arena remains a constant threat, activated by many of 
the same forces that trigger outbreaks of internal strife. 
James Kellas, in his impressive effort to provide an "integrated 
theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity," has also provided 
useful theoretical directions for a theory of intrastate conflict. Not unlike 
the more quantitative recent study of Ted Gurr on ethnic violence and 
minorities, Kellas meticulously differentiates among nationalism, eth­
nic politics, and racism (1991; Gurr 1993a).3 Common to both theoreti-
3. Although all of these careful distinctions (nation, nationalism, ethnic group, 
race, racism, ethnocentrism, and ethnicity) are not critical here, for my purposes, Kellas 
defines a nation as "a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound 
together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry," and share both objective 
(territory, language, religion) and subjective characteristics (awareness and affection for 
one's nationality). He further distinguishes among an "ethnic nation," composed of one 
ethnic group; a "social nation," or several ethnic groups in one nation; and an "official 
Intrastate Conflict and Development 249 
cal approaches is the significance of the timing, place, and context of 
minority-group relations with a dominant majority, and the mecha­
nisms (economic, social, psychological, and cultural) that create or 
intensify ingroup (the common ethnic group, nation, or race) and 
outgroup perceptions, attitudes, and behavior (peaceful and violent) . 
Both theorists agree that an important indicator of the potential for 
intrastate conflict is whether the ethnic, racial, or nationality groups 
aspire to revolutionary political or territorial claims or both. 
In his theory Kellas differentiates between necessary and suffi­
cient conditions-an important logical distinction, which is also useful 
to explain internal violence. Regarding the current debate on the role 
of human nature and sociobiology in group conflict, Kellas concludes 
that "identity and behaviour are partly genetic, but they are also shaped 
by context and choice. In politics they are resources waiting to be used 
by politicians and their supporters for their own advantage. Human 
nature provides the 'necessary' condition for ethnocentric behavior, 
but politics converts this into the 'sufficient conditions' for national­
ism" (1991, 19) .  Although Gurr also emphasizes the political dimen­
sion, his concept of "politicized communal groups" relies on the 
socioeconomic condition of discrimination and deprivation: "Treat a 
group differently, by denial or privilege, and its members become more 
self-conscious about their common bonds and interests" (1993a, 3) .  To 
be "politically salient," Gurr believes that politicized communal groups 
must experience one or both of two key criteria: economic or political 
discrimination and political activism on behalf of collective interests 
(1993a, 5-6) . Discrimination and deprivation, with or without collec­
tive mobilization are, therefore, essential and "sufficient conditions" 
for potential conflict. 
Another important theoretical perspective attempts to link ethnic 
mobilization for warfare to human evolution and genetic predisposi­
tion. Theorists Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong propose "that kin selection 
nation," or the nationalism created by the state. An ethnic group is smaller, exclusive, 
or ascriptive, and more clearly based on common ancestry and shared inborn charac­
teristics; it may refer to a "quasi-national kind of 'minority group' within the state 
which has not achieved the status of a 'nation.' " Race is distinguished from these as 
referring to predominantly biological, phenotypical, and genetic distinctions (1991, 2-4). 
Gurr focuses on "politicized communal groups," divided into two main types and 
respective subtypes: (1 )  "national peoples," or ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples; 
and (2) "minority peoples," or ethnoclasses, militant sects, and communal contenders­
either disadvantaged or advantaged (1993a, 15-23). 
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has interacted with environmental forces over evolutionary time to 
predispose genetically related individuals to band together in groups, 
oriented for conflict" (Shaw 1987, 31 :  5). In other words, their research 
seeks to determine the "ultimate causes" or underlying reasons ("in­
clusive fitness" considerations) for warlike behavior, in distinction to 
the "emergent proximate causes" of human behavior, such as nepo­
tism, xenophobia, and altruism (Shaw 1987, 31 :  8-9).4 By combining 
kin selection theory and its axiom of "inclusive fitness" with cost­
benefit analysis, they identify certain behaviors (intergroup conflict 
and warfare) as functional to reproductive fitness and survival of close 
relatives. Neither further elaboration of their complex and preliminary 
theory nor its acceptance is central to Shaw and Wang's essay. What 
is essential, however, is the importance they place on certain environ­
mental, structural, and socioeconomic conditions in triggering violent 
behavior. 
Despite distinct and even competing approaches to nationalism 
and ethnopolitics, the three theories considered so far identify socio­
economic mechanisms (scarcity, deprivation, competition, and economic 
discrimination) as instrumental in the intensification of ingroup ver­
sus outgroup conflict. Several other theories of ethnonationalism (re­
viewed by Kellas) focus more exclusively on economic causes; two are 
of particular interest. First, Michael Hechter 's theory of "internal co­
lonialism" posits that modernization, and the economic inequalities 
(or localized and discrimination-based scarcity) that it engenders, will 
increase the conflict between ethnic groups within a state and between 
these groups and the state (1975) .  Hechter's related theory of the "cul­
tural division of labour" asserts that internal colonialism will cause 
the "social stratification of ethnic or cultural groups, with the core 
group occupying the best class positions and the peripheral groups 
the inferior positions" (quoted in Kellas 1991, 39-40) .  Second, Ernest 
Gellner 's economic theory proposes that the development of indus­
trial society necessitated the modern state system and a homogenous 
4. "Inclusive fitness" is a central theorem of behavioral and evolutionary biology 
and a more controversial proposition in sociobiology. It refers to an individual's ex­
pected prospects for genetic survival or reproductive success (classical fitness), com­
bined with the reproductive fitness-enhancing effects (including health, power, beauty, 
or other physical traits) of an individual's actions on the survival of his or her affected 
kin (inclusive fitness) .  Shaw and Wong define kin as "nucleus ethnicity," or one's "im­
mediate relatives who share a high degree of genetic relatedness," and "number a few 
hundred individuals at most" (Shaw 1987, 31, 8-9). 
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society and nation to maximize industrial production; thus, the hybrid 
nation-state was formed. Where the result was the repression of other 
cultures, nationalist unrest grew (Kellas 1991,  41-44). Gellner further 
argues that the volatile combination for conflict was the correspondence 
of nationality or cultural differences with class divisions: "Classes, how­
ever oppressed and exploited, did not overturn the political system 
when they could not define themselves 'ethnically.' Only when a nation 
became a class . . .  did it become politically conscious and activist. . . .  
Neither nations nor classes seem to be political catalysts: only nation­
classes or class-nations are such" (quoted in Kellas 1991, 43) .  
Whether the ultimate causes of ethnonationalistic violence are 
biological, cultural, or economic, reputable theorists generally agree 
on the importance of changing environmental and contextual condi­
tions-particularly competition over scarce resources. Specifically, this 
sampling of theorists-as well as others (not discussed here) who 
emphasize conditions of unequal economic development and incon­
gruity between economic status and power resources-strongly sug­
gests that conditions of unequal distribution and discrimination, and 
"absolute" or "relative" (or both) deprivation and scarcity of resources 
have a critical relationship to group violence. On this point, Ted Gurr 
is quite explicit: "By assumption, any communal group or minority 
that has been subject to political or material discrimination is at risk 
of collective adversity" (1993a, 6) .  Material deprivation (often extreme 
impoverishment) and systematic discrimination (by dominant groups 
and advantaged minorities) may threaten the group's physical sur­
vival. In this sense, resource scarcity (both broadly or narrowly de­
fined) is a necessary precondition that activates group conflict and 
transforms it into intrastate and ethnonationalist violence.5 Perhaps 
this convergence of grievances is what Gellner meant by his intriguing 
terms "nation-classes" and "class-nations." 
The most forceful presentation of the contributing role of scarcity 
and deprivation is found in Shaw and Wong. The biological process 
underlying human cooperation and aggression, they variously argue, 
"would be exacerbated under conditions of scarce resources or stress"; 
5. Intrastate violence is defined as physical conflict between advantaged or disad­
vantaged minority or majority groups and the political/juridical state, or among the 
groups themselves, to gain either a greater share of limited resources or autonomy or 
control over the territorial state. This violence may take on ethnonationalist, indigenist, 
or religious dynamics. 
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that "membership in an expanded group would have increased each 
individual's access to scarce resources"; and that in the past "an in­
creasing proportion of man's 'hostile environment' has been other 
nucleus ethnic groups engaged in resource competition" (1987, 31 :  6-
7). They unequivocably affirm the hypothesis of competition and "con­
flict in an environment of scarce resources," over the idea of resource 
sharing and conflict avoidance. The cooperative scenario would be 
likely only "when resources were abundant," because if resources were 
really limited, "sharing would be unlikely." An extensive quote best 
sums up their theory. 
We propose that inclusive fitness considerations (an ultimate cause), 
have combined with competition over scarce resources (environment), 
intergroup conflict and weapon development (changing environment}, 
to (1)  reinforce humanity's propensity to band together in groups of 
genetically related individuals, (2) predispose group members to act 
in concert for their own well-being, first and foremost, and (3) pro­
mote xenophobia, fear and antagonism among genetically related 
individuals towards strangers. We interpret these responses as "emerg­
ing" or reinforcing proximate causes which shaped the structure of 
social behavior in hunter I gatherer groups for 99 percent of humanity's 
existence. (1987, 31 :  11 )  
In conclusion, this limited review of current theories of intrastate 
conflict indicates that conditions of regional, and most especially, glo­
bal scarcity are potentially devastating for the future of human coop­
eration and the delicate calculus between war and peace. Indeed, at no 
time in human history does it seem more vital that both civil and 
global society function as a "collective survival enterprise," organized 
for peaceful competition and cooperation. Perhaps the combination of 
human "egoistic cooperation," social learning, and a frank and calcu­
lated assessment of survival consequences can help forge awareness 
of, and a strategy to navigate, the difficult global future ahead.6 Cer­
tainly, a most viable choice, especially if we assume that the more 
difficult task would be to drastically alter human nature, is to facilitate 
a supportive environment and context for human behavior by reduc­
ing or eliminating the dehumanizing conditions of resource scarcity, 
inequality, and discrimination at all levels of social organization. In-
6. "Collective survival enterprise" and "egoistic cooperation" are quoted in Shaw 
(1987, 31 :  26-27) from P. A. Corning (1993) . 
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deed, a global policy of authentically sustainable development repre­
sents a necessary step toward a comprehensive solution to global scar­
city and intrastate conflict. 
Sustainable Development and 
Collective Survival 
The twenty-first century began with a North-South war. It will continue 
with a battle fought by all human kind for the collective survival of the 
planet. To stop this battle of all human kind for itself from turning once 
more into a North-South war, an alternative development is needed, in 
North and South . . . .  Today, choosing peace implies choosing a new, alter­
native, social and ecological model. " 
-Walden Bello 
The cold war represented a long hiatus from the pressing global work 
at hand: the intractable problems of poverty, scarcity, overpopulation, 
and chronic underdevelopment. Activists in the development field have 
tended to assume that with the end of the cold war ideologized 
"developmentalism" would give way to rational and environmentally 
sound development policies. However, misguided orthodox develop­
mentalism persists as free market (neoliberal) models and technologi­
cal growth ideologies. Intolerance of alternative economic and social 
organizing models, whether nationalistic, socialistic, or mixed, has 
increased. Instead a "new cold war," directed against the Third World 
and its radical development agenda, is being waged. Walden Bello, of 
the Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First), has termed 
this northern process "structural resubordination" and argued: "Re­
garding the South as the principal enemy has since been institution­
alized in US defense planning. In what was billed as the first detailed 
military planning for the post-Cold War era, the Pentagon in the early 
1990s prepared seven scenarios of conflict-five of which saw US troops 
intervening in Third World countries" (1994, 109) . Despite the policy 
rhetoric of governments, the goals of democratization, nation build­
ing, and sustainable development remain elusive, and if seriously 
implemented will complicate global interstate and intrastate politics 
in the short term and revolutionize them in the long term. Indeed, 
there may be no dedicated political will for this task, which will surely 
necessitate serious global redistribution and sharing of scarce resources. 
Early in the cold war, George Kennan, fittingly known as the "father 
of containment," warned in a top secret State Department briefing 
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paper that because "we have about 50% of the world's wealth but 
only 6.3% of its population . . .  [o]ur real task in the coming period is 
to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain 
this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national 
security" (cited in Etzold 1978, 227) . Can this egoistic development of 
global resources be replaced by a communal model? 
A viable alternative is the new development model known as 
sustainable development. What is meant by sustainable development? 
Can an authentic sustainable development model resolve the global 
scarcity crisis and create an equitable and peaceful new world eco­
nomic order? One Third World development expert has broadly de­
fined sustainable development as "meeting the needs of the present 
without destroying resources that will be needed in the future" (Fisher 
1988, xi) . Another, more specific, definition, based on the 1987 
Brundtland Commission's report, asserts that "sustainable develop­
ment therefore means, in essence, sustainable industrial development"; 
or minimally an annual 3 percent global per capita GDP growth rate 
(Chatterjee 1994, 21) . 7  A third definition argues that "sustained devel­
opment depends on the existence of a viable middle class made up of 
people with education, technical know-how, and adequate facilities . . . .  " 
(Fisher 1988, 137) .  Consider the similar terminology and assumptions 
in the 1950s Millikan-Rostow foreign aid request "that the United States 
employ its resources to create and encourage conditions for self-sus­
taining economic growth in the underdeveloped countries . . .  [that] 
would lead to the evolution of politically stable and viable democratic 
societies that could not easily be victimized by Communist promises 
or intimidation" (Millikan 1957 cited in Stoessinger 1979, 240) . By 
comparison with the earlier cold war document, one can see that the 
Brundtland report, despite popularization of sustainable development 
and environmentalism, largely reasserted a traditional development 
paradigm of technological and industrialized growth. 
Moreover, even the more recent 1992 Rio Summit (or Earth Sum­
mit), the ambitious United Nations-sponsored conference on environ­
ment and development, was ultimately coopted by traditional 
7. The Brundtland Commission refers to the World Commission on Environment 
and Development created by the United Nations and headed by the former premier of 
Norway, Ms. Gro Harlem Brundtland with the mandate to report on the condition of the 
planet. The official title of the 1987 Brundtland report is Our Common Future (World 
Commission 1987). 
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developmentalism and the global development establishment. In their 
book, scholars Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger term this pow­
erful planetary development elite "the Earth Brokers" (1994) .  They 
quote a frank admission by Maurice Strong, the influential secretary­
general of the Earth Summit, that "the pattern of production and con­
sumption that gave rise to so many of the global risks [sic] we are 
dealing with are still in place" (1994, 60). And, although Strong founded 
the Earth Council (a group of independent experts) in 1992 to promote 
"people power" and planetary awareness, and sought to ally "brass­
roots" business, financial, and scientific constituencies with "grass­
roots" developmentalist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
Greenpeace International (one such NGO) dismissed these efforts as 
an institutionalized "greenwash" of powerful global corporations 
(Chatterjee 1994, 160-61) .  
Because of an obession with growth over equitable distribution 
and environmentally sustainable modes of production, traditional 
developmentalism has perpetuated and aggravated the conditions of 
global scarcity. The "old development myth" relied on established 
stages of growth: the first stage depends on society's natural resource 
base to create the intellectual, economic, and technological capacity to 
fuel the second stage of growth, which establishes independence from 
the natural resource base. Brundtland and Rio basically reformulated 
"the myth of unlimited industrial development" and increased tech­
nological efficiency as primary solutions to scarcity and underdevel­
opment. Despite defining sustainable development as "development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs," in application, sus­
tainable development contradicted this goal with a process based on 
society's "techno-economic capacities, rather than on the natural re­
source base" (Chatterjee 1994, 21, 27) . This hybrid model compromised 
"limits to growth." Within its rubric, sustainable development meant 
inputs of "financial and human capital, technology, and organizational 
capacity," which were all assumed to be independent of the planet's 
natural and environmental limits (Chatterjee 1994, 27) .  From this per­
spective, inadequate technology and not natural-resource scarcity 
impeded planetary growth. 
The fallacious promise implied in the Rio model is that all societ­
ies can achieve sustainable development with standards of living com­
parable to the industrial and postindustrial north. In short, "coopted" 
sustainable development seemed virtually indistinguishable from 
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modernity (Chatterjee 1994, 28) . The "greening" of traditional 
developmentalism (under the guise of sustainable development) and 
slogans of "green business is good business" served as revamped 
vehicles for growth-based and market-based development strategies. 
The exclusive focus on environmentally friendly development encour­
aged the popular myopia that "clean growth," or growth that mini­
mizes environmental and ecological damage, and growth that is 
technologically and organizationally efficient holds the solution. The 
"eco-efficiency" approach, by asserting that efficient growth provides 
the solution to problems of environmental destruction, scarcity, and 
economic inequality, deftly evaded the more fundamental and devas­
tating impending crisis of limits to growth. 
The critical analysis of Chatterjee and Finger further demonstrates 
that the "politically green" environmental and developmental NGOs 
were tricked by easy access to the United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, unaware that the 
sessions and agenda were purposely structured to favor governments 
and business and industry partners. Small grassroots NGOs had little 
meaningful impact on the substance of the official agreements reached 
and were basically coopted by complex lobbying. The big winners at 
Rio were the financially powerful, especially the transnational corpo­
rations (TNCs), responsible for major global pollution, unsustainable 
depletion of habitats and resources, and other irreparable environ­
mental damage. The Earth Summit legitimated TNCs as major global 
actors in sustainable development and made them appear less part of 
the problem and more part of "the solutions to the kind of problems 
for which they were at least partly responsible" (Chatterjee 1994, 107) . 
Both the TNCs and the more powerful and mainstream NGOs have 
realized that environmentalism can be a profitable enterprise, espe­
cially when it stimulates more lucrative development projects. 
Chatterjee and Finger persuasively argue that as long as sustainable 
development is defined by "unsustainable development models" that 
fail to question the traditional assumptions of growth and further 
industrial development, the real crisis and the real solutions will be 
missed. Only a new vision of global ecology that affirms limits to 
growth, fosters downscaled consumption patterns, and challenges the 
roles of powerful nation-states and TNCs will truly foster sustainable 
development (1994, 173) . 
If in the development field the proponents of NGO-populism and 
the empowerment of grassroots people's movements found themselves 
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upstaged by a so-called new global order run by a global managerial 
elite, a similar scenario has unfolded on the stage of global power 
politics managed by the U.S.-led international security elite. Many of 
the same actors are involved: nation-states and governments of north 
and south, transnational corporations, the United Nations system, and 
the United States. In global politics, as in sustainable development, the 
role and efficacy of the nation-state was also suspect and under attack, 
largely because of its inability and unwillingness to define and resolve 
global crises appropriately. In both arenas the fixation on technocratic 
crisis management became part of the problem. And whether dealing 
with the crises of global poverty, resource scarcity, and environmental 
destruction, or with the crises of global /1 disorder" and ethnic, tribal, 
and religious warfare, the tendency has been the same: to blame the 
victims. In both arenas the persistence of dominant, but irrelevant, 
traditional paradigms has impeded the implementation of real solu­
tions. Finally, not only is the structure of global crises of underdevel­
opment, ecological destruction, and warfare the same in many 
fundamental respects, but all of these crises are integrally related. 
Perhaps, as with the rhetoric of the Earth Summit, the political rhetoric 
of the so-called new world order has also distracted many from the 
sure realization "that the only answer to the global crisis lay in pro­
found structural changes, accompanied by deindustrialization and 
demilitarization" (Chatterjee 1994, 142) .  
Intrastate Wars: Why Bosnia, Somalia, 
and Haiti? 
To the extent that the exploited classes, poor peoples, and despised ethnic 
groups have been raising their consciousness of the oppression they have 
suffered for centuries, they have created a new historical situation . . . .  [I]t 
is a situation charged with promise-a promise that the lords of this world 
see rather as a menace. 
-Gutierrez 
What do Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, three contemporary cases of in­
trastate confilct, have in common? The peoples, languages, cultures, 
histories, governments, and religions (in part) are distinct. Yet, the 
violence in these countries from three different and distant regions of 
the world may suggest similar causal roots. First, these societies share, 
in various forms and degrees, internal economic, social, cultural, and 
political oppression and exploitation. Second, parallel histories of 
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colonialism, neocolonialism, and dependent development in the pe­
riphery perpetuated chronic underdevelopment and the "development 
of underdevelopment. " Third, unsustainable development models have 
created and increased resource scarcity, poverty, and ecological and 
environmental devastation. Fourth, activist racial, ethnic, religious, and 
nationalist identities have combined with socioeconomic differentials 
to intensify out-group discrimination. Fifth, the context and balance of 
minority /majority group relations and the role or condition of the 
state has recently and radically changed. Sixth, potential conflict and 
instability threatens neighboring spheres of prosperity. As the theorist 
Jacques Attali eloquently observed: "If the people in the emerging 
spheres of prosperity knew how to think in the long term, they would 
watch carefully the peripheries at their doors. In the coming world 
order, there will be winners and there will be losers. The losers will 
outnumber the winners by an unimaginable factor" (Attali 1991 cited 
in Bello 1994) . 
In summary, the three cases exhibit the environmental, structural, 
and socioeconomic preconditions of intrastate violence that have been 
identified by selected theorists. Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti contain 
societies torn by the uncertainty and stress of resource competition 
and discrimination-based scarcity and deprivation; they have become 
"nation-classes" or "class-nations." In response to extreme collective 
adversity and violent threats to the physical survival of minority and 
majority groups in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, intrastate conflict has 
escalated into war and revolution. 
Bosnia: Rich Man's War 
When Tito died, leaving a Yugoslavia loo decentralized for any ethnic 
gro11p to dominate, it became inevitable that a Serbian nationalist would 
rise up to redress the perceived wrongs dealt his people. 
-Warren Zimmermann 
"The Last Ambassador" 
United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali lashed out at 
the world community in mid-1992 for its apparently racist preoccupa­
tion with the "rich man's war" in Bosnia while thousands starved in 
Somalia. The United States, nevertheless, assumed a direct role in 
Somalia but not in Bosnia, where its interests were more confused, but 
greater, perhaps because intervention in the Balkans looked costly and 
militarily not very "do-able. "  Several North American concerns were 
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clear: the sanctity of international borders; the proliferation of a Balkan 
war; the swell of war refugees; and the global spread of ethnic warfare 
(ABC 1993) . Despite the world press coverage of "ethnic cleansing" 
and genocide, power politics has largely kept the United States from 
direct involvement in the Balkans. Experts were divided: was this an 
intrastate or interstate conflict; a civil war, interethnic war, religious 
war, or international aggression? In a sense, Bosnia was all of these. In 
Bosnia by the summer of 1995, as the United Nations peacekeeping 
forces were themselves being held hostage, multilateral diplomacy and 
conflict management were too little, too late. As Robert Oakley ob­
served regarding both Somalia and Bosnia, "once a crisis has gone 
beyond preventive diplomacy or small-scale conventional peacekeep­
ing, the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
cannot easily be maintained" (Hirsch 1995, 162) . What were some of 
the critical causes behind this most gruesome intrastate conflict? 
The crisis began in early 1991 .  The former republic of Yugoslavia, 
a multiethnic state of six component republics or regions (Bosnia, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) under Titoist 
communism, disintegrated largely because the Greater Serbian nation­
alism of Slobodan Milosevic raised the ethnic consciousness and fears 
of other minorities.  Between 1987 and 1989, Milosevic's attempts to 
make Greater Serbia the new postcommunist Yugoslavia precipitated 
the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 .  Serbia (or the new 
Yugoslav army) attacked, but both Slovenia and Croatia won indepen­
dence. In Croatia, local Serbs rebelled against the new Croatian gov­
ernment and hoped to reunite their Serbian Krajina republic (some 30 
percent of Croatian territory) with Serbia (Kinzer 1993, 4). In 1992 
Bosnian Moslem leaders also voted for secession; but the Bosnian Serbs 
(about one-third of the population) boycotted the referendum. The 
United States and European Community recognized the newly inde­
pendent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. Serbia's leader, 
Milosevic, then armed local Bosnian Serbs and began a wider war 
(Haass 1994, 37-43). 
In February 1992 a United Nations peacekeeping force was dis­
patched to Croatia and by November 1992 some six thousand peace­
keeping troops were also sent to Bosnia, eventually some twenty-five 
thousand peacekeepers, largely from Western European countries, to 
protect "safe havens" and prevent "ethnic cleansing."  To date, the 
three-way, intrastate and interstate conflict has resulted in hundreds of 
thousands of deaths and some 3 million refugees. And after more than 
three years of negotiations, violated cease-fires, Western bombing of 
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Serbian military targets, and on-and-off-again Western threats to lift 
the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, the Balkan war continued. 
Armed violence and "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnia's internal Serbian 
minority, allied with the Serbian/Yugoslav army, created conditions of 
comprehensive oppression, which provoked further ethnic conflict and, 
finally, the intervention of United Nations' forces. Before the outbreak 
of war in Bosnia, the Moslem majority (about 44 percent of the popu­
lation) faced the prospect of being a disadvantaged minority group in 
Serbia, subject to various degrees of economic, social, cultural, and 
political oppression. After Bosnian independence the Bosnian Serb mi­
nority (about 31 percent of the population) feared that they would 
become a disadvantaged minority instead of an advantaged majority 
group in Serbia. And unless reunited with independent Croatia, the 
Catholic Bosnian Croats (17 percent) would be a minority in either 
state. Regime change or the dissolution of the communist system in 
Yugoslavia (which had kept firm authoritarian control over separatist 
nationalist aspirations) and the consequent severe weakening of the 
central state created the destabilizing precondition that potentially 
reopened minority /majority group relations. The 1990 multiparty elec­
tions represented an important regime change, or alteration in the 
condition and status of the state and its relationship to minority groups. 
The elections allowed noncommunist, nationalist governments to be 
elected in Slovenia and Croatia, which led to the independence of 
these republics (Kellas 1991, 116). Further, with the demise of commu­
nist ideology and the death of Tito, "the power of the centre to resist 
these nationalisms" became particularly weak, James Kellas explains, 
because there was "little in the way of 'official nationalism,' " and no 
really charismatic leader (1991, 116). Ironically, democracy in the former 
Eastern Europe advantaged all the region's ethnic and minority groups, 
but also made it almost impossible for the state government to reas­
sert central control and a state-nationalist unity. 
The economic preconditions of the Balkan crisis also suggest that 
some ethnic groups were economically disadvantaged more than oth­
ers, and that uneven economic development and internal colonialism 
favored certain regions over others. These regional disparities in in­
come, employment, and industrial production (and the resulting eth­
nic group inequalities) became more severe with the failures in the 
Yugoslav economy in the 1980s (Lydall 1989, 4; Hall 1994) . The eco­
nomic downturn in the post-Tito period had a greater impact in Kosovo, 
one of the poorest parts of the country, and less on Slovenia and Croatia, 
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two of the richest provinces, and also the first to become independent 
after 1990. Although not extreme compared to European standards, 
the major regions of the former Yugoslavia could easily be divided 
into the northern developed (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Vojvodina) 
and southern lesser-developed regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo) .  
On the other hand, the southern areas possessed many of the 
country's important natural resources (coal, bauxite, iron, chrome) (Hall 
1994, 130-32, 142-43) .  Economic decentralization in 1974 increased the 
importance of nationalistic considerations, so that ethnic strife became 
played out more and more in economic terms, with richer republics 
complaining that development assistance was squandered by the poorer 
regions, and the poorer regions complaining of exploitation by the 
richer north (Hall 1994, 136-37) . Finally, critics of the Yugoslav economy 
argue that misconceived development models and an emphasis on 
industrialization resulted in the waste of needed resources, high rates 
of inflation, unemployment, price controls, IMF-imposed austerity 
(1988), and economic stagnation. As Gregory Hall concludes, "essen­
tially, Yugoslavia's citizens had become increasingly impoverished in 
the 1980s, and the government . . .  found it increasingly difficult to 
meet peoples' needs" (Hall 1994, 138-39) .  
When the Balkan conflict first erupted, the Western European na­
tions responded halfheartedly, and have continued to reject more force­
ful action by the United Nations forces, NATO, or the United States. 
With peacekeepers on the ground and subject to death and mass hos­
tage taking, their main concern remains containment of the crisis in 
Bosnia. And although the destructive intrastate conflict in Bosnia threat­
ens the neighboring spheres of prosperity in Europe and the region, the 
threat is not yet great enough to risk greater intervention. 
Somalia: A. Failed Humanitarian Intervention 
But it seems likely that, as environmental degradation proceeds, not only 
will the size of the potential social disruption increase, but the capacity to 
intervene to prevent this disruption will decrease. 
-Thomas Homer-Dixon 
"Global Environmental Change and International Security" 
The immediate problem in Somalia was starvation, but the underlying 
problem was intrastate violence among some fifteen warring clans, 
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engaged in a protracted urban guerrilla conflict. The warring in 1992 
seemed a phase in the broader historical struggle for national libera­
tion from foreign rule and repressive internal dictatorship. A United 
Nations trusteeship between 1949 and 1960 ended formal colonial rule 
by Italy in southern Somalia and Britain in the north (Rinehart 1982, 
27-35) . And after only a decade of independence came a brutal twenty­
year dictatorship, which a coalition of clans finally toppled in 1991 .  
Interposing itself into these complicated political events, the 1992 United 
States-United Nations humanitarian rescue mission ("Operation Re­
store Hope")  rapidly escalated into a nasty policing operation against 
the relentless violence among the forces of the warlord, Gen. 
Mohammed Farah Aidid and rival warlords and clans who still sup­
ported the former president-dictator. 
President Mohamed Siad Barre's Socialist-Islamic dictatorship, 
which seized power in a 1969 coup, had forcefully repressed rival clan 
loyalties (sought to control fundamentalist Islamic leaders) and im­
posed a state-sponsored nationalism on the country.8 Although a people 
largely homogeneous ethnically, Siad Barre's imposition of an artificial 
nationhood activated and intensified the tribal and, to some extent, 
religious differences (fundamentalism versus a scientific socialist ver­
sion of Islam) among the Somalis. Nevertheless, Siad Barre tended to 
favor his own minority Marehan clan, and in the last years of dicta­
torship, he manipulated clan politics to remain in power, undermining 
the foundations of the state-nationalist identity he had tried to build. 
Moreover, colonialism had left Somali minorities in the neighboring 
countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and a cultural and eco­
nomic divide between the south and the north of the country. 
Irredentism and Pan-Somali nationalism touched off repeated border 
fighting and a major regional war (Somali-Ethiopian War in the Ogaden 
in 1977-78) .  These conflicts and a protracted civil war (1988-91) inter­
rupted farming and herding, devastated the land, created a massive 
refugee crisis (there were some 1 .3 million in camps in 1981), and 
reinforced a cycle of mass famine. 
By July 1992 a famine had been raging for over eight months and 
two hundred thousand Somalis had already starved to death; another 
2 million were at risk, and fighting continued over access to, and 
hoarding of, private food and medical aid. In times of extreme scarcity 
8. Siad Barre and his revolutionary government hoped to eliminate "clan particu­
larism" or "tribalism," which he saw as the pernicious disease afflicting the Third World 
and obstructing national development (Rinehart 1982, 46--49) .  
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(as well as in the best of times), food and resources were divided up 
along tribal and clan lines, with the dominant clans discriminating 
against the outgroups.9 Thus, in Somalia, once tribal identities were 
reinforced by wide socioeconomic differentials and further aggravated 
by scarcity and famine, several key preconditions of intrastate conflict 
were in place. Finally, the civil war, which deposed Siad Barre, over­
turned the established balance of minority and majority group rela­
tions in Somalia, and simultaneously created a political vacuum that 
radically undermined the legal status and authority of the official state. 
Both the polity and society disintegrated into chaos. 
Siad Barre's model of economic development (if one may call it 
that) had turned Somalia into an economic and military client of both 
superpowers (Bryden 1995, 94: 145-51) .  Jeremy Harding notes that 
Siad Barre received some "$600 million in US military aid, which he 
used to enforce a new but no less ruinous form of totalitarian rule in 
Somalia. After almost twenty years of tyranny, his country simply fell 
apart" (Harding 1993, 265). Somalia, like Haiti, is one of the world's 
poorest countries, chronically dependent on food imports, and with 
scarce arable land, subject to misuse by farmers, overgrazing by no­
madic herdsmen, and, ultimately, desertification. The economy (as in 
most of Africa, and again as in Haiti) relied upon cash crop-primary 
exports (livestock, hides, bananas, and some cotton-whose earnings 
have steadily declined) and import-intensive and capital-intensive 
development. This situation resulted in a severe trade imbalance, with 
imports greatly exceeding exports, and a $2 billion foreign debt. When 
the government attempted IMF structural adjustment measures, riots 
broke out in 1987. In addition, dependence on United States economic 
aid (Somalia with the Sudan, Zaire, Kenya, and Liberia-all "police 
states" -received half of all the total aid for sub-Saharan Africa in 
1985) did solve local needs, and in the case of food aid, undermined 
local farm prices and agricultural productivity. Northern focus on 
"growth" areas for development assistance ignored the importance of 
9. Although space does not permit further elaboration here, the Somali case appears 
to mesh well with the theory of ethnic conflict developed by Shaw and Wong. Culturally, 
conditions reinforced the environmental, inclusive fitness, and cost-benefit aspects of their 
model. Traditionally, Somali society is a warrior society that extolls aggression because 
"force or the potential to use force often decided who prevailed in the harsh environ­
ment." Also, warfare was important in the relations among Somali clans and outsiders. 
"Antagonists in intra-Somali conflicts generally belonged to groups bound by their com­
mitment to pay or receive dia (blood compensation)." The entire group was responsible 
for this compensation, calculated as either a loss or a gain (Ehrenreich 1982, 237). 
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sustainable development and left the poorest of the poor few alterna­
tives other than humanitarian assistance or more anthropogenic de­
struction of their habitat (Timberlake 1986). 
At the time of the U.S.-UN intervention, Presidents Bush and 
Clinton insisted that no North American security interests were in­
volved; however, Clinton justified the U.S. military presence as one of 
superpower credibility and keeping faith with commitments made to 
the United Nations and the world community. There was little public 
analysis of U.S. regional, Middle Eastern, and African interests-such 
as insulating oil-rich sheikdoms, especially Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan 
and Egypt from the tribal instability in the Horn of Africa, a geostrategic 
access point to the Suez Canal and Red Sea. As one reporter argued: 
"How Somalia is put together is likely to have implications for other 
African nations. The kind of political system created here could fuel or 
snuff aspirations in other regions" (Schemo 1993, 3). In short, intrast­
ate conflict in Somalia posed a potential threat to the neighboring 
spheres of prosperity in the region. 
Somalia (not unlike Bosnia and Haiti) was a hapless victim of both 
cold war and post-cold war intervention and a shortsighted and ex­
ploitative northern model of unsustainable development. Despite sta­
tistics of thousands of lives saved, the claims of success for the 1992-93 
humanitarian intervention ring hollow because little was done to deal 
with the endemic causes of hunger, scarcity, and conflict. In June 1995 
the French organization, International Action Against Hunger, reported 
steadily worsening conditions of hunger. Since the pullout of North 
American troops in March 1994 and the United Nations in March 
1995, unemployment had greatly increased; there was a scarcity of 
clean drinking water, and one child in four was starving. Although the 
capital of Mogadishu seemed calm, some 500 kilometers to the north 
the fighting between the supporters of Mohammed Farah Aidid and 
those of Mohamed Siad Barre continued unabated. The cost of the 
United Nations' humanitarian operation ranged from $3 to $4 billion. 
Haiti: The Black Slave Revolution 
In Haiti, the peasantry is the nation. 
-Trouillot 
If the Haitians don 't sell their blood, what do you want them to do with it ? 
-Saint-Gerard 
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The Haitian recent and historical experience reflects comprehensive 
oppression and exploitation, which has been compounded by cumu­
lative resource scarcity in the twentieth century. Not unlike the fan­
tastic but true story of former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza's 
lucrative trade in blood to the United States by his company, 
Plasmaferica, in Haiti, Bemo-Caribbean and Company, financed by 
North American and international capital and with the blessing of 
dictator-president Franc;ois Duvalier and even facilitated by his no­
torious macoutes, sold plasma to the United States (Farmer 1994, 49-
50). This brutal image of "blood sucking" the people dry starkly 
captures the depths of Haiti's exploitation by internal and external 
colonialism. Before and since independence, the country's history of 
political instability can be attributed to foreign and class exploita­
tion. After the original Indian inhabitants had been exterminated, 
Spanish and French colonizers imported black African slave labor to 
mine the riches of the island paradise. First a mercantilist plantation 
system and later export-based dependent development reduced 
today's Haiti, one of France's most prosperous colonies, into the 
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. After independence in 
1804 the black nation was isolated and shunned by a "white world" 
of racist and slave-owning states, like the United States, which with­
held recognition until 1862. In 1915 the United States Marines inter­
vened, occupied Haiti (after a series of eight revolutions in four years) 
and made the country a United States protectorate. When they with­
drew in 1934, their experiment in nation building left behind a Car­
ibbean pattern of repressive dictatorship, agro-export plantations, and 
cheap-labor assembly platforms. 
An unsustainable development model relied on the export of 
primary commodities (sugar, rum, cotton, woods, cocoa, and coffee) 
and assembly products (apparel, toys, and baseballs) to the United 
States and global market, and on aid from the United States (USAID) . 
As dictator Papa Doc bragged to Nelson Rockefeller in 1969, "Haiti 
could be a vast reservoir of man-power for Americans establishing 
re-exportation industries closer, safer, and more convenient than Hong 
Kong" (quoted in Farmer 1994, 115) .  In this model, U.S. industries 
enjoyed a cheap (the minimum hourly wage is less than fifteen 
cents), subservient, nonunionized labor force, no customs taxes, and 
full repatriation of profits. This model contributed to an absolute 
poverty level in 1986 of $60 per capita income per year, with 60 
percent of all Haitians at this level (Farmer 1994, 117; Chomsky 1994, 
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12) . 10 Describing Haiti as the rising "Taiwan of the Caribbean," Noam 
Chomsky writes that the effect of this development strategy was "to 
shift 30 percent of cultivated land from food for local consumption 
to export crops" (1994, 13) .  Desperation to survive forced starving 
peasants to denude the island of trees for cheap fuel, and to exhaust 
sparse arable land to eke out a small food crop. Already by the time 
Baby Doc came to power in 1971, Haiti's  soil and resource depletion 
portended a major environmental and ecological disaster. Extreme 
resource depletion, brutal deprivation and inequality, and decades of 
dictatorship spurred the thousands of Haitian "boat people" since 
the 1970s until more than a million and a half Haitians lived abroad, 
despite a vigorous and forceful return policy by the U.S. Coast Guard 
(Stepick 1992). Paul Farmer poignantly writes that Haiti had become 
"a country increasingly immiserated even as the false 'industrializa­
tion' of offshore assembly grew; a country governed by one iron­
fisted family; and a country increasingly inhospitable to its own 
people" (1994, 119) .  
Internal and external developments in Haiti were accompanied by 
racial discrimination. As the first sovereign black republic under the 
self-rule of free African slaves, Haiti was a threatening anomaly and 
symbol to neighboring centers of prosperity. A powerful mulatto elite 
(which comprised the commercial and political sectors, the military, 
and to an extent the Catholic Church) controlled the land and eco­
nomic wealth of Haiti and maintained the darker peasantry as wage 
slaves. The rise of Frarn;ois (Papa Doc) Duvalier broke the hold of the 
creole and mulatto elite in favor of his personal palace guard, the 
dark-skinned Haitian Guard, and the hated and feared paramilitary 
national security forces, the Tontons Macoutes. A scholar of Haitian 
culture, Duvalier mobilized personal and political support for his dic­
tatorship with a racist doctrine of African negritude and anti-American 
Haitian nationalism (Morales 1995, 38: 29) .  But by the time his nine­
teen-year-old son Jean Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier, succeeded as presi­
dent for life, relations with the lighter-skilled creole elite and the United 
States defined a cozy dependency: the U.S. Pentagon supported and 
trained the Haitian military, and the Agency for International Devel­
opment (USAID) virtually dictated the Haitian economy through eco­
nomic assistance and development planning. Thus, when revolution 
10. Farmer cites 1976 World Bank data, which note a per capita income of $140 per 
year, with 75 percent of all Haitians at this level (1994, 117). 
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erupted in 1986, the lines of struggle were determined by racism, 
nationalism, and class. 
The 1986 revolution was preceded by some of the worst violations 
of human rights and genocide in Haitian history. Amnesty Interna­
tional documented the violence, torture, and killings by the state's 
military and security forces against the peasantry, youth movement, 
and the Christian Base Communities of Haiti's popular church led by 
Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Between 1986 and Aristide's landslide 
election in 1990, and again after Aristide's overthrow by the military 
in 1991 and his restoration to the presidency in October 1994 by the 
North American intervention, a form of "Duvalierism without 
Duvalier" gripped the island. Successive military juntas (the most recent 
headed by Gen. Raul Cedras) brutalized the people and made a mock­
ery of democracy and free elections. This period represented a major 
shift in the balance of power and the traditionally subservient rela­
tionship between the minority ruling class and the peasant majority. 
The state machinery and leadership were under daily attack; the 1986 
revolution represented a radical sea change. It became clear to all that 
"in Haiti, the peasantry is the nation," and any long term solution 
would have to deal with this fact. The United States' response, there­
fore, was to intervene in September 1994 and contain the threatening 
intrastate conflict off its shores before thousands more boat people 
invaded its sphere of prosperity. Aristide was to be the instrument of 
this "structural resubordination" and containment. 
Conclusion 
One possible alternative explanation for the rise in hostilities during past 
years is the cumulative effect of decades of unsustainable development, the 
consequences and pressures of which have begun to undermine the well­
being and security of many countries. 
-Hal Kane 
"The Hour of Departure" 
Perhaps the passing of the cold war will not have as great an effect on 
the potential for global war and peace and intrastate conflict as many 
policy makers have feared. More global conflicts appear to be rooted 
in the convergence of resource scarcity, environmental depletion, hu­
man degradation and deprivation, minority /majority group relations, 
and ethnopolitical and religious discrimination. If this is the case, it 
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will become necessary to redefine human security in a more humane 
manner and to systematically investigate and address the causes be­
hind the conditions and preconditions of intrastate conflict. The 1994 
United Nations Development Report asserts that global interdepen­
dence means that the world's crises of famine, disease, environmental 
degradation, and ethnic strife are no longer isolated or confined within 
national borders (United Nations 1995, 94: 229) .  This portends a future 
of immense challenge in which either truly sustainable development, 
equitable resource consumption, and the elimination of poverty and 
scarcity will help liberate the body and soul of man or in which re­
source wars and ethnopolitical conflicts will proliferate. I share the 
view of Fred Riggs that "the rise of inter-nationality conflict in recent 
years should forewarn us of much worse to come. Unless radical so­
lutions are found, the massive death-tolls of the 20th century may 
appear trivial by contrast with what is yet to come" (1994, 15: 585). 
13. Scarcity, Genocide, and the 
Postmodern Individual 
Leon Rappoport 
If Walliman and Dobkowski's thesis (chapter 1) is nearly correct, and 
future scarcities create a global condition characterized by increasing 
conflict and "a great potential for mass death and even genocide," 
how are people likely to react? More specifically, what sort of psycho­
social and behavioral responses may be anticipated from persons who 
have grown up in a postmodern cultural/technological environment? 
That is, the high-tech, media-saturated environment already well es­
tablished in North America and Western Europe and beginning to 
emerge in urban centers throughout much of the rest of the world 
with the penetration of MTV, McDonald's, the Internet, Disney Worlds, 
and so on. To examine this question, this chapter is organized in three 
sections dealing first with the various forms of genocidal events that 
seem probable in future conditions of scarcity, second with the general 
issue of postmodern culture and personality-those personality at­
tributes many social scientists and culture critics already perceive to 
be characteristic of youth in postmodern environments-and third with 
the potential reactions of such postmodern individuals to genocidal 
events. 
Scarcity and Genocidal Events 
In an article titled "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Over­
population, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social 
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Fabric of Our Planet," journalist Robert Kaplan (1994) provides a re­
markably powerful, documented argument directly supportive of 
Walliman's thesis on scarcity. Kaplan suggests that facing increasing 
scarcity, a condition he has observed in West Africa and Eastern Eu­
rope, systematic campaigns of rationalized mass killing as exemplified 
by the Holocaust or the Cambodian genocide are very unlikely be­
cause they require dedicated cadres under the command of a strong 
central government. Scarcity, however, tends to erode the power of 
central governing authorities. Lacking the material resources to imple­
ment or impose their policies in an orderly fashion, governments be­
come ineffective, corrupt, and decay toward anarchic tribalism. Yet, if 
this situation precludes massive genocide programs, it makes a broad 
range of smaller-scale genocidal events not only more likely but also, 
according to Kaplan, virtually inevitable. 
It takes no great leap of the imagination to understand the connec­
tion between scarcity and a convergent manifold of deadly events that 
can ultimately (and almost as quickly) kill as many people as perished 
in Auschwitz. Over the past decade, for example, famines brought on 
by warfare or natural disasters or both have killed millions in Ethio­
pia, Somalia, and other parts of Africa. Besides the continuing political 
instability and ethnic conflicts, soil erosion, water shortages, and over­
population are all predicted to make famines more frequent in the 
future. Moreover, the international relief efforts that have mitigated 
famines in the past appear destined to decline as the resources avail­
able for relief, as well as the will to provide it, become reduced under 
conditions of global scarcity. 
A similar dynamic applies to outbreaks of epidemic diseases. Scar­
city already limits what is being done to control AIDS in the poorer 
countries and in the poorer segments of the richer countries. As the 
AIDS epidemic spreads, and as new and relatively untreatable dis­
eases emerge (for example, the Ebola virus, cerebral malaria, varia­
tions of tuberculosis),  the demand for biomedical relief will be 
increasing at the same time as the resources available to provide it will 
be decreasing. 
Another domain of genocidal events is war. Appealing to Martin 
van Creveld's analysis of post-cold war warfare, Kaplan points out 
that as scarcity undermines the authority of central governments, or­
ganized warfare conducted by national armies is being replaced by 
varieties of tribal, ethnic, and religious wars. Recent and current ex­
amples include the struggles in the former Yugoslavia, the Russo-
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Chechin war, the tribal war in Rwanda, and lesser conflicts or rebel­
lions in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Peru, and Northern Ireland. Kaplan 
further notes that scarcity makes participation in such forms of war­
fare an attractive alternative for many young men: "As anybody who 
has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, 'technicals' in Somalia, 
Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in 
places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where 
there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in vio­
lence" (1994, 72). 
This point clearly applies equally well to the growth of urban 
gang violence in the United States and the attractiveness of guns for 
youth in general, not to mention the middle-aged wearing camouflage 
and playing with guns on weekends. It is also suggested that low­
intensity armed conflicts shade directly into terrorism and the illegal 
traffic in weapons and drugs. The Afghan tribal armies, for example, 
substantially support themselves by exporting opium; the Shining Path 
guerrillas in Peru receive support from cocaine producers, and U.S. 
motorcycle gangs transport drugs. In this connection, it deserves 
emphasis that powerful nations such as the United States are not 
immune to the domestic violence associated with scarcity. The social 
dislocations produced as the United States makes a transition toward 
a postindustrial economy appears directly or indirectly linked to the 
rise of armed religious cults, private militias, and gang violence. If the 
death toll thus far from gangs, cults, suicidal paranoids, or terrorist 
bombers is still relatively small, it may well show a dramatic increase 
under the impact of serious scarcity. 
Finally, no discussion of the potential genocidal events associated 
with scarcity would be complete without mention of the terrorist or 
rogue nation-state nuclear-weapon scenario. The theme is that the 
political and economic pressures created by scarcity will increase the 
likelihood that nuclear weapons or the means to produce them will be 
offered for sale to any high bidder. And the same sorts of pressures are 
likely to make terrorists or rogue nations more anxious to acquire, and 
eventually use, such weapons. 
Postmodern Culture and Personality 
Although detailed discussion of the end of the modern and beginning 
of the postmodern era is beyond the scope of this chapter, some brief 
perspectives on the issue may be cited. Rappoport and Kren (1995) 
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argue that the modernity ideal died at Auschwitz and Hiroshima. 
That is, the underlying assumption of modernity, that human progress 
toward a better world could be achieved through increased rationality, 
technological efficiency, and social control, has been, on the evidence 
of the Nazi death camps and the nuclear bombing of Japan, shown to 
be false. Nothing in modern science, law, or religion forestalled or 
seriously mitigated the mass genocides of this century. 
Another perspective on the end of modernity was suggested by 
the architecture critic Charles Jencks (1978) . He claims that modernity 
lost its credibility when the Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. 
Louis was demolished in 1972. Designed according to the rationally 
efficient, functional criteria of modernity, this low-income housing 
complex was finally seen to be unfit for human habitation. 
A broader historical view relevant to the end of modernity can be 
found in a recent review of Hobsbawm's history of the twentieth cen­
tury: "In short, Eric Hobsbawm's history of the twentieth century is 
the story of the decline of a civilization, the history of a world which 
has both brought to full flowering the material and cultural potential 
of the nineteenth century and betrayed its promise" (Judt 1995, 20) . 
One way to epitomize the postmodern era as opposed to the 
modern is by appeal to a series of antinomies between them. Marshak 
(1995), for example, lists the following as intrinsic to modernity: gun­
powder, the printing press, mechanical clocks, national markets, se­
quential technologies, and independent relationships .  Intrinsic to 
postmodernity are: atomic weapons, television, electronic clocks, glo­
bal markets, simultaneous technologies, and interdependent relation­
ships. He further contrasts modern management with postmodern 
management principles as follows: stable versus flexible operations, 
structured channels versus fluid flows, hindsight versus foresight, and 
hierarchies versus networks. 
Comparative lists of this sort are oversimplifications postulating 
dichotomies where there are often underlying continuities, but they 
provide a useful sense of the quantum leap many commentators per­
ceive to be characteristic of the movement beyond modernity. This 
view can be seen clearly in Stanley's (1993) economics-oriented de­
scription of the "principles underlying postmodernization," which 
include "the appeal to unadorned market relations, the erosion of the 
state as a source of dependence, the weakening of workplace solidari­
ties and the elevation of the private over the public in matters of 
cultural and social provision" (30) . 
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Kvale (1992, 2) provides a broader philosophical and cultural 
statement. 
Postmodemity refers to an age which has lost the Enlightenment 
belief in emancipation and progress through more knowledge and 
scientific research. Postmodern society consists less of totalities to be 
ruled by preconceived models than by decentralization to heteroge­
neous local contexts characterized by flexibility and change. There is 
a change from a mechanical . . .  to an information industry, and from 
production to consumption as the main focus of the economy. It is an 
age in which the multiple perspectives of new media tend to dissolve 
any sharp line between reality and fantasy. 
He also notes as definitive of postmodern culture: art as collage, Las 
Vegas architecture, rock videos, and the novels of Umberto Ecco. I 
would add certain films, such as Bagdad Cafe and Pulp Fiction. 
Films and television have an important status in postmodern cul­
ture because they allow persons to evade domination by established, 
prosaic realities and encourage awareness of alternative, possible 
worlds. It has been suggested, moreover, that in some respects 
postmodern electronic technologies have advanced to where their simu­
lations/ representations can become, if not an independent reality, at 
least a criterion of the given reality. "Thus, signs may attain the same 
status as the objects they signify in societies that are increasingly 
immersed in media imagery, and the categorization of persons, objects 
or events will vary not with their intrinsic properties but with the sign 
qualities these properties evoke when presented in the media" 
(Baumgardner and Rappaport 1995, 14) . 
Given the truism among social scientists that personality is 
grounded upon, and reflective of, culture, whereas culture is under­
stood to be an expression of the "collective personality" of society, it 
is not surprising that over the past decade an increasing number of 
personality theorists (for example, Lifton 1993; Gergen 1991; Cushman 
1990; Secord 1990; Rowan 1990; Sampson 1989; Baumeister 1987) have 
begun to discuss the psychosocial significance of the socioeconomic 
and cultural changes noted above under the heading of postmodernism. 
Most of this burgeoning literature follows the culture-personality logic 
laid out by Geertz (1973), namely, that culture is the ultimate source 
of the individual's core sense of self or identity, because it provides the 
systems of meaning-roles, norms, values, and language-through 
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which individuals conduct their lives and sense of self. (Parentheti­
cally, although the terms self-concept or self-image refer to both self as 
object and subject, while identity is usually described as the core struc­
ture of self as subject, no such fine distinctions are made in the follow­
ing text.) Writing in more concrete terms, Berger, Berger, and Kellner 
(1974, 12) stipulate that "the consciousness of everyday life is the web 
of meanings that allow the individual to navigate his way through the 
ordinary events and encounters of his life with others."  It is also con­
sidered axiomatic that major changes in a culture will be accompanied 
by major changes in the self-concepts of its inhabitants . Frequently 
cited as exemplary are the changing self-concepts of women in Ameri­
can society. 
How do such changes come about? What are the mechanisms of 
identity formation or change or both? In premodern and early modern 
societies, this was not considered problematic. The individual's self­
concept or identity was seen to be largely determined by the cultural 
meanings attached to their gender, status in the family (first or later 
born), and the position of the family in society (as often indicated by 
the family name: Baker, Smith, Hunter, Taylor, and so on) . In modern 
industrial societies, and even moreso in postindustrial, that is, 
postmodern societies, however, identity and the self have become 
profoundly problematic because the family-based and societal mecha­
nisms no longer apply. 
Some of the reasons for this are obvious.  At the level of the family, 
it is simply that stable intact families able to transmit a strong sense 
of independent selfhood to their children are becoming the exception 
rather than the rule. Even where such families exist, they can hardly 
succeed in this task, because the culture meanings carried by, and 
embodied in, parents and elders are often irrelevant to the situations 
challenging young people in the postmodern environment. It is no 
mere irony that America today resounds with discourses on the "fam­
ily values" that have become yet another kind of scarce resource. 
At the level of society, identity has become more and more prob­
lematic because structural and process changes now occur so rapidly 
as to offer only an amorphous, constantly shifting basis for identity 
formation. One need only mention here the gender role changes (for 
example, women become astronauts and drive trucks; men become 
nurses and grade-school teachers), the corporate takeovers, downsizing 
of the white- and blue-collar labor force, and relocations of industries 
that have become commonplace. 
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More significantly, however, at the level of popular culture, the 
formation of personal identity and construction of a firm self-concept 
has for many youths gone beyond the problematic and, like the manual 
typewriter or rotary telephone, taken on the quality of a curious his­
torical artifact. Thus, as may be seen on MTV, the models of person­
ality popular among young people emphasize flexibility, diversity, and 
multiple identities. For example, a music video by Madonna was re­
portedly criticized by a middle-aged columnist for being "chaotic" 
because of her changing personas: seductress, naive innocent, aggres­
sive dominator. But the same report quoted one of her young fans as 
saying it was wonderful because "Madonna is always herself." 
The ideal of a variable, multidimensional rather than unitary self 
was also modeled in the recent television series Quantum Leap. The 
series centered on a protagonist who took over the minds and bodies of 
people to rescue them from difficult situations. Similarly, in the series 
Highway to Heaven, the lead characters were angels who created novel 
identities for themselves as they went about aiding people in distress. 
The underlying attraction of these and other popular culture models of 
a pluralistic self or diversified personal identity is their representation 
of exciting tranformational possibilities. On the one hand, they drama­
tize the rich potentials that may emerge when the social construction of 
reality principle is applied to personality development, and on the other, 
they present a glamorous alternative to the mundane effort required to 
build a single, unitary identity. In sum, for young people in the 
postmodern environment of rapid socioeconomic changes and a 50 
percent divorce rate, the modern ideal of a unitary identity based on 
singular loyalties to a specific career and intimate psychosexual rela­
tionship-the classic foundations of integrated identity postulated by 
Erik Erikson (1950)-may simply appear to be a bygone romantic myth. 
Besides the popular culture models encouraging a pluralistic self­
concept, human potential psychologists also contribute to this trend 
by warning against entrapment in a fixed sense of self that can inhibit 
further personal growth. A number of self-transformational therapies 
are available to save people from such a situation. Moreover, by taking 
advantage of readily available body-work facilities and cosmetic sur­
gery, the body itself may be harnessed to the task of self-transformation 
(see Finkelstein 1991 for a detailed treatment of the body issue). 
Some therapists consider that cultural pressures toward pluralistic 
self-concepts signal a dangerous slide into psychopathology. The cur­
rent American Psychiatric Association diagnostic manual (DSM-111) 
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defines as an identity "disorder" the "inability to integrate aspects of 
the self." And a recent survey reported a significant rise in the number 
of persons diagnosed with such disorders (Ross 1991) .  However, some 
clinical theorists do not see any danger here. DeBerry (1993) suggests 
that a "schizoid consciousness" is adaptive to contemporary life condi­
tions, and Rowan (1990) considers that "subpersonalities" are a normal 
"semi-permanent and semi-autonomous region of the personality." 
Empirical support for the more-positive viewpoint is growing. 
Markus and Nurius (1986) described evidence showing that normal 
college students represent their various developmental possibilities as 
a range of different "possible selves. " These authors concluded that it 
is a mistake to believe in a single self "to which one can be true."  
Linville (1985, 1987) found that persons with complex or  pluralistic 
self-concepts could better cope with stress, the premise being that if a 
failure or loss of self-esteem occurs in one self-domain, it can be offset 
by success in another. A current study, moreover, indicates that per­
sons with high scores on a measure of personality multiplicity show 
higher levels of creativity than others (Boone 1995). 
Theoretical discussions of postmodern personality qualities are 
more variable. Lifton (1993) acknowledges the multiplicity imposed 
by postmodern culture while suggesting that an " integrative 
proteanism" can hold disparate aspects of the self loosely together. 
Hermans, Kempen, and Van Loon (1992), however, argue that person­
ality should be understood as centering on a "dialogical self" in which 
the "I" may fluctuate through various positions and thus facilitate 
dialogical relations between those positions. Gergen (1991) character­
izes the postmodern self as being "saturated," that is, overstimulated 
and thus fragmented by exposure to the plethora of postmodern com­
munication technologies. He suggests that this condition may eventu­
ally yield persons with a new and beneficial "global consciousness." 
In sharp contrast to Gergen's saturated self, Cushman (1990) postu­
lates an "empty self" brought about by the fragmentation and absence 
of stable values in postmodern society. He maintains that postmodern 
individuals have become relentless consumers who smother their inte­
rior emptiness with material goods. Writing on the theme of "how the 
self became a problem," Baumeister (1987) sees contemporary individu­
als caught in a double bind, on the one hand having to define their life 
meanings and purposes for themselves, yet on the other still being bound 
up in society. In this situation, many come to define themselves by how 
others see them; hence their concern with style statements and con-
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sumption. Finally, Sampson (1985) attributes the problems of contempo­
rary selfhood to the obsolescence of the American ideal of "self-contained 
individualism."  In the emerging globally linked world system, the 
postmodern individual can no longer find much meaning in assertive 
independence, but must find it through relationships and integration 
with a larger community. Sampson conceives the postmodern self to be 
"a decentralized, nonequilibrium structure, a pantheon of selves, within 
a single body." A similar view has been adopted by Fiske and Taylor 
(1991), who describe the self as "an unordered, non-hierarchical collec­
tion of features." 
As might be expected when any fundamental culture change rel­
evant to the theoretical focus of a field or discipline sets in, interpreta­
tions of its meaning will vary a good deal; this has certainly been the 
case insofar as postmodern culture and personality are concerned. But 
underlying the diverse formulations of theorists, therapists, and research­
ers is a generally agreed-upon conclusion that as compared with 
moderns, postmodern individuals tend to have multiple self-concepts, 
or multifaceted identities or both. Taken together, the burden of evi­
dence emerging from analyses of popular culture as well as empirical 
research and theoretical discourse clearly points to multiplicity as the 
defining quality of postmodern personality. Particularly noteworthy are 
the apparent parallels between the features of postmodern culture­
collage, networks, fluidity, decentralization-and the personality quali­
ties suggested as characteristic of postmodern individuals-schizoid 
consciousness, subpersonalities, possible selves, dialogical self, saturated 
self, and empty self. 
It also seems clear that the hierarchical structure of personality 
idealized in modern psychology, that is, a vertically integrated, cen­
trally organized system in which lower-order impulses and emotions 
are supposed to be controlled by higher-order cognitive (ego) pro­
cesses, is no longer viable. It appears destined to be replaced by a 
horizontally integrated, decentralized system-one in which the cog­
nitive and emotional sides are seen as interpenetrating rather than 
opposed, and the model for consciousness becomes a conversation of 
equals rather than a struggle for power. 
Viewed in this perspective, the modern idea that personal moral­
ity can be understood as residing in a unitary "superego" or con­
science that wrestles with our basic instincts while trying to enforce 
obedience to internalized moral values seems not only irrelevant but 
also reminiscent of a Victorian steam engine. A postmodern approach, 
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by contrast, would conceptualize personal morality as a manifold of 
context-dependent evaluative possibilities. In a valuable comprehen­
sive review of postmodern morality, Hill (1995, 7) concludes: "Instead 
of moral universals, the postmodern self acknowledges the multiplic­
ity of moral choices and seeks to understand morality in terms of our 
relations to others and community." It is further suggested that this is 
a highly relativistic and relational type of morality that transcends 
rationality. The postmodern culture recognizes a plurality of rationali­
ties, and for any given situation it may offer such a broad range of 
possible values and actions as to reduce the exercise of moral choice 
to an arbitrary act of will-a "leap of faith. " 
Postmodern's Reactions to Genocidal Events 
To explore the question of how postmoderns may respond to geno­
cidal events, it will be helpful to first mention a few general disclaim­
ers-theoretical "points of order." Thus, if one wished to address the 
question in a genuinely postmodern voice, there would be an imme­
diate appeal to the principles of contextualism and the social construc­
tion of meaning. One would question the question: where is it coming 
from, who is asking it, what sort of genocidal events are concerned, 
and what is the range of meanings that might plausibly be attributed 
to these events? In short, one might easily fall into an endless discur­
sive textual analysis postmodern thinkers call deconstruction, and the 
likely bottom line would simply be "it all depends." 
It should also be stipulated that, like moderns, postmoderns come 
in different varieties . Ambiguous as traditional socioeconomic and 
class distinctions may be, for example, they are, nevertheless, still ap­
plicable to postmoderns. Indeed, at least metaphorically, the contem­
porary two-class society distinction fits quite well. There are the 
postmodern proletarians who service and maintain the information 
highway versus the plutocrats who cruise on it. And there appear to 
be "lumpen" postmoderns-homeless surfers of cyberspace forever 
seeking a new electronic fix versus the avant-garde of artists and pro­
fessionals pushing the limits of global linkage. 
But though the significance of the foregoing considerations must be 
acknowledged as undoubtedly useful in various contexts, they will be 
set aside here in favor of a more conventional type of comparative 
analysis: how do the salient features of postmodern culture and person­
ality relate to knowledge about individual responses to genocidal events? 
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In their analysis of "the genocidal mentality" Lifton and Markusen 
(1990) provide a detailed discussion of the psychosocial adjustment they 
found to be characteristic of persons able to accept and participate in 
genocidal activities. Called "doubling," the process involves a type of 
psychic splitting analogous to the Freudian ego defense mechanism of 
compartmentalization. Doubling, however, is defined as a form of dis­
sociation by which the individual's self is divided into "two functioning 
wholes, so that a part-self acts as an entire self" (Lifton and Markusen, 
106). This phenomenon was identified by Lifton (1986) as a particularly 
strong personality factor enabling Nazi physicians to carry out their 
work in the death camps. A less intense but very similar type of dou­
bling was also found by Lifton and Markusen to be typical of American 
nuclear-warfare planners and atomic-weapons scientists. 
Insofar as doubling is a valid formulation of the way persons can 
accommodate themselves to genocidal events, and insofar as doubling 
would seem to be a specific variant of the general multiplicity (if not 
"schizoid consciousness") typical of postmoderns, it follows that 
postmoderns would probably not find it very difficult to tolerate geno­
cidal events. They are, from this standpoint, already geared up to 
carry out the appropriate psychosocial adjustment. 
Language and imagery are another source of the genocidal men­
tality. Lifton and Markusen refer to a "language of nonfeeling," noting 
that nuclear strategists very frequently speak in a language of euphe­
misms, acronyms, and metaphors, which allow them to distance them­
selves or dissociate from the realities of human destruction intrinsic to 
their work. Here too, there is a direct parallel with the semiotics of 
postmodern culture, in that much of contemporary language and 
imagery is manifestly "nonfeeling."  One need only consider the rapid 
collage imagery, metaphors, and language of music videos and video 
games, computer screen icons, passwords, PIN numbers, and the 
trivialization of violence on television. 
Immersion in such a semiotic environment may not produce full­
blown dissociation but can hardly fail to facilitate a degree of nonfeeling 
or desensitization toward genocidal events. And this process would 
seem particularly relevant to situations in which victims lack the sign 
qualities that can evoke empathy among "viewers. "  In a rudimentary 
form, perhaps such desensitization is already apparent from the way 
postmoderns can navigate through the homeless people cluttering 
urban centers, either treating them as invisible or dropping a handout 
without breaking stride. 
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The empathy issue deserves further emphasis, because it is gener­
ally viewed as the key psychological factor determining individual 
behavior in problematic social situations, and has, accordingly, been 
heavily researched. Drawing on this research for his analysis of major 
genocides of the twentieth century, Staub (1989) concluded that at 
least two general conditions militate against empathy. One is material 
scarcity, which drives people toward preoccupation with personal needs 
and reduces their sense of connection with others. This was the case 
in Weimar Germany, and presently in the former Soviet Union. The 
other condition is an inner-psychic state Staub describes as typified by 
a weak ego or poorly articulated self-concept. It tends to be character­
istic of people who have been traumatized during childhood by an 
abusive family, or by the chaotic deprivation occurring in war zones, 
or by any number of other conditions, including family breakups owing 
to divorce. 
Such people are likely to deal with anxiety and stress by using 
paranoid projection mechanisms, that is, by perceiving others to be 
the source of their difficulties. A "popular" paranoid scenario related 
to genocidal events throughout the modern era has centered on the 
idea of an international Jewish conspiracy to rule the world. A more 
recent one often mentioned by Americans in private militias is that 
gun control laws are part of a government conspiracy (probably insti­
gated by Jews) to turn the United States over to the United Nations. 
Although there is no substantial evidence indicating that the 
multiplicity characterizing postmoderns inclines them toward para­
noid defense mechanisms, the implications of Staub's analysis are 
obvious. The postmodern "empty," "saturated," or "dialogical" self 
may not directly equate to a weak modern ego, but there is enough 
similarity between these formulations to suggest parallel psychody­
namic reactions to scarcity-induced stress. Something along the line of 
a "blaming the victim" dynamic would certainly fit the free market 
orientation of postmodern culture. 
Turning from psychodynamic theory to a more general level of 
discussion, however, the final issue demanding consideration concerns 
differences between modern and postmodern morality. It will be re­
called that in contrast to the modern ideal of universal moral values, 
postmodern moral values were described as "context-dependent evalu­
ative possibilities ."  The reactions of postmoderns to genocidal events, 
therefore, are likely to be complex and variable depending upon the 
range of possible moral interpretations associated with those events. 
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The point in question here is nicely illustrated by certain films drama­
tizing the postmodern mindset toward moral values. In Pulp Fiction 
and Apocalypse Now, for example, modem moral values are deliber­
ately confounded by situating characters in amoral contexts and thereby 
forcing viewers away from any simplistic moral interpretation. The 
modern films made by John Ford and John Wayne impose straightfor­
ward, "predigested" moral values, whereas the moral values in films 
by Quentin Tarantino and Harvey Keitel are confabulated. The mod­
ern films could succeed as popular entertainments because they pro­
vided assurances of moral certainties; the postmodern succeed today 
because they provide assurances of moral ambiguities. A relevant 
citation-life imitating art?-might be the way the 0. J. Simpson mur­
der trial has become a major media entertainment. 
Other aspects of postmodern culture also promote complex, rela­
tivistic moral perspectives. During the Gulf war with Iraq, television 
news often presented near-simultaneous reports from both sides of 
the conflict, and viewers could find themselves being encouraged 
to cheer for the bombers while almost at the same being encouraged 
to sympathize with the bombees. Even the abhorrent rationality un­
derlying genocidal acts of terrorism is now widely understood to be 
a facet of postmodern culture. Thus, terrorism has its logic: when 
anyone can become a victim, governments are shown to be impotent; 
when terror attacks generate wide media coverage, they become a 
public-relations tactic; and when everyone can be defined as a direct 
or indirect participant in the current world system, there are no inno­
cent bystanders. This is not to say that the logic of terrorism is ac­
cepted as legitimate. What is accepted, however, is that as soon as 
yesterday's terrorist group (for example, the PLO, the IRA) agrees to 
renounce violence, it becomes a legitimate participant in the world 
system. 
In general, therefore, and in the light of the increasing climate of 
moral ambiguity indicated above, postmoderns are not likely to make 
knee-jerk, moralistic responses to genocidal events. On the contrary, 
the postmodern response is likely to be tentative, inquisitive, and 
multifaceted. Or in circumstances when the events and victims are 
remote, apathetic. Insofar as recent American government policies may 
be taken as prototypical, the tentative, multifaceted response pattern 
can be seen in the negotiated invasion of Haiti, or the drawn-out, 
variable efforts to reduce or contain civil warfare in the former Yugo­
slavia. The apathetic pattern can be seen in the ritual condemnations 
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but relative indifference that followed the massacre of Chinese stu­
dents in Tiananmen Square, or the withdrawal of American forces 
from Somalia. The operative principle of postmodern policy responses 
to genocidal events may sum up to something like this: "If you can't 
wait them out, talk them out, or buy them out, then blow them up, but 
only if the cost-benefit ratio is very favorable."  
Conclusion: A Koan for the 
Twenty-first Century 
The views developed in this chapter about how postmodern individu­
als will respond to genocidal events must be taken with a large grain 
of salt. They are, at best, speculations on the future informed by a 
present body of fallible knowledge that may not apply. If it does ap­
ply, however, it would seem that postmoderns will generally be toler­
ant, and perhaps indifferent to genocidal events. There is no other 
plausible conclusion to be drawn from our present knowledge of 
postmodern culture and personality. All of the relevant cultural fac­
tors-the language, imagery, and climate of moral ambiguity-sug­
gest that a growing desensitization is at work. And all of the relevant 
personality theory and research suggest that the multiplicity charac­
terizing postmoderns facilitates the adoption of desensitizing stress­
coping or defense mechanisms. 
What this may mean for the future of civilization is the great koan 
of the twenty-first century. Does it portend a new Dark Age in which 
a privileged postmodern minority becomes smugly detached from the 
chaotic genocidal events afflicting everyone else? Or does it portend 
movement toward a new Enlightenment, in which a privileged 
postmodern minority will find the means, however slowly and tenta­
tively, to save what can be saved while expanding the world culture 
base for a liberating multiplicity? Stay tuned . . .  
1 4. Critical Reflections on the 
Doomsday, Apocalyptic Vision 
Craig A. Rimmerman 
What kind of culture is it, when some serious analysis appears and is 
almost at once placed as another installment of "doom and gloom"?  What 
kind of culture is it which pushes distraction, in its ordinary selection 
even of news, to the point where there is hardly any sustained discussion 
of the central and interlocking issues of human survival ? 
-Raymond Williams 
The Year 2000 
Over the past twenty years, the doomsday, apocalyptic perspective 
has characterized much of the environmental literature. At its most 
extreme, this literature warns, in the words of Bill McKibben, that we 
are witnessing "the end of nature" as we know it. The metaphor of 
"the apocalypse" has captured much attention. As Lawrence Buell 
points out, "apocalypse is the single most powerful master metaphor 
that the contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal" 
(Buell 1995, 285) . 1  
Underlying this perspective is a belief in resource scarcity. Resource 
scarcity generally manifests itself in two ways. At the broadest level, 
resource scarcity refers to a scarcity of planetary resources, including 
clean water, air, and energy sources at affordable prices. At a more 
1 .  My thanks to Steven Lee and David Ost for their thoughtful suggestions in 
response to an earlier draft of this chapter. 
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narrow level, resource scarcity indicates the kind of budgetary .scarcity 
that has transformed American politics over the past fifteen years. As 
deficits mounted throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, politicians from 
both parties were forced to confront the reality of declining resources to 
pay for myriad social and economic programs, especially given the 
American public's aversion to raising taxes. This has increasingly led to 
a political and social environment that the economist Lester Thurow has 
identified as a "zero-sum society," where there are clear winners and 
losers in the distribution of scarce resources (Thurow 1980) . It is this 
zero sum dilemma that underlies much of the doomsday, apocalyptic 
literature, though much of the focus is on the broader conception of 
resource scarcity. 
This chapter provides a critical evaluation of the doomsday, apoca­
lyptic literature regarding the future of the planet, with a specific fo­
cus on energy and environmental concerns. In doing so, several 
questions are addressed: What is the purpose of this literature? To 
what extent does the doomsday, apocalyptic perspective undermine 
possible meaningful political and policy responses addressing resource 
scarcity issues? In what ways does the doomsday perspective prevent 
serious grassroots mobilizing efforts in response to the distribution of 
energy and environmental resources? In other words, if the future is 
so bleak, why do anything at all? How useful is it to frame a discus­
sion of the future of the planet within the broader context of resource 
scarcity? How should one teach the doomsday, apocalyptic perspec­
tive in the classroom? In addressing these questions, I argue that there 
is value in teaching the doomsday perspective and its critique. Stu­
dents are forced to confront serious questions regarding values under­
lying our political and economic order as well as how various analysts 
on the left and the right have attempted to interrogate questions that 
should be at the center of our public discourse. Before these issues can 
be addressed adequately, however, we must first outline the central 
tenets of the doomsday, apocalyptic perspective. 
The Doomsday Perspective: An Overview 
At the core of the doomsday view is a belief that "the economic and 
social development of the United States over the last two centuries 
might better be characterized as extraordinary, fortuitous, and 
nonsustainable" (Miles 1976, 1 ) .  Recognizing the limits to economic 
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growth is of the utmost importance if we are to survive as a planet 
over the long term. The emphasis here is on long-term planetary sur­
vival and what we can and should be doing to provide for ecological 
sustainability and stability. 
Most doomsday theorists also embrace a Hobbesian conception of 
humanity, positing that only a centralized state, one that embraces 
some form of government coercion, can adequately provide for soci­
etal stability in both the short and long term, because heightened in­
equalities in a time of increased resource scarcity will foster class conflict 
and ultimately threaten the stability of the political and economic order. 
Doomsday theorists also believe that the environmental problems we 
face are so severe that those in power must respond to them in a 
decisive and timely manner. If the goal is planetary survival, such 
decisions cannot possibly be made through the kind of democratic 
procedures associated with liberal democracy. For analysis I have 
chosen the work of William Ophuls and Stephen Boyan, Jr., and Rob­
ert Heilbroner as representative of the doomsday perspective. 
Like almost all doomsday theorists, Ophuls and Boyan have a 
Hobbesian conception of humanity. They raise this question: How do 
we protect or advance the interests of the collective, when the indi­
viduals that comprise it behave in a selfish, greedy, and quarrelsome 
fashion? Their solution is government coercion, as government must 
give way to elite rule. They offer this justification for what many would 
regard as an extreme solution: "It is simply not true that, once they are 
aware of the general gravity of the situation, men will naturally mod­
erate their demands on the environment" (Ophuls and Boyan 1992, 
202) . Like the other doomsday theorists, Ophuls and Boyan's primary 
concern is to provide collective stability for the long term. 
Robert Heilbroner frames his doomsday analysis by posing this 
question: "Is there hope for man?" (Heilbroner 1991, 20) .2 In answering 
his query, Heilbroner offers a bleak analysis: "The outlook for man is 
painful, desperate, and the hope that can be held out for his future 
seems to be very slim indeed" (Heilbroner 1991, 20). He identifies two 
basic reasons for his grim prognosis-mankind's struggle for individual 
2. Like all other doomsday authors whom I have met, Heilbroner is insensitive to 
gender in his use of language. When discussing the doomsday perspective, I have 
adopted the doomsday authors' use of "mankind," rather than the more acceptable, 
more inclusive, and gender-neutral "humankind." 
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achievement and man's inherent self-centeredness. The second, in par­
ticular, is a human nature argument. Heilbroner embraces a Hobbesian 
conception of humanity when he raises these concerns. 
When men can generally acquiesce in, even relish, the destruction of 
their living contemporaries, when they can regard with indifference 
or irritation the fate of those who live in slums, rot in prison, or 
starve in lands that have meaning only insofar as they are vacation 
resorts, why should they be expected to take the painful actions 
needed to prevent the destruction of future generations whose faces 
they will never live to see? Worse yet, will they not curse these future 
generations whose claims to life can be honored only by sacrificing 
present enjoyments; and will they not, if it comes to a choice, con­
demn them to nonexistence by choosing the present over the future? 
(Heilbroner 1991, 169) 
Like Ophuls and Boyan, Heilbroner rejects the notion that citizens can 
and will sacrifice now to promote long-term planetary stability. 
What are some of the specific global problems according to the 
doomsday perspective? As one representative of this view, Heilbroner 
identifies four external challenges to the human prospect that warrant 
immediate attention if the doomsday scenario is to be avoided-over­
population, the threat of nuclear war, the greenhouse effect, and sci­
ence and technology. For Heilbroner the demographic trends over the 
next two to three generations suggest that the planet will not be able 
to adjust to the consequences of overpopulation. Heilbroner contends, 
for example, that "in one century, the underdeveloped world[,] which 
today totals 2.5 billion, will have to support something like 40 billion 
by that date if it continues to double its numbers approximately every 
quarter century" (Heilbroner 1991, 33). Indeed, overpopulation will 
lead to serious environmental problems. What factors might check the 
overpopulation problem? Heilbroner recognizes that the ability of 
overpopulated areas to introduce effective and stringent birth control 
programs might begin to address overpopulation. In the second edi­
tion to his book, he points out that China has begun to make progress 
through these sorts of measures (Heilbroner 1980), but he is not opti­
mistic that such measures will deal adequately with the full gravity of 
the problem. Instead, Heilbroner grimly concludes that "the eventual 
rise of iron governments" that practice "government coercion" may be 
the only way to halt "the descent into hell ."  For Heilbroner and the 
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other doomsday theorists, "hell" is the fundamental instability that 
will arise as members of an overpopulated planet compete for increas­
ingly scarce resources. 
A second external challenge is the threat of nuclear war. In ad­
dressing this challenge, Heilbroner raises this question: Will the twenty­
first century be an era of annihilation? His chief concern here is that 
poor nations might use the threat of nuclear power as blackmail of 
rich nations for food and other resources in a time of heightened 
scarcity. 
The greenhouse effect is Heilbroner 's third external challenge. He 
worries that we are already "encroaching on the environment beyond 
its ability to support the demands made on it" (Heilbroner 1991, 47) . 
For Heilbroner "the inescapable need to limit industrial growth" and 
prevent the heating up of the earth's atmosphere deserves immediate 
global attention, as does the depletion of the ozone layer (Heilbroner 
1991, 54) . His analysis thoughtfully addresses the capability of both 
capitalist and socialist societies' abilities to curb the growth impera­
tive. Not surprisingly, Heilbroner concludes that both systems will 
have difficulty limiting growth over the long term, though socialist 
societies will do a better job in the short term. Indeed, both systems 
will have to address environmental problems, such as the greenhouse 
effect and air pollution, over the long term. 
Heilbroner cites science and technology as a fourth challenge that 
must be confronted. He recognizes that many skeptics have invoked 
science and technology to address the challenges facing the human 
prospect. For Heilbroner and other doomsday theorists, however, sci­
ence and technology provide society with a false sense of security, a 
security that is not warranted given the intractability and seriousness 
of the external challenges that he outlines throughout his book. 
William Ophuls and A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., elucidate several addi­
tional components of the doomsday analysis. Like Heilbroner, they 
raise serious questions about the capability of liberal democratic soci­
eties to address larger resource-scarcity issues. They contend that the 
political implications of heightened scarcity include greater inequality 
and conflict among classes, conflict that poses a serious threat to sys­
tem stability. Furthermore, they believe that the unpleasant reality of 
heightened scarcity is that "the golden age of individualism and lib­
erty is all but over" (Ophuls and Boyan 1992, 192) . 
Their most significant contribution to the doomsday perspective is 
their claim that the American political and economic system will not 
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be able to make the sweeping changes needed to deal with the chal­
lenges of scarcity. This inability is due to a larger political culture 
that embraces radical individualism as the hallmark of liberal de­
mocracy. They also worry that our Madisonian system of checks and 
balances and separate political institutions sharing power is far too 
fragmented and dispersed to arrive at the kind of timely consensus 
needed to address the challenges to the human prospect that 
Heilbroner describes. They cite two additional problems-disjointed 
incrementalism and policy decision making that inevitably lags far 
behind events (Ophuls and Boyan 1992, 247-48) .  For Ophuls and 
Boyan "the external reality of ecological scarcity has cut the ground 
out from under our own political system, making merely reformist 
policies of ecological management all but useless" (Ophuls and Boyan 
1992, 3) .  Working within the broader structure of the American po­
litical and economic system as we know it constrains our ability to 
respond in a meaningful way. 
In the end, they believe that mankind's political, economic, and 
social life must once again become thoroughly rooted in the realities 
of diminished planetary resources. This imperative cannot be met under 
a system that adheres to liberal democratic values. As a result, democ­
racy must give way to elite rule and a society where state coercion is 
the norm. Ophuls and Boyan are not alone in arguing that govern­
ment coercion is the only vehicle for promoting global stability over 
the long term. Heilbroner, for example, believes that "the most suc­
cessful governments may be governments capable of rallying obedi­
ence far more effectively than would be possible in a democratic setting. 
If the issue for mankind is survival, such governments may be un­
avoidable, even necessary" (Heilbroner 1991, 134) . 
Clearly, the doomsday, apocalyptic perspective provides a grim 
analysis of the future and the capability of governments to respond to 
global challenges, but there are occasional glimpses of hope. For ex­
ample, in the most recent edition of his book (updated in 1991),  
Heilbroner finds "it hopeful that we know we live in difficult times­
a necessary state of mind if we are to appraise the prospect before us 
with clear eyes" (Heilbroner 1991, 30) . He points out that ecology is 
now a household word and believes that the 1990s might "become a 
'turnaround decade'-not in the actual extent of environmental dete­
rioration, but in taking action to prevent further deterioration" 
(Heilbroner 1991,  76) .  In the end, Heilbroner is hopeful that a 
"survivalist ethic," sown in the nature of humankind, will prompt us 
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to confront the external challenges to the human prospect with mean­
ing and force. 
As might be expected, the doomsday critique has provoked an array 
of critical responses. Those on the Right who criticize the doomsday 
perspective from a modem conservative3 vantage point find that it ex­
aggerates our global dilemma and ignores reasons to believe that progress 
can be achieved working within existing political and economic institu­
tions. On the Left, critics point to the serious problems with embracing 
the paradigm of resource scarcity associated with the doomsday per­
spective. Leftist scholars also criticize the doomsday perspective for 
failing to confront global inequalities in the distribution of property, 
wealth, and resources. To feminist leftist critics, a central flaw of the 
doomsday perspective is its failure to confront global gender inequities. 
To a discussion of these perspectives we now tum. 
The C:ritique of the Doomsday Approach 
One vocal conservative critic of the doomsday approach is Julian Simon, 
whose ideas are well articulated in his 1981 book, The Ultimate Re­
source. To Simon, the doomsday scenario can be avoided if we adhere 
to the following four principles rooted in neoclassical economics: 
1 .  the federal government should play a limited role in the energy 
development arena; 
2. the economic marketplace, through Adam Smith's notion of the 
law of supply and demand, can and will deal with resource-scarcity 
concerns; 
3. an increase in demand for energy resources will lead to an 
increase in new discoveries of such resources; 
4. our present use of resources has little negative effect upon fu­
ture generations, because current prices make an automatic allowance 
for future generations (Simon 1981) .  
Embracing the principles of  neoclassical economics, Simon believes 
that market forces and present prices already take into account expected 
future developments, thus automatically conserving scarce resources 
for future consumption. Hence, he rejects calls for shared sacrifice and 
3. I use "modern conservative" to refer to thinkers who embrace the free-market 
principles associated with neoclassic economics. Modern conservative thought is dis­
tinct from the organic conservatism associated with Edmund Burke and Michael 
Oakeshott. 
290 Craig A. Rimmerman 
extreme conservation measures. In the end, Simon is optimistic that the 
doomsday scenario can be avoided, especially if we rely on the science, 
technology, and human ingenuity that Heilbroner believes provide a 
false sense of security against serious external challenges to the human 
prospect. Simon concludes optimistically by suggesting that "the ulti­
mate resource is people-skilled, spirited, and hopeful people who will 
exert their wills and imaginations for their own benefit, and so, invari­
ably, for the benefit of us all" (Simon 1981, 348). 
Like Simon, Ronald Bailey embraces a conservative perspective 
when he identifies serious weaknesses in the doomsday perspective 
and criticizes the culture that devotes much attention to such faulty 
analyses. Bailey singles out books such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring 
(1962), Paul and Ann Ehrlich's The Population Bomb (1968), and the 
Club of Rome's The Limits to Growth (1972) for describing the future in 
hopelessly bleak terms. These books have had negative consequences, 
not the least of which is affecting public policy in ways that led to the 
slowing of economic growth, thus unnecessarily increasing human 
misery. Unlike the doomsday theorists, Simon and Bailey believe that 
economic growth is the hallmark of a vital and stable society. 
Bailey also contends that the doomsday theorists (whom he iden­
tifies as "environmental alarmists") "must be held accountable for their 
faulty analyses, their wildly inaccurate predictions, and their heedless 
politicization of science" (Bailey 1993, xi-xii) . To Bailey the world faces 
some real problems, but they do not call for the draconian measures 
embraced by the doomsday theorists. He is particularly critical of the 
media for focusing on the doom-and-gloom analyses warning of eco­
logical collapse, which he believes have motivated voters and policy 
makers to adopt "environmentalist policies." Like Simon's work, 
Bailey's analysis is rooted in a sense of hope and optimism that the 
American political system can tackle virtually any problems now and 
in the future. He suggests that "human history shows that our energy 
and creativity will surmount whatever difficulties we encounter" (Bailey 
1993, xii) . 
For those who embrace the critique from the Left, the doomsday, 
apocalyptic perspective is misguided to the extent that it fails to con­
front global gender inequities and inequalities in the distribution of 
property, wealth, and resources. This critique manifests itself in the 
response to overpopulation concerns. For example, Joni Seager be­
lieves that what is needed is a "feminist rethinking of population/ 
environment issues. "  She supports her belief in this way: 
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Women want access to reproductive planning services; they do not 
want to be instruments of population control. Global population 
growth may well be a "problem," but not in the ways that most of 
us are encouraged to believe . . . .  There is good reason to be con­
cerned about the environmental pressures exerted by population 
growth, just as there are good humanitarian and feminist reasons to 
promote programs that provide women everywhere with access to 
reproductive planning services. What is disturbing, though, is the 
manner in which men have framed the public environmental debate 
on population, and the extent to which women's lives are, once again, 
made invisible within the debate. (Seager 1993, 217). 
Seager perceptively recognizes that it is easier for doomsday theo­
rists to call for strict birth control measures than confront the social 
and economic structures that perpetuate global inequality. The next 
section argues that Seager ' s critique is useful for pedagogical 
purposes because it asks students to explore global inequities and 
how they intersect with power and gender concerns. To more fully 
understand the critique from the Left, we turn to John Bellamy 
Foster 's critique and explore how to incorporate his perspective in 
the classroom. 
Reflections on Teaching the Doomsday View 
If the doomsday, apocalyptic perspective contains serious weaknesses, 
does it deserve serious consideration in the classroom? The short answer 
is yes, as there is much value in asking students to evaluate this per­
spective. To engage this perspective effectively, however, it is crucial 
to explicate its basic tenets and then offer a critique from different 
vantage points. I have been doing so for the past fourteen years at the 
college level, in my American political system, environmental policy, 
and public policy courses. 
If this perspective is to be taught, it seems to me that it should be 
in ways that enable students to make important connections to the 
broader values of radical individualism, equality of opportunity, ac­
quisition of private property, and emphasis on procedural democracy, 
all of which underlie liberal democratic systems. Indeed, I cannot think 
of a better way to ask students to evaluate the consequences of adher­
ing to radical individualistic impulses, such as material acquisition 
associated with an emphasis on economic growth. Just what are the 
consequences of adhering to such values for the collective in the short 
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and long term? In a recent essay,4 John Bellamy Foster provides a 
useful metaphor for engaging the doomsday view and the values 
associated with liberal democracy. 
What is all too often overlooked in such calls for moral transforma­
tion is the central institutional fact of our society: what might be 
called the global "treadmill of production . . . . " A  defining trait of the 
system is that it is a kind of giant squirrel cage. Everyone, or nearly 
everyone, is part of this treadmill and is unable or unwilling to get 
off. Investors and managers are driven by the need to accumulate 
wealth and to expand the scale of their operations in order to prosper 
within a globally competitive milieu. For the vast majority the com­
mitment to the treadmill is more limited and indirect: they simply 
need to obtain jobs at liveable wages . (Foster 1995, 2). 
Foster 's analysis provides an excellent vehicle for responding to the 
doomsday perspective in the classroom, as it forces students to recog­
nize that the global problems that we currently face are hardly worthy 
of mere individual responses. Indeed, "our wants are conditioned by 
the kind of society in which we live. "  The central enemy of the envi­
ronment, then, "is not individuals acting in accordance with their own 
innate desires, but rather the treadmill of production on which we are 
all placed" (Foster 1995, 3) .  Foster 's analysis is important because it 
enables instructors to raise important questions about the relationship 
between the individual and the collective. It also affords students the 
opportunity to challenge the underlying Hobbesian conception of 
human nature underlying the doomsday perspective. Virtually all of 
the doomsday theorists embrace a deductive analysis, much like 
Hobbes uses in Leviathan. This deductive analysis begins with nega­
tive assumptions about human nature and links these assumptions to 
the importance of maintaining system stability. Students need an op­
portunity to examine the core assumptions underlying an array of 
perspectives regarding the future of the planet, and the doomsday 
view provides a particularly useful opportunity for doing so. 
I have found, as well, that the institutional analysis offered by 
Ophuls and Boyan raises compelling questions concerning the capa­
bility of the American political system to respond to the zero sum 
environment of resource scarcity. Before raising such questions, I de­
vote much attention to explaining the basic principles of Madisonian 
4. I am grateful to Christopher Gunn for bringing Foster 's essay to my attention. 
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democracy as outlined by James Madison in "Federalist 10 ." It is then 
possible to explore the ability of an incremental policy characterized 
by separate institutions sharing power to respond with the sweeping 
changes needed to address energy and environmental concerns. Can 
a political and economic system that was created more than two hun­
dred years ago in a time of relative plenty respond to the demands of 
heightened scarcity? What institutional changes might allow the sys­
tem to respond in a more timely and effective manner? For example, 
would it be useful to adopt changes that would move our system of 
government in a more parliamentary direction? And what are the 
criteria for policy "effectiveness"? These are just some of the questions 
that might be addressed as we explore broader questions of change 
that might be occasioned by the doomsday analysis. 
Much of the analysis here has suggested that the doomsday per­
spective is useful for teaching because it enables the instructor and 
students to raise broad considerations regarding the political and eco­
nomic system and the cultural values emanating from that system 
regarding the relationship between the individual to the larger society. 
Students also see that scholars from the political Left and Right are 
exploring questions that should be at the core of public discourse 
today. At the same time, the doomsday approach asks the citizenry to 
confront its own responsibilities vis-a-vis the planet. 
It is useful to ask students to recognize that much of what is 
associated with the doomsday view embraces a top-down approach to 
the world, one that lodges many decision-making responsibilities with 
a small group of policy elites who hold power. Indeed, note that 
Heilbroner and Ophuls and Boyan all suggest (albeit reluctantly and 
unhappily) that democracy must give way to elite rule if the interests 
of the collective are to be protected over the long term. To what extent 
is such a view compatible with democratic principles? And does the 
doomsday analysis suggest, unequivocally, that participatory demo­
cratic opportunities are destined for failure? Can we envision a par­
ticipatory democratic society that links individual interests with the 
interests of the collective in routine decision making? If so, what might 
such a society look like in practice? These questions can also be en­
gaged by discussing the doomsday perspective and its critics. 
Those who worry that the doomsday perspective paralyzes citizens 
who might otherwise mobilize politically have a legitimate point. We 
should not forget that in the early 1980s the Brown University student 
body voted to have cyanide tablets in every student's dormitory in case 
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of a nuclear holocaust. Much was made at the time regarding the res­
ignation, futility, and passivity associated with the Brown student body's 
response. The reasons for this passive response need to be engaged in 
the classroom as a part of any discussion of the doomsday perspective. 
The response to the doomsday view need not be resignation, fu­
tility, or passivity. C. B. Macpherson, for one, believes that environ­
mental awareness and concern about the future of the planet may well 
inspire the larger citizenry to get more involved politically, especially 
at the grass roots. In this way, environmental problems may well in­
spire a more participatory democratic society. Writing in the late 1970s, 
Macpherson contends that more people are recognizing the deleteri­
ous environmental consequences associated with economic growth, 
such as pollution, "the depletion of natural resources and the likeli­
hood of irreversible ecological damage" (Macpherson 1977, 102) . To 
Macpherson recognizing that these problems are associated with eco­
nomic growth is one of several conditions that must be met if a more 
participatory democratic society is to be achieved. 
Macpherson's analysis is important and worthwhile to share with 
students for several reasons. It allows students to connect the broader 
values of Western society with environmental policy making and citi­
zenship. In doing so, students will be forced to confront their roles as 
global citizens as well as their responsibilities as citizens within the 
American political system. Finally, Macpherson's analysis enables 
important connections to be made between democratic theory and 
environmental policy. The following questions might be addressed: 
Who makes global environmental policy? Who should make global 
environmental policy? Who makes environmental policy in the United 
States? Who should have the most say in formulating U.S. environ­
mental policy? Should the citizenry be more active in environmental 
policy making and in policy implementation? If so, how? What are the 
barriers to citizen participation in environmental decision making and 
policy implementation? Can the barriers be overcome? If so, how? 
What are the arguments against having citizens be more active in 
environmental decision making? What are concrete examples of envi­
ronmental organizations at the grass roots that adhere to participatory 
democratic principles? These are just some of the rich questions that 
I have asked students to consider as they respond to the doomsday, 
apocalyptic perspective. 
Much attention should be focused, as well, on global inequities in 
the distribution of property, wealth, and resources and how these in-
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equities structure and affect people's lives. As we know, the dooms­
day perspective largely ignores these concerns. To the extent that it 
does, it neglects an element of the global condition. Instead, the dooms­
day view merely embraces the language of scarcity. Students should 
be given an opportunity to break out of the scarcity paradigm and 
explore ways to redistribute the world's resources in a more equitable 
manner. 
Finally, it seems to me that students should confront a paradox, 
one that is not unique to America, but one that is surely prominent in 
the United States. Lawrence Buell describes the paradox. 
For more than a century the United States has been at once a nature­
loving and resource consuming-nation . . . .  The earth's most 
suburbanized citizens, we like being surrounded by greenery but ig­
nore our reliance on toxic substances that increase the comfort of our 
surroundings until waste disposal becomes a local issue--whereupon 
we are relieved when the incinerator gets built in the less affluent and 
politically weaker county fifty miles downwind. (Buell 1995, 4) 
A discussion of this paradox is important because it enables students 
to address important questions pertaining to the sources of American 
attitudes and values regarding the environment as well as compelling 
issues of environmental justice. They can then interrogate broader 
values growing out of the American political culture and connect these 
values to political, social, and economic change affecting our plan­
etary future. I have found, as well, that discussion of the paradox 
enables students to reflect upon their lives critically as they confront 
their relationships to the planet. 
In the end, the most valuable response that educators can have to 
the doomsday, apocalyptic perspective is our daily work in the class­
room and in curriculum development. In the past twenty years, we 
have made progress at all levels of education in asking the young to 
confront the true meaning of economic growth, the sources of our 
belief that "human domination is good," and the notion that material 
acquisition and progress is crucial for a productive society (Orr 1994, 
32). But we still have much work to do as we ask our students to 
challenge the underlying assumptions of the doomsday, apocalyptic 
perspective. In doing so, we will ask students to challenge years of 
political socialization and ultimately focus their attention on what it 
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